The Roles of Stewardship and Public Participation in the Conservation of Architectural Heritage from the Perspective of the Theory of Complex Property Rights: The Cases of Farnsworth House and the Buzludzha Monument

Abstract

This article examines the roles of stewardship, ownership, and public participation in the conservation of architectural heritage from the perspective of the Theory of Complex Property Rights (TCPR). The analysis addresses three research questions: (1) What is the role of property rights and private owners in the conservation of architectural heritage? (2) Who can be the best-suited owner or serve as the best steward of architectural heritage, how should such an owner or steward be selected, and how should rights and responsibilities be allocated? (3) What role should advocates of architectural heritage play in its conservation? The study applies TCPR to two case studies involving threatened heritage assets: Mies van der Rohe’s Farnsworth House in the United States and the Buzludzha Monument in Bulgaria. The findings demonstrate that successful conservation depends less on formal ownership status than on the allocation and exercise of management and control rights. Effective conservation is most likely when such rights are exercised by actors who place a high value on architectural heritage and possess the capacity to mobilize financial, organizational, and professional resources. The article introduces the concepts of the best-suited owner and the best steward and argues that property rights should be allocated through Coasian processes that favour actors capable of ensuring the long-term preservation and sustainable use of heritage assets. The analysis also highlights the important role of heritage advocates and non-governmental organizations in heritage governance and conservation.

1. Introduction

What roles do public groups, private owners, the wider public, and advocates of architectural value play in the conservation of architectural heritage? Citizens in every country value their architectural heritage, but professionals and other admirers of architectural creativity are often its most active defenders [1,2,3,4,5]. Many heritage advocates view private ownership critically, assuming that owners are primarily motivated by short-term economic gain and pay insufficient attention to architectural value. As a result, public or state ownership is often seen as the preferred solution. In practice, however, we have ample reason to argue that both private and public ownership are too often the cause of failures in heritage conservation. Private owners may prioritize short-term profits, while public institutions may neglect their responsibilities [6,7,8,9].

This article contributes to the debate on the roles of private and public ownership in heritage conservation by focusing on the role of public groups, especially owners and advocates of architectural heritage [10,11]. In so doing, we pay particular attention to the distinction between formal ownership and the effective exercise of management and control rights, as well as to the role of heritage advocates as potential stewards of architectural heritage.

The analysis draws on the Theory of Complex Property Rights (TCPR) [12], which argues that no ownership arrangement is purely private or purely public. Instead, every real-world ownership arrangement combines private and public components. Consequently, there is no universally optimal form of ownership [13]. The most appropriate arrangement depends on the characteristics of the resource, its architectural function, and the institutional and economic conditions within which it operates.

Architectural monuments of national and international significance often possess exceptional architectural value [14,15,16] while requiring financial resources that exceed the capacity of individual owners. Their conservation therefore depends on cooperation among individuals and organizations that place a high value on architectural heritage. Such cooperation frequently leads to the creation of associations and non-governmental organizations, whose role is a central focus of this article.

To examine these arguments, we analyse two cases involving threats to important architectural heritage assets: Mies van der Rohe’s Farnsworth House and the Bulgarian Buzludzha Monument.

The analysis addresses three principal research questions:

• What is the role of property rights and private owners in the conservation of architectural heritage?
• Who can be the best-suited owner or serve as the best steward of architectural heritage, how should such an owner or steward be selected, and how should rights and responsibilities be allocated?
• What role should advocates of architectural heritage play in its conservation?

The article is structured as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework based on TCPR. This is followed by an analysis of the two case studies. The final section revisits the three research questions and presents the principal findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

2. Theoretical Framework: The Importance of Property Rights and TCPR for Heritage Conservation

2.1. General Framework

There is broad consensus in the literature that property rights are institutions, that is, systems of rules embedded in society and its collective activities [17,18]. Property rights define not only the relationship between a subject and a resource but also the relationships among individuals engaged in collective action. They reflect social agreement regarding the rights and obligations of community members in the use of resources. Thus, property rights determine who may possess a resource, how it may be managed and used, what share of the resulting benefits may be obtained, and what responsibilities are owed to others [19,20,21,22]. According to this definition, ownership includes three principal groups of entitlements [12]:

(1)

management rights over resources;

(2)

rights to consume the benefits derived from their use; and

(3)

obligations and responsibilities associated with their provision and use.

Within TCPR, property is understood in its broad institutional sense, encompassing de facto rights of access, management, and control over space rather than merely formal legal titles. In complex urban environments, property is best viewed as a decentralized network of multiple actors and overlapping jurisdictions that enables cities to self-organize and adapt [23,24]. Distinguishing between de jure property rights and actual access to property is therefore essential for effective heritage management and urban governance [25].

