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Article

Compiled Constructions towards Post-Quantum Group Key Exchange: A Design from Kyber

1
MACIMTE, U. Rey Juan Carlos, 28933 Móstoles, Spain
2
BBVA Next Technologies, 28050 Madrid, Spain
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Mathematics 2020, 8(10), 1853; https://doi.org/10.3390/math8101853
Received: 15 September 2020 / Revised: 9 October 2020 / Accepted: 13 October 2020 / Published: 21 October 2020
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Mathematics Cryptography and Information Security)
A group authenticated key exchange (GAKE) protocol allows a set of parties belonging to a certain designated group to agree upon a common secret key through an insecure communication network. In the last few years, many new cryptographic tools have been specifically designed to thwart attacks from adversaries which may have access to (different kinds of) quantum computation resources. However, few constructions for group key exchange have been put forward. Here, we propose a four-round GAKE which can be proven secure under widely accepted assumptions in the Quantum Random Oracle Model. Specifically, we integrate several primitives from the so-called Kyber suite of post-quantum tools in a (slightly modified) compiler from Abdalla et al. (TCC 2007). More precisely, taking as a starting point an IND-CPA encryption scheme from the Kyber portfolio, we derive, using results from Hövelmanns et al. (PKC 2020), a two-party key exchange protocol and an IND-CCA encryption scheme and prove them fit as building blocks for our compiled construction. The resulting GAKE protocol is secure under the Module-LWE assumption, and furthermore achieves authentication without the use of (expensive) post-quantum signatures. View Full-Text
Keywords: post-quantum cryptography; group authenticated key exchange; Module-LWE; Kyber post-quantum cryptography; group authenticated key exchange; Module-LWE; Kyber
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MDPI and ACS Style

Escribano Pablos, J.I.; González Vasco, M.I.; Marriaga, M.E.; Pérez del Pozo, Á.L. Compiled Constructions towards Post-Quantum Group Key Exchange: A Design from Kyber. Mathematics 2020, 8, 1853. https://doi.org/10.3390/math8101853

AMA Style

Escribano Pablos JI, González Vasco MI, Marriaga ME, Pérez del Pozo ÁL. Compiled Constructions towards Post-Quantum Group Key Exchange: A Design from Kyber. Mathematics. 2020; 8(10):1853. https://doi.org/10.3390/math8101853

Chicago/Turabian Style

Escribano Pablos, José I., María I. González Vasco, Misael E. Marriaga, and Ángel L. Pérez del Pozo 2020. "Compiled Constructions towards Post-Quantum Group Key Exchange: A Design from Kyber" Mathematics 8, no. 10: 1853. https://doi.org/10.3390/math8101853

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