Theoretical Foundations and Architectural Evolution of Cyberspace Endogenous Security: A Comprehensive Survey
Abstract
1. Introduction
1.1. Fundamental Challenges to Cyberspace Security
1.2. The Proposal and Vision of the Endogenous Security Paradigm
- First, through a systematic analysis that treats the theoretical development and architectural evolution of endogenous security as two parallel and synergistic threads, this review delineates a comprehensive panorama of its technological maturation.
- Second, it deeply dissects the latest dynamics and potential directions for integrating endogenous security with cutting-edge trends such as artificial intelligence, cloud-native technologies, and future networks.
- Third, it critically summarizes current theoretical and engineering challenges while proposing several open questions to guide future research.
1.3. Review Methodology
- Title/Abstract Screening: Documents that were clearly irrelevant, non-academic (e.g., news reports, commercial promotions), or in languages other than Chinese or English were excluded, yielding 213 papers.
- Full-Text Screening: After obtaining and reviewing the full texts, papers were further excluded if they (a) did not focus on endogenous security or its core models, (b) lacked clear methodological descriptions, (c) had inaccessible full texts, or (d) were deemed low in academic quality.
2. The Theoretical Foundations of Endogenous Security
2.1. Philosophical Thought and Core Definitions
2.2. Core Security Axioms and Assumptions
- Axiom of Heterogeneity: Security can be enhanced by constructing multiple, functionally equivalent execution entities that are heterogeneously implemented (differing in hardware, software, algorithms, or parameters). This axiom recognizes that attack success is often tightly coupled with specific implementation details. Heterogeneity ensures that a single vulnerability cannot simultaneously compromise all execution paths, thereby transforming attack “certainty” into “probability”.
- Axiom of Transformation: Security is positively correlated with dynamic transformations over time, such as changes in resource allocation, network topology, or execution policy. This axiom acknowledges that static targets afford attackers prolonged windows for reconnaissance, validation, and exploitation. Continuous or triggered transformations render the attack surface non-stationary, turning the system from a “fixed target” (easy to detect and attack) into a “moving target” (hard to detect and attack).
- Axiom of Redundancy: By constructing resource and functional redundancy alongside collaborative, multi-modal arbitration mechanisms, a system can internally detect, isolate, or tolerate failures or anomalies within a defined subset of its components (which may be under attack). This axiom grants the system inherent “intrusion tolerance” and “self-healing” capabilities.
2.3. Key Model
2.3.1. Formal Description of Dynamic Heterogeneous Redundancy Models
- Heterogeneous Execution Pool: A set of multiple, functionally equivalent execution entities that are heterogeneous in their implementation (e.g., hardware, OS, algorithms, or parameters). These entities process identical input tasks in parallel, each producing an independent output. This heterogeneity is the security cornerstone, ensuring that the same exploit manifests as distinct vulnerabilities across different entities.
- Multi-mode Arbiter: Acting as the system’s “security brain”, the arbiter receives and compares all executor outputs in real time. Its core function is to determine and output a trusted result from potentially inconsistent outputs based on a predefined strategy (e.g., majority voting, threshold judgment), while simultaneously identifying and flagging anomalous executors.
- Feedback Controller & Scheduler: Driven by anomaly signals from the arbiter, this component dynamically manages the system state. Its key actions include sanitizing, resetting, or repairing flagged executors, and dynamically scheduling, replacing, or reorganizing entities within the pool. This continuous adjustment alters the system’s attack surface over time.
2.3.2. Analysis of Safety Enhancement Mechanisms
- Spatial Defense via Heterogeneous Redundancy: This forms the first defensive layer. Because multiple, functionally equivalent execution entities operate in parallel with inherent implementation heterogeneity, an attack payload targeting a specific vulnerability in one entity cannot produce identical effects on others. This prevents a single-point exploit from simultaneously compromising all output paths, thereby confining attacks to localized components.
- Temporal Uncertainty via Dynamic Scheduling: The feedback control loop continuously or selectively alters the active set of executors and their configurations. Consequently, even if an attacker successfully exploits a vulnerability in a specific executor at time *t*, their attack vector may rapidly become ineffective as the target is scheduled offline or its environment changes. This drastically compresses the viable attack window, disrupting the continuous cycle of reconnaissance, exploitation, and lateral movement.
