Endogenous and Exogenous Institutional Compliance in Community-Based Forest Management: Pathways for a Jelled Institutional Arrangement in Namibia

Abstract

Diverse institutional analyses in natural resource settings highlight the dominance of exogenous institutions over endogenous ones with sub-(optimal) outcomes. The continued search for optimality signals the need for a theoretical approach to understand the alignment of endogenous and exogenous institutions. To contribute to this theoretical perspective, this paper uses seven community-based forest management settings in the Tsumkwe, East Kavango and West Kavango Regions of Namibia to (i) identify and assess the remnant endogenous cultural institutions (ECIs) and their levels of compliance; (ii) analyze the functioning of key exogenous institutional arrangements governing community-based forest resource use and management; and (iii) explore the potential for a jelled institutional arrangement to shape the future of community-based natural resource management. Data for this study were collected by reviewing policy documents, conducting key informant interviews (n = 10), having focus group discussions (n = 6), and conducting expert interviews (n = 6). Content and thematic analyses of the data yielded several key findings. First, although ECIs remain an integral component of community-based forest management in Namibia, levels of compliance with these institutions vary according to age, gender, and resource characteristics. Older community members exhibit higher levels of compliance with ECIs than younger members. In addition, compliance is significant for subsistence-oriented resources than for market-oriented ones. Second, exogenous institutional arrangements experience weak enforcement, largely due to high transaction costs. Third, institutional jelling, when steered from an endogenous rule-based standpoint, is likely to shape positive outcomes in subsistence-based resource use, whereas those steered from an exogenous rule-based position may shape such outcomes in commercialized resource settings. The insights from Namibia contribute to the ongoing empirical substantiation of institutional jelling as a novel theoretical approach with emphasis on endogenous institution-led roles in shaping subsistence-based resource use systems, and exogenous institution-led roles in steering commercialized resource use and management processes. Policy-wise, emphasis on the jelling of endogenous and exogenous rule-based systems is required to reduce transaction costs linked to sustainable community-based forest resource management in Namibia. As the evidence provided is qualitatively derived, future mixed-methods investigation is needed to empirically ground this theoretical approach in the frame of resource typology and salience, geographical variations in the outcomes linked to (un)jelled institutions, and actor constellations in jelling.

1. Introduction

Forests constitute a critical resource in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), yet they are increasingly threatened by deforestation and forest degradation. Between 2010 and 2020, the region experienced its highest net annual forest loss, estimated at 3.9 million hectares, and this trend is expected to continue [1]. Overall, Sub-Saharan Africa recorded a 13.45% decline in forest cover between 1990 and 2018 [2]. Net annual forest loss in the region is accounted for by population growth, changing land uses, and agricultural extensification, among other factors. These changes have contributed to the formulation of community-based forest governance approaches that contribute towards stemming forest loss and forest landscape degradation. Community-based forest governance denotes management and decision making processes that are rooted in the community, carried out by actors at the community level—either with or on behalf of the community–and shaped by the prevailing institutional framework [3,4]. This governance approach plays a critical role in shaping forest resource use and management rights [5]. A core governance dimension relates to institutions—the ensemble of rule-based systems (formal and/or informal) shaping the organization of actions that are repetitive to produce outcomes that have a bearing on community-based forest management actors [6,7].

Institutions have been typified based on formality (formal versus informal), temporality (ephemeral, intermittent and perennial), and source (exogenous versus endogenous). While formal institutions are enacted, documented, and mostly sanctioned by the state, informal institutions are passed over generations and remain uncodified and/or undocumented [8,9]. Ephemeral institutions are spontaneous arrangements which occur during forest resource access and use transactions. Intermittent institutions refer to arrangements which occur repeatedly but fizzle out as new actors emerge. Perennial institutions are arrangements which exhibit stability and have a long-term nature [10,11]. Forest management institutions which emanate from within communities are viewed as endogenous, while those from outside are viewed as exogenous [12,13]. The interactions of these institutions define forest resource management outcomes in the global south (including SSA), as evident in the theoretical positions of scholars in the field of institutionalism.

The Leviathan theoretical position of Hobbes which emphasized state-based regulation in resource management [14,15] reported deficits in state resource capacity and conflicts [16,17]. The theoretical proposition on private property regime sought to restore order in resource management [18]. Ostrom’s [6] theoretical proposition of “actual rules-in-use” shaping resource management did not establish the role of internal dynamics (such as power asymmetry) and external forces as institutional success or failure factors in resource management [19,20,21]. Ensminger [22] theorized on the role of socio-demographic and market forces in shaping natural resource management institutions. Institutional bricolage as advanced by Cleaver [23] depicts actors’ navigation around unjelled formal and informal institutions [24,25]. Haller’s [20] theoretical position on constitutionality emphasizes community-based emic perception of participation, strategic negotiation, and ownership sense in natural resource management [20,26]. This position fell short of establishing the higher-level recognition and ratification of local rules (called ‘constitutions’), providing strong grounds to rethink institutional approaches. Irrespective of the diversity in theoretical approaches on institutions, key arguments almost invariably converge around (i) the relative roles of and the interactions between formal and informal institutions, and (ii) the lack of a unifying theoretical approach to understand conditions under which institutions (formal and informal rules) can be aligned (jelled) to enhance optimality in resource use and management. Recently, Kimengsi et al. [27] theorized on institutional jelling as a change pathway in which compatible provisions of endogenous and exogenous institutions are aligned to shape (forest) resource use and management and enhance legitimacy for diverse actors [27]. “Jelling” as a term is rooted in team building and conflict management studies; jelled teams (with well-bonded members) realize efficient outcomes as opposed to “toxic” (unjelled) teams. Compatibility is a key trait in jelled teams. The alignment of these institutional arrangements is rooted in goal consistency wherein actors in the endogenous and exogenous domains seek to jointly attain the goal of sustainable community-based forest resource management. Having identified convergent goals, this process is further reinforced by traits such as cultural adaptability (adjusting behaviour and value systems to suit new institutional arrangements), and implementation feasibility (engaging in the change process based on available resources). The applicability of institutional jelling is justified for community-based resources which support livelihood and local development interventions [27].

Institutional jelling differs from earlier postulations (e.g., institutional shopping and institutional bricolage) as it emphasizes precision and the piecing together of compatible endogenous and exogenous rules into a single unifying rule system which gains acceptance from actors in both endogenous and exogenous domains. In contrast, institutional shopping explains how interest-based actors selectively adopt institutional provisions but do not engage in unifying them into a single entity. Here, actors simply exercise their power and knowledge to select beneficial institutional frameworks in certain situations (e.g., claims of justification in conservation efforts and/or indigenous identity). Furthermore, institutional bricolage explains how actors (un)consciously piece together or modify exogenous and endogenous institutional provisions to access, use, and manage resources. For details, please consult this earlier article [27]. Bricolage manifests horizontally (e.g., between forest user groups), and/or vertically (e.g., between state actors and forest user groups). Haller’s constitutionality approach emphasized the non-recognition of endogenous rules by exogenous entities. Consequently, endogenous institutions which initially worked well at the community level were short-lived [20,26]. Institutional jelling responds to this challenge as it presents an approach to understand how bridging this gap could facilitate recognition from both exogenous and endogenous entities and assure institutional durability. This provides a novel theoretical lens to mirror where jelling yields positive and/or negative outcomes and the conditions thereof vis-a-vis conditions under which unjelled institutions yield positive and/or negative outcomes in many parts of the global south, including SSA.

