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Proceedings, 2026, IECGA 2025

The 1st International Electronic Conference on Games (IECGA 2025)

Online | 15–16 October 2025

Volume Editors:

Kjell Hausken, University of Stavanger, Norway

Number of Papers: 3
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Cover Story (view full-size image): The 1st International Electronic Conference on Games (IECGA 2025) was held virtually from 15 to 16 October 2025. This conference presented the latest studies in experimental game theory, applied game [...] Read more.
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16 pages, 251 KB  
Conference Report
Abstracts of the 1st International Electronic Conference on Games (IECGA 2025)
by Kjell Hausken
Proceedings 2026, 135(1), 1; https://doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2026135001 - 7 Jan 2026
Viewed by 522
Abstract
The 1st International Electronic Conference on Games (IECGA 2025) was hosted online from 15 to 16 October 2025 [...] Full article
(This article belongs to the Proceedings of The 1st International Electronic Conference on Games (IECGA 2025))
7 pages, 1557 KB  
Proceeding Paper
Allais–Ellsberg Convergent Markov–Network Game
by Adil Ahmad Mughal
Proceedings 2026, 135(1), 2; https://doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2026135002 - 19 Jan 2026
Viewed by 185
Abstract
Behavioral deviations from subjective expected utility theory, most famously captured by the Allais paradox and the Ellsberg paradox, have inspired extensive theoretical and experimental research into risk and ambiguity preferences. While the existing analyze these paradoxes independently, little work explores how such heterogeneously [...] Read more.
Behavioral deviations from subjective expected utility theory, most famously captured by the Allais paradox and the Ellsberg paradox, have inspired extensive theoretical and experimental research into risk and ambiguity preferences. While the existing analyze these paradoxes independently, little work explores how such heterogeneously biased agents interact in networked strategic environments. Our paper fills this gap by modeling a convergent Markov–network game between Allais-type and Ellsberg-type players, each endowed with fully enriched loss matrices that reflect their distinct probabilistic and ambiguity attitudes. We define convergent priors as those inducing a spectral radius of <1 in iterated enriched matrices, ensuring iterative convergence under a matrix-based update rule. Players minimize their losses under these priors in each iteration, converging to an equilibrium where no further updates are feasible. We analyze this convergence under three learning regimes—homophily, heterophily, and type-neutral randomness—each defined via distinct neighborhood learning dynamics. To validate the equilibrium, we construct a risk-neutral measure by transforming losses into payoffs and derive a riskless rate of return representing players’ subjective indifference to risk. This applies risk-neutral pricing logic to behavioral matrices, which is novel. This framework unifies paradox-type decision makers within a networked Markovian environment (stochastic adjacency matrix), extending models of dynamic learning and providing a novel equilibrium characterization for heterogeneous, ambiguity-averse agents in structured interactions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Proceedings of The 1st International Electronic Conference on Games (IECGA 2025))
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7 pages, 167 KB  
Proceeding Paper
Negotiating Forest Rights Debates: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Stakeholder Behaviour in the Western Himalayas
by Aanchal Seth
Proceedings 2026, 135(1), 3; https://doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2026135003 - 14 Feb 2026
Viewed by 238
Abstract
This study employs cooperative, behavioural, and experimental game theory to examine how forest rights are negotiated among tribal communities, government agencies, and civil society organisations in the western Himalayas. It explores how claims over access, governance, and benefit-sharing regarding forest resources are asserted, [...] Read more.
This study employs cooperative, behavioural, and experimental game theory to examine how forest rights are negotiated among tribal communities, government agencies, and civil society organisations in the western Himalayas. It explores how claims over access, governance, and benefit-sharing regarding forest resources are asserted, contested, and mediated in a complex socio-political environment. This research adopts a mixed-methods approach. Qualitative data from in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. Quantitative data from structured surveys and field-based experiments. The findings underscore the importance of integrating traditional knowledge systems with modern development policies. This study emphasises the need for sustainable and inclusive strategies that protect both the environment and local livelihoods. Full article
(This article belongs to the Proceedings of The 1st International Electronic Conference on Games (IECGA 2025))
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