- Anomaly Neutralization via Multi-mode Adjudication: The arbiter performs real-time comparison of outputs from all heterogeneous executors. Any anomalous output from a compromised executor is identified and discarded due to its inconsistency with the majority. The system’s correct output is thus guaranteed by consensus or more sophisticated strategies, ensuring that the failure of one or several components does not lead to system failure.
2.4. Threat Model and Adversarial Assumptions
2.4.1. Assumed Capabilities and Knowledge of the Adversary
- Full Exploitation Capability: The adversary can exploit unknown vulnerabilities (e.g., 0-day), design backdoors, or configuration errors to fully compromise and control one or more execution entities. This enables data theft and the tampering of internal logic or outputs.
- Limited Prior Knowledge: Initially, the adversary lacks complete vulnerability information for all heterogeneous execution entities and is unaware of the system’s real-time dynamic scheduling policies. Acquiring this intelligence requires continuous reconnaissance.
- Non-Instantaneous Coordination: Compromising different heterogeneous entities is a sequential process requiring time for reconnaissance, adaptation, and attack. DHR’s dynamic design aims to disrupt and compress this timeline, thereby increasing the difficulty of mounting a coordinated attack across all entities.
- Inability to Subvert Cryptographic Foundations: The adversary cannot break the cryptographic primitives (e.g., secure hash functions, digital signatures) used to ensure secure communication between entities, identity authentication, and code integrity verification.
2.4.2. System Trust Boundaries and Security Assumptions
- Trustworthiness of the Arbiter and Scheduler: The multi-modal arbiter and the feedback-controlled scheduler constitute the Trusted Computing Base of the system. They must be implemented within a hardware-protected trusted execution environment or as formally verified, high-assurance modules. This assumption is fundamental; a compromised arbiter would lead to a catastrophic failure of the security mechanism.
- Initial Cleanliness of the Resource Pool: During system initialization or reconfiguration, the execution entity instances drawn from the heterogeneous resource pool are assumed to be free of pre-embedded, targeted malicious code. The system relies on dynamic reset, sanitization, and scheduling to mitigate runtime contamination.
- Reliable Functional Equivalence: All heterogeneous execution entities, when processing valid inputs, must produce semantically consistent outputs that conform to the prescribed specifications. This reliability is essential for the effective operation of the multi-modal adjudication mechanism.
2.4.3. Core Defense Focus and Applicable Scenarios
- Attacks Leveraging Specific Vulnerabilities: This is the primary defense target. The architectural heterogeneity ensures that a single vulnerability cannot compromise all execution paths, while its dynamism causes the reconnaissance and exploit cycle against a specific target to become obsolete quickly.
- Non-Coordinated, Incremental Penetration: An attacker attempting to probe and compromise entities sequentially to gain majority control is mitigated by DHR’s adjudication mechanism, which isolates anomalous outputs from a minority of compromised entities. Concurrently, dynamic scheduling replaces suspected or confirmed compromised units, thereby resetting the attacker’s foothold.
3. The Evolutionary Path of the Endogenous Security Architecture
3.1. Early Architecture: Prototypes and Practices of Mimetic Defense
3.2. Evolution and Expansion: From Concept to Universal Framework
3.2.1. Extension of the Dimension of Heterogeneity
- Algorithmic and Implementation Heterogeneity: Under identical functional specifications, systems employ multiple algorithms based on distinct principles, each with independently developed code. For example, image encoding might concurrently use encoders for different standards (e.g., JPEG, WebP), while cryptographic operations run implementations from separate libraries (e.g., OpenSSL, BoringSSL) [23]. This compels attackers to exploit entirely independent vulnerabilities across disparate codebases, drastically increasing the attack complexity.
- Parameter and Configuration Heterogeneity: On identical hardware and software bases, systems introduce uncertainty at the micro-execution level by dynamically adjusting critical runtime parameters—such as randomized memory layouts, compiler optimization flags, or task scheduling policies. This “lightweight” heterogeneity strategy significantly reduces resource overhead while effectively disrupting attacks that depend on predictable memory states or execution timing.