Ownership is critically important for the conservation of architectural heritage because conservation depends on how heritage assets are used. The owner possesses management rights and decides how and for what purposes such assets are utilized and every owner seeks to maximize the benefits derived from a resource. Since resources may be used in different ways, the resulting benefits and values may vary considerably and may be economic, environmental, aesthetic, architectural, or of another kind. The importance attached to each type of value depends on the specialization and interests of the owner.

For the purposes of this study, we distinguish between two types of value:

• Utilitarian value, which includes the principal architectural function of an asset together with the benefits derived from its use, including rental income.
• Architectural value, which is the cultural value to the community [15,26] at the local, regional, national, and international levels.

The sustainable use of architectural heritage requires the preservation or enhancement of architectural value [27]. The key issue is therefore not simply who owns a heritage asset, but whether the owner values its architectural significance. The pursuit of economic returns is not inherently detrimental to conservation. On the contrary, conservation often requires substantial financial resources. If an owner places a high value on architectural significance, the ability to generate income becomes an important means of financing preservation. In this article, a best-suited owner [12] is defined as an individual or collective actor who places a high value on architectural significance while also being capable of generating sufficient income to support conservation. This concept is closely related to Ronald Coase’s notion of Coasian bargaining (1960). Such an owner provides the strongest guarantee for the long-term preservation of a heritage asset. In this article, Coasian bargaining refers to negotiated transfers of rights between identifiable parties, whereas Coasian competition refers to situations in which multiple actors compete to acquire management or ownership rights.

For the purposes of this article, we also define the term best steward, which refers to a potential best-suited owner who does not yet possess the relevant ownership rights but demonstrates, through expertise, commitment, and resource mobilization, the capacity to exercise ownership-related functions, particularly management and control rights (see for instance [28,29]). In both cases, rights tend to gravitate towards actors who value the resource most highly and are willing to commit the greatest resources to its use and preservation.

2.2. The Importance of TCPR, Privateness, Publicness, Financing, and the Selection of the Best-Suited Owner (Steward)

The purpose of this article is to apply and test the TCPR approach [12] as well as other relevant concepts and views relating to heritage governance, commons, stewardship, public value, adaptive reuse, and cultural protection literature. According to TCPR purely private and purely public forms of ownership do not exist in the real world. Every ownership arrangement combines private and public entitlements. Consequently, every activity has an optimal ownership arrangement defined by the balance between these entitlements [13,30]. Architectural function is one of the principal factors determining the optimal degree of privateness and publicness. Single-family residential use, for example, is characterized by a high degree of privateness, whereas cultural and administrative functions involve a higher degree of publicness. Construction and maintenance costs also influence this balance. Because the conservation of architectural heritage is often expensive, high costs tend to favour greater collectiveness and publicness.

The level of significance of a heritage asset is another important factor. The greater its local, regional, national, or international significance, the higher the degree of publicness associated with the optimal ownership arrangement.

At the same time, a high degree of privateness increases responsibility. When responsibility is shared among many participants, it tends to become diluted. A high degree of privateness therefore encourages responsibility for conservation, whereas a high degree of publicness may encourage irresponsibility [31].

TCPR emphasizes that mixed and hybrid ownership arrangements predominate in practice. Resources are often shared among multiple actors, while different aspects of the same resource are controlled by different groups [32,33]. This is particularly true of architectural heritage, which can be regarded as jointly held by direct owners and the wider community that identifies with the historical memory embodied in the asset. Heritage regulations effectively confer management rights on the state and municipalities, creating a form of de facto co-ownership. Because heritage assets have both private and public dimensions, theorists such as Sax [34] challenge the unrestricted autonomy of private owners to dispose of cultural property in ways that threaten its preservation and deprive the public of its collective benefits.

TCPR also emphasizes the complex structure of society [12]. Different social, ethnic, and professional groups attach different levels of importance to architectural heritage. Groups that place greater value on heritage are generally more willing to invest effort and resources in its preservation, and act as the best stewards. Accordingly, they should hold a larger share of the property rights associated with that heritage.

The discussion above suggests that the best guarantee for preserving architectural heritage is to allocate management rights and control rights to actors who highly value architectural significance and possess the expertise required to protect it. Although owners seek to maximize benefits, the best-suited owner does not do so at the expense of architectural value. Rather, economic benefits become a means of ensuring its preservation.

