Special Issue "Global Collaborative Solution for Climate Change—A Game-Theoretic Perspective"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 April 2017).

Special Issue Editor

Guest Editor
Prof. Dr. Alain Haurie Website E-Mail
1 Professor (emeritus) of Operations Research, University of Geneva, Switzerland
2 Adjunct Professor, GERAD, HEC Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
3 Director, ORDECSYS, 4 Place de l’Etrier, CH-1224 Chêne-Bougeries, Switzerland
Interests: game theory; stochastic control; energy/environment modeling; logistics; risk analysis

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

The global climate change due to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions caused by human economic activities is addressed by the international community through the passing of agreements or treaties, such as the Kyoto or Copenhagen, or the Paris agreement currently being designed by COP21. To assess the policies that are implemented in these climate agreements, scientists combine models based on climate science, macroeconomic analyses, and ecology-biology, in the so-called Integrated assessment models (IAMs). To drive the simulations performed by these IAMs, one needs to represent in an overarching game model the actions and reactions of the different countries that are negotiating the agreement. The nature of the global change issue makes necessary to consider games that are hybrid, with both a cooperative and a non-cooperative mode of play and which must be dynamical, since the information on climate dynamics and economic growth is uncertain and will be revealed in the medium- to long-term future. The models already proposed in this realm have exploited the concepts of normalized equilibrium in games with coupled constraints, cooperative equilibria supported by credible threats, equilibria supported by a coalition structure, solutions in the core or Shapley values in dynamic games with regularization. New concepts of equilibrium, like the Kantian equilibria, have been advanced as more appropriate than the Nash equilibrium, to address the climate negotiations issues. In the implementation of market based instruments, like emissions trading, the uncertainty can be tackled through the use of “mean field games” concepts. Robust equilibria for meta-games, defined through statistical emulation of large scale numerical simulation models of general economic equilibrium or climate dynamics, have also been proposed in this context. This Special Issue of the journal Games will gather advanced and up-to-date contributions to the theory of games applied to climate economics and polity, where these specific aspects are explored mathematically and numerically

Prof. Dr. Alain Haurie
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1000 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • global climate change
  • game theory
  • integrated assessment
  • meta-modeling
  • cooperative solutions
  • cooperative equilibria
  • threats
  • normalized equilibria
  • Kantian equilibria
  • robust equilibria
  • burden sharing
  • fair agreements

Published Papers (3 papers)

Order results
Result details
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:

Research

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle
Game Theory of Pollution: National Policies and Their International Effects
Games 2017, 8(3), 30; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030030 - 18 Jul 2017
Cited by 3
Abstract
In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each country is in control of its own pollution, while the environmental effects of policies do not stop at country borders. In our noncooperative differential game, countries as players [...] Read more.
In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each country is in control of its own pollution, while the environmental effects of policies do not stop at country borders. In our noncooperative differential game, countries as players minimize the present value of their own costs defined as a linear combination of pollution costs and costs of environmentally friendly policies, where the state vector of the system consists of the pollution stock per country. A player’s time-varying decision is her investment into clean policies, while her expected costs include also pollution caused by her neighbors. We analyze three variants of this game: (1) a Nash game in which each player chooses her investment into clean policies such that her expected costs are minimal, (2) a game in which the players imitate the investments into clean policies of their neighbors without taking the neighbor’s success concerning their costs into account and (3) a game in which each player imitates her neighbors’ investments into clean policies if this behavior seems to bring a profit. In each of these scenarios, we show under which conditions the countries have incentives to act environmentally friendly. We argue that the different results of these games can be used to understand and design effective environmental policies. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Open AccessArticle
Clusters with Minimum Transportation Cost to Centers: A Case Study in Corn Production Management
Games 2017, 8(2), 24; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8020024 - 01 Jun 2017
Cited by 1
Abstract
In Northern Thailand, the size and topographical structure of farmland makes it necessary for operators of small-scale waste management systems to be able to reach their clients in an effective manner. Over the past decades, corn contract farming has increased, and the chief [...] Read more.
In Northern Thailand, the size and topographical structure of farmland makes it necessary for operators of small-scale waste management systems to be able to reach their clients in an effective manner. Over the past decades, corn contract farming has increased, and the chief method for eliminating waste from these farms has chiefly been open burning on the fields, which produces enormous amounts of greenhouse gases (GHG) and Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs). To find a way to reduce GHG emissions in the corn production system, this work focuses on finding clusters with minimum transportation time from waste disposal centers. To solve the clustering problems, four models are created and solved on AIMMS and MATLAB. Simulation results indicate that the number of clients essentially affects the performance of the procedure. The case studies are on corn production management in Chiang Mai, the region’s economic capital, as well as in 9 provinces in Northern Thailand, including Chiang Mai, whose combined corn production comprises 32.73 percent of the national production. With roughly 15% of the corn cobs and husks involved in the study, we found that by changing the waste elimination process, the total CO2 emissions can be reduced by up to 12,008.40 tons per year in Chiang Mai and up to 180,198.14 tons per year in the 9 provinces of Northern Thailand. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Open AccessArticle
Promoting Residential Recycling: An Alternative Policy Based on a Recycling Reward System
Games 2016, 7(3), 21; https://doi.org/10.3390/g7030021 - 17 Aug 2016
Cited by 1
Abstract
This paper analyzes a reward system that uses a club good to promote recycling. In particular, we examine a context of incomplete information in which the administrator is unable to observe the resident’s attitude towards recycling. The results suggest that despite the lack [...] Read more.
This paper analyzes a reward system that uses a club good to promote recycling. In particular, we examine a context of incomplete information in which the administrator is unable to observe the resident’s attitude towards recycling. The results suggest that despite the lack of information, the administrator is able to induce all types of residents to recycle when the reward is sufficiently high. Furthermore, we show that education programs, technologies that help to reduce the residential recycling cost and penalties for garbage dumping are complementary tools that could also promote recycling. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Back to TopTop