“The Clash of Civilizations” in Cyprus: Religion, Nationalism, and Populism in the Discourses of ELAM and YDP

Abstract

This study examines the political discourse and practices of the Greek Cypriot political party ELAM and the Turkish Cypriot political party YDP within the framework of populism. The findings of the study demonstrate that ELAM frames the Greek Cypriot community as part of “Judeo-Christian civilization” and portrays this civilization as being under threat from “Islamic civilization,” including Türkiye, Turkish Cypriots, and “illegal immigrants.” YDP, in turn, conceptualizes the Turkish Cypriot community as part of “Islamic civilization” and claims that “the West”—comprising actors such as Greek Cypriots, Greece, Israel, the EU, and the USA—is waging a comprehensive campaign against “Islamic civilization.” ELAM accuses the Greek Cypriot left of acting against the interests of “Western civilization” and Hellenic Orthodox values, while YDP similarly charges the Turkish Cypriot left with acting contrary to the interests and values of the Turkish-Islamic world. Moreover, while ELAM opposes Turkish Cypriots and “illegal immigrants” benefiting from the resources of the Republic of Cyprus, the right-wing government in which YDP is a coalition partner is frequently criticized for having contributed to the deterioration of the living standards of foreign workers. ELAM adopts a sharply oppositional stance toward the expansion of LGBTIQ+ rights, whereas YDP prefers not to foreground this issue. The study concludes that the discourses of both parties largely correspond to the concept of “civilizational populism.”

1. Introduction

For the research objectives of this study—particularly with regard to examining how civilizational populist discourse is constructed—Cyprus offers an exceptionally conducive sociopolitical setting. Ethnic conflict on the island dates back to the 1950s. Entrenched variants of Turkish and Greek nationalisms already possess a strong tendency to construct the opposing side as the “other.” Moreover, the fact that the two communities have been physically and geographically separated for decades has created favourable conditions for the formation of two distinct discursive and propaganda “pools,” encompassing various instruments of information, manipulation, and, inevitably, disinformation. Turkish Cypriots are Muslim, whereas Greek Cypriots adhere to Orthodox Christianity, a distinction that enables an analysis of how these religious traditions are reflected (and instrumentalized) in the political sphere, particularly within nationalist and populist discourses. Furthermore, while the Republic of Cyprus—an EU member state—is governed by Greek Cypriots, the TRNC remains under Türkiye’s patronage, a configuration that also renders the case suitable for analysis through the lens of broader geopolitical contestation involving not only regional actors but also the USA and Israel. It might be argued that these characteristics of Cyprus create a social and political terrain in which both Western and Islamic variants of civilizational identities become useful for political purposes.

Civilizational populism has emerged as a novel challenge to democracy and pluralism both in Western societies and in partially democratized Muslim-majority countries. By infusing national identities with religious and civilizational interpretations, this form of populism—in both its Western and Muslim-majority variants—tends to exacerbate Muslim–Western antagonisms in international politics. Both variants commonly otherize, discriminate against, and stigmatize religious minorities and foreigners as “internal enemies,” thereby contributing to the erosion of democratic pluralism. Moreover, civilizational populism frequently portrays various elites or political actors not as legitimate opposition, but as “immoral enemies.” The Muslim-majority variant of civilizational populism, in particular, also exhibits a tendency to turn religious authorities into instruments of pressure over the judiciary, undermining the rule-of-law principle (Yilmaz et al. 2022; Morieson 2023). Another recurring tendency across both Western and Muslim-majority forms of civilizational populism is the effort to legitimize “radical solutions” by depicting ordinary politics as inadequate in the face of a “hostile external civilization,” “internal enemies,” or “immoral elites” (Yilmaz and Morieson 2023). By representing various political (and especially oppositional) groups as “agents of an enemy civilization,” civilizational populism narrows the space for democratic deliberation and further erodes tolerance (Bacik and Seker 2023).

This study examines the political discourse and practices of the Greek Cypriot political party ELAM (Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο—National Popular Front) and the Turkish Cypriot political party YDP (Yeniden Doğuş Partisi—Rebirth Party), and sheds light on various elements within these discourses and practices that the scholarly literature identifies as populism. Turkish and Greek nationalisms, both of which developed on the island as forms of ethnic nationalism, played a highly decisive role in shaping not only the identities of the two communities but also the political fate of the island from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. Their influence has persisted into the 21st century. While these nationalisms brought the two communities closer—politically and culturally—to the “motherlands” they sought to unite with (Greece for Greek Cypriots, and Türkiye for Turkish Cypriots), they also drove them into conflict with one another. Therefore, ethnic nationalism conceptualized the Cyprus issue as a confrontation between Greeks and Turks—a kind of “clash of nations”—defining both “us” and “them” through the prism of national identity1 (see Kızılyürek 2005; Aktar et al. 2010; Kyritsi and Christofis 2018).

When the discourses of the two parties are analysed, it becomes clear that they continue to attribute significant importance to national identities and ethnic nationalism in constructing images of “us” and “them.” Therefore, they continue to reflect the island’s predominant 20th-century narrative, built around the notion of a “clash between Greeks and Turks.” However, it is also evident that ELAM and YDP do not construct “us” and “them” solely within the framework of national identity, but also frequently define both as parts of larger civilizations. In this context, they portray the struggle of “Turkism versus Hellenism” in Cyprus as part of a broader conflict between the civilizations to which these nations belong—namely, between Islamic and Western civilizations. This reveals that the political discourse and practices of both parties bear significant traces of what the scholarly literature conceptualizes as civilizational populism. Moreover, while ELAM operates within a framework of pronounced xenophobia and exhibits strong opposition to the expansion of LGBTIQ+ rights, YDP has been involved in a regulatory arrangement that makes it possible for wages paid to foreign workers—excluding Turkish citizens—to be reduced by up to 40 percent relative to those paid to local workers.

The bicommunal structure of Cyprus dates back to the island’s conquest by the Ottoman Empire in 1571. The island’s indigenous population consisted predominantly of a Hellenic Orthodox community, and following the conquest, a Muslim Turkish population also became established on the island. British rule began in 1878, and Cyprus was formally declared a British colony in 1925 (Varnava 2019). In the 1950s, Greece and the Greek Cypriot leadership advocated enosis, the unification of Cyprus with Greece, while Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership called for taksim, the partition of the island between Türkiye and Greece (Yorgancioglu and Kiralp 2019). Following US encouragement aimed at accommodating intra-NATO sensitivities, the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 on the basis of three key arrangements: the political equality of the two communities; the United Kingdom’s retention of two sovereign base areas on the island; and the acquisition by Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and Greece of guarantor status, entailing responsibility for safeguarding the island’s territorial integrity, independence, and constitutional order. Greek Cypriot political elites were unwilling to reconcile themselves to political equality with Turkish Cypriots, whom they regarded as a minority constituting less than 20 percent of the island’s population. In 1963, Archbishop Makarios, the Greek Cypriot President of the Republic, persistently called for constitutional revisions that would have effectively undermined the political equality between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, leading to intercommunal violence. Turkish Cypriots subsequently withdrew from the state apparatus, the state came under the unilateral control of Greek Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriots became segregated from the Greek Cypriot majority by forming enclaves across the island. During this period, Türkiye and Greece repeatedly came to the brink of war (Ker-Lindsay 2011, pp. 20–34; Stergiou 2015; Kiralp 2019, 2023).

In addition to the Greco-Turkish conflict, intense political struggles emerged between the Greek Junta, which came to power in Athens through a coup in 1967, and Makarios over who would ultimately exercise decisive authority in Cypriot politics. These confrontations culminated in the coup of 15 July 1974, which overthrew Makarios, and the subsequent Turkish military intervention of 20 July 1974, which was triggered in response to the coup. Following the Turkish intervention, Greek Cypriots became concentrated in the southern part of the island administered by the Republic of Cyprus, while Turkish Cypriots gathered in the northern region, which was under the control of the Turkish military and accounted for approximately 37% of the island’s territory. It was at this point that Cyprus acquired the de facto bi-zonal structure that continues to define it today (Kiralp and Guneyli 2021; Fouskas 2022; Theophanous 2025, pp. 30–54). In the aftermath of 1974, migration from Türkiye to Northern Cyprus also began2. One of the key socio-cultural differences between the population arriving from Türkiye and local Turkish Cypriots is that the former tends to be comparatively more religious and socially conservative (Kızılyürek 2016, p. 541; Sonan et al. 2020, p. 15; Latif 2021; Moudouros 2025, pp. 13–14). Among the parties examined in this study, YDP—led by Professor Erhan Arıklı—today explicitly positions itself as the political representative of immigrants from Türkiye (Sozen and Sonan 2019).

