1. Introduction
The transition toward a low-carbon economy depends heavily on corporate green innovation: technologies, products, and production processes that reduce pollution, conserve resources, and lower carbon intensity [
1,
2]. Green innovation combines two market failures rather than one. Like conventional research and development, it generates knowledge spillovers the innovating firm cannot fully capture [
3]; unlike conventional R&D, it also generates environmental benefits that accrue to society rather than to the firm [
4]. This double externality causes private green investment to fall short of the social optimum and provides the standard rationale for public intervention [
5,
6]. Governments have responded with a broad policy portfolio, and understanding which instruments move firm behavior, through what channels, and under what conditions is central to effective environmental policy design.
Among fiscal instruments, the tax system occupies a distinctive position. Most environmental tax incentives work by lowering the effective price of qualifying activities, for example through R&D super-deductions or accelerated depreciation for green equipment [
7,
8,
9]. A different, less-examined class operates on the timing of cash flows rather than tax rates. China’s VAT credit refund policy belongs to this class. Firms that accumulate an uncredited input-VAT balance under China’s credit-invoice VAT, historically carried forward rather than refunded, effectively extend an interest-free loan to the government; the deferred claim exceeded RMB 1 trillion in 2018 and accounted for roughly 60 percent of the RMB 2.5 trillion in nationwide tax reductions and refunds by 2022 [
10,
11]. The reform converts this deferred claim into an immediate cash refund for firms in targeted industries, improving liquidity without altering the statutory tax burden [
12].
Whether such a liquidity injection translates into green innovation is theoretically ambiguous. If green R&D is constrained by internal funds, as a large literature on financing constraints and innovation suggests [
13,
14], relaxing the cash constraint should raise innovation investment. But refunded cash is fungible and could instead fund dividends, debt repayment, or conventional capital expenditure; evidence shows the refund raises cash dividends [
15] and cash holdings [
16], so the policy might leave green technology largely untouched. Even where firms redeploy the cash, execution rests on the internal control environment, which governs how faithfully a stated intention becomes monitored expenditure [
17,
18]. Beyond the firm’s own governance, how uncertain the future of climate policy is plausibly shapes whether a windfall is worth committing to a long-gestation, irreversible green project at all.
This paper addresses that question by exploiting China’s 2018 VAT credit refund pilot as a quasi-natural experiment. In 2018, the authorities selected eighteen advanced-manufacturing, modern-service, and power-grid industries for one-time refunds of accumulated, uncredited input-VAT balances, before the policy was progressively broadened and made near-universal in 2022. This industry-targeted rollout generates plausibly exogenous variation in firms’ exposure to the liquidity shock. We estimate two-way fixed-effects difference-in-differences models with firm and year fixed effects on 25,259 firm-year observations covering 4044 firms over 2014–2021.
Green innovation is measured by patent applications, which are dated at filing and therefore record the moment a firm commits to a specific inventive project. Treatment is defined by industry eligibility, so the estimate is an intention-to-treat effect of eligibility rather than of refund receipt, and inference is clustered at the industry level, the level at which the pilot assigns eligibility.
We report three sets of findings. First, the refund raises green invention-patent applications both without firm controls (0.172, t = 3.215) and with a compact control set covering size, age, leverage, profitability, growth, and ownership concentration (0.157, t = 2.910, 95 percent CI [0.049, 0.264]); because the outcome is measured in logarithms, the preferred estimate corresponds to an increase of 17.0 percent (95 percent CI 5.1 to 30.2 percent). Second, a sequential decomposition is consistent with a coherent transmission chain: the refund eases financing constraints, which raises R&D investment intensity, which in turn raises green-invention applications; a Monte Carlo confidence interval for the indirect chain excludes zero. Third, the policy’s translation into innovation is conditional on the firm’s structural governance and on its external policy environment: it is strengthened by internal control quality, concentrates among firms with greater pre-treatment financial slack, and is absent in provinces with high climate policy uncertainty (CPU). The results strengthen when control firms drawn in by the 2019 expansion are removed, survive sector-by-year and province-by-year fixed effects, and are reproduced by the [
19,
20,
21] estimators as well as by a triple difference on the innovation-quality margin.
This study makes three contributions. First, it extends the tax-and-innovation literature beyond price-based instruments, such as R&D super-deductions and investment tax credits, to a liquidity-based one. Because the refund accelerates the timing of a cash flow the firm already owned without changing statutory rates, it offers a setting in which liquidity effects on innovation can be studied with more limited confounding from tax-price changes than is typical of the literature; the channel we document is predominantly, rather than purely, liquidity-based, and we ground this distinction in the financing-constraints theory of investment [
22,
23].
Second, it advances the VAT-credit-refund literature, summarized in
Section 2.2.2, which has documented effects on productivity, R&D spending, dividends, hiring, environmental ratings, and, in one recent study, a green-patenting result reported as a secondary channel within a broader carbon-emissions analysis [
24]. We make green invention patenting the primary outcome rather than a downstream mechanism, and open the financing-to-innovation pathway with a formal sequential decomposition bounded by a Monte Carlo confidence interval.