Pre-colonial SSA was characterized by endogenous cultural institutions (ECIs) which were either consensus-based and decentralized or chieftaincy-based and centralized [28,29]. In Southern Africa, the Letsema (group-based land and labour management rule), and the kgotla system (natural resource conflict resolution approach) were practiced [30,31]. The colonial and post-colonial periods were characterized by the dominance of exogenous institutions which continued until present times [10,32]. Furthermore, SSA has the highest ethnic fractionalization score which is an apparent pointer to the multiplicity of endogenous cultural institutions across the sub-region [33]. The persistence of endogenous institutions is shrouded in controversies linked to their variations across Africa. These controversies are linked to resource salience and historical processes such as colonial influence. The literature established that settings which came under British influence are characterized by resilient endogenous cultural institutions as opposed to those which came under French influence. While the British engaged in the indirect rule system which upheld endogenous arrangements, the French administration was characterized by the direct rule system which largely ignored endogenous rules in favour of exogenous ones [9,10]. This colonial hangover played a significant role in explaining variations in the persistence of endogenous institutions. For example, Malawi, a country in Southern Africa which came under British influence exhibits resilient endogenous rules which steer gender-differentiated land access and ownership practices [5]. In Anglophone West Africa (e.g., Ghana), the endogenous arrangements as exercised by traditional rulers significantly shape the socio-political pace of these countries [7,9]. In Central Africa, former French influence in parts of Cameroon contributed to the weakening of endogenous cultural institutions [8,10]. Some exceptions exist; traditional leaders (Marabouts) in Senegal (a former French colony) still wield significant power in this part of West Africa [7]. What is also clear is that these institutions are significantly shaped by socio-demographic, economic, and political forces. Namibia is a relevant example in the context of southern Africa where community-based forest management models have been instituted.

The Namibian case demonstrates uniqueness since its community-based natural resource management model was largely inspired by the globally relevant design principles advanced by Ostrom [6]. Furthermore, the institutional history of Namibia is shaped by previous German influence and later the South African apartheid rule system. Although Namibia came under the apartheid rule, its local resource governance was steered by Traditional Authorities (TAs) and Headwomen (Hompas) who incarnate ECIs. The 1968 Nature Conservation Ordinance was instituted during the period of apartheid rule, granting private farmers commercial wildlife rights. This reform allowed farmers to benefit from game thus spurring the growth of the private wildlife industry. The regulation was later re-emphasized in the 1975 Nature Conservation Ordinance which granted farmers conditional wildlife exploitation rights on their land, and the right to retain income obtained from the use and sale of game animals. Both reforms caused a shift in perception from solely conservation of forest and wildlife resources towards their sustainable utilization. This formed the basis for the institution of community-based policies. The next important reform in Namibia’s community-based forest resource management is the Nature Conservation Amendment Act of 1996 which amended the 1975 Nature Conservation Ordinance [34,35,36]. This reform instituted an economic-centred approach in which local communities were allowed to form conservancies for sustainable wildlife and forest resource use. This conservancy-oriented policy allows for collaborative land management agreements between traditional leaders and the state with emphasis on reconciling the triple goals of conservation, community livelihoods, and overall economic growth.

As the implementation of community-based forest resource management programmes ensued, it became clear that there was a need to reduce ambiguities linked to the management of forest resources. This led to the institution of the 2001 Forest Act which clarifies the way forest resources were to be used and assigned responsibilities to the respective entities charged with the management of forest resources. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Environment, Forestry, and Tourism, it was further elaborated upon in the 2007 Environmental Management Act. This act established principles for decision making regarding the management of forest resources and clarified the process of assessing and controlling activities which might have significant effects on forest and environmental resources [34]. The Namibian government established the Directorate of Forestry (DoF) to facilitate the management of forestland resources using community forestry and conservancy models [35,36]. The next reform was the 2013 National Policy on Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) which was complemented by the 2013 Guidelines for Management of Conservancies and Standard Operating Procedures. This provides a framework for transparency in governance and financial procedures, and clarifies benefit sharing mechanisms, sustainable wildlife management and resource use, and compliance and accountability procedures. Owing to inherent ambiguities in the 2001 Forest Act, another reform was introduced in 2015—the 2015 Forest Regulation. This reform detailed the implementation of the 2001 Forest Act. It emphasized the granting of licences for forest product harvesting and transportation, the protection of key species, the sanctioning of fire prevention practices and the use of the permit system to ensure sustainable resource use. Key exemptions were made for domestic resource use (e.g., fuel and shelter) in areas under customary rule-based systems.

Namibia’s community-based natural resource management approach is dispensed through conservancy and community forest models. Conservancies are managed by an established committee with a set of operational rules and clearly defined membership boundaries [37]. Namibian conservancy policy allows for collaborative land management agreements between traditional leaders and the state. The management structure makes provisions for shared forestland rights and the state guaranteeing forestland trusteeship for the people [38]. Community forest in the Namibian context related to a communal land area where residents exercise conditional rights to sustainably use, manage, and derive benefits from forests, woodlands, and other forest products [39]. This is further applied through the permit system which is regulated and controlled by the Directorate of Forestry (DoF). Here, the Community Forest Management Board members grant exploitation rights according to the block permit obtained from the DoF. It assumes a hybrid business model which blends commercial practices with social or environmental goals, and controlled harvesting and management of forest products for commercial and subsistence use [36,40]). The forest management committee, a group of community representatives, are charged with running the affairs of the community forest for three years with the possibility of further re-election [36,41].

The interplay of endogenous and exogenous institutions reveals that the latter exercises dominance in recent times. This has reignited interest in establishing the remnant ECIs, and their potential in further empirically grounding the institutional jelling theoretical construct. A key empirical gap in the literature centres on the lack of evidence on the potentials and outcomes linked to institutional jelling—the piecing together of compatible endogenous and exogenous rules into a single unifying rule system which gains acceptance from actors in both endogenous and exogenous domains. While previous studies have identified instances of the selective application of endogenous and exogenous rules, this does not capture institutional provisions which are jelled (well-aligned) as a unified entity. This paper contributes by drawing from seven community-based forest management settings in Namibia—three integrated community forest models (conservancy-cum-community forest), and four strict community forest models—to (i) establish what is left of endogenous cultural institutions and their current compliance status, (ii) analyze the functioning of key exogenous institutional arrangements in relation to community-based forest resource use and management, and (iii) explore potentials for a jelled institutional arrangement in shaping future community-based natural resource management. The results are useful to advance the theoretical approach on institutional jelling with emphasis on establishing jelling outcomes (positive and/or negative) vis-a-vis the outcomes under unjelled institutional settings. It provides relevant insights to inform Namibia’s resource management policy with emphasis on jelled and conflict-free institutional frameworks.

2. Conceptual Framework

Institutional theories examining the relative roles of formal and informal institutions in resource management tend to converge around several key arguments. These include the following: (i) the relative dominance of formal institutions over informal ones [20]; (ii) the scales and modes of interaction between formal and informal institutions, with particular attention to levels of endogeneity and exogeneity [10,11]; (iii) the often (sub-)optimal management outcomes associated with these interactions, which underscore the continued need for theoretical inquiry into institutional optimality [6,20]; and (iv) the absence of a unifying theoretical framework for understanding the conditions under which endogenous and exogenous institutions can be aligned (jelled) to enhance optimality in resource use and management [27]. This alignment (jelling) or non-alignment (unjelled arrangement) potentially mirrors outcomes (either positive or negative).