- Virtual and Cloud Resource Heterogeneity [24]: With the advent of mainstream cloud computing, heterogeneity has been abstracted into the differentiated orchestration of virtualized resource pools. Systems can dynamically assemble service instances from diverse physical hosts, virtualization technologies (KVM 5.10, Xen 4.15), container runtimes (Docker 20.10+, Kata Containers 2.4), or geographic regions to create logically unified yet physically distributed, dynamic execution environments. This not only preserves the benefits of hardware diversity but also enables elastic provisioning and automated orchestration [25].
3.2.2. Intelligent Dynamic Strategy
- Threat-Aware Scheduling: The system continuously monitors the threat landscape via external intelligence, internal anomaly detection (e.g., adjudicator inconsistency rates), or active probes. Scheduling policies then adapt dynamically—for instance, increasing transformation frequency during sustained scanning to compress attack windows, or proactively isolating and re-diversifying resource pools upon detecting anomalies targeting specific component types, enabling precise, threat-informed defense.
- Performance-Load-Aware Scheduling: Scheduling decisions holistically consider Quality of Service (QoS) metrics such as system resource utilization and service latency. The objective is to dynamically balance security and efficiency. For example, more aggressive, resource-intensive scheduling may be employed during off-peak hours to elevate security levels [27], while conservative strategies that prioritize core service performance are activated during peak loads.
- Adaptive Scheduling via Reinforcement Learning (RL): This represents the frontier of intelligent dynamism. Through continuous interaction with its environment (encompassing both attack patterns and workload states), the system uses RL algorithms to autonomously learn and converge on optimal scheduling policies (e.g., timing, target selection) for specific contexts [28]. This approach aims to achieve long-term global optimization by maximizing security gains while minimizing performance costs.
3.2.3. The Evolution of the Adjudication Mechanism
- It implicitly assumes compromised executors remain in the minority, potentially failing against sophisticated attacks that simultaneously affect multiple entities (e.g., via common design flaws).
- Its applicability is restricted to discrete, deterministic output comparisons. It struggles with legitimate but manipulated outputs (e.g., from implanted backdoors) or with complex, continuous outputs like images or text.
3.3. Standardization and Reference Architecture
- Architecture and Equipment Standardization: From the top-level design of the “Network 5.0 Endogenous security Architecture” to specifications for over 40 types of equipment—including network controllers and mimic routers/firewalls—a standardized technical system encompassing “architecture, equipment, and interfaces” has been established.
- International Standardization in Critical Scenarios: In the cutting-edge field of intelligent connected vehicles, an innovation consortium led by the Purple Mountain Laboratories successfully initiated the world’s first international standard for endogenous security in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks, paving the way for secure and trustworthy autonomous driving.
- Large-Scale Commercial Deployment: The establishment of standards has facilitated extensive commercial rollout. Examples include: intrinsically secure 5G small cells deployed for demonstration across 28 provinces; the endogenous security micro-segmentation system scheduled for nationwide deployment in 5G core networks by 2025, covering approximately 200,000 network element virtual machines; and intrinsically secure MCU chips already applied in critical power infrastructure such as substation monitoring systems [37,38,39,40].
4. Enabling Technologies and Cutting-Edge Integration
4.1. Foundational Enabling Technologies
4.2. Integration and Evolution with Cutting-Edge Technologies
4.2.1. The Empowerment of Artificial Intelligence
- Intelligent Anomaly Detection: Moving beyond traditional arbitration based on output comparison or fixed rules, AI—particularly deep learning models—can analyze massive, multi-dimensional runtime data (e.g., system call sequences, resource fingerprints, micro-features of network traffic) to construct more precise “normal behavior baselines”. This enables the detection of covert, low-frequency, or novel anomalies that elude conventional methods. Furthermore, using technologies like graph neural networks, AI can trace anomaly propagation across multiple execution entities, facilitating rapid attack localization and root-cause analysis.
- Attack Intent Prediction: Transcending reactive responses to isolated events, AI correlates external threat intelligence with internal system logs. By learning attackers’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), it can predict subsequent intentions and potential attack paths. This shifts system operations from an “event-driven” to a “threat-driven” paradigm, enabling proactive adjustments such as preemptive hardening of heterogeneous entities predicted to be targeted [45].
