Search Results (15)

This study investigates dynamic behaviors within a competition Cournot duopoly framework incorporating consumer surplus, and social welfare through the bounded rationality method. The distinctive aspect of the competition game is the incorporation of discrete difference equations into the players’ optimization problems. Both rivals seek to achieve optimal quantity outcomes by maximizing their respective objective functions. The first firm seeks to enhance the average between consumer surplus and its profit, while the second firm focuses on its profit optimization with a social welfare component. The game map features four fixed points, with one being the Nash equilibrium point at the intersection of marginal objective functions. Our analysis explores equilibrium stability, dynamic complexities, basins of attraction, and the emergence of chaos through double routes via flip bifurcation and Neimark-Sacker bifurcations. We observe that increased adjustment speeds can destabilize the system, leading to a richness of dynamic complexity. Full article

This paper studies a class of two-player all-pay contests with externalities that encompass a general version of duopoly price competition. This all-pay contest formulation puts little restriction on production technologies, demand, and demand rationing. There are two types of possible equilibria: In the first type of equilibrium, the lower bound to pricing is the same for each firm, and the probability of any pricing tie above this price is zero. Each firm’s equilibrium expected profit is their monopoly profit at the lower bound price. In the second type of equilibrium, one firm prices at the lower bound of the other firm’s average cost and other firm prices according to a non-degenerate mixed strategy. This type of equilibrium can only occur if production technologies are sufficiently different across firms. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium and use these conditions to demonstrate the fragility of deterministic outcomes in pricing games. Full article

A model of Edgeworthian economies is studied, in which participants are randomly chosen at each period to exchange two goods to increase their utilities, as described by the Cobb–Douglas utility function. Participants can trade deviating from their bilateral equilibrium, provided that the market and the trade follow appropriate symmetry conditions. The article aims to study the convergence to equilibrium in a situation where individuals or small groups of participants trade in a market, and prices are determined by interactions between the participants rather than by demand and supply alone. A dynamic matching and bargaining game is considered, with statistical duality imposed on the market game, ensuring that each participant has a counterpart with opposite preferences. This guaranties that there is sufficient incentive for trade. It is shown that, in each period, the expected logarithm of the trading price in the Edgeworthian economy equals the expected Walrasian price. This demonstrates that, under symmetry conditions, the trading price in the Edgeworthian economy is related to the Walrasian price, indicating convergence of the trading price in the Edgeworthian economy towards the Walrasian price. The study suggests that, under the right conditions, the decentralized trading model leads to price convergence similar to what would be expected in a more classical Walrasian economy, where prices balance demand and supply. Full article

MbtI from Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Mtb) is a Mg²⁺-dependent salicylate synthase, belonging to the chorismate-utilizing enzyme (CUE) family. As a fundamental player in iron acquisition, MbtI promotes the survival and pathogenicity of Mtb in the infected host. Hence, it has emerged in the last decade as an innovative, potential target for the anti-virulence therapy of tuberculosis. In this context, 5-phenylfuran-2-carboxylic acids have been identified as potent MbtI inhibitors. The first co-crystal structure of MbtI in complex with a member of this class was described in 2020, showing the enzyme adopting an open configuration. Due to the high mobility of the loop adjacent to the binding pocket, large portions of the amino acid chain were not defined in the electron density map, hindering computational efforts aimed at structure-driven ligand optimization. Herein, we report a new, high-resolution co-crystal structure of MbtI with a furan-based derivative, in which the closed configuration of the enzyme allowed tracing the entirety of the active site pocket in the presence of the bound inhibitor. Moreover, we describe a new crystal structure of MbtI in open conformation and in complex with the known inhibitor methyl-AMT, suggesting that in vitro potency is not related to the observed enzyme conformation. These findings will prove fundamental to enhance the potency of this series via rational structure-based drug-design approaches. Full article

Network environments have recently emerged as a considerable research area. In addition to government supervision, platform supervision is also critical to improve network environments. So, we should improve the social network platform’s single regulatory model. Against this background, we described public opinion supervision as a game between marketing accounts, netizens, and the platform. Unlike previous studies, we considered the influence of marketing accounts on online public opinion. Because of the players’ bounded rationality, we built an evolutionary game model, and by solving it, we obtained the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Then, we analyzed the influence of relevant parameters on the evolutionary stable state. Our research results show that if the authenticity of the information is not high, to not publish is the best choice for the marketing account, and to not participate is the best choice for the netizen. The platform penalty for the marketing account is also directly related to the marketing account’s decision making. The platform penalty for the government, as well as the increase in the penalty risk coefficient, considerably affected the choice of platform. Finally, we put forward the “pre-event–in-the-event–post-event” three-stage supervision model, which provides countermeasures and suggestions for all parties to jointly maintain the network environment. Full article