The conceptual framework of institutional jelling is informed by the interactions between compatible provisions of endogenous and exogenous institutions. Endogenous institutions in the context of resource use and management in community forests and conservancies in Namibia include ancestral beliefs, values, taboos, traditional hunting rules, and beliefs linked to medicinal plants, and benefit sharing rules which are rooted in the customs and tradition of the communities (Figure 1). Exogenous institutions relate to the state-sanctioned rules such as the Nature Conservation Amendment Act (1996) [38], Forest Act (2001), Environmental Management Act (2007), Guidelines for Management of Conservancies and Standard Operating Procedures (2013), Forest Regulation (2015), by-laws regulating community forests and conservancies, documented regulations of resource use in community forests, conservancies [38,39], the rules that guide the provision of technical support by state and civil society agencies, and others [41]. These rule-based systems are characterized by varied levels of compliance, namely non-compliance (−), partial compliance (±), and full compliance (+), by resource users or actors in community forests and conservancies. Following Owusu et al. [42], full compliance (+) was framed as the total adherence or conformity by actors to applicable exogenous and endogenous institutions; partial compliance (±) denotes the partial adherence or conformity to applicable exogenous and endogenous institutions or a reduction in enforcement intensity. Furthermore, non-compliance (−) denotes the complete non-adherence to exogenous and endogenous institutions).

Resource harvesting and use practices that, in some cases, shape how actors comply with both endogenous and exogenous institutional arrangements include wood cutting, non-timber forest product (NTFP) harvesting, fruits and/or medicinal plant collection, hunting, and grazing. To enhance legitimacy and full compliance in these settings, institutional jelling—the tactful combination of comparable provisions of the endogenous and exogenous institutions—provides a veritable pathway to guarantee institutional stability, compliance, legitimacy, and conflict management. These pathways have a bearing on species protection and social norms, the harvesting and benefit sharing rules, legal and cultural protection of medicinal plants, hunting access rules and quotas, conflict-free fire management rules, management plans, collection timing and quota rituals, and conflict mediation between traditional and state rules.

3. Materials and Methods

3.1. Study Area

With just 3 million inhabitants covering 824,000 km², Namibia is considered a sparsely populated country in SSA [43,44]. Half of its population live in rural areas [44]. Its total land area covered by communally managed wildlife areas and private lands used for wildlife ranching is estimated at 46% [44,45]). The Kavango East and West Landscape and the Tsumkwe region account for a significant fraction of community forest and conservancies in Namibia. The Kavango East and West Landscape (10,311 km²) hosts five conservancies and twelve community forests, some of which are integrated in nature. From here, two integrated model (conservancy-cum-community forest) sites were selected to include Muduva Nyangana and George Mukoya. An additional conservancy-cum-community forest site (M’kata community forest—1054 ha) which coincides with the N ≠ aJaqna and Nyae Nyae conservancies of Namibia’s San people [46] in the Tsumkwe district was also selected. These conservancies are home to the San people and are considered as a highly marginalized region in Namibia [47]. Furthermore, four strict community forest sites in the Kavango East and West Landscape were selected to include Mbeyo, Ncamangora, Ncumcara (Figure 2). The vegetation consists of dry medium to tall woodland and savannah. Dominant vegetation types are Terminalia spp., Baikiaea plurijuga, Burkea africana, Combretum spp., Pterocarpus angolensis, Guibourtia coleosperma and Lonchocarpus spp. The key wildlife species include elephant, spotted hyena giraffe, lion, and African wild dog. The area has over 36,741 households with main cultural groups being the Kwangali, Gciriku, Hambukushu, and Mbuza, who make use of bush foods, medicines, grass and wood for building, fuelwood, as well as grazing and cropping. Some conservancies (e.g., N ≠ aJaqna) generate income through the harvesting of devil’s claw, a medicinal plant used for treating arthritis and rheumatism [38].

3.2. Data Collection

Data for this study were collected through a review of policy documents, interviews, and group discussions. The document review focused on key components of the Namibian legal framework governing community forests and conservancies, including the Forest Act of 2001, the Nature Conservation Amendment Act of 1996, the Environmental Management Act of 2007, the Guidelines for the Management of Conservancies and Standard Operating Procedures (2013), and the Forest Regulations of 2015. These documents provided essential background information on the formulation, operation, and management of community forests and conservancies. They also informed the development of the research instruments used for field data collection in the study communities. Three research instruments were developed, including key informant interviews (KIIs), expert interviews (EIs), and focus group discussion (FGDs) guides (Appendix A). The combination of KIIs, EIs, and FGDs provided an important avenue to derive insights from individuals (local and expert knowledge) and in dynamic group settings. This facilitated a holistic appreciation of the issues under investigation and enhanced data triangulation. The KII guide contained nine questions which focused on the forest resources and use practices, the endogenous and exogenous institutions shaping the management of resources in community forests and conservancies, and the potential points of convergence of institutional provisions. The EI guide contained eight questions which emphasized the role of state and civil society actors in the development of endogenous and exogenous institutions shaping the management of resources in community forests and conservancies. The FGD guide (containing eight questions) focused on resource use practices, potential conflicts between endogenous and exogenous institutions, and conflict management approaches. Some of the questions captured in the instruments are as follows: What are the most collected forest resources and their importance? What are the endogenous and exogenous rules linked to the access, use, and management of these resources? Do people adhere to these institutions totally or partially? Are there instances of complete non-adherence? What explains the variations in compliance levels? Have these rules witnessed a change? What has been the direction of change in these rules? How do different actors steer the enforcement and transformation process of exogenous and endogenous rules in your community? These tools were reviewed and further refined prior to data collection. Data collection ran in the month of March 2025 involving KIIs (N = 10), FGDs (N = 6), and EIs (6) in the Tsumkwe, Kavango East, and Kavango West Landscapes of Namibia (Figure 3).

In the Tsumkwe landscape, three key informant interviews were conducted as follows: one female resource user, one male actor and one youth actor (hunter). Expert interviews were conducted with park rangers (2) while one FGD held involving nine participants in M’kata (four men, three women, two youths). In the Kavango East Landscape, four KIIs were conducted as follows: two male actors, one female actor, and one youth actor. Expert interviews were conducted with a conservancy representative (1) and forest officer (1), while two FGDs were heled as follows: George Mukoya (six participants; three men, three women) and Muduva Nyangana (eigth participants; three men, three women, two youths). In the Kavango West Landscape, 3 KIIs were conducted as follows: two male actors, one female actor. Expert interviews were conducted with forest officers (2), while three FGDs were heled as follows: Ncnamagoro (seven participants; three men, two youths) and Mbeyo (6 participants; 3 men, 2 women, 1 youth), and Ncumcara (8 participants; 3 men, 3 women, 2 youths). The participants were selected based on their engagement with community forest and conservancy activities. The interviews lasted between 33 and 50 min while the FGDs lasted between 45 and 70 min. After interviewing ten key informants and six experts, it was established that similar responses would be obtained from further interviews as per the data saturation principle [48]; it was judged to end with the twelve in-depth interviews, and to further triangulate the data through focus group discussions. Phone recorders were used to record the interviews after obtaining verbal consent of respondents, while field notes were used to capture some key issues. Direct observation of community forest and conservancy practices was another method to internalize the facts. The recorded data were then transcribed manually for treatment, analysis, and interpretation.

