Global Collaborative Solution for Climate Change—A Game-Theoretic Perspective
A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).
Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 April 2017) | Viewed by 25337
Special Issue Editor
2 Adjunct Professor, GERAD, HEC Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
3 Director, ORDECSYS, 4 Place de l’Etrier, CH-1224 Chêne-Bougeries, Switzerland
Interests: game theory; stochastic control; energy/environment modeling; logistics; risk analysis
Special Issue Information
Dear Colleagues,
The global climate change due to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions caused by human economic activities is addressed by the international community through the passing of agreements or treaties, such as the Kyoto or Copenhagen, or the Paris agreement currently being designed by COP21. To assess the policies that are implemented in these climate agreements, scientists combine models based on climate science, macroeconomic analyses, and ecology-biology, in the so-called Integrated assessment models (IAMs). To drive the simulations performed by these IAMs, one needs to represent in an overarching game model the actions and reactions of the different countries that are negotiating the agreement. The nature of the global change issue makes necessary to consider games that are hybrid, with both a cooperative and a non-cooperative mode of play and which must be dynamical, since the information on climate dynamics and economic growth is uncertain and will be revealed in the medium- to long-term future. The models already proposed in this realm have exploited the concepts of normalized equilibrium in games with coupled constraints, cooperative equilibria supported by credible threats, equilibria supported by a coalition structure, solutions in the core or Shapley values in dynamic games with regularization. New concepts of equilibrium, like the Kantian equilibria, have been advanced as more appropriate than the Nash equilibrium, to address the climate negotiations issues. In the implementation of market based instruments, like emissions trading, the uncertainty can be tackled through the use of “mean field games” concepts. Robust equilibria for meta-games, defined through statistical emulation of large scale numerical simulation models of general economic equilibrium or climate dynamics, have also been proposed in this context. This Special Issue of the journal Games will gather advanced and up-to-date contributions to the theory of games applied to climate economics and polity, where these specific aspects are explored mathematically and numerically
Prof. Dr. Alain Haurie
Guest Editor
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Keywords
- global climate change
- game theory
- integrated assessment
- meta-modeling
- cooperative solutions
- cooperative equilibria
- threats
- normalized equilibria
- Kantian equilibria
- robust equilibria
- burden sharing
- fair agreements
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