- Dynamic Policy Optimization: This represents AI’s most transformative application. Through reinforcement learning and similar algorithms, systems frame dynamic scheduling as a sequential decision problem within a continuous adversarial interaction. By iteratively engaging with the environment (encompassing both attacks and system states), AI agents autonomously learn optimal scheduling strategies under specific security and performance constraints, ultimately achieving the long-term maximization of security utility [46]. This approach fundamentally addresses the efficiency and adaptability limitations of early random or rule-based schedulers.
4.2.2. Architectural Adaptation for Emerging Scenarios
- “On-Demand Endogenous security” for 6G Network Slicing
- 2.
- “Declarative Endogenous security” in Cloud-Native Environments
- 3.
- “Lightweight Endogenous security” for IoT Edge Computing
- Redundancy: Moving from multi-copy, full-time redundancy to collaborative redundancy based on opportunistic communication or neighboring nodes—scheduling multiple adjacent nodes across time and space to jointly execute security-sensitive tasks [50].
- Heterogeneity: Shifting from deep hardware/OS diversity to lightweight differentiation via software configuration, algorithmic parameters, or compilation options.
- Arbitration: Adopting lightweight consensus algorithms or threshold-based local decisions to drastically reduce communication and computational overhead.
5. Application Evaluation and Challenges Outlook
5.1. Typical Application Domains and Performance Evaluation
5.1.1. Case Study 1: Endogenous Security Micro-Segmentation in 5G Core Networks
5.1.2. Case Study 2: DHR Architecture for Endogenous Security in Intelligent Connected Vehicles
5.1.3. Comparative Analysis and Paradigm Validation
5.2. Feasibility and Cost–Benefit Trade-Offs
5.2.1. Analysis of Resource and Operational Overhead
5.2.2. A Multidimensional Cost–Benefit Trade-Off Framework
5.3. Challenges Faced
5.3.1. Theoretical Challenges: From “Engineering Effectiveness” to “Rigorous Proof”
- Proofs of Strict Security Upper Bounds: Presently, the efficacy of endogenous security, particularly the Dynamic Heterogeneous Redundancy (DHR) model, is supported primarily by experimental and probabilistic evidence. This empirical foundation, however, does not render formal worst-case proofs theoretically unattainable; rather, it defines a critical, open research frontier. The central challenge is to rigorously establish the theoretical upper bound of security gain in DHR architectures under stringent adversarial models—where attackers may possess advantages such as unbounded resources or partial knowledge of scheduling strategies. Successfully addressing this challenge would not refute the paradigm’s validity but would ground its core tenet—“structure determines security”—within a more robust and universal mathematical axiomatic system. This advancement would elevate endogenous security from a powerful engineering paradigm to a formally verifiable theoretical discipline, thereby enhancing its academic rigor and providing a principled foundation for designing next-generation, high-assurance architectures.
- Quantitative Trade-off Models: The dynamic, heterogeneous, and redundant nature of the paradigm inherently introduces overhead. The absence of a universal, quantifiable model to optimize the “security-performance-overhead” trilemma impedes precise engineering trade-offs during deployment.
5.3.2. Engineering Challenges: From “Lab Prototypes” to “Large-Scale Systems”
- Heterogeneous Resource Management: Constructing and maintaining effective heterogeneous resource pools across hardware, OS, software, and cloud vendors is complex and costly. Automation toolchains for deployment, configuration, and operations remain immature, leading to high management overhead.
- The Arbitration Accuracy-Efficiency Trade-off: The arbiter’s false positives and negatives directly impact system availability and security. Simple rules struggle with complex outputs (e.g., AI inferences), causing high false alarms, while sophisticated models introduce prohibitive latency and computational cost.
- Complexity of Distributed Deployment at Scale: Current implementations focus on bounded, closed systems. Scaling to mega-systems spanning multiple domains, clouds, and endpoints (e.g., nationwide IoT) introduces unprecedented challenges in global state awareness, distributed consensus, and cross-domain policy coordination.