3.3. Data Analysis

The transcribed data were analyzed using directed content analysis [49]. Themes were developed in line with the research objectives and refined through a careful review of data obtained from FGDs, KIIs, EIs, and policy documents. The theme related to the first objective focused on ECIs, including beliefs, taboos, rituals, and traditional practices related to forest resource conservation, extraction, distribution, sanctions, and use, along with their current compliance levels, i.e., partial, full, and non-compliance. The second theme addressed exogenous institutional arrangements, their corresponding compliance levels as well as the factors that determine the compliance with the institutions. Finally, the third theme, it identified the potential for jelled institutional arrangements influencing forest resource extraction and use across the study sites. The analysis was conducted manually according to predefined themes. Through qualitative analysis, we identified ECIs that remain functional in the context of harvesting and using forest resources such as fruits, NTFPs, grasses, timber and fuelwood, as well as in grazing management, forest fire control, and forest settlements. Similarly, exogenous institutional arrangements were analyzed across the same thematic areas in community forests, as provisioned under the Forest Act and related regulations, along with their current levels of compliance. Through an in-depth extraction and analysis of key information from the transcribed data, compliance levels were established into three categories to include full compliance (+) which denotes the total adherence or conformity by actors to applicable exogenous and endogenous institutions; partial compliance (±) being the partial adherence or conformity to these institutions, non-compliance (−) depicting the complete non-adherence to exogenous and endogenous institutions [42]. Finally, based on the transcribed data and the observed compliance of both ECIs and exogenous institutions, we identified potential jelled institutional arrangements and appropriate combinations of endogenous and exogenous institutions, supporting sustainable forest resource management and use in community forests/conservancy in Namibia.

4. Results

4.1. Endogenous Cultural Institutions and Their Current Compliance

This study reveals a diverse set of ECIs, rooted in cultural beliefs, rituals, and traditions, that continue to regulate forest resource use and management. These institutions govern access to and the use of timber, fruits, medicinal plants, and wild animals (

Table 1. ECIs and variations in compliance.

SN	ECI	Description	Compliance Levels	Source
1	Belief-based sanctions on medicinal plant use	Snake plant and Kiet tree are protected, with cutting forbidden to sustain their populations. Their products are used for cleansing, protection from spiritual attacks, and rituals or healing, often via smoke.	Elders still enforce protection and sustainable use of key medicinal resources—Full compliance (+)	KII2, KII7, FGD1
2	Gender-based dietary taboos on wild animals	Pregnant women are forbidden from eating giraffe meat unless a ritual with the skin is performed; otherwise, their child risks being born weak and sickly. Leopard and wild cat meat are believed to cause epilepsy and breathing problems in descendants. Men cannot eat rock monitor meat.	Rules followed during pregnancy or menstruation, though knowledge gaps limit consistent compliance—Partial compliance (±)	KII1, KII2, KII5, KII7 FGD2 FGD4
3	Witchcraft-related taboos	Witchcraft and supernatural taboos deter unauthorized forest use, with violations believed to cause misfortune, sickness, or death. Certain trees, graveyards, and forest sites are considered sacred and protected by these powers.	Some youths ignore taboos, but fear of supernatural consequences which sustains adherence and limits overexploitation— Full compliance (+)	KII9, FGD6
4	Traditional hunting rules and benefit sharing	Traditional hunting rules restricted the hunting of some animal species (e.g., pangolins, giraffes) while the timing for some species (e.g., breeding season) was set by the chief or headman. Killing totem animals (e.g., elephant, frog) without permission violated cultural values, and only certain animals could be hunted for subsistence. Only parts like skins or horns are used for community rituals.	The formal hunting rules replaced traditional hunting rules, but the cultural use of horns and skin are still highly valued— Full compliance (+)	KII2, KII4, KII7, KII10 FGD2, FGD6
5	Fruit harvesting rituals and sanctions	Headwomen/elders set collection days; fruits (rosewood, hypoxia, dialup, mangetti) are first offered to ancestors, then blessed and announced for community harvest. Each person may collect up to 10 kg, with excess confiscated. Early consumption is still believed to cause sickness, poor yields, and fruit loss.	Young generation ignores this, leading to unrestricted harvesting— Non-compliance (−)	KII1, KII6, KII7, KII10, FGD3 FGD6
6	Ritual grazing and firebreaks	Elders enforce controlled burning and grazing during the early ploughing season, including constructing firebreaks approximately 2–3 m wide, to protect livestock pastures and prevent wildfires.	Youth sometimes ignore them, but key firebreaks are maintained, preventing total loss—Partial compliance (±)	KII7
7	Traditional access rules	Thatching grass, firewood, poles are for personal and community use, except banning on harvesting certain trees with medicinal properties.	Full compliance (+)	FGD1, FGD4 FGD5

Note: Full compliance (+), Partial compliance (±), Non-compliance (−)

). Compliance with these institutions varies across resources and is notably lower (partial to non-compliance) among the youth. While ECIs remain particularly persistent in relation to medicinal plants, fruits, and wild animals, a more obscured role is reported for timber regulation. The evidence lends credence to the role of ECIs in shaping subsistence resource use and management processes. This further shows that institutional jelling (alignment) steered from an endogenous rule-based standpoint may well yield positive outcomes under conditions of subsistence-based resource use. However, in the context of market-based resource use, endogenous institutions play less significant roles in steering outcomes.

Medicinal plants are a cornerstone of traditional healing practices in the context of rural Namibia. Species such as the Snake plant (Dracaena trifasciata) and Kiet tree (Aquilaria rugosa L.C.) are widely used to treat malaria, pain, snake bites, and for cleansing rituals. They are also believed to provide spiritual protection, for instance, against evil spirits, often through smoke rituals (KII2, KII7, FGD1). Social enforcement by elders plays a key role in protecting and ensuring the sustainable use of these species. While the continued attachment to such traditionally rooted rules and practices is based on convictions and beliefs which transcend generations, they are partly upheld due to poverty and the difficulty in accessing orthodox medicine due to the generally remote nature of these landscapes.

Belief-based ECIs or taboos linked to sacred forests, certain species, graveyards, and the consumption of wild animals serve as powerful conservation mechanisms. Witchcraft- and supernatural-related beliefs deter unauthorized forest use, with violations feared to cause misfortune, sickness, or even death. Cultural prohibitions also extend to diets: for example, pregnant women are forbidden from eating giraffe meat unless a ritual with the skin is performed, while consuming leopard or wild cat meat is believed to cause epilepsy or respiratory problems in descendants. Compliance with these taboos remains partial, with elders and traditional leaders ensuring enforcement.

Beyond taboos, hunting is regulated through customary rules set by TAs or headmen. Restrictions include species-specific prohibitions (e.g., pangolins, giraffes) and seasonal bans during breeding periods. Killing totems such as elephants or frogs without permission violates cultural norms, while skins and horns of permitted species are reserved for rituals. These practices have historically protected critical species and their habitats while also providing nutrition, sustaining traditions, and reinforcing cultural identity. However, several informants (KII2, 4, 7 and 10; FGD2 and 6) noted that formal hunting regulations have largely replaced customary ones, though cultural uses of horns and skins remain highly valued.