The complex nature of property rights also implies that even the best steward should not be granted unrestricted private rights. Heritage should not be managed without public oversight. Even local and international communities and NPOs genuinely committed to protecting architectural heritage may overstep their roles by assuming functions that properly belong to public authorities responsible for safeguarding the public interest [35]. Because architectural heritage remains part of the heritage of the local or national community, ultimate management and control rights must remain with the relevant public authorities, even if exercised only within certain limits. Accordingly, within the bundle of rights, pre-emption rights and public domain rights remain vested in local or central government.

2.3. Problems with Defining Property Rights and the Appropriate Degree of Publicness

Property rights are based on social agreement regarding the use of resources. However, defining such agreements is often complex, time-consuming, and costly [36,37,38]. As a result, property rights are frequently incomplete or imprecise, which reduces their effectiveness.

According to TCPR, all property rights are complex, but some ownership arrangements are more complex than others. Property rights associated with architectural heritage are among the most complex because they often involve numerous stakeholders [37]. As the number of co-owners increases, defining and enforcing rights and responsibilities becomes more difficult and costly. This is particularly important for heritage conservation, where the anticommons problem has been identified as a major obstacle to preservation. Multiple overlapping property rights impede effective action and increase transaction costs. Mendelson-Shwartz et al. argue that the principal obstacle to successful transfer of development rights (TDR) schemes is the extreme fragmentation and interdependence of property rights [39]. This reflects the tragedy of the anticommons, in which multiple rights holders possess veto power, preventing the efficient use and conservation of heritage resources.

The complexity of heritage ownership also explains the relevance of Heller’s theory (1998) of the anticommons [40]. Heller argues that management becomes increasingly problematic when many actors possess rights over a resource because their rights tend to block one another. Anticommons problems may also arise when multiple actors claim management rights without a clear allocation of responsibilities.

As a general rule, the greater the significance of a heritage asset, the larger the number of stakeholders involved. Heritage of international significance typically attracts more claimants and more complex ownership structures than heritage of local significance. Heritage of international significance, such as World Heritage Sites, typically attracts more claimants, leading to highly complex governance challenges, exacerbated tourism pressures, and overlapping institutional jurisdictions [14,26,41].

Consequently, anticommons problems tend to increase with both the architectural value and the significance of a heritage asset.

Commons and anticommons issues further highlight the importance of financing and the relevance of Coase’s approach [40,42]. Because conservation is often costly, the most reliable strategy is to identify uses capable of generating economic returns without reducing architectural value. Selecting an owner capable of implementing such a strategy therefore represents one of the most effective approaches to heritage conservation.

While the public interest in architectural heritage justifies a substantial degree of publicness, responsibility for conservation requires a sufficient degree of privateness. Many members of society are unwilling to contribute resources to conservation. For this reason, TCPR highlights the importance of NGOs and other organized groups composed of individuals who place a high value on architectural heritage. Such groups combine public purposes with a sufficient degree of privateness by bringing together individuals willing to invest effort and resources while excluding those who are not.

2.4. Limitations of the Coasian Approach and the Role of Participatory Governance

Although allocating rights through Coasian competition to the actor willing and able to commit the greatest resources is a powerful mechanism, this approach requires caution. Heritage value cannot always be measured by willingness or ability to pay, creating a risk of excluding other legitimate stakeholders and questions of legal responsibility when management or ownership rights are transferred to hybrid or non-traditional actors. Approaches based primarily on financial capacity may overlook equity, democratic legitimacy, symbolic ownership, and minority community claims. Moreover, local governments increasingly use market-based instruments—such as upzoning, density bonuses, and conservation easements—to encourage private owners to preserve heritage assets and become best stewards. However, these instruments may also commodify cultural heritage and reduce public oversight [24].

Similarly, while NPOs often emerge as ideal stewards, it is crucial to recognize the potential “dark side” of non-profit governance. Extensive reliance on NPOs can lead to “consultocracy,” where third-sector organizations replace democratic decision-making and relieve the state of its traditional governance responsibilities in providing public goods [43], sometimes prioritizing exclusive growth machine models over equitable public access [35]. Therefore, the concept of the “best steward” must be aligned with established participatory governance frameworks, such as those promoted by ICOMOS and UNESCO, which emphasize shared responsibilities, community empowerment, indigenous rights, and transparent stewardship rather than mere financial capability.

3. Materials and Methods

3.1. Methodological Framework of the Comparative Study

This study employs a qualitative comparative case study approach to examine how different ownership arrangements influence the sustainable management of architectural heritage. Comparative case studies identify similarities and differences across institutional contexts while distinguishing case-specific features from broader governance mechanisms [44,45]. This approach is appropriate because heritage assets are embedded in distinct historical, legal, and cultural settings while facing similar management and conservation challenges.