Third, it identifies the conditions under which a fungible windfall becomes green technological output. Financing-constraints theory predicts that releasing a cash constraint raises constrained investment, but is silent on whether the released cash reaches any particular use. We locate the missing filter in the firm’s formal control architecture and in the credibility of the external climate policy environment, showing that fiscal liquidity complements rather than substitutes for governance quality and regulatory predictability.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 describes the institutional background, reviews the related literature, and develops the hypotheses.
Section 3 details the sample, variable measurement, and empirical specification.
Section 4 reports the main results, and
Section 5 reports the identification and robustness analysis.
Section 6 discusses the findings and concludes.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Sample and Data
Our sample comprises Chinese A-share listed firms observed between 2014 and 2021, the window surrounding the 2018 pilot; the period ends in 2021 because the 2022 reform extended the refund to essentially all firms and removed the control group. Following standard practice, we exclude financial-sector firms, firms under special-treatment (ST/*ST) status, and observations with missing values on the core variables, and we drop singleton firm or year observations that contribute no within-firm or within-year variation to the two-way fixed-effects model. After this screening, we retain 25,259 firm-year observations on 4044 firms across 76 two-digit industries and 31 provinces, of which 35.0 percent are DID = 1 observations.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. This applies to the continuous control variables, the mechanism variables (SA, CashFlow, RDRatio), and the moderating and heterogeneity variables (ICQ, CPU, financial slack). Count-based outcome variables are not winsorized.
Firm financials, ownership, and governance variables, together with the treatment indicators built from the 2018 pilot industry catalogue, are drawn from the CSMAR database. Green invention-patent application counts are collected from the China National Intellectual Property Administration and classified following the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Green Inventory. Internal control quality scores come from the DIB internal control and risk management database, a widely used proxy in the Chinese accounting and finance literature for the design and operating effectiveness of a firm’s internal control system [
33]; we standardize the raw index to mean zero and unit variance so that its interaction coefficient is interpretable per one-standard-deviation change. Provincial CPU comes from the news-based index of [
36], which applies deep-learning text classification to more than 1.7 million articles from six major Chinese newspapers; the index has been used to measure CPU in China in prior work [
42]. We obtain the series from the ISETS Energy Finance Network.
3.2. Variable Definitions
The dependent variable is GIA, the natural logarithm of one plus the count of green invention-patent applications. Applications are dated at filing, so the measure records the moment a firm commits to a specific inventive project and bears the cost of documenting it, which is the decision the liquidity shock is hypothesized to move. Invention patents, which require substantive examination for novelty and inventive step, are our focus rather than utility models, which do not;
Section 5.3 reports a triple difference between the two that isolates the innovation-quality margin.
The key explanatory variables are Eligible, an indicator equal to one for firms in one of the eighteen 2018-pilot industries; Post, equal to one in 2018 and every subsequent year; and their interaction, DID, the coefficient of interest throughout. Because eligibility is defined by industry classification while receipt of a refund additionally required an accumulated uncredited balance and a claim, DID identifies an intention-to-treat effect of industry eligibility. Take-up within eligible industries is a firm decision plausibly correlated with unobserved determinants of innovation, whereas industry membership is fixed within our panel, which makes eligibility the more credible source of variation.
The baseline control vector comprises firm size, age, leverage, return on assets, revenue growth, and the shareholding percentage of the largest shareholder. We report the baseline both with and without this vector as alternative specifications; controls measured contemporaneously with the outcome may themselves respond to the treatment, so their addition is not a robustness test.
Three mechanism variables operationalize H2: the
SA financing-constraint index of [
32], computed as SA = −0.737 × Size + 0.043 × Size
2 − 0.040 × Age, with higher values indicating greater constraints; operating cash flow scaled by total assets (CashFlow); and R&D expenditure scaled by operating revenue (RDRatio).
One moderation variable operationalizes H3: internal control quality (ICQ), the standardized DIB internal control index.
Two further variables operationalize the boundary-condition analysis in
Section 4.5: the firm’s pre-treatment (2014–2017) average
SA index, used to split the sample into higher- and lower-financial-slack subsamples, and the province-level CPU index, evaluated at its pre-treatment provincial average. Both splits are formed on pre-treatment values so that the splitting variable cannot itself be affected by the policy.
3.3. Empirical Specification
3.3.1. Baseline Difference-in-Differences
We estimate the effect of the refund on green invention-patent applications with a two-way fixed-effects DID model:
where DID
i,
t = Eligible
i × Post
t; X
i,
t is a compact vector of firm controls (Size, Age, Lev, ROA, Growth, and Top1); and μ
i and λ
t are firm and year fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is β
1.
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level (two-digit CSRC, 76 clusters), the level at which the pilot assigns eligibility: firms sharing an industry share their treatment assignment and any shock correlated with it.
Section 5.4 confirms the result under a wild cluster bootstrap and under randomization inference over industry eligibility.
