Evaluating the Effectiveness of Standardized Sales Incentive Contracts Under Agent Heterogeneity
Abstract
1. Introduction
- (1)
- Does heterogeneity among the salespeople lead to a loss in incentive effectiveness under standardized incentive contracts?
- (2)
- How can firms identify and quantify the presence and degree of such heterogeneity as well as evaluate the effectiveness of standardized incentive schemes?
- (3)
- Do different types of salesperson heterogeneity, such as heterogeneity in capability versus heterogeneity in risk attitude, differ in their impact on contract effectiveness and in the methods required for their evaluation?
2. Literature Review
2.1. Research on the Design of Sales Incentive Contracts
2.2. Research on the Evaluation of Sales Incentive Contract Effectiveness
2.3. Contributions
- (1)
- Theoretical Advancement: By focusing on the effectiveness evaluation of standardized sales incentive contracts, this research addresses a critical gap in the sales compensation literature. It extends the scope of incentive contract management and responds to Ahearne and Ahearne’s [8] call for further investigation into the effectiveness of sales incentive allocations;
- (2)
- Modeling and Methodology: Leveraging a principal–agent game-theoretical framework, we examine heterogeneous salespeople’s responses to standardized incentive contracts. Our analysis yields two novel methodologies for assessing contract effectiveness, thereby establishing a robust theoretical foundation for future research in this domain;
- (3)
- Managerial Implications: The proposed evaluation frameworks demonstrate strong operational feasibility, offering actionable insights for salesperson management. These tools enable firms to systematically optimize incentive structures, enhancing both efficiency and effectiveness in salesperson management.
3. Model
3.1. Firm
3.2. Salesperson
3.3. Decision Equilibrium
3.3.1. Scenario CK
- Incentive Compatibility Constraint (IC):
- Rational Constraint (IR):
3.3.2. Scenario PK
- Incentive Compatibility Constraint (IC1):
- Incentive Compatibility Constraint (IC2):
- Rational Constraint (IR):
4. The Incentive Contract Effectiveness Evaluation with Salesperson Heterogeneity
4.1. Salesperson Heterogeneity in Scenario CK
4.1.1. The Incentive Contract Effectiveness Evaluation with Heterogeneity in Salespeople’s Capabilities
4.1.2. The Incentive Contract Effectiveness Evaluation with Heterogeneity in Salespeople’s Effort Costs
4.1.3. The Incentive Contract Effectiveness Evaluation with Heterogeneity in Salespeople’s Risk Attitudes
4.2. Salesperson Heterogeneity in Scenario PK
4.2.1. The Incentive Contract Effectiveness Evaluation with Heterogeneity in Salespeople’s Capabilities
4.2.2. The Incentive Contract Effectiveness Evaluation with Heterogeneity in Salespeople’s Effort Costs
4.2.3. The Incentive Contract Effectiveness Evaluation with Heterogeneity in Salespeople’s Risk Attitudes
4.3. Summary of Evaluation Methods
- (1)
- Evaluation based on actual income distribution relies on interim performance outcomes as evaluation signals, serving as a form of ex post (real-time) control. In contrast, evaluation based on salespeople’s reported market potential sales volumes uses their information transmission as signals and functions as a form of ex ante (preemptive) control;
- (2)
- In the game between the firm and salespeople over the sales incentive contract, when the market potential is private information held by the salespeople, the ex ante control method is effective under all three types of heterogeneity: capability, effort cost, and risk attitude. When the market potential is common knowledge, the ex post control method is effective under capability heterogeneity and effort cost heterogeneity but ineffective under risk attitude heterogeneity;
- (3)
- Even when the market potential is private information, the ex post control method remains effective under capability and effort cost heterogeneities and can serve as a complementary approach to ex ante control in practical implementation.
4.4. Further Discussion on Dynamics and Selection
5. Monte Carlo Numerical Simulation Experiments
5.1. Salesperson Heterogeneity in Scenario CK
5.2. Salesperson Heterogeneity in Scenario PK
5.3. Robustness Check
6. Conclusions
6.1. Key Findings
6.2. Managerial Implications
6.3. Limitations and Future Research
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Appendix A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Appendix A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
Appendix A.3. Proof of Proposition 3
Appendix A.4. Proof of Proposition 8
Appendix A.5. Proof of Proposition 9
Appendix A.6. Proof of Proposition 10
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Literature | Research Method | Research Contexts | Focus on Practical Effectiveness | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Game-Theoretical Models | Empirical Econometric Approaches | Platform-Based Heterogeneity Estimation | |||
Basu et al. [10] | ✓ | Basic Enterprise Sales | |||
Lal and Staelin [12] | ✓ | Basic Enterprise Sales | |||
Mishra and Prasad [16] | ✓ | Basic Enterprise Sales with Pricing Delegation | |||
Dai and Jerath [20] | ✓ | Basic Enterprise Sales with Inventory | |||
Bhargava and Rubel [22] | ✓ | Two-sided Market Sales | |||
Dai et al. [23] | ✓ | Multitasking Sales | |||
Homburg et al. [32] | ✓ | Effects of Unit Structures | Partially | ||
Zhang et al. [26] | ✓ | Brand-Managed Retail Sales | |||
Opitz et al. [34] | ✓ | Online Labor Platforms | Partially | ||
This paper | ✓ | Basic Enterprise Sales | ✓ |
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Wang, N.; Duan, H.; Ning, L. Evaluating the Effectiveness of Standardized Sales Incentive Contracts Under Agent Heterogeneity. Mathematics 2025, 13, 2968. https://doi.org/10.3390/math13182968
Wang N, Duan H, Ning L. Evaluating the Effectiveness of Standardized Sales Incentive Contracts Under Agent Heterogeneity. Mathematics. 2025; 13(18):2968. https://doi.org/10.3390/math13182968
Chicago/Turabian StyleWang, Ning, Housheng Duan, and Lang Ning. 2025. "Evaluating the Effectiveness of Standardized Sales Incentive Contracts Under Agent Heterogeneity" Mathematics 13, no. 18: 2968. https://doi.org/10.3390/math13182968
APA StyleWang, N., Duan, H., & Ning, L. (2025). Evaluating the Effectiveness of Standardized Sales Incentive Contracts Under Agent Heterogeneity. Mathematics, 13(18), 2968. https://doi.org/10.3390/math13182968