Games

17 pages, 2886 KB

Open AccessArticle

Clusters with Minimum Transportation Cost to Centers: A Case Study in Corn Production Management

by Sirilak Phonin, Chulin Likasiri and Sittipong Dankrakul

Games 2017, 8(2), 24; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8020024 - 1 Jun 2017

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 6881

In Northern Thailand, the size and topographical structure of farmland makes it necessary for operators of small-scale waste management systems to be able to reach their clients in an effective manner. Over the past decades, corn contract farming has increased, and the chief [...] Read more.

In Northern Thailand, the size and topographical structure of farmland makes it necessary for operators of small-scale waste management systems to be able to reach their clients in an effective manner. Over the past decades, corn contract farming has increased, and the chief method for eliminating waste from these farms has chiefly been open burning on the fields, which produces enormous amounts of greenhouse gases (GHG) and Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs). To find a way to reduce GHG emissions in the corn production system, this work focuses on finding clusters with minimum transportation time from waste disposal centers. To solve the clustering problems, four models are created and solved on AIMMS and MATLAB. Simulation results indicate that the number of clients essentially affects the performance of the procedure. The case studies are on corn production management in Chiang Mai, the region’s economic capital, as well as in 9 provinces in Northern Thailand, including Chiang Mai, whose combined corn production comprises 32.73 percent of the national production. With roughly 15% of the corn cobs and husks involved in the study, we found that by changing the waste elimination process, the total CO₂ emissions can be reduced by up to 12,008.40 tons per year in Chiang Mai and up to 180,198.14 tons per year in the 9 provinces of Northern Thailand. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Global Collaborative Solution for Climate Change—A Game-Theoretic Perspective)

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23 pages, 1372 KB

Open AccessArticle

Security Investment, Hacking, and Information Sharing between Firms and between Hackers

by Kjell Hausken

Games 2017, 8(2), 23; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8020023 - 25 May 2017

Cited by 28 | Viewed by 8486

Abstract

A four period game between two firms and two hackers is analyzed. The firms first defend and the hackers thereafter attack and share information. Each hacker seeks financial gain, beneficial information exchange, and reputation gain. The two hackers’ attacks and the firms’ defenses [...] Read more.

A four period game between two firms and two hackers is analyzed. The firms first defend and the hackers thereafter attack and share information. Each hacker seeks financial gain, beneficial information exchange, and reputation gain. The two hackers’ attacks and the firms’ defenses are inverse U-shaped in each other. A hacker shifts from attack to information sharing when attack is costly or the firm’s defense is cheap. The two hackers share information, but a second more disadvantaged hacker receives less information, and mixed motives may exist between information sharing and own reputation gain. The second hacker’s attack is deterred by the first hacker’s reputation gain. Increasing information sharing effectiveness causes firms to substitute from defense to information sharing, which also increases in the firms’ unit defense cost, decreases in each firm’s unit cost of own information leakage, and increases in the unit benefit of joint leakage. Increasing interdependence between firms causes more information sharing between hackers caused by larger aggregate attacks, which firms should be conscious about. We consider three corner solutions. First and second, the firms deter disadvantaged hackers. When the second hacker is deterred, the first hacker does not share information. Third, the first hacker shares a maximum amount of information when certain conditions are met. Policy and managerial implications are provided for how firms should defend against hackers with various characteristics. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Decision Making for Network Security and Privacy)

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25 pages, 1065 KB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Emotions and Behavior Regulation in Decision Dilemmas

by Joaquin Gómez-Miñambres and Eric Schniter

Games 2017, 8(2), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8020022 - 19 May 2017

Cited by 6 | Viewed by 10491

Abstract

We introduce a dynamic model of emotional behavior regulation that can generalize to a wide range of decision dilemmas. Dilemmas are characterized by availability of mutually exclusive goals that a decision maker is dually motivated to pursue. In our model, previous goal pursuant [...] Read more.

We introduce a dynamic model of emotional behavior regulation that can generalize to a wide range of decision dilemmas. Dilemmas are characterized by availability of mutually exclusive goals that a decision maker is dually motivated to pursue. In our model, previous goal pursuant decisions produce negative emotions that regulate an individual’s propensity to further pursue those goals at future times. This emotional regulation of behavior helps explain the non-stationarity and switching observed between so-called “preferences” revealed in repeated decision dilemmas (e.g., by choosing A over B at time 1, then choosing B over A at time 2). We also explain how behavior regulation under dilemma conditions is affected by the set of available options and how the strength and decay rate of emotions affect the tendency to choose behaviors pursuant of extremely (rather than moderately) different options over time. We discuss how emotional behavior regulation insights provided by our model can extend to a variety of topics including approach and avoidance, temptation and self-control, moral balancing, impulse buying and shopping momentum, dieting and exercise, work and leisure, sleep regulation, cooperation, and competition. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavior Regulation and Conflicted Emotions: Theory and Experimental Evidence)

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12 pages, 395 KB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

A Study of the Triggers of Conflict and Emotional Reactions

by Michael Caldara, Michael T. McBride, Matthew W. McCarter and Roman M. Sheremeta

Games 2017, 8(2), 21; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8020021 - 20 Apr 2017

Cited by 11 | Viewed by 12717

Abstract

We study three triggers of conflict and explore their resultant emotional reactions in a laboratory experiment. Economists suggest that the primary trigger of conflict is monetary incentives. Social psychologists suggest that conflicts are often triggered by fear. Finally, evolutionary biologists suggest that a [...] Read more.