Interdependent decisionmaking of individuals in social systems can be modelled by games played on complex networks. Players in such systems have bounded rationality, which influences the computation of equilibrium solutions. It has been shown that the ‘system rationality’, which indicates the overall rationality of a network of players, may play a key role in the emergence of scale-free or core-periphery topologies in real-world networks. In this work, we identify optimal topologies and mixing patterns of players which can maximise system rationality. Based on simulation results, we show that irrespective of the placement of nodes with higher rationality, it is the disassortative mixing of node rationality that helps to maximize system rationality in a population. In other words, the findings of this work indicate that the overall rationality of a population may improve when more players with non-similar individual rationality levels interact with each other. We identify particular topologies such as the core-periphery topology, which facilitates the optimisation of system rationality. The findings presented in this work may have useful interpretations and applications in socio-economic systems for maximizing the utility of interactions in a population of strategic players. Full article

In the game of basketball game-related statistics are utilised to help decision makers to evaluate players’ achievements. Previous research showed that in the case of individual awards, points are preferred over other indicators of effectiveness. Based on recent studies and following Simon’s bounded rationality, in our interpretation, decision-makers decide on nominations at the post-grant level according to points scoring which is the easiest aspect to assess and the most familiar to them. In this context we also hypothesise that youth all-star players have better overall performance than their not selected teammates. To test our hypotheses we selected all of the youth awarded male players and their teammates from 2004 to 2019. In our sample, we examined n = 3198 player statistics. Two groups were created with nominated and not selected players. We used a two-sample t-test, and correlation matrix to examine the relationship between the variables (p < 0.001). We found that scoring is the most important selection criteria for decision-makers (r = 0.605; p = 0.000) and the selected players had significantly better individual statistics. An important finding of our study is that although efficiency (EFF) is used to measure the players’ contribution to the game, it is not the primary selection factor and should therefore be redefined. Full article

The concept of education for sustainable development (ESD) belongs to the latter exogenous type. It was not put forward as an independent concept at first. At present, it is necessary to shift from the approach to an understanding concentrating on sustainable development to an interpretation that focuses on the structure of education. Under the guidance of online technology’s pursuit of efficiency, effect, simplicity and materialization, the process of ESD embedded with online technology has highlighted its value of tools, while lacking rules and guidance of the teleological rationality, hence it cannot achieve the value tendency of humanism which accords with its reason and being good to it. In the course of realistic education, the instrumental value and humanistic value of ESD are always intertwined together, and the value choices of educational entities are often manifested as bounded rationality. Therefore, around the theme of ESD, any two of the players of educational organizations constitute the “evolutionary game with bounded rationality”. Based on the result of an evolutionary game, ESD should pay more attention to the humanization of purpose, the contextualizing of content, the experience of process and the rationalization of technology, to fully realize the return of humanistic value of ESD. Full article

Infrastructure, such as waste incineration infrastructure, is entangled in the “not in my back yard” (NIMBY) dilemma. Consequently, the closed public decision-making model has difficulty adapting to the increasingly strong public-participation needs. Thus, a new mode of negotiated decision making is urgently required. This paper focuses on the negotiation problem, considers the government and society as game players, builds an evolutionary game model of negotiated decisions based on the bounded rationality hypothesis, and simulates the process and results of the evolution of the players’ strategy. The study concludes that the stable state of system evolution depends on the initial state of the dual populations and the comparative relationship between changes in revenue and cost, and the sufficient and unnecessary condition for the government and society to both agree on the given strategy. Taking the waste incineration projects in Yuhang and Chaonan as examples, the negotiated decision-making practice of NIMBY facilities is analysed, and it is found that it takes less time for the system to reach equilibrium in the latter. Finally, optimisation strategies for decision making regarding NIMBY facilities are systematically proposed. Full article

We formalize the adversarial process between defender and attackers as a game and study the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism under bounded rationality. We analyze the long-term dynamic process between the attacking and defending parties using the evolutionary stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of a defender and multiple attackers, formally describe the strategies, and construct a three-player game payoff matrix. Then, we propose two punishment schemes, i.e., static and dynamic ones. Moreover, through the combination of mathematical derivation with simulation, we obtain the evolutionary stable strategies of each player. Different from previous work, in this paper, we consider the influence of strategies among different attackers. The simulation shows that (1) in the static punishment scheme, increasing the penalty can quickly control the occurrence of network attacks in the short term; (2) in the dynamic punishment scheme, the game can be stabilized effectively, and the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the change of the initial values. Full article

Honeypot has been regarded as an active defense technology that can deceive attackers by simulating real systems. However, honeypot is actually a static network trap with fixed disposition, which is easily identified by anti-honeypot technology. Thus, honeypot is a “passive” active defense technology. Dynamic honeypot makes up for the shortcomings of honeypot, which dynamically adjusts defense strategies with the attack of hackers. Therefore, the confrontation between defenders and attackers is a strategic game. This paper focuses on the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism of bounded rationality, aiming to improve the security of the array honeypot system through the evolutionarily stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a three-party evolutionary game model of array honeypot, which is composed of defenders, attackers and legitimate users. Secondly, we formally describe the strategies and revenues of players in the game, and build the three-party game payoff matrices. Then the evolutionarily stable strategy is obtained by analyzing the Replicator Dynamics of various parties. In addition, we discuss the equilibrium condition to get the influence of the number of servers N on the stability of strategy evolution. MATLAB and Gambit simulation experiment results show that deduced evolutionarily stable strategies are valid in resisting attackers. Full article