Another important traditional practice recorded concerns fruit collection, which is regulated by headwomen. This practice underscores women’s authority in regulating access to forest resources and their role in safeguarding both ecological and cultural values. Collection days are set in advance, and certain fruits (e.g., rosewood, Hypoxis, Dialium, mangetti) are first offered to the ancestors, then blessed and officially announced for community harvest. Each person is allowed up to 10 kg, with any excess confiscated. Early consumption is believed to result in sickness, poor crop yields, or fruit loss. Nevertheless, some interviewees (KII1, KII7) reported that younger generations increasingly disregard these rituals, leading to overharvesting and weakening compliance. Women healers uphold traditional medical knowledge and enforce associated cultural taboos; and headwomen control the gathering of fruits. This shows that women are both users and stewards of vital forest resources in Namibia.

Elders of the various communities also regulate forest access and fire management through customary practices. Controlled burning and grazing are implemented during the early ploughing season, accompanied by firebreaks of 2–3 m to safeguard pastures and reduce wildfire risks. At the same time, access to forest products such as thatching grass, firewood, and poles is generally permitted for household and community use, though harvesting of trees with medicinal value is strictly prohibited. These rules not only protect ecological resources but also sustain cultural values and community well-being. The youth are the future stewards of forest resources; however, the trend of ignoring customary practices and their displacement by formal institutions is growing.

4.2. Exogenous Institutional Arrangement in Community-Based Forest Management

The study found that a plethora of exogenous institutions shapes community-based forest resources in Namibia. These include the mostly structured formal regulations, permits, quotas, and external interventions established by government agencies and non-governmental organizations, as revealed in the Forest Act (2001) and regulation (2015) (

Table 2. Key exogenous arrangements in community-based forest resource management in Namibia.

SN	Institutions	Description	Observed Compliance	Ref.
1	By-laws and management plans	Standard by-laws developed by the conservancy and DoF, guided by ministry rules, provide the main framework for forest resource management.	Communities expected to follow formal rules; full compliance (+).	KII 4, 7, 10, FA
2	Fruit trees and penalties	Unauthorized cutting or damaging fruit trees incurs fines (NAD150–850) and tree confiscation by the Forest Committee.	Partial compliance (±)	FGD1
2	Timber permits	Commercial timber harvesting requires both approval and ministry-issued permits.	Generally enforced, though bureaucratic in nature; full compliance (+).	KII 1,3, 4, 5, FA
3	Permits and seasonal quotas	Permits to regulate wildlife/forest product harvesting seasons and species limits. Includes block permits—internal use managed by committees, while exports are controlled by government.	Compliance is partial (±); some youths bypass quotas or harvest off-season, especially in remote areas.	KII 1, 3, FA
4	Protection of medicinal trees	Certain species (pod Mahogony, Mopane) are legally protected from harvesting.	Partial compliance (±) due to weak monitoring and enforcement capacity.	KII 1, 3, FA, FR
5	Conservancy hunting quotas	Formal hunting quotas set by conservancies and government regulate wildlife use but exclude traditional benefit sharing arrangements.	Weak, as locals often feel excluded and bypass the system; partial compliance (±)	KII3
6	External projects	Government and donor-funded projects (e.g., GIZ) support monitoring, enforcement, and sustainable use through training and resources.	Was effective when funding available. No longer effective (−).	KII 6, 7
7	Department of forestry (DoF)	Provides technical support by co-developing by-laws, supplying tools and training, and granting approvals for resource management activities.	Full compliance (+) since community activities cannot proceed without DoF approval.	KII 4–9
8	NGO	NGOs such as the Namibian Nature Foundation (NNF) provide technical support, capacity building, and assistance in game counts, fire management, and monitoring.	Partial compliance (±); dependent on resources.	KII5, 6, 7
9	Churches	Church influence varies across the sites: some oppose traditions and others discourage rituals, while some remain tolerant.	It weakens traditional rituals depicting partial compliance (±).	KII 1, 3, 4

). They also include the management plans created in line with Sections 24 and 26 and licences granted under Sections 27, 28, 29, 30, and 33 of the Forest Act of 2001 to control different activities like harvesting, grazing, mining, and building within forests. The Directorate of Forestry (DoF), which has considerable authoritative control over community activities, frequently has to approve these permits, which are granted by designated licencing officers and are subject to the payment of prescribed royalties and fees (Sections 26–30, T4). Laws pertaining to the certification, grading, and trading of forest products further strengthen the legal protection of specific medicinal tree species and the regulation of forest products (Section 48, T1). Even though the goal of these measures is to promote conservation, enforcement issues and clashes with local customs, beliefs, and norms mean that compliance is still only partially achieved. Initially the DoF guided the framing of by-laws but this changed during its third phase, characterized by the development of the CF toolbox, and a standard set of by-laws. Field evidence clearly highlights the limited application of these provisions partly due to the limited resources available for authorities in the exogenous domain to enforce such rule-based provisions. The loopholes linked to limited enforcement have created avenues for complacency as illegal wood trafficking persists. Considering the high transaction costs associated with enforcing such rules, aligning it with endogenous rule-based systems and entities would facilitate enforcement in a jelled institutional arrangement.

The community’s support for conservancy hunting quotas is also limited since they sometimes lack typical benefit sharing procedures, despite their goal of striking a balance between sustainability and animal utilization. Organizations like GIZ and Namibia Nature Foundation (NNF) offer technical assistance and resources through external initiatives, but their efficacy is largely reliant on financing stability and adherence to legal requirements. As the primary authority, the DoF is emphasized in the Forest Act, which mandates that most community activities have the department’s approval, especially for mining, grazing, and harvesting licences. For commercial exploitation, permits for timber and forest products are prime examples of the dependence on both conservancy and government approvals. Traditional authority is incorporated as important players in the authorization process that impacts decisions about access and management by the Forest Act or the legal framework. However, besides their official recognition in processes like obtaining permission from traditional authorities, the act itself makes no explicit reference to or codification of societal norms, beliefs, taboos, or traditional practices. In contrast to the explicit integration or reference of the cultural taboos or informal social norms related to the extraction and use of forest resources, the emphasis is still on statutory compliance and processes. However, the degrees of compliance of exogenous institutions are found to be inconsistent; there is full compliance in situations where legal permissions and permits are required, but they are partial or non-compliance in situations where enforcement is irregular, project directives are brief, or formal regulations clash with regional norms and customs.

A review of community forest’s by-laws (2004) shows that the Forest Management Committee (FMC) and traditional leaders share authority in hybrid governance with a case in point being the Mbeyo Community Forest. Permits, fines, and sanctions are used to control access and use rights. While strangers need permission from the Headwomen through the headman, citizens are allowed to gather firewood, thatching grass, fruits, and other NTFPs for their own consumption. Selling thatching grass requires expensive permissions (NAD20–30 per tonne) and harvesting it without permission can result in fines or confiscation. If you cut fruit or commercial trees without permission, the headman will sanction it and punish by charging two animals. The resources that are taken away become the property of the FMC. Formal by-laws uphold traditional authority and benefit sharing norms, while simultaneously encouraging sustainable forest usage. These hybrid regulations are an example of jelled institutions. The wide variations in compliance in the Mbeyo community forest were validated by FGD3 (Mbeyo CF). Even key actors who should enforce such rules end up violating them in some cases. For instance, a Senior Headwoman in Mbeyo who controlled the community forest management board connived with a former police officer to engage in largescale illegal timber harvesting and trade. The timing of fruit harvesting and taboos are examples of traditional standards that are generally followed, while formal regulations, permits, thatching, and firewood collecting, and income-generating activities, are only partially followed because of a lack of resources, enforcement, and outside transgressions. Institutional and resource limitations are reflected in the partial or non-compliance with the land use and management plan. The empirical insights establish the role of EIs in shaping commercialized resource use and management processes. This further shows that institutional jelling (alignment) steered from an exogenous rule-based standpoint may well shape outcomes under conditions of commerce-based resource use with varied degrees of dominance.