In accordance with the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements signed between the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, the framework for a prospective settlement on the island was defined as a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal partnership based on political equality. This federal partnership model subsequently became the United Nations’ official formula for resolving the Cyprus problem. However, negotiations held between 1974 and 1983 did not yield a final agreement. In 1983, Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the TRNC (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti—Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). Under UN Security Council Resolution 541, the Greek Cypriot–controlled Republic of Cyprus retained its status as a UN member state, whereas the TRNC has remained unrecognized by any country other than Türkiye (Kiralp 2020, pp. 409–10). Ahead of Cyprus’s accession to the European Union in 2004, the UN Secretary-General at the time, Kofi Annan, proposed a comprehensive settlement plan that envisioned the reunification of the island under a federal partnership structure. The plan was put to simultaneous but separate referenda in the two communities. It was rejected by 76% of Greek Cypriots, while 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour. As a result, Northern Cyprus was unable to integrate into the EU in practice, and the acquis communautaire came into force only in the South. The TRNC has since continued to lack international recognition and remains outside the structures of the international community. Although reunification efforts gained renewed momentum in the 2000s and continued intensively until the 2017 Crans-Montana summit, they ultimately failed to produce a decisive outcome (Direkli 2022).

ELAM and YDP are political movements that formally adopted a political party structure in the 2010s. Prior to the 2010s, the most enduring parties in the South were the major right-wing party DISY (Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός—Democratic Rally), the major left-wing party AKEL (Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazoménou Laoú—Progressive Party of the Working People), as well as the smaller right-wing party DIKO (Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα—Democratic Party) and the smaller left-wing party EDEK (Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Ένωση Κέντρου—United Democratic Union of the Centre)3. In the Turkish Cypriot party system, the most deeply rooted parties have been the major right-wing party UBP (Ulusal Birlik Partisi—National Unity Party), the smaller right-wing party DP (Demokrat Parti—Democratic Party), and the left-wing parties CTP (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi—Republican Turkish Party) and TKP (Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi—Communal Liberation Party), which was later renamed TDP (Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi—Communal Democracy Party). In the 2000s, CTP gained dominance over its rivals on the left and emerged as the principal competitor to UBP within the party system (Kızılyürek 2005). By the 2010s, both ELAM and YDP entered the political arena by competing not only with long-established parties but also with newer political actors. Although YDP was the smallest party to enter parliament in both elections it contested (2018 and 2022), it nevertheless surpassed the long-established TDP in 2022, when the latter fell below the electoral threshold. Moreover, by participating in coalition governments—with its leader Erhan Arıklı serving in successive cabinets as Minister of Economy and Energy and as Minister of Public Works and Transportation—YDP has evolved into an influential political actor (Unal 2025). ELAM, on the other hand, despite never having joined a cabinet, has expanded its electoral base with remarkable consistency and, within a short period of time, reached a significant level of support. It overtook EDEK in the 2021 House of Representatives elections, and in the 2024 European Parliament elections it surpassed both EDEK and DIKO (Euronews 2021; Philenews 2024).

Identity politics constitutes one of the most defining features that distinguishes the two nationalist right-wing parties examined in this study. In Greek Cypriot politics, the long-established political parties within the system—excluding, to some extent, the nationalist-conservative faction within DISY—tend to identify Cyprus and Greek Cypriots primarily with Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus itself, rather than conceptualizing them as “organic components of the Greek nation.” These parties define Greek Cypriot communal identity within a socio-cultural and political framework that synthesizes Hellenism with Cypriotism (Kızılyürek 2005; Loizides 2007). ELAM rejects this approach and adopts a more fundamentalist position, grounded in the assertion that “Cyprus is Greek.” (ELAM 2016a). While the party represents the far-right and a hardline form of Greek nationalism, its core voter base consists predominantly of young people aged 18–24 and individuals who seek to “protest” the system, particularly those disillusioned with established political parties (Charalambous 2023, p. 164; Theophanous and Varda 2024, p. 107).

In Northern Cyprus, cleavages between “federalists and two-state advocates,” alongside a post-1974 socio-political divide between local Turkish Cypriots and immigrants from Türkiye—manifesting among Turkish Cypriots as an anxiety over losing political agency, and among immigrants as a sense of social exclusion or discrimination—have long shaped political perceptions (Kızılyürek 2005; Kurtulus and Purkis 2014). In addition to these dynamics, the Islamization policies pursued under the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—Justice and Development Party) government in Türkiye have also had visible repercussions in Northern Cyprus. Developments that were previously uncommon in a community characterized by a predominantly secular way of life—such as the establishment of a theological college4, the construction of numerous new mosques, Ankara-backed Qur’an courses, and the increasing public presence of religious associations linked to Türkiye—became more pronounced. While these initiatives have received support among more religious segments of the immigrant population from Türkiye, they have also provoked significant societal opposition, led primarily by teachers’ unions (Latif 2021). YDP has demonstrated a consistent tendency to align itself politically with Ankara whenever tensions arise between the Turkish Cypriot community and the Turkish government, a stance that has drawn substantial criticism from various sectors of society (Hatay 2017, p. 8). Although there is no single party for which all migrants from Türkiye vote as a unified bloc, it is clear that YDP’s voter base consists of this group (Sozen and Sonan 2019, p. 144).

2. Literature Review

The first quarter of the twenty-first century has witnessed the strengthening of populist political movements across the globe. When combined with susceptibility to disinformation and tendencies toward authoritarianism, these movements have acquired the potential to pose a threat to entrenched norms of liberal democracy (Azgin and Kiralp 2024). A fundamental characteristic of populist politics, particularly in Western nations, is anti-immigrant sentiment (Mat et al. 2024). The scholarly literature has long identified that right-wing populist parties in Europe, North America, and Australia engage in propaganda claiming that native workers are losing their jobs to foreign workers. These narratives also suggest that foreigners unfairly benefit from state resources and undermine national culture (Oesch 2008, p. 349; Hogan and Haltinner 2017; Hameleers and de Vreese 2020, p. 261). Empirical research demonstrates that, in European countries where right-wing populist politics have gained strength, the working conditions of immigrant workers can deteriorate in practice. In some cases, their risk of workplace accidents may also increase (see D’Ambrosio et al. 2025).

At the global level, populist parties also tend to oppose LGBTIQ+ rights, arguing that such rights undermine public morality (Yermakova 2021). Public disillusionment resulting from the poor performance of long-established parties has further paved the way for the rise of populist actors (Učeň 2007). Populist politics, including variants sometimes mistakenly equated with “socialism” (such as those observed in Latin America), frequently portrays “the people” as a homogeneous social body that has been “betrayed.” Within this discourse, certain elite groups are depicted as “traitors,” while the populist actor presents itself as a political “saviour.” Populism often operates through an organizational logic centred on a charismatic leader and closed to pluralism. As a result, the people it claims to “save” are reduced to passive followers and denied the ability to act as autonomous political agents capable of articulating and pursuing their own interests (Stengel et al. 2019; Posner 2021). A significant portion of populist variations across Western countries, Latin America, and Muslim-majority states has evolved into authoritarianism. This shift is driven by a political logic that, although rhetorically framed as “bottom-up,” in practice operates in a “top-down” manner (Posner 2016; Kraus 2021; Cherry 2021; Hidayah et al. 2025). As discussed in detail in this study, these characteristics partially overlap with those of the two political parties examined here. However, the concept of civilizational populism, which is relatively new in the populism literature, largely overlaps with the rhetoric and practices of both parties.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Cold War came to an end. This marked the collapse of a bipolar world order divided between the liberal democratic Western bloc and the socialist Eastern bloc. Among the most influential figures seeking to conceptualize the post-Cold War era was Samuel P. Huntington, who rose to prominence with his “clash of civilizations” thesis on the future of international relations. According to Huntington, the primary sources of conflict in the post-Cold War world would no longer be ideological or economic. Instead, they would be cultural and civilizational in nature. Religions, as integral components of civilizations, would play a decisive role in shaping and driving these conflicts. In Huntington’s formulation, the world is divided into major civilizations such as Western, Islamic, Confucian (Chinese), Hindu, and Orthodox. He argued that the future global order would likely be structured around a “clash of civilizations.” In this view, the post-Cold War period witnessed a transformation in how states perceive their interests. Accordingly, states increasingly moved beyond the nation-state framework toward a civilizational paradigm that ascribed to them a mission to defend the interests of their respective civilizations (Huntington 1993, 1996).

Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis has been widely challenged in the academic literature. Critics argue that conflicts stem not from civilizational differences but from political choices and strategic decisions (Roudometof 1999; Łatyszonek 2001; Ben-Yehuda 2003; Singh 2006; Casanova 2011). Nevertheless, in the twenty-first century, political parties promoting narratives rooted in notions of “civilizational conflict” have gained traction in North America, Europe, and certain Muslim-majority countries that have undergone partial democratic transitions. As noted by Brubaker, the rhetoric of radical right-wing parties such as the AfD in Germany, the PVV in the Netherlands, and the FN in France extends beyond conventional nationalism. These parties increasingly emphasize civilizational identities that transcend the nation-state. Within their discourse, a “clash of civilizations” between Western civilization—of which they position their own nations as part—and Islam is frequently invoked. Brubaker argues, however, that this alleged clash does not reflect an inevitable outcome of inherent civilizational differences. Rather, it constitutes a deliberate narrative socially constructed for populist political purposes (Brubaker 2017, p. 1191). Similarly, Kaya and Tecmen contend that the growing emphasis on an “Islamic threat” in European political discourse does not represent an objective cultural diagnosis. Instead, it forms part of a consciously manufactured political narrative employed for strategic ends (Kaya and Tecmen 2019, p. 49).

Over the past two decades, a political orientation described as “Far-Right Civilizationism” has emerged across North America and Europe. This political formation aligns less with cosmopolitan capitalism than with an illiberal configuration grounded in authoritarianism, nationalism, and civilizationalism. Drawing heavily on Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis, this mode of politics frames Islam, immigrants, and refugees as “existential threats” to political, cultural, and social order (Stewart 2020). Yilmaz and Morieson demonstrate that contemporary populist discourse has expanded beyond national identity in both Western and Muslim-majority contexts. According to their analysis, “civilizational populism” constructs ontological polarizations that frame political conflict in broader, civilization-based terms. Within this discourse, civilization functions as a symbolic “uniform” worn by opposing sides, with religious motifs occupying a central place. Political movements employing this discourse typically portray certain domestic opponents as corrupt actors who refuse to uphold the values and interests of “our civilization.” At the same time, they frame the other civilization as an aggressive threat. Claims of implicit collaboration between internal “corrupt elites” and an external “hostile civilization” constitute a recurring feature of civilizational populist rhetoric (Yilmaz and Morieson 2022). In this context, it may be argued that the template of civilizational populist discourse largely overlaps with populist discourse. The populist discursive triad of a “pure” people, “corrupt elites” portrayed as betraying the people’s values and interests, and a populist movement that presents itself as a “saviour” is also present in civilizational populism (see Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2017; Mudde 2021). As Yilmaz and Morieson demonstrate, civilizational populism constructs the “pure” identity of the people through religion, civilizational belonging, and nationalism, while framing “elite betrayal” in terms of actions and orientations depicted as incompatible with the imperatives of that identity.

In the literature, the discourse of the ruling AKP–MHP alliance in Türkiye—widely regarded as a prototypical case of civilizational populism in a Muslim-majority country—is structured around a narrative of struggle between Islamic and Western civilizations. In line with this framing, earlier secular education policies oriented toward Western values were abandoned. They were replaced by religiously infused reforms aimed at restoring an “authentic Muslim identity” among youth (Bacik and Seker 2023, p. 12). Other studies similarly note that the AKP era has been marked by the construction of a religion-centred civilizational identity. This identity is framed through a binary opposition between “Muslim us” and “Western them.” In foreign policy, this discourse has been accompanied by references to ümmetçilik (ummah-centrism) and neo-Ottomanism. Domestically, it has been reinforced through state-led efforts to cultivate a “pious generation.” Within this framework, tensions between Sunni-Muslim publics and secular elites are framed as extensions of a broader civilizational clash (Yilmaz and Morieson 2023, p. 1). Comparable patterns have been identified in Indonesia’s FPI and Malaysia’s PAS. Both movements articulate discourses that portray secular elites as subservient to the West and frame Western actions as assaults on Islamic civilization (Yilmaz et al. 2022; Shukri 2023).

Civilizational populism in the USA and Europe exhibits striking similarities to its counterparts in Muslim-majority countries with limited integration into liberal democratic systems, such as Türkiye, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Donald Trump’s invocation of a “Judeo-Christian” American identity, Marine Le Pen’s framing of France as “secular with Christian roots,” and the Polish PiS party’s emphasis on Catholic identity all exemplify this pattern. These actors frequently accuse domestic elites of failing to uphold the values of their respective civilizations while simultaneously emphasizing an “Islamic threat” to Western civilization5 (Morieson 2023). In this respect, although populist radical-right discourse in the United States and the European Union may appear ideologically opposed to Islamist populism in Muslim-majority countries, they converge on several core patterns. Most notably, both seek to delegitimize elite groups by portraying them as actors who refuse to uphold the values of “their own civilization.” While Western radical-right populism claims that Western civilization is under Islamic threat, Islamist populism argues that the West poses a threat to Islamic countries. Despite their opposing ideological positions, the two mirror one another through a shared narrative framework rooted in a reconfigured “clash of civilizations” (De Groot Heupner 2023, p. 1).

As established in the literature, civilizational populism is not confined to the USA or the EU. It is also present in Muslim-majority states with limited incorporation into liberal democratic frameworks. Actors adopting this discourse present their nation as part of a religiously anchored civilization and frame the protection of that civilization’s values as a central political mission. They seek to discredit domestic rivals by portraying them as actors who refuse to protect or embrace those values. At the same time, they construct narratives of civilizational confrontation by asserting that another civilization is engaged in an attack on their own. This study focuses on two political parties that both position themselves as nationalist actors, yet are widely labelled as far-right in both domestic and international discourse. These labels stem from criticisms that the parties undermine democratic norms and promote identity-based social polarization (Çıraklı 2018, p. 30; Katsourides 2013, p. 575; Yenidüzen 2018; Bağımsızlık Yolu 2024; SBS News 2021; Philenews 2025). In this context, the study examines the extent to which the actions and discourses of the two political parties align with populism, and more specifically, with civilizational populism.

3. Methodology

As the literature indicates, a common discursive template can be identified across North American, European, and Muslim manifestations of civilizational populism. Within this template, the identity of the people—framed as “us”—is constructed through a synthesis of nation, religion, and civilization. Additionally, this discourse seeks to delegitimize an elite group portrayed as belonging to that same civilization, yet failing or refusing to “represent its values or interests”. Furthermore, another civilization—or one or more of its constituent nation-states, international organizations, or communities—is depicted as a threatening “enemy”. This study analyses the press statements of ELAM and YDP to assess the extent to which their rhetoric conforms to this template. It examines the discourse of both parties within the time period from their establishment to the present. This covers the period after 2011 for ELAM and after 2016 for YDP. The study employs a qualitative and comparative methodology and examines the statements of the two parties in question using the content analysis method. The findings reveal that the discourse of both parties closely and consistently aligns with the defining characteristics of this discursive framework.

ELAM maintains an official institutional website (www.elamcy.com) where its press releases are archived. The website includes an advanced internal search engine that allows users to retrieve statements associated with specific keywords. Using this feature, searches were conducted with the following keywords: “Ελληνισμός” (Hellenism), “Ελλάδα” (Greece), “Oρθοδοξία” (Orthodoxy), “Ευρώπη” (Europe), “Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση” (European Union), “Ισλάμ” (Islam), “ΛOAΤΚΙ+” (LGBTIQ+), “Τουρκοκύπριοι” (Turkish Cypriots), “Τουρκία” (Türkiye), “Mετανάστες” (immigrants), “Ισραήλ” (Israel), “Θρησκεία” (Religion), “Χριστιανισμός” (Christianity) and “Hνωμένες Πολιτείες Aμερικής” (United States of America). All matched results were reviewed, and those containing content relevant to the analytical scope of the study were selected for analysis. Since YDP does not possess an institutional website with comparable functionality, its press statements were retrieved through news reports published on Turkish and Turkish Cypriot news platforms, identified via Google search queries. Press statements by YDP that aligned with the analytical objectives of this study were identified through Google searches combining the keywords “YDP,” “Erhan Arıklı,” and “Yeniden Doğuş Partisi” (Rebirth Party) with terms such as “Türk” (Turkish), “Türklük” (Turkism), “İslam” (Islam), “Müslüman” (Muslim), “göçmenler” (immigrants), “din” (religion), “Hristiyan” (Christian), “Yahudi” (Jewish), “Türkiye”, “LGBTIQ+”, “Güney Kıbrıs” (Southern Cyprus), “Kıbrıslı Rumlar” (Greek Cypriots), “Yunanistan” (Greece), “Türki devletler” (Turkic states), “Amerika Birleşik Devletleri” (United States of America), “İsrail” (Israel), “Avrupa” (Europe), “Avrupa Birliği” (European Union), and related terms.