5.3.3. Ecosystem Challenges: From “Technical Silos” to “Security Foundations”
- Supply-Chain Collaboration and Standardization: In integrated domains like automotive, coordinated design and standardized interfaces across chips, OS, and software are essential. Current fragmented standards often relegate endogenous security to an “add-on” or custom solution, preventing its integration as a default design principle.
- Integration with Legacy Systems and Processes: Enterprises operate vast traditional security infrastructures and workflows. Endogenous security must demonstrate interoperability—sharing intelligence and coordinating responses—to avoid creating new “security silos”. Moreover, its dynamic nature challenges static, compliance-based audit and risk assessment frameworks.
- Paradigm Inertia in Industry and Education: The incumbent security industry, educational frameworks, and certification regimes are deeply entrenched in the traditional “signature-based detection” paradigm. Promoting endogenous security requires overcoming path dependencies in technical standards, economic models, and user perceptions.
- Establishing New Metrics and Trust Frameworks: Unlike traditional security measured by vulnerabilities and detection rates, endogenous security provides probabilistic, structural gains aimed at making attacks “unlikely to succeed”. Developing scientifically rigorous metrics and trust frameworks to quantify this “unbreached” state is therefore a critical ecosystem challenge.
5.4. Future Research Directions
5.4.1. Paradigm Shift: Security-As-A-Service (SaaS)
5.4.2. Technology Convergence: Deep Integration with Quantum-Safe Technologies
5.4.3. Mechanism Innovation: Bio-Inspired Endogenous Defense
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
| DHR | Dynamic Heterogeneous Redundancy |
| APT | Advanced Persistent Threat |
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| Dimension | Endogenous Security | Moving Target Defense | Resilience | Zero Trust | Trusted Computing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Core Philosophy | Security by Construction: Embeds security as an inherent property via architectural dynamics, heterogeneity, and redundancy. | Dynamic Randomization: Increases attack cost/uncertainty by persistently altering system attributes [11]. | Survive & Recover: Ensures continuity of core functions and rapid recovery post-compromise. | Never Trust, Always Verify: Eliminates implicit trust; mandates continuous authentication and least-privilege access. | Hardware Root of Trust: Establishes and extends trust from a hardware root via verified measurements. |
| Security Paradigm | Proactive Construction: Prevents attack success through inherent architectural design. | Proactive Perturbation: Perturbs the attack chain by adding a layer of dynamism. | Reactive Adaptation: Focuses on post-disruption resistance, recovery, and adaptation. | Continuous Verification: Dynamically assesses risk and grants minimal necessary access. | State Verification: Verifies system/components conform to a known, trusted baseline. |
| Trust Model | Dynamic Relative Trust: Achieves overall trust via multi-execution & adjudication, without presuming component trustworthiness. | Trust-Neutral: Effectiveness relies on change strategies, not on altering intrinsic trust. | Post-Trust Survival: Concerned with system survivability after trust is broken. | Dynamic Minimal Trust: Defaults to distrust; grants trust dynamically based on continuous risk assessment. | Static Transitive Trust: Trust propagates statically from a hardware root up through a measurement chain. |
| Primary Focus | Architectural immunity to unknown vulnerabilities/backdoors. | Increasing cost of attacks reliant on staticity/predictability. | Service continuity and business recovery from disruptions. | Access control to prevent lateral movement/unauthorized access. | System/software integrity against tampering and malware. |
| Key Limitation | Engineering challenges: formal proof, resource management, adjudicator protection. | Limited against insider threats; potential performance overhead; strategies may be learned. | Does not inherently reduce attack success probability. | Operational complexity and dependency on identity management. | Hardware dependency; cannot address hardware-level backdoors. |
| Standard Tier | Representative Standard | Lead/Drafting Organization(s) | Core Content & Significance | Deployment Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Domestic Consortium Standards | T/ZGTXXH 043—2022 Intrinsic Security Architecture for Network 5.0 [33] | China Communications Standards Association | Defines terminology, overall architecture, and an authentication and trust transfer mechanism based on trusted identifiers for endogenous security networks, providing a top-level design framework for future network architectures. | Conceptual/Framework |