4.3. Potentials of Jelled Institutions in Shaping Resource Use and Management

The jelled institutions, alignment of ECIs, and exogenous formal arrangements (

Table 3. Potential for a jelled institutional arrangement in community forests/conservancy.

Institutions	Potential Jelled Institutional Arrangements
Sustainable timber harvesting	Ministry regulations (exogenous) require permits; community approves individual harvests based on local norms, and benefit sharing rules (endogenous)
Wildlife use for women	Exogenous rules restrict hunting of protected species; endogenous norms restrict pregnant/menstruating women from eating certain meat; combined rules protect both species and social norms
Medicinal plant protection	Exogenous forest protection regulations combined with indigenous knowledge restricting cutting of medicinal trees; ensures both legal and cultural protection
Sustainable hunting	Exogenous hunting quotas set by the Ministry, aligned with endogenous rules on who can hunt and have access to animals, incl. sharing skins and horns for community rituals. Combined system regulates sustainable hunting
Integrated fire and grazing management protocol	The formal requirement for DoF approval aligns with community-led practices, leading to a cohesive fire management strategy.
Fruit harvesting timing	Elders/headmen/headwomen set collection days (endogenous), while conservancy by-laws define rights and quota (exogenous); fruits collected post-rituals and recorded in management plan.
Settlement control in forest	Exogenous zoning and conservancy rules formally define settlements, while endogenous recognition of traditional authority sustains customary governance. Together, they influence settlement patterns, regulate land claims, and mediate conflicts between state regulations and community traditions.

) hold significant potential in Namibia’s community forests or conservation area’s governance. They are not merely a coexistence of systems but a negotiated and adaptive form of institutional arrangements that shape sustainable outcomes. Kimengsi et al. [27] stated that the emergence and functioning of jelled institutions where endogenous cultural and exogenous formal arrangements interact depend on certain enabling conditions. These include (i) recognition and documentation of remaining informal rules, (ii) shared understanding of how formal and informal institutions shape resource extraction and use; (iii) intergenerational continuity of customary practices, (iv) adequate intrinsic and extrinsic incentives; (v) willingness among actors to negotiate trade-offs; (vi) adequate intrinsic and extrinsic incentives; and (vii) facilitative mediation (through participatory approaches) by neutral actors that could be NGOs or international agencies. Based on these conditions, Table 3 indicates potential resource use practices under a jelled institutional arrangement.

4.3.1. Jelled Institutional Arrangements for Sustainable Timber Harvesting in Namibia

Timber is a key resource in Namibia. The transition towards sustainable wood governance requires recognizing the remnants of regional customs and taboos surrounding tree felling and its benefit sharing. On the contrary, formal regulations on timber harvesting, such as the permit system, logging quotas, and management plans, are often difficult to enforce due to high transaction costs, the vastness of the geographical landscape, and limited state capacity. According to elders, there have long been rules forbidding the collection of timber or the cutting down of sacred species without following cultural rituals. However, many of these traditions are gradually disappearing as younger generations focus more on market opportunities. For jelled institutions to form, young and elderly actors in the communities as well as the state actors must share understanding of both customary norms and state forest policies. When actors recognize the ecological and cultural significance of wood resources, it becomes possible to negotiate trade-offs, such as integrating harvesting quotas and permit systems under formal community forestry by-laws with local norms and cultural taboos. Extrinsic incentives, such as timber and timber-derived revenues, together with intrinsic incentives, including community pride, further strengthen cooperation among resource users. Institutional arrangements that are both culturally legitimate and formally recognized not only discourage illegal tree felling and reduce enforcement costs but also enhance the regeneration of key timber species and sustain timber resources. In this case, they promote more sustainable forest governance and more optimal management outcomes in community-managed forests and conservancies in Namibia. With growing calls for the endogenization of resource management initiatives, prospects for such can be assured through the valorization of forest resource use activities to reduce over dependence on externally induced incentives and resources.

4.3.2. Jelled Institutional Arrangements for Sustainable Wildlife Hunting and Consumption in Namibia

Wildlife use in Namibia reveals the importance of both cultural and regulatory dimensions that, when blended, can sustain conservation and generate local incentives. Taboos that forbid pregnant women from eating the meat of giraffes, leopards, or wild cats are examples of the remnants of ECIs. Their continued existence depends on the younger generations’ understanding of ecological and symbolic significance in the area. Formal institutions (e.g., forest laws), in contrast, regulate hunting seasons, protected species, and permit system, but often overlook gendered cultural dimensions and traditional beliefs linked to hunting rituals. Most of the sites have community forest by-laws guided by the forest act and regulations which include hunting permits, quotas, and species protection lists, providing a structured enforcement, but are often poorly respected by local communities who see them as external impositions. Exogenous institutions (forest act or regulations) can complement these practices if communities and the government share an understanding of their mutual conservation goals. In such situations, jelled institutions can emerge and function well when local actors agree to uphold beneficial taboos while modifying restrictive ones that exclude gender from decision making. More adherence is encouraged when incentives, like tourism profits and contract hunting, are combined with internal motives, such as cultural continuity, health beliefs, and customs of donating certain parts (such as skins or bones) for communal rituals. In community-managed forests and conservancies, implementing such jelled institutions may decrease illegal hunting, improve the conservation of endangered species, and maintain the ecological and cultural relevance of hunting traditions.

4.3.3. Jelled Institutional Arrangements for Medicinal Plant Conservation and Use in Namibia

Medicinal plants remain vital livelihood and health resources in Namibia, with their collection shaped by cultural taboos, traditional practices, and state regulations. Endogenous cultural institutions (ECIs) protect species such as the Snake plant and Kiet tree, prohibiting cutting to sustain their populations. Healers hold specific knowledge, guiding harvesting practices—for example, using Monkey Orange (Strychnos spinosa) to treat infertility. These beliefs and practices contribute to species conservation. Exogenous arrangements, including forest and biodiversity regulations, provide scientific guidelines for determining yields and allowable harvests. Effective jelled institutions require shared understanding between healers and forest officials of how traditional practices intersect with biodiversity and livelihood goals. Promoting sustainable harvesting and youth engagement ensures intergenerational continuity. When both parties recognize the ecological and socio-economic value of medicinal plants and formalize customary practices, institutional coherence improves. Integrating traditional healing practices with monitoring protocols enhances legitimacy and sustainability, ensuring medicinal plants remain available for future generations while safeguarding cultural traditions.