The PSGL-1-actin cytoskeleton linker proteins ezrin/radixin/moesin (ERM), an adaptor between P-selectin glycoprotein ligand-1 (PSGL-1) and spleen tyrosine kinase (Syk), is a key player in PSGL-1 signal, which mediates the adhesion and recruitment of leukocytes to the activated endothelial cells in flow. Binding of PSGL-1 to ERM initials intracellular signaling through inducing phosphorylation of Syk, but effects of tensile force on unligation and phosphorylation site exposure of ERM bound with PSGL-1 remains unclear. To answer this question, we performed a series of so-called “ramp-clamp” steered molecular dynamics (SMD) simulations on the radixin protein FERM domain of ERM bound with intracellular juxtamembrane PSGL-1 peptide. The results showed that, the rupture force of complex pulled with constant velocity was over 250 pN, which prevented the complex from breaking in front of pull-induced exposure of phosphorylation site on immunoreceptor tyrosine activation motif (ITAM)-like motif of ERM; the stretched complex structure under constant tensile forces <100 pN maintained on a stable quasi-equilibrium state, showing a high mechano-stabilization of the clamped complex; and, in consistent with the force-induced allostery at clamped stage, increasing tensile force (<50 pN) would decrease the complex dissociation probability but facilitate the phosphorylation site exposure, suggesting a force-enhanced biophysical connectivity of PSGL-1 signaling. These force-enhanced characters in both phosphorylation and unligation of ERM bound with PSGL-1 should be mediated by a catch-slip bond transition mechanism, in which four residue interactions on binding site were involved. This study might provide a novel insight into the transmembrane PSGL-1 signal, its biophysical connectivity and molecular structural basis for cellular immune responses in mechano-microenvironment, and showed a rational SMD-based computer strategy for predicting structure-function relation of protein under loads. Full article

We investigate the complex dynamic characteristics of a duopoly game whose players adopt a gradient-based mechanism to update their outputs and one of them possesses in some way certain information about his/her opponent. We show that knowing such asymmetric information does not give any advantages but affects the stability of the game’s equilibrium points. Theoretically, we prove that the equilibrium points can be destabilized through Neimark-Sacker followed by flip bifurcation. Numerically, we prove that the map describing the game is noninvertible and gives rise to several stable attractors (multistability). Furthermore, the dynamics of the map give different shapes of quite complicated attraction basins of periodic cycles. Full article

Entropy plays a significant role in the study of games and economic behaviour in several ways. A decision maker faced with an n-fold repetition of a decision-making problem needs to apply strategies that become increasingly complex as n increases. When several players are involved in selecting strategies in interactive games, bounds on the memories and cognitive capacities of the players can affect possible outcomes. A player who can recall only the last k periods of history is said to have bounded recall of capacity k. We present here a brief survey of results of games played by players with different bounded recall capacities, in particular those indicating surprisingly strong relations between memory and entropy in the study of the min-max values of repeated games with bounded recall. In addition, we consider uses of entropy in measuring the value of information of noisy signal structures, also known as experiments. These are represented by stochastic matrices, with the rows representing states of the world and the columns possible signals. The classic ordering of experiments, due to David Blackwell and based on decision-making criteria, is a partial ordering, which has led to attempts to extend this ordering to a total ordering. If a decision maker has a prior distribution over the states, receipt of a signal yields a posterior. The difference between the entropy of a prior and the expected entropy of the set of possible posteriors has been proposed as a natural extension of the Blackwell ordering. We survey this alongside the theory of rational inattention, which posits that, since individuals have limited attention, they do not always follow every single piece of economic news in planning their economic behaviour. By modelling attention limits as finite channel capacity in the sense of Shannon, economists have developed a theory that explains a range of observed economic behavioural phenomena well. Full article

This paper analyzes Cournot duopoly games that are constructed based on Cobb–Douglas preferences. We introduce here two models whose dynamic adjustments depend on bounded rationality, dynamic adjustment, and tit-for-tat mechanism. In the first model, we have two firms with limited information and due to that they adopt the bounded rationality mechanism. They update their productions based on the changing occurred in the marginal profit. For this model, its fixed point is obtained and its stability condition is calculated. In addition, we provide conditions by which this fixed point loses its stability due to flip and Neimark–Sacker bifurcations. Furthermore, numerical simulation shows that this model possesses some chaotic behaviors which are recovered due to corridor stability. In the second model, we handle two different mechanisms of cooperation. These mechanisms are dynamic adjustment process and tit-for-tat strategy. The players who use the dynamic adjustment increase their productions based on the cooperative output while, in tit-for-tat mechanism, they increase the productions based on the cooperative profit. The local stability analysis shows that adopting tit-for-tat makes the model unstable and then the system becomes chaotic for any values of the system’s parameters. The obtained results show that the dynamic adjustment makes the system’s fixed point stable for a certain interval of the adjustment parameter. Full article