The study adopts an explanatory comparative design. Rather than assessing which heritage asset has been managed more successfully, it examines how institutional settings and ownership arrangements influence conservation, resource mobilization, and the capacity for sustainable management. The comparison thus tests the analytical applicability of the Theory of Complex Property Rights (TCPR) to architectural heritage.

The two case studies were selected purposively. Farnsworth House and the Buzludzha Monument differ substantially in their historical origins, political context, architectural function, and legal framework. Despite these differences, both are internationally recognized examples of twentieth-century architectural heritage whose conservation raises complex issues of ownership, management, financing, and stakeholder involvement. Their contrasting institutional settings, combined with similar conservation challenges, make them well suited for comparative analysis.

The analysis is based primarily on documentary research. Data were collected from academic publications, legislation, strategic and policy documents, conservation and management plans, official reports, archival sources, institutional publications, and publicly available documents produced by organizations engaged in heritage conservation.

The comparison follows a common analytical framework derived from the Theory of Complex Property Rights. Each case is examined through the same analytical dimensions: (1) the evolution of the ownership regime and the balance between public and private components of the ownership arrangement; (2) financial costs, resource mobilization, and mechanisms for sustainable conservation; (3) stakeholder interaction, Coasian competition, and Coasian bargaining; and (4) outcomes for heritage management and conservation, including the allocation of rights and responsibilities.

3.2. Analysis of the Farnsworth House Case and the Sustainable Management of Architectural Heritage

Farnsworth House, Plano IL, (Figure 1) was designed by Mies van der Rohe and built between 1945 and 1950.

3.2.1. The Complexity of Ownership Arrangements

The Farnsworth House case confirms that none of the ownership arrangements involved was either purely private or purely public. Three categories of owners can be identified: (1) the private owners, Edith Farnsworth and Peter Palumbo; (2) the State of Illinois; and (3) three non-governmental organizations—the National Trust for Historic Preservation, Landmarks Illinois, and the Friends of Farnsworth House [46,47]. All of these ownership arrangements exhibited a mixed private-public character:

As natural persons, Farnsworth and Palumbo possessed property rights characterized by the highest degree of privateness. Yet even this form of ownership was not entirely private. Palumbo’s ownership was shared with his family, while Farnsworth’s property would have passed to (direct or indirect) heirs or, ultimately, to society at large. This observation is particularly relevant in the case of architectural heritage, whose value increasingly becomes a matter of public concern.

Similarly, although state ownership is characterized by a high degree of publicness, it is not perfectly public because it belongs specifically to the citizens of Illinois rather than to society as a whole. Moreover, heritage regulations effectively transfer part of the owner’s management rights to public authorities, creating a form of shared ownership authority.

The ownership arrangements of NGOs display an explicitly hybrid character. Organizations such as the National Trust for Historic Preservation, Landmarks Illinois, and the Friends of Farnsworth House pursue public objectives while relying primarily on private resources rather than government funding [7,11].

3.2.2. The Importance of Financial Factors (Benefits, Costs, Values, and Profits) and Coasian Bargaining for the Sustainable Management of Architectural Heritage

To acquire the house, both Farnsworth and Palumbo paid substantial purchase prices and subsequently invested significant resources in repairing repeated flood damage. Their actions demonstrated a willingness to devote resources to preserving both the property and its architectural value. They may therefore be regarded as best-suited owners.

The sustainable management of architectural heritage depends on both the function of an asset and the owner responsible for it. Farnsworth commissioned the house in 1945, but construction costs substantially exceeded the original budget of $40,000. By the time she took possession of the property in 1950, the final cost had reached approximately $74,000. She remained the owner until the late 1960s. Edith Farnsworth did not particularly value the house’s modern architecture. In 1972, she sold it to Peter Palumbo for $150,000—approximately twice its original cost. By then, the architectural value of the house had become widely recognized and had surpassed its utilitarian value as a private residence [47,48].

Palumbo invested not only in works by Mies van der Rohe but also in buildings by Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier. He sought both to preserve their architectural qualities and to enhance their value. Following a major flood in 1996, he spent approximately $250,000 on repairs and subsequently opened the house to visitors in order to help finance its maintenance [48].