4.3.4. Jelled Institutional Arrangements for Sustainable Fruit Harvesting in Namibia

Traditional norms guide fruit collection through rituals, headwomen’s announcements, and tasting rites, while prohibiting early harvesting and the cutting of species like rosewood and Mangetti trees (Schinziophyton rautanenii). Fines help enforce these rules, promoting fairness and sustainable use. However, modernization and commercialization are eroding full compliance, leading to over and unsustainable harvesting in some areas. Exogenous by-laws within community forests sometimes regulate collection period but lack cultural resonance. Jelled institutions could integrate first-fruit ceremonies into legal harvesting frameworks, aligning cultural restrictions with scientific assessments of fruiting cycles. Adherence is strengthened by extrinsic incentives, such as revenue from sustainable fruit marketing, along with intrinsic ones, such as food security and cultural celebration. By legitimizing traditional ceremonies within formal management structures, jelled institutional governance ensures that wild fruit resources remain both culturally meaningful and ecologically sustainable.

4.3.5. Jelled Institutional Arrangements for Integrated Fire and Grazing Management Protocol in Namibia

Fire and grazing are central to Namibia’s rangeland ecology within community-managed forests. Communities have long used seasonal burning practices to regenerate pastures, while cultural norms dictate grazing rotations and prohibit overuse in certain areas. Exogenous institutions often consider fire as a destructive force, imposing blanket prohibitions and top-down management rules, which are disconnected from local practices. This led to uncontrolled wildfires or degraded rangeland and forest ecosystems. Community forests may engage in jelled arrangements of these institutions, offering a way forward by aligning traditional burning rituals and grazing calendars with formal fire management protocols. For instance, culturally sanctioned burning could be combined with exogenously inserted guidelines to reduce fire risks while maintaining pasture productivity. Likewise, local grazing practices could be codified in community forest by-laws and forest management plans, ensuring full compliance while granting flexibility. In such contexts, jelled institutional arrangements not only help to achieve sustainable rangeland management, but also balance cultural practices with ecological aspects. The strip burning technique which allows for the installation of a cost-and-labour-effective 30 m cutline is used as an integrated fire management approach to replace the earlier applied 10 m cutline which did not successfully manage fire outbreaks.

4.3.6. Jelled Institutional Arrangements for Settlement Control in Forest Areas in Namibia

Settlement expansion into forest areas is a growing concern in Namibia, driving deforestation, habitat loss, and ecosystem degradation. Cultural institutions traditionally restricted settlements in sacred grooves and taboo sites, thereby conserving ecologically important patches. In the case of Makata and Ncumcara, the TAs play a crucial role in forbidden settlement expansion. However, there were instances where TAs promoted land expropriation for settlement, agriculture, and mining despite the non-acceptance by community members; such practices continue unabated due to the influential position of these TAs. Exogenous institutions impose zoning laws and designate protected areas, but enforcement is often weak. By combining these systems, jelled institutions can strengthen settlement control. For instance, community forestry by-laws could formally recognize sacred forests as no-settlement zones, thereby reinforcing both legal and cultural authority. This would discourage encroachment while protecting biodiversity hotspots and cultural landscapes. Such jelled arrangements also reduce conflicts between local communities and government agencies by creating governance systems that resonate with community values, offering an effective mechanism to balance cultural respect, ecological protection, and formal land use regulation in managing settlement pressures within forest areas.

Overall, the findings establish the following cross-cutting mechanisms through which jelled institutions could potentially improve governance outcomes across different resource types. They include the mechanisms that recognize the socio-cultural significance of resource systems (e.g., in timber harvesting), extrinsic and intrinsic incentive-based mechanisms (e.g., in medicinal plants conservation and use, sustainable fruit harvesting, and wildlife hunting and consumption), the institution of shared understanding of mutual conservation goals (e.g., in wildlife hunting and consumption), the codification of local practices (e.g., in fire and grazing management), and the formal recognition of sacred sites (e.g., in settlement control).

5. Discussion

5.1. Variations in ECI Compliance Shaped by Age and Resource Typology

The study revealed that while community-based forest management in Namibia is characterized by a vast array of ECIs (beliefs, rituals, and traditions), full compliance with these institutions exhibits variations based on age and resource typology. Regarding age, partial or non-compliance with ECIs was observed for the younger actors—this is explained by growing youth apathy for ECIs and shifts in preference in favour of the so-called modern and Christian-like way of life. This is also supported by recent findings from Southern Africa (Malawi) where M’bona, an ECI which regulates resource use and management, witnessed a progressive decline in the context of non-timber forest products [50]. Youth apathy for forest-linked ECIs in favour of Western institutional arrangements has also been reported in parts of West Africa [51,52] and South Asia [53,54]. These scenarios contradict findings in parts of Central Africa where findings revealed that Christianity has failed to weaken ECIs [13,55]. Resource-wise, the study found that full compliance with the institutional arrangements that shape resources usage and management is linked to the regulation of rules of appropriation for medicinal plants, fruits, and wild animals. These practices, which are largely carried out by the older generation, demonstrate a relatively significant level of compliance (full compliance) with the ECIs than the younger actors as the older generation still uphold their customs and traditions. The findings contradict recent evidence from the rural Eastern Cape of South Africa which reported that due to multiple exogenously rooted factors, ECIs which are largely upheld by the older generation face significant challenges in effectively regulating natural resources [56]. The Namibian case also depicts a new dynamic in terms of the gendered roles linked to upholding ECIs. For instance, in many settings, women are usually not found to be key in administering ECIs [8,57]. However, in the case of fruit harvesting, the headwomen played key roles in regulating access to fruit resources in the forest. The interplay of traditionally rooted convictions and beliefs on the one hand and the difficult financial situation and remoteness of the landscape on the other hand have contributed to sustaining such rule-based systems. Recent evidence from Nepal indicates that rising incomes and the consequent reduction in poverty contribute to reduced community engagement in resource governance, thereby signalling non-compliance with community-based resource management institutions [58]. However, more lucrative forest activities such as timber and wood extraction tend to witness non-compliance as relatively younger actors, in collaboration with traders, engage in transactions that defy ECIs. Institutional jelling presents an approach to understand the extent and scale of institutional alignment under diverse resource settings, and the outcomes. The evidence supports the jelling theoretical approach with emphasis on endogenous institution-led roles in shaping subsistence-based resource use systems, and exogenous institution-led roles in steering commercialized resource use and management processes. This further shows that institutional jelling (alignment) may well shape outcomes (positive and/or negative) under diverse resource settings. The evidence aligns with findings from South Asia where Charmakar et al. [58] report the predominance of endogenously driven institutional aggregation in subsistence-based resource settings, and exogenously driven institutional aggregation in commercialized-based resource settings. It, however, contradicts evidence from Central Africa, which showed that resource users depended either on exogenous or endogenous rules in the navigation of their daily forest use practices. Alliances of convenience were established between actors representing the endogenous and exogenous domains, signalling potentials for jelling to ensue [10]. This might work in conditions where the exogenous domain actors (e.g., state agencies) are willing to accommodate and ratify endogenously rooted rules [20].