We study three triggers of conflict and explore their resultant emotional reactions in a laboratory experiment. Economists suggest that the primary trigger of conflict is monetary incentives. Social psychologists suggest that conflicts are often triggered by fear. Finally, evolutionary biologists suggest that a third trigger is uncertainty about an opponent’s desire to cause harm. Consistent with the predictions from economics, social psychology, and evolutionary biology, we find that conflict originates from all three triggers. The three triggers differently impact the frequency of conflict, but not the intensity. Also, we find that the frequency and intensity of conflict decrease positive emotions and increase negative emotions and that conflict impacts negative emotions more than positive emotions. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavior Regulation and Conflicted Emotions: Theory and Experimental Evidence)

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13 pages, 607 KB

Open AccessArticle

Watching Eyes and Living up to Expectations: Unkind, Not Kind, Eyes Increase First Mover Cooperation in a Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma

by Loren Pauwels, Carolyn H. Declerck and Christophe Boone

Games 2017, 8(2), 20; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8020020 - 11 Apr 2017

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 8495

Abstract

(1) Background: Why and when images of watching eyes encourage prosocial behavior is still subject to discussion, and two recent meta-analyses show no effect of watching eyes on generosity. This study aims to discern the effect of watching eyes of different valence on [...] Read more.

(1) Background: Why and when images of watching eyes encourage prosocial behavior is still subject to discussion, and two recent meta-analyses show no effect of watching eyes on generosity. This study aims to discern the effect of watching eyes of different valence on two separate aspects of prosocial behavior, and additionally investigates whether individuals’ social value orientation moderates the effect of eyes. (2) Methods: Individuals take on the role of either a first or second mover in an incentivized, anonymous sequential prisoner’s dilemma (n = 247), a two-person game which separates the need to form expectations about the other player (first mover cooperation, trust) from the motive of greed (second mover cooperation, reciprocity). During decision-making, a picture of either kind eyes, unkind eyes, or a control picture is presented above each decision matrix. (3) Results: The results indicate that unkind eyes, and not kind eyes, significantly boost first mover cooperation. In contrast, neither type of eye cues increase second mover cooperation. Social value orientation does not moderate these effects. (4) Conclusions: Thus, the data suggest that the valence of eye cues matters, and we propose that unkind eyes urge first movers to live up to the interaction partner’s expectations. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavior Regulation and Conflicted Emotions: Theory and Experimental Evidence)

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3 pages, 176 KB

Open AccessEditorial

Epistemic Game Theory and Logic: Introduction

by Paul Weirich

Games 2017, 8(2), 19; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8020019 - 31 Mar 2017

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 7687

Abstract

Epistemic game theory and the systems of logic that support it are crucial for understanding rational behavior in interactive situations in which the outcome for an agent depends, not just on her own behavior, but also on the behavior of those with whom [...] Read more.

Epistemic game theory and the systems of logic that support it are crucial for understanding rational behavior in interactive situations in which the outcome for an agent depends, not just on her own behavior, but also on the behavior of those with whom she is interacting. Scholars in many fields study such interactive situations, that is, games of strategy. [...] Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Logic)

11 pages, 595 KB

Open AccessReview

The Emotional Moves of a Rational Actor: Smiles, Scowls, and Other Credible Messages

by Lawrence Ian Reed and Peter DeScioli

Games 2017, 8(2), 18; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8020018 - 31 Mar 2017

Cited by 6 | Viewed by 8272

Abstract

Many scholars turn to emotions to understand irrational behavior. We do the opposite: we turn to rationality and game theory to understand people’s emotions. We discuss a striking theory of emotions that began with the game theory of credible threats and promises, then [...] Read more.

Many scholars turn to emotions to understand irrational behavior. We do the opposite: we turn to rationality and game theory to understand people’s emotions. We discuss a striking theory of emotions that began with the game theory of credible threats and promises, then was enriched by evolutionary biology and psychology, and now is being tested in psychological experiments. We review some of these experiments which use economic games to set up strategic situations with real payoffs. The experiments test whether a player’s emotional expressions lend credibility to promises, threats, and claims of danger or hardship. The results offer insights into the hidden strategies behind a warm smile, an angry scowl, a look of terror, and eyes of despair. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavior Regulation and Conflicted Emotions: Theory and Experimental Evidence)

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Games, Volume 8, Issue 2 (June 2017) – 7 articles

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