Palumbo’s eventual sale of the property represents a classic example of Coasian bargaining. In 2001, he placed the house on the market because of declining health. In response, a group of business leaders and public figures who admired modern architecture, including the philanthropist John H. Bryan, established the Friends of Farnsworth House and approached the State of Illinois with a proposal that it purchase the property and provide free public access to the house. The state recognized the building as an important component of its architectural heritage and accepted the proposal. It also accepted the Friends’ valuation of the property at approximately $6.2 million, together with an annual maintenance cost of $200,000. Subsequently, however, it became clear that the state was unable to secure the necessary funding [49].

As a result, the international auction house Sotheby’s organized an auction in 2003 [50]. The Friends of Farnsworth House joined forces with two NGOs—the National Trust for Historic Preservation and Landmarks Illinois [51]. The coalition initially succeeded in raising only $3.6 million. On the day of the auction, the price reached $7.5 million, including an $800,000 premium [49]. Within a matter of hours, the heritage coalition managed to secure the remaining funds: John H. Bryan donated an additional $500,000; another substantial contribution came from the Chicago art dealer Richard Gray; and nearly $500,000 more was raised through telephone donations. The remaining amount was covered by a bridge loan secured by the National Trust.

Between 2004 and 2010, Farnsworth House was operated by Landmarks Illinois, which invested an additional $200,000 in restoring the visitor centre and reopening the property to visitors [52]. The National Trust also established a $5 million endowment fund. During the following years, the house attracted approximately 6500 visitors annually, with the proceeds being used for maintenance. However, another flood interrupted visits for nearly a year and required further investment [52]. Because Landmarks Illinois operated the property at a financial loss, ownership was transferred to the National Trust in 2010. In May 2020, the terrace of the house was flooded once again, and repairs cost approximately $700,000 [53]. In recent years, visitor numbers recovered to approximately 10,000 annually [50].

3.2.3. Conclusions from the Farnsworth House Case

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The Farnsworth House case demonstrates that architectural value may become a dominant concern for both private individuals and organizations characterized by a high degree of publicness. Both Peter Palumbo and the NGOs involved were willing to invest substantial resources in preserving the heritage asset.

-

The conservation of architectural heritage often requires significant capital investment. As the architectural value of Farnsworth House increased, the resources required for its acquisition and maintenance exceeded the capacity of most individuals and became more compatible with the capacities of larger organizations.

-

While advocates of architectural heritage often criticize profit-oriented behaviour, the Farnsworth House case demonstrates that economic efficiency and heritage conservation can reinforce one another. The market valorisation of the property generated resources essential for its preservation, while the NGOs involved demonstrated considerable innovation and flexibility in mobilizing funding.

3.3. Analysis of the Buzludzha Monument Case

The construction of the Buzludzha Home-Monument (Figure 2) was initiated by the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), began in 1974, and was completed in 1981 [54,55]. Unlike Farnsworth House, the purpose of the monument was not for residential use, but it was to emphasize the role of BCP in Bulgarian society since its establishment [56]. The monument was designed by one of Bulgaria’s leading architects of the period, Georgi Stoilov, and forms part of the Shipka-Buzludzha National Park-Museum, designated as a historical and architectural reserve in 1978.

The monument’s significance as part of socialist modernist architectural heritage is vital to this article. Modernist and brutalist architecture carries a controversial history across former communist states. Suppressed during the Stalinist era, this bold style was later adopted after the 1960s for propaganda purposes. Consequently, post-socialist countries possess striking examples of modernist art, ranging from low to exceptionally high quality. While such landmarks are most abundant in Serbia—including the Genex and Rudo Towers, Sava Centre, Avala Tower, and Novi Beograd’s residential blocks—the Buzludzha monument is frequently recognized as one of the most prominent.

3.3.1. Evolution of the Ownership Arrangement

Period from 1974 to the Political Changes of 1989–1990

In contrast to Farnsworth House, ownership of the Buzludzha Monument was initially characterized by a high degree of publicness. During the socialist period, such ownership was popularly described as “property of the entire people.” In practice, however, ownership arrangements in socialist Eastern Europe were often defined imprecisely.

The legally recognized forms of ownership in Bulgaria at the time were defined in the Property Act of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria (1951) and included state, cooperative, public-organization, personal, and private ownership [57]. Although the monument was generally regarded as state property, ownership was never formally documented and no title deed was issued. Consequently, the associated property rights exhibited a high degree of publicness but remained poorly defined. Nevertheless, BCP may be regarded as the monument’s nominal owner because it exercised management and control rights. In this sense, the arrangement possessed a higher degree of privateness than ordinary state ownership because these rights belonged exclusively to party members.

Period from the Political Changes of 1989–1990 to the Present

This period is often described as an institutional vacuum. Ownership before 1989 had never been clearly defined, while the political transition made fundamental changes in the ownership system inevitable.