5.2. Exogenous Institutions Characterized by Limited Enforcement and Compliance

The study found that the exogenous institutions (such as formal regulations, permits, quotas) which were developed through initial support from government agencies and NGOs offer a platform to regulate harvesting, grazing, mining, and construction in principle. The exogenous institutional arrangements are anchored in the Forest Act of 2001 and related legal instruments. These rule-based systems are characterized by limited enforcement and conflicts with ECIs, which steers partial compliance. The limited application of these rules is explained by both institutional design failure and enforcement capacity constraints. Exogenous rules which are not well-adapted to suit the local context are still in place, making their adherence difficult especially when they conflict with local realities. Additionally, there is the problem of limited resource availability for actors in the exogenous domain and high transaction costs linked to the enforcement of exogenous rules. These have reinforced illegal timber, wildlife, and wood trafficking. These results resonate with evidence from Zambia which points to the fact that exogenous entities such as NGOs failed to foster community-based participation in resource management but rather empowered local leaders through commercial deals and bureaucratic resource management processes. Therefore, instead of facilitating rule compliance for equitable resource management, these entities have perpetuated the reproduction of existing patterns of inequity [59]. Our finding also resonates with earlier findings in the context of scientific forest management in Nepal which was driven by exogenous entities–the government and international NGOs [60,61]. Additionally, this study aligns with the findings of Boakye [62], who reported that limited regulatory capacity to detect violations has contributed to the weak enforcement of logging regulations in Ghana.

In another dimension, our study revealed that formal hunting regulations are progressively being replaced in some settings by customary ones, and the use of horns and skins for cultural purposes remains significant. The current scenario presents an opportunity for the blending of exogenous and endogenous rules to reduce transaction costs associated with monitoring, while facilitating the organic enforcement of a jelled institutional arrangement. Earlier studies have reported high transaction costs for poor forest-dependent households in parts of Asia [63,64,65]. Furthermore, in East Africa (southeastern Tanzania), high transaction costs accounted for the non-viability of tropical timber which was obtained from community forests under the Forest Stewardship Council certification [66]. Additionally, the transaction costs—borne largely by the poorer members of the community—played a critical role in shaping community-based natural resource management in Tanzania [67]. Institutional jelling is a pertinent pathway considering the existing shared responsibilities between traditional entities (e.g., Tas and Hompas) and state entities in some community-based forest management settings in Namibia (e.g., Mbeyo Community Forest).

5.3. Potentials of Jelled Institutions in Shaping Resource Use and Management

Institutional jelling demonstrates potential in shaping resource management in socio-ecological systems as advanced by Kimengsi et al. [27]. In the Namibian cases, these potentials are evident in timber harvesting, wildlife hunting and consumption, medicinal plants conservation and use, fruit harvesting, integrated fire and grazing management, and settlement control. Formal institutions (such as permit system and quotas) could find a common denominator with earlier established ECIs, forbidding the collection of timber and the cutting down of sacred species. Earlier studies have significantly reported growing conflicts between endogenous and exogenous resource management institutions. For instance, the bricolage of exogenous and endogenous institutions in parts of SSA and Asia revealed sub-optimal resource use and management outcomes in relation to efficiency and social equality [10,68,69]. However, other studies provide a green light on the potential for institutional jelling. For instance, in SSA (Mali and Zambia), endogenous and exogenous entities jointly crafted local conventions to manage conflicts linked to formal and informal institutional interactions in the forestry and fisheries sector [20]. Such crafting lacked durability because of non-ratification at higher formal instances–this signalled an unjelled arrangement. In Latin America (Brazil and Bolivia), institutional integration and “shopping” was facilitated by the interaction of formal and informal institutions and actors in resource access and use [70,71]. However, institutional shopping does not directly translate to jelling as incompatible rule provisions characterized this process. As opposed to shopping, jelling upholds a change path towards the effective alignment of endogenous and exogenous institutional provisions in resource management. Furthermore, the Asian context (Myanmar and Indonesia) depicts a situation in which exogenous and endogenous entities jointly sought collaboration to reverse threats of unsustainable resource use and conservation while addressing community needs and aspirations [72,73]. In West Africa, synergy between endogenous and exogenous institutions contributed to strengthening wildlife protection. It, therefore, holds that endogenous rules could be potentially enhanced through an appropriate alignment (jelling) with exogenous ones [9]. This requires a set of trade-offs from formal and informal rules to enhance collaboration, inclusivity, and benefit arrangements. Institutional jelling in the Namibian cases should occur in instances where actors in the endogenous and exogenous domains liaise to guarantee the integration of harvesting quotas and permits with local norms and practices. In this case, they should adhere to the tenets of intergenerational knowledge and practice transfer. Such jelled arrangements are likely to mitigate state and community-based conflicts by creating value-driven governance systems to balance ecological, cultural, political, and socio-economic interests of actors within forest areas. As calls for endogenously rooted practices increase, studies that explore endogenous resource mobilization schemes capable of reducing over-dependence on externally induced incentives and resources represent a good platform for research in the frame of institutional jelling. Studies should uncover instances of jelled and unjelled institutional arrangements, the typology and salience of socio-ecological systems (e.g., forests, rangeland, agricultural land, mangroves) under jelled and unjelled institutional conditions, geographical variations explaining the range of positive and/or negative outcomes linked to jelled or unjelled institutions, and the actor constellations and scale dimension of jelled rule-based systems. Additionally, mixed-methods analysis of the gendered perspectives of enforcement and full compliance with jelled institutions should be considered for future studies.

6. Conclusions

Growing interest in establishing common grounds for exogenous and endogenous institutions is gaining traction as advanced by the recent theoretical approach—institutional jelling. Based on the analysis, we draw the following conclusions: Firstly, although ECIs form an integral part of community-based forest management in Namibia, the determinants of compliance variations are shaped by age, gender, and resource attributes. In this light, older generations exercise a significant level of full compliance with the ECIs compared to the younger generations who have other non-cultural preferences and attachments. Furthermore, compliance with institutions is linked more to subsistence-based resources (medicinal plants, fruits, and wild animals) over market-based resources which are championed by younger actors (timber). Secondly, exogenous institutions which were developed through external support are characterized by limited enforcement and partial compliance. This scenario occurs due to the high transaction costs linked to enforcement which outweighs the resource availability of enforcement agents. These lapses show that institutional jelling contributes to advancing the debate on the role of institutions in shaping community-based forest management. Thirdly, institutional jelling steered from an endogenous rule-based standpoint may well shape positive outcomes in subsistence-based resource use settings, while those steered from an exogenous rule-based position may shape outcomes in commercialized resource settings.

While previous theoretical and empirical analysis identified instances of the selective application of endogenous and exogenous rules, this does not capture institutional provisions which are jelled (well aligned) as unified entities. This paper deepens the understanding of the cross-cutting mechanisms through which jelled institutions could potentially improve governance outcomes across different resource types. The paper theoretically positions socio-cultural significance, extrinsic and intrinsic incentives, shared understanding, local practice codification, and formal recognition of sacred sites as cross-cutting mechanisms through which jelled institutions could potentially improve governance outcomes.

Policy-wise, emphasis on the jelling of the endogenous and exogenous rule-based systems is required to reduce transactions costs linked to sustainable community-based forest resource management in Namibia. This should be applied by policymakers through the reframing of rule-based systems to capture institutional provisions which are jelled (well-aligned). Furthermore, forest and wildlife authorities should work towards the proper understanding of community-specific endogenous rules and identify elements of goal alignment, adaptability, and implementation feasibility. Development agencies should provide technical and material support for the redesign of such unified institutional arrangements.

From a methodological standpoint, the analysis conducted was purely qualitative. A robust mixed-methods analysis is likely to further strengthen empirical evidence on these issues. Therefore, future studies should consider adopting mixed-methods analysis to empirically ground this theoretical approach in the frame of resource typology and salience, geographical variations in the outcomes linked to (un)jelled institutions, actor constellations in jelling, and youth engagement.