New Directions in Behavioral Game Theory: Introduction to the Special Issue
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Golman, R. New Directions in Behavioral Game Theory: Introduction to the Special Issue. Games 2020, 11, 50. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040050
Golman R. New Directions in Behavioral Game Theory: Introduction to the Special Issue. Games. 2020; 11(4):50. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040050
Chicago/Turabian StyleGolman, Russell. 2020. "New Directions in Behavioral Game Theory: Introduction to the Special Issue" Games 11, no. 4: 50. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040050
APA StyleGolman, R. (2020). New Directions in Behavioral Game Theory: Introduction to the Special Issue. Games, 11(4), 50. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040050