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Open AccessArticle

Subsidy and Pricing Model of Electric Vehicle Sharing Based on Two-Stage Stackelberg Game – A Case Study in China

School of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
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Appl. Sci. 2019, 9(8), 1631; https://doi.org/10.3390/app9081631
Received: 11 February 2019 / Revised: 8 April 2019 / Accepted: 17 April 2019 / Published: 19 April 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Energy Management and Smart Grids)
Electric vehicle sharing provides an effective way to improve the traffic situation and relieve environmental pressure. The government subsidy policy and the car-sharing operator’s pricing strategy are the key factors that affect the large-scale application of electric vehicle sharing. To address this issue, a subsidy and pricing model for electric vehicle sharing based on the two-stage Stackelberg game is proposed in this paper according to the current situation in China. First, an electric vehicle sharing operation mode under government participation is constructed. Then, a two-stage Stackelberg game model involving the government, the car-sharing operator and the consumers is proposed to determine the subsidy rates and pricing strategies. The improved particle swarm optimization algorithm is used to obtain the Nash equilibrium of the model. Also, the influence of private car cost and shared travel comfort on subsidy rates and pricing strategies is analyzed. Finally, the simulation of electric vehicle sharing in a town of China is carried out to investigate the performance of the proposed subsidy and price model. The simulation results show that the model rationally formulates subsidy policies and pricing strategies of the electric vehicle sharing to balance the interests of the three participants, mobilizing users’ enthusiasm while guaranteeing the benefits of the government and operator, making the overall benefit optimal. View Full-Text
Keywords: two-stage Stackelberg game; electric vehicle sharing; subsidy policy; pricing strategy two-stage Stackelberg game; electric vehicle sharing; subsidy policy; pricing strategy
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Yang, J.; Lin, Y.; Wu, F.; Chen, L. Subsidy and Pricing Model of Electric Vehicle Sharing Based on Two-Stage Stackelberg Game – A Case Study in China. Appl. Sci. 2019, 9, 1631.

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