To systematically analyze the determinants influencing sustainable investment, it is essential to first understand the core strategic interactions in the shipping supply chain. In the context of emission reduction investment, the most critical interaction occurs between ports and shipping enterprises, as their investment decisions are highly interdependent and directly determine the overall emission level of the supply chain. Therefore, this section takes the green investment in a shipping supply chain as the entry point, and employs an evolutionary game model to identify the key factors that drive their strategic choices.
4.1. Evolutionary Game Strategy of Sustainable Investment
We focus our analysis on the container shipping supply chain, as its significant contribution to total global emissions makes it a critical focus for reduction research. Although container shipping enterprises account for approximately 16% of the global fleet, their CO
2 emissions represent nearly 34% of the total [
38], making them a critical focus for global decarbonization efforts. Given this context, we simplify the complex shipping supply chain network into a representative two-level supply chain comprising a single port and a single container shipping enterprise [
11,
39]. The port is obligated to meet governmental emission targets, while the shipping enterprise is subject to international scrutiny and the demands of shippers who prioritize low-carbon services.
The relevant notations involved in this paper are listed in
Table 2. The pricing of freight services is jointly determined by the port and the shipping enterprise, expressed as
, where we normalize the operating cost of the port as zero [
40]. Assuming that in the freight market, the owners have a preference for low-carbon services, and the market demand function is defined as
, where
[
14]. The sustainable technical level
and the pricing of freight services
p directly influence the shipper’s demand. The sustainable technical level in this study represents the efforts made by enterprises to improve the port environment during the service process. Port and shipping enterprises are independent economic entities, each responsible for determining its own sustainable technical level with the objective of maximizing profits. However, when adopting sustainable investment practices, both parties need to make additional investments.
Port and shipping enterprises are encouraged to invest in low-carbon technology to foster sustainable development and improve their sustainability level . Assuming that the investment cost is , which shall be borne by both parties, denotes the sustainability investment cost coefficient. If both parties invest simultaneously, they share the investment cost, with the shipping enterprise bearing , and the port bearing , where the sharing coefficient is . The research in this thesis is mainly represented by low-carbon technology.
The government has implemented a carbon emission cap
for ports in accordance with the cap-and-trade scheme [
41]. Carbon emissions are a byproduct of shipping services provided to customers. If emissions exceed the cap, the port can purchase additional quotas through the carbon trading market; otherwise, it can sell unused quotas. The trade price of carbon emission permits
is determined by the carbon trading market [
23]. The carbon emissions generated during cargo transportation can be calculated as
, where
represents the initial carbon emissions per unit of cargo, and
denotes the low-carbon coefficient effect on reducing emissions. Since new technologies cannot completely eliminate carbon emissions, the sustainability level should satisfy
.
Based on the above problem description, we assume that the shipping enterprise acts as the Stackelberg leader due to its dominant market position. First, the formation of shipping alliances enhances carriers’ bargaining power, allowing them to determine marginal profits as first movers [
42]. Second, vertical integration strategies, exemplified by CMA CGM’s global terminal investments, further solidify this leverage. Consequently, shipping enterprises first determine marginal profit, while ports act as followers, setting the competitive service fee [
43].
Table 3 demonstrates the profit derived from four different investment strategies. The equilibrium solution can be obtained using backward induction, as demonstrated in
Appendix A.
Drawing upon behavioral economics, we assume that port and shipping enterprises can make independent investment decisions and play the game in the future to ensure continuous cooperation. Specifically, we assume that the probabilities of a port investing or not investing in sustainable technology are represented by (
x) and (1 −
x), respectively, while those of a shipping enterprise investing or not investing are represented by (
y) and (1 −
y). The payoff matrix is simplified and shown in
Table 4.
We assume
. By analyzing the evolutionary game situation in
Figure 2, the distribution of stable points in
Table 5 can be obtained, with the corresponding evolutionary phase diagram is shown in
Figure 3.
In the long-term sustainable investment of the shipping supply chain, three kinds of locally stable situations represent the stable equilibrium of the system’s evolution. Depending on the conditions, ports and shipping enterprises make different investment choices, but sustainable investment remains superior to situations where neither party invests.