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In 1992, the Act on the Nationalization of the Property of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Other Political Organizations (National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria 1991) [58] formally established the monument as state property and transferred responsibility for its management to the Regional Administration of Stara Zagora.

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In 2011, the Bulgarian government adopted Decision No. 731 providing for the gratuitous transfer of the monument to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) as the successor of BCP. However, BSP failed to complete the procedure and the transfer never entered into force.

-

In 2017, amendments to the State Property Act (National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria 2017) [59] prohibited the gratuitous transfer of state-owned properties to political parties. BSP subsequently sought permission to use the monument free of charge for ten years, but this proposal was not implemented.

That is, the monument’s controversial history has decisively shaped its ownership. Post-1990 ownership of the Buzludzha Monument became highly contested due to conflicting stakeholder claims regarding its historical, ideological, and aesthetic value. As a result, the site remained ownerless—a classic anticommons dilemma (see Section 2.3)—and fell into ruin over the next two decades due to neglect. This trajectory is common among socialist modernist heritage sites across post-socialist nations.

3.3.2. The Importance of Financial Factors for the Sustainable Management of the Buzludzha Monument

The provision of resources for the creation and maintenance of a property, together with the benefits generated, constitutes a key element of ownership [12,19,20,21] Construction of the monument was financed entirely through donations from BCP members. Approximately 15 million leva was raised through payroll deductions and commemorative fundraising stamps and invested in the monument and its infrastructure [60]. In present-day terms, this amount corresponds to approximately €28–35 million.

The principal benefit sought by BCP was the creation of a monument of high architectural value that would promote the Party’s history and achievements. According to the administration of the complex, approximately two million visitors visited the monument between 1981 and 1989 [60]. However, these figures have not been independently verified and were likely inflated by the propaganda practices of the period (compared, for instance, to the 10,000 visits to Farnsworth House annually). Moreover, many visits were subsidized and therefore do not provide an objective measure of public demand.

The financial conditions associated with the monument are very different today. Three decades of insufficient maintenance have resulted in severe deterioration and very high restoration costs. Various expert assessments conducted before 2020 estimated the cost of full restoration at between 15 and 20 million leva (up to approximately €10 million). According to the Conservation and Management Plan prepared with the support of the Getty Foundation, the most urgent priorities include structural stabilization, roof repair, mosaic conservation, infrastructure restoration, and improvements to access and visitor facilities. Since 2020, these most urgent repair works have been valued at approximately 7–8 million leva (€3.5–4.1 million).

The following funding has been secured over the past three decades:

2019–2020: The Getty Foundation provided approximately €215,000 for the preparation of conservation and stabilization plans.

2021–2024: The National Culture Fund and other donors provided smaller amounts for emergency protection measures and cultural events.

July 2025: A 6.93 million leva (approximately €3.5 million) project was approved for funding for structural stabilization and other urgent conservation works by the Regional Development Programme 2021–2027, financed by the European Regional Development Fund (85%) and national co-financing (15%). The project was initiated by a consortium of the Municipality of Kazanlak and an NGO—Foundation Project Buzludzha. The municipality serves as the lead partner, the Regional Administration of Stara Zagora acts as the principal implementing authority, and the Foundation participates as an expert partner [61,62]. Currently, the repair works are in progress.

3.3.3. The Importance of Coasian Competition for the Conservation of the Buzludzha Monument

The purpose of Coasian competition is to allocate management and ownership rights to the candidate willing and able to assume the full costs associated with a resource. In practice, these costs reflect not only economic value but also the expenditures required for restoration and conservation. The assessment of architectural and historical value depends significantly on the specialization and interests of the competing actors.

The principal participants in the Coasian competition surrounding the monument include the state, the Municipality of Kazanlak, BSP, formal and informal associations, and individual advocates [62]. Although their motivations differ in value, the enormous cost of restoration represents a major barrier for all potential claimants.

Since 1992, the owner of the monument has been the Bulgarian state, represented by the Ministry of Culture and the Regional Administration of Stara Zagora. While the state is the legitimate representative of the Bulgarian people and their cultural heritage, it has failed to allocate sufficient resources for the monument’s maintenance. It should also be recognized that limited public resources and relatively low taxation rates constrain the state’s ability to finance projects of this scale. Better preservation of heritage would require higher public expenditure and, consequently, higher taxes, which most citizens are reluctant to support. In 2018, following an initiative by Foundation Project Buzludzha, a procedure was launched to designate the monument as an immovable cultural property of national significance. The procedure was completed in 2021.

