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Games
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Logistic Games
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Logistic Games

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 July 2018) | Viewed by 11208

Special Issue Editors

Dr. Moshe Dror

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Guest Editor
Department of Management Information Systems, Eller College of Management, University of Arizona, USA
Interests: applied game theory; applied combinatorial optimization; scheduling and applied logistics
Dr. Stefan Engevall

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Guest Editor
Communications & Transport Systems, Deptartment of Science & Technology, Linköping University, Sweden

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

In a dictionary “logistic” is defined as the “management of inventories and groups of people in motion and at a rest”. Adding “games” as a suffix to “logistics” frames questions of how can the participants (people, inventories, warehouses, vehicles, etc.) fairly account for their logistic outcomes. This Special Issue is about cooperative games and competitive games instantiated in real life and addresses questions, such as what should be the cost to a household when dividing the cost of a postmanʹs delivery route between the route’s beneficiaries? Would a remote gas station be allocated a higher cost for its gasoline replenishment than a gas station in a close central location? What is a fair taxation on a congested toll road? The lower the toll the higher the traffic congestion and it takes longer to reach the destination. What are the roles of the players in these games?
In the last 25 years we have witnessed a significant academic awakening to issues of fair allocation of resources in public and private domains. The academic domain of this Special Issue is that of applied combinatorial optimization with familiar problems with easy descriptions and a definite game flavor in the challenging search for new solutions. In this Special Issue we intend to take stock of what has been achieved thus far and what questions remain unanswered.

Keywords

  • cooperative games

  • cost allocation

  • selection of Itineraries

  • shortest route

  • marginal values

  • Fair tools

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Published Papers (2 papers)

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21 pages, 685 KiB  
Article
Sharing Loading Costs for Multi Compartment Vehicles
by Bruce C. Hartman
Games 2018, 9(2), 25; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020025 - 14 May 2018
Viewed by 4723
Abstract
Supply chains for goods that must be kept cool—cold chains—are of increasing importance in world trade. The goods must be kept within well-defined temperature limits to preserve their quality. One technique for reducing logistics costs is to load cold items into multiple compartment [...] Read more.
Supply chains for goods that must be kept cool—cold chains—are of increasing importance in world trade. The goods must be kept within well-defined temperature limits to preserve their quality. One technique for reducing logistics costs is to load cold items into multiple compartment vehicles (MCVs), which have several spaces within that can be set for different temperature ranges. These vehicles allow better consolidation of loads. However, constructing the optimal load is a difficult problem, requiring heuristics for solution. In addition, the cost determined must be allocated to the different items being shipped, most often with different owners who need to pay, and this should be done in a stable manner so that firms will continue to combine loads. We outline the basic structure of the MCV loading problem, and offer the view that the optimization and cost allocation problems must be solved together. Doing so presents the opportunity to solve the problem inductively, reducing the size of the feasible set using constraints generated inductively from the inductive construction of minimal balanced collections of subsets. These limits may help the heuristics find a good result faster than optimizing first and allocating later. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Logistic Games)
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23 pages, 10769 KiB  
Article
Dynamic Pricing Decisions and Seller-Buyer Interactions under Capacity Constraints
by Vincent Mak, Amnon Rapoport and Eyran J. Gisches
Games 2018, 9(1), 10; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010010 - 22 Feb 2018
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 5972
Abstract
Focusing on sellers’ pricing decisions and the ensuing seller-buyer interactions, we report an experiment on dynamic pricing with scarcity in the form of capacity constraints. Rational expectations equilibrium solutions are constructed and then tested experimentally with subjects assigned the roles of sellers and [...] Read more.
Focusing on sellers’ pricing decisions and the ensuing seller-buyer interactions, we report an experiment on dynamic pricing with scarcity in the form of capacity constraints. Rational expectations equilibrium solutions are constructed and then tested experimentally with subjects assigned the roles of sellers and buyers. We investigate behavior in two between-subject conditions with high and moderate levels of capacity. Our laboratory market exhibits strategic sophistication: the price offers of sellers and the buyers’ aggregate responses largely approximate equilibrium predictions. We also observe systematic deviations from equilibrium benchmarks on both sides of the market. Specifically, in our experiment the sellers are boundedly strategic: their prices often exhibit strategic adjustments to profit from buyers with limited strategic sophistication, but they are also often biased towards equilibrium pricing even when that would not be ex-post optimal. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Logistic Games)
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