In Case 1, when the joint investment share ratio is , the shipping enterprise bears a small portion of the investment cost, making green investment highly attractive to it. Therefore, the optimal strategy for the shipping enterprise is to “invest”. As a rational participant, the port’s optimal strategy becomes to “not invest” when it is certain that the shipping enterprise will invest. This allows the port to save costs and benefit from the positive externality brought by the shipping enterprise’s investment. As a result, the system will stabilize at the unique equilibrium point .
In Case 2, when the joint investment share ratio is in a moderate range
, the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) becomes
or
, indicating that only one party invests. The evolutionary process and the final stable state are influenced by the saddle point
of the initial game states. As illustrated in
Figure 3b, if the initial state lies in the ABCE region, the system will eventually converge at point
B, indicating that only the port invests while shipping enterprise does not. In contrast, if the initial state lies within the ADCE region, the system will eventually converge at the point where the shipping enterprise invests, while the port does not. Therefore, the probability of the system’s stability strategy is determined by the size of the regions
and
, as shown in Equation (10). This suggests that precise policy interventions, such as providing temporary subsidies to one party, can guide the evolutionary path toward a more desirable ESS by altering the initial game conditions.
In Case 3, when the joint investment share ratio is , in contrast to Case 1, the shipping enterprise is required to bear most of the investment cost, investment is no longer attractive to it, and its optimal strategy is to “not invest”. In this case, to meet the government’s emission reduction targets and market demand, the port is forced to invest alone, while the shipping enterprise can ride free and benefit from the green investment provided by the port. Therefore, the system ultimately stabilizes at the unique equilibrium point . Next, the main factors that influence investment in port and shipping enterprise will be analyzed.
4.2. Identification of Influencing Factors
The analysis of the evolutionary game model in
Section 4.1 reveals five key factors that govern the strategic investment choices: the cost-sharing ratio, investment efficiency, carbon price, consumer sensitivity, and emission reduction index. External factors include consumer sensitivity and carbon price, while internal factors comprise investment efficiency, emission reduction index, and sharing ratio (
Figure 4). These are identified as the primary direct factors influencing sustainable investment behavior in the shipping supply chain. As the model simulates, these factors determine the relative influence and direction of investment decisions under varying conditions. They therefore serve as the theoretical foundation for the subsequent fuzzy multi-method analysis. This approach ensures a logical connection between the model’s theoretical insights and the empirical evaluation.
To refine the theoretical framework, five direct factors were further decomposed into 15 sub-factors according to their behavioral relevance in port-shipping low-carbon investment. The selection and structure of sub-factors were verified through expert consultation to ensure rationality and non-redundancy. In addition, real-world developments reported in industry news and official announcements were used to inform the identification of relevant sub-factors and to contextualize their practical relevance.
Table 6 summarizes these sub-factors, their corresponding emission reduction strategies, and representative references, forming the analytical foundation for subsequent behavioral mechanism analysis. Furthermore, the detailed definitions of these sub-factors and their relationships with the direct factors are systematically elucidated in
Appendix B.
- (1)
Investment efficiency
Investment efficiency is not an internal financial objective of the shipping enterprise, but rather a comprehensive concept jointly shaped by three factors: government intervention, market perfection degree, and enterprise governance level. Regarding government intervention (C1), public policy serves as a key external variable that influences the efficiency of capital allocation. The study shows that appropriate policy incentives can channel capital toward the most efficient green projects, whereas inappropriate intervention may distort market signals and thereby reduce overall investment efficiency [
44]. Regarding market perfection degree (C2), a well-functioning market mechanism ensures that capital flows at the lowest cost to areas with the highest returns. For example, a mature green financial system can provide clearer financing channels for the development of low-carbon technologies [
45]. Regarding enterprise governance level (C3), a sound governance structure ensures that investment decisions can be effectively implemented. For example, establishing a dedicated sustainability committee enables the systematic planning and supervision of low-carbon investments, thereby enhancing the efficiency of capital allocation [
46].