| Domestic Consortium/Industry Standards | T/NJCESS 003-2024 Technical Specification for Intrinsic Security Network Controllers [34] | Purple Mountain Laboratory, et al. | Specifies endogenous security capability requirements for network controllers, including heterogeneous redundant executor groups, providing criteria for the security design and evaluation of cloud-network infrastructure controllers [35]. | Pilot/Validation |
| International Standard | GSMA FS.61 5G Core Network Resource Pool Micro-segmentation Guidelines [36] | China Mobile, etc. (promoted within GSMA) | The first international standard for a specific technology under the “endogenous security” paradigm, promoting the original micro-segmentation scheme to global mobile communication systems [37]. | Large-scale Commercial Deployment (Promotion Ongoing) |
| Domestic Industry Standards | YD/T 6021-2024 Technical Requirements for Micro-Segmentation Systems in Cloud-Based Telecommunication Networks [38] | CCSA (China Communications Standards Association) | Details the general framework and functional requirements for micro-segmentation systems, laying the direct technical foundation for implementing endogenous security in scenarios like 5G core networks [39]. | Large-scale Commercial Deployment |
| Evaluation Dimension | 5G Core Network Endogenous Security Micro-Segmentation | Endogenous Security DHR Architecture for Intelligent Connected Vehicles (ICVs) |
|---|---|---|
| Core Security Challenge | East–west lateral movement attacks within the cloud-based core network create a “single breach, network-wide compromise” risk. | The deep integration of functional safety and cybersecurity presents novel challenges for unified security assurance. |
| Deployment Architecture | A hybrid architecture combining centralized management with distributed data-plane plugins. Plugins are embedded within 5G virtualized network functions (VNFs/CNFs), while a central manager handles policy orchestration and situational awareness, enabling fine-grained isolation within resource pools. | Introduces a Dynamic Heterogeneous Redundancy (DHR) structure into the vehicle E/E architecture. This enables integrated defense via multiple heterogeneous execution entities, a multi-mode arbiter, and dynamic scheduling. |
| Measured Security Gains | 1. Lateral Attack Blocking Rate: Effectively monitors and blocks internal lateral movement attacks [51]. 2. Service Availability: Maintains 99.999% reliability with negligible impact on service performance [52]. 3. Resource Overhead: CPU/Memory utilization does not exceed 3% of the host network function virtual machine [51]. | 1. Attack Success Rate Suppression: White-box testing shows the DHR architecture achieves 100% differential-mode suppression against uncertainty-based perturbations [20]. 2. Defense Coverage: Effectively counters both known and unknown threats without prior knowledge, spanning the pre-incident, during-incident, and post-incident lifecycle [16,20]. |
| Application Maturity | Has passed centralized procurement testing and entered large-scale commercial deployment, currently securing approximately 200,000 network function virtual machines [51]. | Has undergone extensive white-box testing and real-vehicle validation, and is now in the standardization and industrial implementation phase [16]. |
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Zhang, H.; Li, J.; Wang, H.; Xu, S.; Yang, H.; Wu, H. Theoretical Foundations and Architectural Evolution of Cyberspace Endogenous Security: A Comprehensive Survey. Appl. Sci. 2026, 16, 1689. https://doi.org/10.3390/app16041689
Zhang H, Li J, Wang H, Xu S, Yang H, Wu H. Theoretical Foundations and Architectural Evolution of Cyberspace Endogenous Security: A Comprehensive Survey. Applied Sciences. 2026; 16(4):1689. https://doi.org/10.3390/app16041689
Chicago/Turabian StyleZhang, Heming, Jian Li, Hong Wang, Shizhong Xu, Hong Yang, and Haitao Wu. 2026. "Theoretical Foundations and Architectural Evolution of Cyberspace Endogenous Security: A Comprehensive Survey" Applied Sciences 16, no. 4: 1689. https://doi.org/10.3390/app16041689
APA StyleZhang, H., Li, J., Wang, H., Xu, S., Yang, H., & Wu, H. (2026). Theoretical Foundations and Architectural Evolution of Cyberspace Endogenous Security: A Comprehensive Survey. Applied Sciences, 16(4), 1689. https://doi.org/10.3390/app16041689