The Municipality of Kazanlak has repeatedly expressed its willingness to manage the monument. However, the cost of restoration exceeds its financial capacity. In 2024, the municipality organized a local referendum seeking authority to manage the monument free of charge for ten years, but the referendum failed because of insufficient voter turnout [61].

BSP has also repeatedly asserted claims to ownership. Yet when the state offered to transfer the monument free of charge in 2011, BSP refrained from this option. The most plausible explanation is the financial burden associated with the required restoration works.

Among the remaining organizations, Foundation Project Buzludzha is by far the most significant. Organizations such as Foundation Project Buzludzha represent citizens who place particularly high value on architectural heritage and cultural memory. Other advocates have contributed primarily as individuals—for example, the monument’s architect, Georgi Stoilov, and the publisher Petar Zhelyazkov—but they have been unable to mobilize significant resources or make a comparable contribution.

Foundation Project Buzludzha may be regarded as the monument’s best steward. The Foundation has contributed more to the preservation of the monument than any other stakeholder. Established in 2015 by architect Dora Ivanova, it has become the leading non-state actor in the conservation process. The Foundation has organized international expert networks, prepared conservation and adaptive reuse plans, attracted international funding, and built public support through cultural events, public forums, and educational initiatives. As a result of these efforts, Buzludzha was included in Europa Nostra’s “7 Most Endangered” programme in 2018. In 2019, the Foundation initiated cooperation with the Getty Foundation, leading to the preparation of an international Conservation and Management Plan. Its most significant achievement to date has been the successful application, prepared jointly with the Municipality of Kazanlak, that secured approximately €3.5 million for the monument’s most urgent conservation works [61,63].

The outlined contributions suggest Foundation Project Buzludzha is not only the best steward, but also a potential best-suited owner. Indeed, it has already demonstrated ownership-related functions without possessing ownership rights.

3.3.4. The Tragedy of the Anticommons After 1989

Many commentators concerned about the deterioration of the monument emphasize the institutional vacuum that emerged after 1989. This situation is closely related to Heller’s theory of the anticommons, according to which a large number of actors holding rights or legitimate claims to rights may obstruct one another’s actions.

Such tendencies are clearly visible in the management of the Buzludzha Monument. First, ownership rights were poorly defined during the socialist period. Second, even after state ownership was formally established in 1992, many actors continued to regard the arrangement as temporary or incomplete. As a result, competing claims persisted while the existing management framework remained widely contested.

Under these conditions, the initiatives of some actors frequently obstruct those of others, creating an additional barrier to the effective management and conservation of the monument (

Table 1. Summary of Key Aspects of the Comparison of the Two Case Studies.

Area of Analysis	Farnsworth House	Buzludza Monument
Degree or privateness/publicness of the property regime	Initially: Ownership with a very high degree of privateness. After 2003: Owned by an NPO consortium with a high degree of publicness.	Initially: Imperfectly defined state ownership. After 1989: State private property administered by the Regional Administration of Stara Zagora.
Stakeholders and participants in the management of the object of cultural heritage	Private owners; the State of Illinois; philanthropists; art collectors and dealers; NPOs.	The Bulgarian State; the Regional Administration of Stara Zagora; Kazanlak Municipality; political parties; NPOs; professional communities.
Mechanisms of Coasian bargaining	Negotiations between the State of Illinois (Governor and Attorney General) and Peter Palumbo (2001–2002). Direct bargaining among three NPOs and a real estate developer during the Sotheby’s auction (12 December 2003).	Ongoing negotiations among the Regional Administration of Stara Zagora, the Council of Ministers, NINKN, Kazanlak Municipality, NPOs, professional communities, and private individuals.
Funding and resource mobilisation	Private donations, fundraising campaigns, foundation grants, and visitor revenue.	Public funding, EU programmes, project funding, and public fundraising campaigns.
Final/current distribution of management and control entitlements	Management and control rights vested in a heritage conservation organization with the commitment and financial capacity to preserve the asset.	The State retains ownership, while management and control rights are shared between public authorities and NPOs, with limited coordination.
Key finding	A clear allocation of management rights facilitates resource mobilisation and long-term conservation.	State ownership alone does not ensure effective management in the absence of a clear allocation of rights and responsibilities.

).

3.4. Comparison of the Two Case Studies

4. Results, Discussion and Conclusions

One of the principal objectives of this study was to examine the relevance of the Theory of Complex Property Rights (TCPR) through two case studies involving the conservation of prominent architectural heritage assets: Farnsworth House and the Buzludzha Monument. This section summarizes the principal findings of the analysis.