- (2)
Consumer sensitivity
Consumer sensitivity primarily affects low-carbon investments through three channels: product factors provided by the shipping enterprise, marketing strategy targeting environmentally conscious consumers, and the satisfaction ultimately experienced by consumers. Product factors (C4) serve as the fundamental carrier of consumer sensitivity. Investing in green product services is a prerequisite for converting this sensitivity into commercial value. If the shipping enterprise does not invest in low-carbon services capable of delivering actual low-carbon transport, consumer sensitivity remains merely an abstract demand [
48]. Marketing strategy (C5) serves as a tool to guide and enhance consumer sensitivity. An effective marketing strategy can amplify shippers’ attention to sustainability and convert latent preferences into actual purchasing behavior [
49]. In the shipping context, customer satisfaction (C6) is defined as a shipper’s overall evaluation of a service based on their total purchase and consumption experience [
50], which is the key component for maintaining consumer sensitivity. If the shipping enterprise fails to fulfill its commitments regarding emission reduction measures, the use of green fuels, and transparent information disclosure, customer satisfaction will be undermined, thereby reducing consumer sensitivity.
- (3)
Carbon price
Carbon price fluctuations are influenced by macroeconomic environment, related energy prices, and external environmental factors. Macroeconomic environment (C7) plays a pivotal role in shaping carbon price through its impact on actual carbon emissions. When studying variables affecting carbon pricing in domestic pilot projects, researchers often consider the Shanghai and Shenzhen 300 Index (HS300) as representative macroeconomic indicators, providing a more accurate reflection of China’s economic development [
51]. Related energy prices (C8) can be regarded as the opportunity cost of green transition. Fluctuations in other energy prices directly alter the economic incentives for shipping enterprises to reduce emissions, thereby causing short-term volatility in carbon price [
53]. For example, higher prices of non-clean energy, such as coal, prompt enterprises to opt for cleaner alternatives, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and leading to a decline in both carbon emission demand and carbon price. Environmental factors (C9) influence carbon market policies by affecting public sentiment and regulatory pressure, which in turn indirectly transmit to carbon price. Additionally, they influence carbon price because extreme weather conditions usually cause abrupt fluctuations in fossil energy consumption, which in turn affect the demand for carbon allowances [
52].
- (4)
Emission reduction index
The emission reduction index, representing an enterprise’s overall emission reduction efficiency, is determined by technology, operational measures, and energy type. Technological (C10) is a core driver for enhancing emission reduction efficiency. For example, by adopting air lubrication systems and bulbous bow optimization, shipping enterprise can significantly reduce carbon emissions per unit of transport, thereby improving its overall emission reduction performance [
15]. Operational measures (C11) achieve efficient energy utilization by optimizing voyage planning [
55], speed management [
56], and loading efficiency [
54]. The choice of energy type (C12) is a fundamental factor determining carbon intensity. Transitioning from conventional heavy fuel oil to LNG, methanol, or ammonia can substantially enhance emission reduction efficiency [
56].
- (5)
Cost share ratio
The cost share ratio is primarily determined by three factors: each party’s resources, corporate scale, and investment inclination. With regard to resource (C13), capital and technological resources determine a shipping enterprise’s capacity to bear investment risks, thereby directly influencing the upper limit of its acceptable cost share ratio in negotiations [
59]. Corporate scale (C14) is a key factor influencing the cost share ratio. Large enterprises possess advantages such as superior human resources, R&D investment, and an efficient management system, all of which facilitate carbon abatement. However, they are also subject to more internal and external supervision, which encourages them to prioritize sustainable development [
60]. Therefore, in cooperative negotiations, larger enterprises typically have both the capacity and a greater willingness to bear a higher proportion of the investment cost. Investment inclination (C15) determines the willingness of each party to contribute [
61]. When a shipping enterprise regards low-carbon investment as a strategic priority, it places greater value on long-term intangible benefits. This strong investment inclination leads to greater sincerity in negotiations, making it willing to bear a larger share of costs to facilitate cooperation.