While data concerning ELAM were collected directly from the party’s official sources—thereby ensuring a strong level of authenticity and credibility, which are essential criteria in documentary research—data relating to YDP were obtained from online news sources, as the party does not maintain an equivalent institutional archive. To enhance the reliability of the YDP-related data, sources were selected from online news outlets with a long-standing publication history and transparently disclosed editorial responsibility information. These sources included the websites of the TRNC Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT), headed by Minister Erhan Arıklı, and the government-run Radio-TV channel BRTK (Bayrak Radyo Televizyon Kurumu-Bayrak Radio TV Corporation), as well as established Northern Cypriot news outlets such as Kıbrıs Postası, Halkın Sesi, Gıynık Gazetesi, Gündem Kıbrıs, Bugün Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen, Haber Kıbrıs, and Star Kıbrıs, each of which has maintained uninterrupted publication for at least five years. A portion of the news materials containing relevant YDP statements was also retrieved from the websites of major Turkish media institutions with over forty years of publication history, including Anadolu Ajansı, Hürriyet, and Sabah. In addition, search engine queries were used to systematically verify whether any official corrections or rebuttals had been issued in response to statements attributed to YDP. In the subsequent section of the study, ELAM’s discourse is examined, followed by an analysis of YDP’s discourse in the section thereafter. Both are evaluated with respect to the extent to which they align with the patterns of civilizational populism identified in the literature review.

4. ELAM’s Civilizational Populist Discourse: Countering the “Islamic Threat” in Europe and Cyprus

To understand the ideological roots of ELAM, it is necessary to examine the ideological line of Greece’s GD (Χρυσή Aυγή—Golden Dawn). According to GD, Greeks constituted a people who shared the same “biological” and “spiritual heritage” (a Hellenic–Orthodox synthesis). GD frequently referred to the threat of “Islamic terrorism” targeting Europe, to Türkiye as an “eternal threat,” and to Greece being “Islamized” through immigrants and refugees6 (Sakellariou 2015, p. 11; Antonopoulou 2018; Kaya and Tecmen 2019, pp. 59–61). Founded as the “twin party” and Cypriot branch of Greece’s GD, ELAM transformed into a formal political party in 2011. Its leader, Christos Christou, is a Greek Cypriot politician who was politically shaped within the ranks of GD. ELAM is ideologically opposed to the long-standing settlement framework of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation in Cyprus. Its discourse displays clear anti-immigrant and anti-Turkish positions. While GD was dissolved by court order in Greece due to its involvement in criminal activities, ELAM has continued its presence in the Cypriot political arena (Charalambous and Christoforou 2018, p. 463; Triga et al. 2019; Kurtcebe and Ozsaglam 2025). In the 2016 elections, ELAM received 3.7% of the vote, securing two seats and entering the House of Representatives (Ellinas and Katsourides 2021, p. 424). In the 2021 parliamentary elections, it became the fourth largest party by winning 6.78% of the vote and 4 of the 56 seats. In the 2024 European Parliament elections, it reached 11.2% of the vote, gaining one seat and entering the European Parliament for the first time (Adamides 2024). The civilizational populism articulated in ELAM’s discourse shows a high degree of congruence with the core elements of populist rhetoric in general, particularly the construction of a “pure” people “betrayed by corrupt elites” (see Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2017; Mudde 2021). As demonstrated in detail in this section, ELAM defines Greek Cypriots as a “pure people” endowed with “Hellenic–Orthodox values” and belonging to “Judeo-Christian civilization.” By contrast, AKEL is portrayed as a “corrupt” actor that is detached from Christian-Orthodox values and incapable of representing the interests of Judeo-Christian civilization.

The rise of ELAM in the political arena has been strongly influenced by the economic crisis, unemployment, and the erosion of public trust in mainstream political parties (Katsourides 2013, p. 567). In Cyprus, foreigners are both employed for lower wages, longer hours, and under conditions incompatible with human dignity (sometimes through legal, sometimes through informal means), and accused of “stealing” the jobs of native workers—dynamics that, as is well known, contribute to the formation of socioeconomic and sociocultural grounds on which right-wing populism can gain strength (Alecou and Mavrou 2017, p. 9). In this context, ELAM functions as the flagship of xenophobia within the Greek Cypriot community. Christos Christou, party leader and MP for Nicosia, argued in a speech delivered at the House of Representatives that “as long as there are unemployed Greek Cypriots, not a single euro should be spent on illegal immigrants” (ELAM 2019e). ELAM frequently assumes a leading role in protest actions in southern Cyprus that promote xenophobic sentiments. For example, in 2024, ELAM members organized a protest in Larnaca calling for measures against what they described as “crimes committed by illegal immigrants.” The event, which adopted a racially charged discourse, was also attended by one of the party’s Members of Parliament, Sotiris Ioannou, who addressed the crowd. During the demonstration, participants chanted slogans such as “immigrants out now” and “criminal foreigners out” (Cyprus Mail 2025). In Cyprus’s Europeanization process, the island has witnessed a form of activism that favors the expansion of LGBTIQ+7 rights; however, the Church and conservative worldviews continue to pose significant obstacles (Kamenou 2023).

ELAM, as is typical of right-wing populist political movements, opposes the expansion of LGBTIQ+ rights. For instance, the party stood against a legislative proposal introduced by AKEL in the House of Representatives in support of LGBTIQ+ rights, arguing that it was “contrary to the faith, principles, and values of Cypriot Hellenism” (ELAM 2024b). As is evident, ELAM’s political discourse and practices exhibit several of the general characteristics commonly attributed in the literature to populist political parties (such as anti-immigrant and anti-LGBTIQ+ positions). However, ELAM’s populist discourse and practice display a particularly strong resemblance to the template described in the literature as civilizational populism. As discussed in detail in this study, the party invokes a pronounced “clash of civilizations” both at the Cypriot level and in the international arena, framing the opposing sides of this purported “clash” as “Islamic civilization” and “Western civilization.” As an interesting and noteworthy point, Huntington defines Greece and other Orthodox countries as a separate civilization rather than as parts of “the West” (Huntington 1993, 1996). ELAM, however, does not separate the Greek nation from European civilization. This tendency demonstrates that civilizational populist discourse can be adapted to the political objectives of the actors who employ it, and that civilizational identities can accordingly be instrumentalized and reconfigured in ways that may even contradict the views of “clash of civilizations” theorists, including Huntington himself.

ELAM embraces the civilizational form of “European nativism,” which has been growing stronger across Europe, and argues that the EU must adopt stricter measures both against migration flows and the “Islamic threat” (Katsourides and Savvides 2024, p. 452). This stance aligns with the political group it has joined in the European Parliament, namely the European Conservatives and Reformists (Steven 2025). ELAM characterizes Orthodoxy as an inseparable component of Hellenism (ELAM 2019a). It defines Cyprus with the statement, “Cyprus was Greek, is Greek, and will remain Greek” (ELAM 2025c). The party views the ancient Greeks, the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire, and the modern Greek nation as forming a single whole through historical and cultural continuity, and frames Cyprus as one of the constitutive parts of this whole, emphasizing this narrative throughout its discourse (ELAM 2025b). The party frequently states that it will intervene and take action against policies pursued by the governments of the Republic of Cyprus whenever they are deemed to be “in contradiction with Orthodoxy” (ELAM 2016a). One of the clearest indications that ELAM views Cyprus as part of European civilization, yet is dissatisfied with the EU’s current policies, was its slogan in the 2019 European Parliament elections: “Europe is changing, and Cyprus with it.” This slogan conveyed the need for both Cyprus and other EU member states to be represented in the European Parliament by nationalist deputies (ELAM 2019b). During the campaign period in question, ELAM advocated for a Europe “where national and religious identities are protected,” one that “counters the Islamic threat,” and possesses “strengthened moral values” (ELAM 2019c).