4.1. Answers to the Three Research Questions

The study provides the following answers to the three research questions.

• What is the role of property rights and private owners in the conservation of architectural heritage?

The analysis confirms that property rights are of critical importance for the conservation of architectural heritage. The two case studies demonstrate that successful conservation depends on whether the actor exercising management and control rights possesses the expertise, motivation, and capacity to secure sustainable financing for conservation, maintenance, and adaptive reuse.

In the case of Farnsworth House, Peter Palumbo was unquestionably knowledgeable about architectural heritage. Similar expertise was present among the members of the Friends of Farnsworth House, Landmarks Illinois, and the National Trust for Historic Preservation. Likewise, Foundation Project Buzludzha and its founder, architect Dora Ivanova, have demonstrated substantial expertise in heritage conservation. Most importantly, both the individuals and organizations involved were highly motivated advocates of architectural heritage who attached exceptional value to its preservation.

• Who can be the best-suited owner or serve as the best steward of architectural heritage, and how should rights and responsibilities be allocated?

The best steward is an actor who places a high value on the architectural significance of a heritage asset, possesses the organizational capacity required for its management, and is capable of securing sustainable funding for its preservation. For this reason, management rights and ownership rights should be allocated through procedures that may be described as Coasian in nature, rewarding those actors who are willing and able to commit the greatest resources to the conservation and sustainable use of the asset.

The Farnsworth House case illustrates this principle particularly well. Both Edith Farnsworth and Peter Palumbo acted as responsible stewards who invested substantial resources in maintaining the property and preserving its architectural value. However, once each owner reached the limits of his or her financial capacity, ownership had to pass to another actor capable of providing greater resources for conservation.

The Buzludzha Monument presents a different situation. The scale of the required investment is so large that very few potential claimants are capable of financing the necessary restoration works. To date, Foundation Project Buzludzha has been the only actor that has successfully mobilized substantial resources and secured major external funding; the Foundation has therefore demonstrated the practical capacity to exercise management and control rights. Consequently, the case provides strong evidence that the Foundation should be entrusted with the principal management and control rights associated with the monument.

• What role should advocates of architectural heritageplay in its conservation?

Some of the most important conclusions of this study concern the role of heritage advocates, professional communities, and their organizations. In our view, it is essential that these actors fully recognize the significance of their role, which may take two distinct forms.

First, heritage advocates should articulate and promote the architectural value of heritage assets, mobilize public support, assist in securing financial resources, and, where necessary, assume ownership responsibilities themselves. This role is exemplified by the Friends of Farnsworth House, Landmarks Illinois, and the National Trust for Historic Preservation.

Second, heritage advocates should actively seek participation in the governance of heritage assets in partnership with public institutions. In many cases, they possess the expertise, motivation, and commitment required for the effective exercise of management and control rights.

4.2. Some Key Recommendations

This article has emphasized the important role that advocates of architectural heritage can play in conservation. The preceding discussion identified two groups of activities that heritage advocates must undertake if they wish to contribute effectively to conservation efforts. The underlying implication is that they should rely less on the automatic intervention of the state and more on their own initiatives and contributions. This does not diminish the role of governments; rather, it highlights the importance of cooperation between public institutions and civil society in the conservation of heritage assets.

At the same time, recommendations should also be directed towards central and local governments because of their crucial role in heritage management. Governments represent local and national communities, which are the legitimate holders of rights associated with cultural heritage. Accordingly, governments should recognize that the most reliable strategy for managing architectural heritage is to identify the best-suited owner or steward—namely, the actor who places the highest value on architectural significance and possesses the capacity to preserve it—and to allocate the relevant property rights accordingly. The most effective method of making such a selection is through a process of Coasian competition (or Coasian bargaining), whereby competing actors demonstrate their ability to preserve and enhance the value of the resource.

Another key aspect of property-rights allocation is the establishment of effective conservation requirements, monitoring mechanisms, and enforcement procedures governing the behaviour of owners and managers of heritage assets. Effective oversight should continue after rights have been assigned in order to ensure compliance with conservation objectives.

It is equally important that local authorities create favourable conditions enabling responsible owners and stewards to generate income from heritage assets while preserving their architectural value. In the case of the Buzludzha Monument, one potentially effective strategy would be to support the development of a broader tourism complex centred on the monument. As a distinctive example of socialist modernist architecture, Buzludzha has the potential to become the focal point of a major cultural and tourism destination. Such an approach could generate a stable revenue stream through which the best-suited owner or steward would be able to finance the long-term preservation of the monument’s architectural value.