After entering the House of Representatives, ELAM spearheaded a decision that led to a resurgence of traditional Greek nationalism and dealt a serious blow to the bi-communal negotiations, which had been progressing in a highly optimistic atmosphere in 2017, ultimately resulting in their suspension. This decision was supported by all parties except AKEL, which voted against it, and DISY, which abstained. ELAM submitted a motion to the House of Representatives in favour of commemorating in schools the 1950 plebiscite, organized under the leadership of the Orthodox Church, in which more than 95 percent of participating Greek Cypriots (approximately over 210,000 individuals) voted in support of Enosis. As a result of the adoption of this motion, the Turkish Cypriot side withdrew from the negotiations, stating that this action undermined the spirit of peace, and announced that it would remain withdrawn until the decision was revoked. Following the revocation of the decision, the negotiations resumed (Al Jazeera 2017; ELAM 2021).

According to ELAM, the only acceptable solution to the Cyprus Problem is a unitary state in which Turkish Cypriots would be granted minority rights rather than political equality (ELAM 2017b). ELAM frequently and harshly criticizes the public benefits allocated by the Republic of Cyprus to Turkish Cypriots and foreigners. The party opposes public spending on “mosques, crossing points (between northern and southern Cyprus), Turkish Cypriots, and illegal immigrants,” particularly at a time when Greek Cypriots are facing economic hardship (ELAM 2018b). ELAM claims that more than 70 percent of the “illegal immigrants” in the south of the island arrive from the north “under Türkiye’s direction,” and that this has resulted in the infiltration of “thousands of extremist Islamists” into Cyprus (ELAM 2020). Accordingly, ELAM portrays “illegal immigrants,”8 Islam, and Türkiye as interconnected components of the same “civilizational threat.” ELAM frequently asserts that Europe faces both a serious security threat and the danger of erosion of its core values due to “Islamic terror” and the “refugee influx.” According to ELAM, “open borders” and multiculturalism have led to the emergence of “the threat of Islamic terror across Europe” (ELAM 2018a). The party argues that the only path to salvation for both Europe and Cyprus lies in the implementation of “strict immigration policies.” In its statements during the period of intensified terrorist attacks in Europe between 2015 and 2017, ELAM conflated terrorism with Islam, and alleged that the “pseudo-state”9 and Türkiye were “linked to terrorists.” ELAM also called on the Cypriot government to close the crossing points between the north and south for security reasons (ELAM 2017a). During these years, the party further integrated and adopted Islamophobic rhetoric voiced in other European countries. For instance, following the terrorist attacks in Brussels, Belgian Interior Minister Jan Jambon’s statement that “Muslims were dancing with joy after the attacks” was interpreted by ELAM as evidence that “resistance against the Islamic invasion in Europe is growing” (ELAM 2016b).

One of the most significant steps taken by ELAM in response to what it frames as the “Islamization of Cyprus” was the submission of a bill to the House of Representatives in 2019 proposing a ban on Islamic clothing in public spaces, including state schools (see

Table 1. Analysis of ELAM’s discourse and practice.

Identity of Greek Cypriots	Hellenic Orthodox, part of the Judeo-Christian civilization
Actor(s) framed as “traitors”	AKEL
Demands articulated in demonstration(s)	Measures against “crimes committed by illegal immigrants”
Prominent legal change promoted	Headscarf prohibition in state schools and public spaces

). The party’s press spokesperson, Geadis Geadi, argued that covering in accordance with Islamic dress codes creates a security vulnerability by complicating identity verification (ELAM 2019g). Party MP Linos Papagiannis maintained that banning Islamic attire would also “advance gender equality” and liberate women from subjugation (ELAM 2019h). Christou stated that the purpose of the bill was to “protect the Hellenic-Orthodox character of the country” (ELAM 2019f). Thus, the party opposed the wearing of headscarves in the south of the island on the grounds of “security,” “gender equality,” and “preserving the Hellenic-Orthodox values of Cyprus.” It is important to note that the House of Representatives did not pass such legislation, and ELAM ultimately failed to achieve its objective. Notably, as discussed in the following section, YDP has likewise sought to amend regulations in Northern Cyprus to allow the wearing of headscarves in secondary schools.

In conflicts between Israel and Iran as well as other Muslim actors, ELAM has expressed clear support for Israel. The party argues that Israel’s clashes with Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah are “not merely conflicts between two sides,” indicating that it views these armed confrontations as part of a broader “clash of civilizations” (ELAM 2025a). This can be interpreted as ELAM positioning Cyprus, Hellenism, Christianity, and Israel under the same “Western” umbrella. Moreover, ELAM’s discourse treats Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, the “pseudo-state,” and Türkiye—whose common denominator is Islam—as actors “belonging to the same civilization” (ELAM 2023c), while portraying Hamas and Türkiye as “aggressors” and Israelis and Greek Cypriots as victims of violence (ELAM 2023b). ELAM also assigns Greece a special role within the EU as a key supporter of the Greek Cypriot struggle against Türkiye—an unsurprising stance given its Greek nationalist ideological foundations. According to the party, Athens should back Greek Cypriots against Türkiye because “Greece has a national responsibility toward Cyprus” (ELAM 2024a). ELAM additionally considers the USA a useful partner in countering Türkiye, particularly due to its recent steps toward partially lifting the arms embargo on the Republic of Cyprus, imposing limited restrictions on Türkiye, and progressively deepening military cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus (ELAM 2024c).

It is quite clear that ELAM’s discourse constructs a “clash of civilizations” between “Judeo-Christian Western civilization” and “Islamic civilization.” Within this framework, the “elite group” that ELAM accuses of “refusing to defend the values of its own civilization”—despite being positioned, in this civilizational confrontation, within Hellenism, the Greek Cypriot community, and the “West”—is the Greek Cypriot left-wing party AKEL, which has remained in opposition since 2013. AKEL has taken a cautious position toward the recent development of US–Cyprus relations, and ELAM accuses the party of attempting to obstruct a development that serves the interests of Greek Cypriots (ELAM 2025d). AKEL has voiced support for Palestinians in response to Israel’s military actions in Gaza, and has been accused by ELAM of “supporting Türkiye and its allies” and of being “dangerous to the national interests of Greek Cypriots.” While stating that Türkiye has positioned itself against the USA and Israel over Gaza, ELAM labels AKEL as a “Hamas supporter” (ELAM 2023a). In condemning AKEL’s stance, ELAM has also asserted that “only Islamic organizations, Türkiye, the ‘pseudo-state’, and AKEL support Hamas” (ELAM 2023c).

The strongest opposition to AKEL’s initiative in the House of Representatives Education Committee to abolish the school holiday on the “Feast of the Three Holy Hierarchs” (30 January)—a day recognized as sacred in Orthodoxy—came from ELAM (ELAM 2016c). In a speech delivered in the House, party leader Christou stated that Cyprus’s Hellenic–Orthodox values, and even the very words “Hellenic” and “Orthodox,” “disturb AKEL,” further claiming that AKEL’s Turkish Cypriot Member of the European Parliament, Professor Niyazi Kızılyürek, is “disturbed by Europe’s Christian identity” (ELAM 2019d). As can be seen, ELAM portrays itself as a party that defends both the national interests and values of Greek Cypriots and the broader values and interests of Western civilization, while depicting its domestic political rival, AKEL, as acting against these values and interests.

This section of the study has sought to identify the elements of civilizational populism in ELAM’s discourse and to make sense of the “clash of civilizations” framework the party constructs. The analysis finds that, in addition to defining Cyprus through a Hellenic–Orthodox identity, the party also positions the island as part of “European civilization” and the “Judeo-Christian West.” The party draws on a discourse that depicts, in general, this “West,” and, in particular, Greek Cypriots, as being in conflict with Islam. In ELAM’s “clash of civilizations” narrative, one side is composed of the Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriots), Greece, the EU (Europe), the USA, and Israel, while the opposing side consists of actors framed as components of “Islamic civilization”—namely Türkiye, the “pseudo-state,” Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, refugees, and terrorists. Within this framing, the “elite” that, despite belonging to the Greek Cypriot community and the Judeo-Christian West, refuses to defend Hellenic-Orthodox values and Western interests is AKEL. In light of these findings, it can be stated that ELAM’s civilizational populist discourse closely aligns with the template identified in the literature. The next section of the study examines YDP’s discourse in terms of the extent to which it conforms to this same template.

5. YDP’s Civilizational Populist Discourse: The Resistance of the Islamic World Against the “Aggressive West”

The TRNC is a de facto state recognized only by Türkiye. It is highly dependent on Türkiye both economically and in terms of security and is therefore open to Ankara’s political and cultural influence (Bozkurt 2014; Dayioglu and Koprulu 2019; Latif 2021). In this respect, in order to make sense of YDP’s discourse, it is also necessary to consider the discourse of the ruling coalition in Türkiye. Through both political rhetoric and popular culture (e.g., television series), the AKP–MHP government in Türkiye has promoted the message that “Turkish and Muslim lands must be protected from the plans of the US, the EU, and the Jewish lobby.” While the AKP emphasized the “reconciliation of civilizations” during its early years in power (2002–2010), when it was pursuing full EU membership, it later shifted toward a discourse based on a “clash of civilizations” amid deteriorating relations with the EU and the USA (Yilmaz and Morieson 2023). Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish Cypriots—who maintained close cultural ties with the Republic of Türkiye—internalized the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding President of the Republic of Türkiye, aimed at modernizing the country from the 1920s and 1930s onward, and consequently underwent a transition toward a secular way of life. Until the rise of the AKP to power, Türkiye implemented state–religion relations (and their separation) within the secular framework established by the Atatürkist reforms, while Turkish Cypriots likewise pursued a process of society–state formation grounded in secularism. By transforming the practice of secularism in Türkiye so as to render religion more visible in the public sphere, the AKP has likewise expected a similar transformation to take place in Northern Cyprus (Yeşilada 2009).

It should be noted that prior to YDP—which was founded in 2016 under the leadership of Erhan Arıklı, himself of Türkiye origin—at least seven political parties had previously been established claiming to “represent migrants from Türkiye.” Among them was the Yeni Doğuş Partisi (New Birth Party), founded in 1985 and dissolved in 1992, whose name and political orientation closely resemble those of today’s YDP10. While some of these parties managed to gain enough support to enter parliament, none remained active or visible in the political arena for longer than a decade. Migrants from Türkiye, meanwhile, have never demonstrated a monolithic voting pattern or consistently supported political movements labelled as the “party of migrants from Türkiye”11 (Hatay 2017, p. 5). Members of YDP’s executive cadre also include local Turkish Cypriots (Gıynık Gazetesi 2021). Positioned on a nationalist-conservative ideological line, YDP received 6.99% of the vote in the 2018 elections and 6.39% in the 2022 elections, securing two parliamentary seats in each election and thereby entering the 50-seat parliament on both occasions. Supporting the two-state solution, YDP has participated in coalition governments since 2020 alongside two other parties that advocate the same position, UBP and DP. Within this right-wing coalition, UBP has been the senior partner, with DP and YDP operating as junior partners (Grigoriadis 2018, p. 2; Dizdaroglu 2020, p. 7; Unal 2025). YDP’s civilizational populist discourse, much like that of ELAM, conforms to the general template of populism outlined by Hawkins and Kaltwasser (2017) and Mudde (2021). Within YDP’s discourse, Turkish Cypriots are constructed as a “pure people” belonging to “Turkish–Islamic civilization,” while federalist, leftist, and secularist groups are portrayed as “corrupt” actors detached from the values and interests of this civilization.

Importantly, YDP’s political discourse does not exhibit a level of anti-immigrant or anti–foreign worker rhetoric comparable to that of ELAM. During its period in opposition, YDP criticized the absence of private sector worker representation on the TRNC Minimum Wage Determination Commission, characterizing the commission’s structure as “bizarre” due to this lack of representation and calling on the state to “stand with workers” (Star Kıbrıs 2020). However, once in government, the party became complicit in the adoption of a highly controversial decision regarding the rights of foreign workers. In 2025, the Council of Ministers—of which YDP was a coalition partner—adopted a decision that legally enabled foreign workers (excluding Turkish nationals) to be paid up to 40 percent less than the standard minimum wage granted to citizens. This policy provoked criticism from left-wing groups, some of whom characterized the measure as “racist” toward foreign workers. Critics argued that the decision grants employers a structural advantage by facilitating the “exploitation” of foreign labour, while simultaneously pushing the local workforce toward unemployment and outward migration (Bugün Kıbrıs 2025).

Another incident occurring during the period of the tripartite coalition government, in which the YDP is a partner, and which is related to violations of the rights of foreign workers, concerns dozens of Bangladeshi agricultural workers brought to Northern Cyprus after paying substantial sums to so-called “consultancy” firms. These firms are publicly understood to be providing services for a public economic enterprise affiliated with the Ministry of Agriculture; however, the workers are ultimately left unemployed and subjected to inhumane living conditions in a location that the press likens to a “slave camp,” provoking widespread public outrage. (Halkın Sesi 2024). It should also be stated that, in the discourse of the YDP, one does not encounter an overt and pronounced opposition to LGBTIQ+ issues comparable to that of ELAM. In one of its rare public statements addressing demands related to LGBTIQ+ rights, YDP argued that it is inconsistent for left-wing groups to invoke children’s rights to justify the headscarf ban in schools while simultaneously supporting billboard campaigns promoting the freedoms of LGBTIQ+ individuals under the rubric of sexual freedom (Haber Kıbrıs 2025a).

As can be inferred, an exclusionary stance toward migrant workers does not feature prominently in the YDP’s discourse; indeed, given that the party positions itself as a “migrant party” (representing those who arrived from Türkiye), such a stance would be highly contradictory. Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that the UBP–DP–YDP government has been accused of contributing to the deterioration of the living conditions of foreign workers. Moreover, it is quite difficult to argue that the YDP’s discourse is as anti-LGBTIQ+ as that of ELAM. Nonetheless, just as in the case of ELAM, civilizational populist elements frequently appear in YDP’s discourse. YDP portrays a state of conflict between “Islamic civilization” and “Western civilization.” In doing so, it characterizes Northern Cyprus as a vital component of “Islamic civilization” and, in the words of Erhan Arıklı, as “the frontier outpost of the Turkish world in the Eastern Mediterranean” (Kıbrıs Postası 2024). Bertan Zaroğlu, one of the party’s senior figures elected to parliament alongside Arıklı in 2018, has described the EU as a “Christian community,” arguing that “Europe refuses to accept the Muslim–Turkish reality” and that “it does not want Türkiye to become stronger” (Gündem Kıbrıs 2017). According to YDP, the 1983 declaration of independence is irreversible, and the TRNC must endure permanently (Star Kıbrıs 2025b). YDP has hailed President of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s call at the UN General Assembly, urging member states to recognize the TRNC, as well as the TRNC’s admission as an “observer member” to the Organization of Turkic States, as “historic turning points” (MPWT 2022). The party asserts that the TRNC’s lack of recognition and its ongoing isolation stem from the fact that it is “a Muslim country,” claiming that “had it been Christian, it would have long been recognized and admitted to the UN” (Star Kıbrıs 2021).

In YDP’s discourse, the “West”—comprising Southern Cyprus, Greece, the EU, the USA, and Israel—is depicted as being in a state of attack against Northern Cyprus and Türkiye. According to YDP, the ultimate objective of these powers is “to de-Turkify Cyprus” (Haber Kıbrıs 2025b). Assigning Türkiye a role similar to that attributed by ELAM to Greece, Arıklı argues that if the Turkish army were to withdraw, the island would become a Greek island (Sabah 2025). In YDP’s rhetoric, the “West,” led by the USA, has intervened in numerous Middle Eastern countries since the early 2000s under the framework of the “Greater Middle East Project,” and Türkiye is next in line. However, Türkiye is not alone and has allies such as Azerbaijan, Libya (the Tripoli-based government), and Pakistan (Kıbrıs Postası 2025g). While YDP’s discourse occasionally invokes analogies to a “civilizational conflict” with China in relation to Beijing’s repression of Uyghur Turks (Kıbrıs Postası 2025b), references to China remain exceedingly rare compared to those directed at the “West”. Erhan Arıklı frequently reiterates that the EU and the USA maintain a “hostile” stance toward Türkiye. He contends that the growing US military presence in Greece constitutes a form of “rehearsal for the occupation of Türkiye” (Gündem Kıbrıs 2023).

According to YDP, one of the most significant threats facing both Türkiye and Turkish Cypriots, as well as the broader Islamic civilization, is Israel. YDP argues that Israel employs military force based particularly on the religious notion of the “promised land” (Kıbrıs Postası 2025h). The party’s rhetoric frequently maintains that the only way to halt Israel is through the collective action of the Muslim world (Star Kıbrıs 2023). YDP further emphasizes that Israel has entrenched itself in Southern Cyprus, that Southern Cyprus has procured Barak MX missiles from Israel, and that “because Israel will not withdraw from Southern Cyprus,” the hope for a federal settlement amounts to nothing more than “wishful thinking.” In a 2025 presidential campaign statement, Arıklı asked CTP leader and presidential candidate Tufan Erhürman whether his real interlocutor would be Nikos Christodoulides (President of the Republic of Cyprus) or Benjamin Netanyahu (Prime Minister of Israel) “if he won the election and began negotiations for a federation” (Kıbrıs Postası 2025f).

In YDP’s discourse, Southern Cyprus is portrayed as an actor that does not recognize Turkish Cypriots as equals and even adopts a hostile stance toward them. Again, during the 2025 presidential election process, YDP stated that Southern Cyprus views Turkish Cypriots as a minority, and that it has never been willing to grant them anything beyond minority rights (Kıbrıs Postası 2025e). Moreover, YDP’s discourse frequently emphasizes the military ties Southern Cyprus has established with Israel, France, and the USA (Star Kıbrıs 2025a). Therefore, within YDP’s rhetoric, the notion of a “clash between the West and Islam”—which also aligns with the civilizational populism template identified in the literature—is highly visible. In this framing, the actors of the “West” are the USA, the EU, Israel, Greece, and Southern Cyprus, while the actors of the Islamic civilization are the TRNC, Türkiye, the Turkic republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and other Muslim-majority countries.

YDP accuses federalist, secularist, and left-leaning elites (particularly politicians and trade union leaders) in Northern Cyprus of being “collaborators of the West.” Consequently, within YDP’s civilizational populist discourse, these actors are positioned as “elites who do not defend the values of their own civilization.” YDP argues that the federalist camp, which campaigned for a “yes” vote in Northern Cyprus during the 2004 Annan Plan referendum, was backed by the EU and the USA (Kıbrıs Postası 2025i). Similarly, during the 2025 presidential election process, Arıklı claimed that opinion polls placing the main opposition party CTP—the flagship of the federalist camp—and its candidate Tufan Erhürman,12 in first place did not reflect reality, but rather “what the EU and the USA wish to see” (Kıbrıs Postası 2025c). As a coalition partner of UBP and DP, YDP repeatedly asserts—especially during election periods—that “the government is backed by Türkiye, whereas the opposition is backed by the EU and the USA” (Yenidüzen 2022). Arıklı has further argued that Mustafa Akıncı, the federalist leader who served as President of the TRNC from 2015 to 2020 and was previously active in left-wing parties TKP, BDH (Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi/Peace and Democracy Movement), and TDP, eventually abandoned alignment with Türkiye and “fell under the influence of the USA” (Haber Kıbrıs 2018).

Another issue that clearly illustrates YDP’s stance toward left-wing, federalist, and secularist “elites” is the party’s approach to religious policy in Northern Cyprus. In 2025, when two secondary-school female students—supported by their families—sought to attend school wearing headscarves, they were prevented from doing so by school administrations because TRNC regulations did not permit it. The ruling UBP–DP–YDP coalition government, taking into account the demands of the students’ parents and conservative circles, hastily amended a bylaw under the Ministry of National Education, lifting the restriction and allowing students to enter schools wearing headscarves. Dozens of civil society organizations and political parties, including teachers’ unions and CTP, opposed the new regulation and organized protests, driven particularly by the perception that the policy shift had been imposed by Ankara. During this period, public opinion in Northern Cyprus turned largely against the government’s new headscarf bylaw, and a form of tension emerged between Turkish Cypriots and Ankara (Yenidüzen 2025).

Kıbrıs Türk Orta Eğitim Öğretmenler Sendikası (The Cyprus Turkish Secondary Education Teachers’ Union) and the Kıbrıs Türk Öğretmenler Sendikası (Cyprus Turkish Teachers’ Union) —which were at the forefront of the societal opposition to the government’s stance on the headscarf issue—had explicitly stated in their public statements that, in addition to defending secularism, they were also against “discrimination between Turks from Türkiye and Cypriots” (Kıbrıs Postası 2025j). This helped prevent the issue from being transformed into a “conflict between Turks from Türkiye and Cypriots.” In Türkiye, the AKP–MHP government openly supported the right to wear headscarves in secondary schools in Northern Cyprus, describing the regulation that prevents students from entering school with headscarves as “a form of outright fascism” (Hürriyet 2025). In response to the protests against the regulation that lifted the headscarf ban in schools, YDP organized a rally titled Respect for the Motherland in front of the Turkish Embassy in Northern Cyprus (see

Table 2. Analysis of YDP’s discourse and practice.

Identity of Turkish Cypriots	Turkish and Muslim, part of Islamic civilization
Actor(s) framed as “traitors”	Federalists, secularists, and leftists
Demands articulated in demonstration(s)	“Respect for Türkiye”, headscarf permissibility in schools
Prominent legal change promoted	Headscarf permissibility in schools

), clearly siding with Ankara in this confrontation (Anadolu Ajansı 2025).

YDP views the TRNC as a Muslim entity and advocates for greater visibility of Islam in the public sphere. In doing so, it tries to turn the arguments of those it criticizes as “Western imitators”—leftist, federalist, and secularist actors—back against them, frequently emphasizing that “while headscarves are permitted in Christian EU countries, they are banned in the Muslim TRNC”. For instance, in one of his statements, Arıklı appealed to federalist, secularist, and left-wing figures who oppose the right to wear headscarves in schools, pointing out that no such ban exists even in the South, which they “admire so much” (Haber Kıbrıs 2025a). In another statement, addressing the same figures, he asked whether they would still oppose the headscarf if the federation they “would die for” were possible and if Cyprus were reunified and joined the EU. He also argued that the boundaries of secularism in Northern Cyprus were determined by “fascist-minded trade unions” (Kıbrıs Postası 2025d). The TRNC Constitutional Court ruled to annul the headscarf regulation, citing a procedural issue rather than a substantive one. Consequently, the Court concluded that the intended changes could only be implemented through legislative amendment. YDP has been one of the political actors most actively engaged in explaining to the public that the Constitutional Court’s decision did not mean that the regulation was found to be unconstitutional on the grounds of secularism, and that the government would introduce the necessary legal amendments to lift the headscarf ban in secondary schools (Kıbrıs Postası 2025a).

In 2023, the verbal harassment of the Greek Cypriot priest of the Apostolos Andreas Monastery in the Karpas Peninsula (northeast of the island) by an individual publicly known for his connection to YDP triggered strong reactions in both the media and on social media. Arıklı condemned the incident, stressing that such harassment “is incompatible with Islam,” yet he also described it as “abnormal” that the “usual circles”—who, according to him, “applaud the democracies in Sweden and Europe that allow Islam’s holy book to be burned”—were keeping the issue on the agenda (Kıbrıs Postası 2023). While advocating for the construction of a mosque next to the Apostolos Andreas Monastery, YDP has argued that building places of worship is “a form of demonstrating sovereignty.” The party views the relevant monastery in Northern Cyprus as a remnant of “Christian dominance” and considers the absence of a Muslim place of worship next to it to be a political weakness for the TRNC (Yenidüzen 2023).

In YDP’s civilizational populist discourse, the TRNC is portrayed as an entity bound to the Turkish nation and to Islamic civilization. There is an ongoing struggle against the “West,” which is depicted as being in an active “offensive” against this civilization, particularly with the aim of “removing the Turks from Cyprus.” While the “West” encompasses actors such as Southern Cyprus, Greece, Israel, the EU, and the USA, the “allies” of the TRNC and Türkiye in this “struggle” are the Turkic Republics and Muslim states. This aspect of YDP’s discourse—specifically the construction of “us,” “them,” and a “conflict” between the two—clearly aligns with the civilizational populism template in the literature. Furthermore, YDP argues that federalist, secularist, and leftist “elites” within Turkish Cypriot politics (and civil society) do not share the values of Islamic civilization and are, in fact, “actors who aspire to the West and cooperate with it.” This, too, strongly corresponds with the aforementioned template in the literature. In addition, a notable tendency in YDP’s discourse is its attempt to “beat secularist, federalist, and leftist actors with their own weapons” by accusing them of being “even less tolerant of headscarves than the West they aspire to.”

Populist modes of politics have gained strength on a global scale in the twenty-first century, and Cyprus is no exception to this trend. To claim that populist politics on the island are confined solely to ELAM and YDP would be misleading, much like the reductionist assumption that nationalist politics can be identified exclusively with these two parties. This study makes no such claim. Nevertheless, the empirical findings clearly demonstrate that both ELAM and YDP have developed a distinct political discourse that corresponds to what the literature conceptualizes as civilizational populism, a discursive style that blends populism with nationalism, civilizational narratives, and religion. In ELAM’s discourse, one encounters the image of a Judeo-Christian Western civilization seeking to resist what are framed as “Islamic attacks,” along with the Hellenic Orthodox Greek Cypriot community positioned as part of this civilization. ELAM further argues that AKEL does not act in accordance with the values and interests of both Western civilization and the Greek Cypriot community. By contrast, YDP portrays Islam as being on the defensive against what it describes as “Western attacks” and maintains that Turkish Cypriots, as part of Islamic civilization, are integral to this broader defensive struggle. Within this framework, the elite groups accused by YDP of acting against the values and interests of both Islamic civilization and the TRNC include leftists, secularists, and federalists.

6. Conclusions

This study sought to elucidate the extent to which the political discourses and practices of ELAM and YDP overlap with established patterns of populism. It finds that both parties exhibit, to a considerable degree, tendencies that closely align with what the literature defines as civilizational populism. First, while ELAM’s discourse is characterized by a markedly strong anti-immigrant stance, no comparable tendency is observed in YDP’s rhetoric. Nevertheless, YDP has faced accusations of “racism” due to its support for a decision enabling the payment of foreign workers—excluding citizens of Türkiye—up to 40 percent less than the monthly wages of local workers. ELAM opposes the expansion of LGBTIQ+ rights by invoking “moral traditions.” YDP, by contrast, does not advocate for the expansion of these rights; however, rather than employing overtly antagonistic rhetoric, it generally opts to exclude the issue from its political agenda. The principal similarity between the two parties—and their alignment with the civilizational populism framework identified in the literature—lies not in a shared political stance, but in their reliance on narratives of religion- and civilization-based conflict to position themselves, albeit from opposing and often antagonistic civilizational poles, at both the national and international levels.

ELAM represents Cyprus and Greek Cypriots as a Hellenic-Orthodox nation and as part of the “Judeo-Christian Western Civilization.” It accuses the left-wing party AKEL of “undermining Christian-Orthodox values” in domestic politics and of “siding with Islam against the West” in international politics. Thus, in ELAM’s discourse, the “elite group” that is charged with “refusing to defend the interests/values of its own civilization” is AKEL. ELAM’s narrative emphasizes a “struggle against the Islamic threat,” both in Cyprus specifically and across Europe more broadly and, therefore, draws upon the notion of a “clash of civilizations between the West and Islam.” In ELAM’s discourse, the actors that constitute the “West” include the Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriots), Greece, the EU (Europe), the USA, and Israel, whereas the “Islamic front” is represented by actors such as Türkiye, the “pseudo-state,” Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, migrants/refugees, and terrorists.

The discourse of YDP also aligns to a very large extent with the civilizational populist template identified in the literature. YDP regards Northern Cyprus as part of both the Turkish world and Islamic civilization. Accordingly, it opposes a federal partnership between the two communities on the island, supports a two-state policy based on the international recognition of the TRNC, and advocates for increasing the visibility of Islam in the public sphere. In YDP’s discourse, the “elites who refuse to act in line with the values and/or interests of their own civilization” are the secularist, federalist, and left-wing elites in Northern Cyprus. YDP argues that these groups are “backed by the EU and the USA” and function as a kind of “Trojan horse” in the TRNC. A form of “clash of civilizations” framing is also present in YDP’s rhetoric. YDP frequently asserts that the “Judeo-Christian West”—encompassing actors such as Southern Cyprus, Greece, the EU, the USA, and Israel—is engaged in “aggressive” schemes targeting Muslims in general, and Türkiye and the TRNC in particular. In YDP’s discourse, these actors are portrayed as the architects of policies that “threaten the Turkish presence in Cyprus.”

YDP frequently reminds federalist, secularist, and left-wing actors that “in Southern Cyprus and the EU they aspire to,” headscarves are already permitted in schools. In doing so, it portrays these groups’ support for integration with Southern Cyprus and the EU while opposing the visibility of Islam in the public sphere as a “contradiction.” A similar tendency is not observed in ELAM’s discourse. This feature of YDP’s rhetoric can be considered an indication that civilizational populist discourse may be constructed with a pragmatism that does not require the wholesale rejection of all practices of the “opposing civilization,” and can even take on an instrumental character, in which selected practices are used to indict the “corrupt elites” at home. A further example of YDP’s interpretation of religion through a “clash of civilizations” framework is its assertion that a mosque should be constructed beside the Apostolos Andreas Monastery, on the grounds that religious sites serve as symbols of sovereignty. In the party’s view, the existence of a structure recalling historical Christian dominance in the Karpas Peninsula necessitates the establishment of a place of worship that reflects contemporary Muslim sovereignty.

The two parties hold diametrically opposed positions on headscarf legislation. ELAM sought to ban headscarves in public spaces, including state schools in Southern Cyprus—where they are currently permitted—by submitting a bill to the House of Representatives, citing justifications such as preserving the “Hellenic-Orthodox essence” of Cyprus. YDP, by contrast, pushed for the removal of existing regulations that prevented students from wearing headscarves in secondary schools in Northern Cyprus. Considering the civilizational populist elements and “clash of civilizations” framings in their respective discourses, it is not surprising that the two parties adopt these contrasting positions toward an Islamic symbol. Through these respective stances, ELAM poses a challenge to the long-established tradition of religious tolerance within its own community, while YDP places at risk the entrenched practice of secularism in its respective community. In this sense, it can be argued that both parties instrumentalize religion as a political tool in ways that contribute to the polarization of their respective communities.

The conflicts to which these two parties—both of which display a visible overlap with the patterns of civilizational populism identified in the literature—contribute are multidimensional in nature. In the first instance, both parties exacerbate conflicts rooted in the internal dynamics of their respective societies by mobilizing them along religious lines. ELAM accuses Greek Cypriot leftists of failing to uphold Hellenic–Orthodox values, while YDP similarly accuses Turkish Cypriot leftists of failing to defend Turkish–Islamic values. In this respect, both parties function to inflame religious–secular polarization within their respective communities. Moreover, the two parties contribute, albeit through different modalities, to the othering of foreign labour on both sides of the island. While ELAM employs a discourse that associates immigrants with crime and terrorism, the coalition government in which YDP participated is widely regarded as having presided over a period marked by the deterioration of the rights and living conditions of foreign workers.

Although YDP does not appear to display an explicit form of LGBTIQ+ antagonism comparable to that of ELAM, both parties adopt a firmly oppositional stance toward a federal partnership framework. YDP advocates the political separation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots into two independent states, whereas ELAM supports a unitary state in which Turkish Cypriots would be relegated to minority status. Both positions remain far removed from contributing to the construction of a future grounded in shared citizenship and a common homeland between the two communities. Furthermore, both parties instrumentalize religion and civilization as sources of conflict at both the national and international levels, producing discourses premised on the notion of an enduring and inevitable clash—both between the two communities on the island and between Western civilization and Islamic civilization more broadly. Another issue on which the YDP has been subject to intense criticism with regard to democracy in Northern Cyprus concerns its alignment with Ankara in disputes between the Turkish Cypriot public and Türkiye, a stance widely perceived as undermining the political autonomy of Turkish Cypriots.

Regardless of their future political influence in Cyprus, both parties place civilizational populism—an increasingly prominent 21st-century narrative—at the centre of their political discourse. Earlier in the study, it was noted that YDP draws its votes primarily from migrants from Türkiye, while ELAM receives significant support from younger voters and those who seek to “protest” established parties. The extent to which these voter groups embrace the civilizational populist arguments of the two parties constitutes a highly intriguing subject for future research. Moreover, the findings of the study demonstrate that while the civilizational populist discourses of these two parties continue to incorporate the 20th-century ethnic nationalist narrative of “Turks versus Greeks,” they increasingly interpret and situate this narrative within the framework of a “clash of civilizations,” a construct that has gained broader global prominence, particularly in recent decades.

The literature characterizes civilizational populism as a new political paradigm in the twenty-first century that undermines established democratic principles both in Western societies and in partially democratized Muslim-majority countries. By fostering exclusionary attitudes toward different religions, ideologies, and sexual orientations, civilizational populism contributes to the erosion of pluralism. Rather than engaging with various elites or political groups within the framework of democratic debate, it seeks to delegitimize and marginalize them by portraying them as “agents of a hostile civilization.” Whether the Western and Muslim variants of civilizational populism indirectly reinforce one another remains an important question and is likely to continue emerging as a promising area of inquiry for future research.