3.3.2. Chain-Mediation Specification
We test the sequential channel underlying H2 in stages. First, we regress each of the three mechanism variables, SA, CashFlow, and RDRatio, on DID, controls, and fixed effects; because SA is mechanically a function of Size and Age, we exclude those two from the control set in the
SA regression only. We then estimate a chain of the form DID → SA → RDRatio → GIA: path a regresses SA on DID and controls; path b regresses RDRatio on SA, DID, and the full control vector; and path c regresses GIA on RDRatio, DID, and the full control vector, so that the direct effect of DID net of the mediating path is recovered from path c. We compute the compound indirect effect as a × b × c and construct its confidence interval by Monte Carlo simulation [
43] with 200,000 draws from the asymptotic sampling distributions of the path estimates.
A confidence interval that excludes zero establishes that the estimated product is inconsistent with a null indirect path, not that the causal ordering runs in the direction imposed. We read the result as statistically consistent with the proposed pathway rather than as identification of a sequential mechanism.
3.3.3. Moderation
We test the structural governance condition (H3) by augmenting Equation (1) with the moderator and its interaction with DID:
where ICQ is the standardized internal control index, so β
2 is the change in the DID coefficient per one-standard-deviation increase in internal control quality. A positive β
2 supports H3.
3.3.4. Boundary Conditions
We split the sample by pre-treatment financial slack, at the sample median of each firm’s 2014–2017 average SA index; because SA is decreasing in financial slack, the below-median subsample is labeled high financial slack. We apply the same pre-treatment-average logic to each firm’s provincial CPU index. For each split, we estimate Equation (1) separately on each subsample and report a Chow-type test in which every control variable, not only DID, is interacted with the subsample indicator, so that the reported p-value tests equality of the treatment slope across subsamples.
5. Identification and Robustness
This section addresses the principal threats to the design: contamination of the control group by the 2019 policy expansion and the partially treated 2018 year (
Section 5.1), time-varying industry and regional shocks (
Section 5.2), estimator choice and the innovation-quality margin (
Section 5.3), and placebo evidence, inference and sample composition (
Section 5.4).
Table 9 collects all four sets of results in a single paneled format; the DID coefficient is stable across each one.
5.1. Control-Group Composition and Policy Timing
The 2019 reform extended an incremental-refund mechanism to taxpayers outside the 2018 pilot industries, so the control group is not wholly unexposed after 2019, and the later-year contrast understates the difference between exposed and unexposed firms. We identify, firm by firm, which control-group firms became eligible under the 2019 expansion and in which year: 1773 control firm-years become eligible from 2019, 764 from 2020, and 763 from 2021, while 7006 control firm-years are never contaminated.
Panel A of
Table 9 reports the estimate under four remedies. Dropping every contaminated control firm raises the coefficient to 0.252 (t = 5.085); censoring their post-contamination observations gives 0.248 (t = 4.977); retaining only never-contaminated controls gives 0.142 (t = 2.494). Restricting the sample to 2014–2018, a window that closes before the expansion and within which no control firm can therefore be contaminated, gives 0.137 (t = 3.169) on the full panel and 0.219 (t = 5.001) when the clean-control restriction is imposed within that window as well. The direction is the one the contamination logic predicts: if part of the control group receives a smaller dose of the same treatment, the estimated difference is attenuated, so removing those firms raises it. The baseline is therefore conservative.
Panel A also addresses the 2018 transition year. The pilot took effect in June 2018, so that year is only partially treated. Dropping 2018 entirely yields 0.163 (t = 2.778) on the full panel and 0.263 (t = 4.788) when the clean-control restriction is imposed as well, and beginning the post-period in 2019 yields 0.127 (t = 2.559). When 2018 is given its own coefficient alongside a post-2019 indicator, that coefficient is itself positive and significant (0.138, t = 3.063), consistent with firms filing applications within months of receiving a refund in the second half of the year. Coding 2018 as post is conservative, since it averages a partially treated year into the post period.
5.2. Time-Varying Industry and Regional Shocks
The pilot industries may have experienced different innovation trends or concurrent support programs around 2018 regardless of the refund, and firm and year fixed effects do not absorb such differential trends. Panel B of
Table 9 reports the specifications that address this directly. Sector-by-year fixed effects, which absorb any technological or policy trend common to a broad sector in a given year, give 0.194 (t = 3.366). Province-by-year fixed effects, which absorb any regional industrial or environmental policy that changed in a given year, give 0.153 (t = 2.944). With both included, identification rests only on the comparison between eligible and ineligible two-digit industries within the same broad sector and the same year, and the coefficient is 0.191 (t = 3.398). Sector-specific linear time trends give 0.173 (t = 3.592), and adding a direct control for provincial environmental-regulation intensity gives 0.154 (t = 2.849). The estimate rises rather than falls under these specifications, which is difficult to reconcile with a differential-sector-trend account.
5.3. Alternative Estimators and the Innovation-Quality Margin
Two-way fixed-effects estimators can be biased when treatment timing is staggered and effects are heterogeneous. The 2018 pilot has a single treatment date, so with a clean never-treated control group, two-way fixed effects, the [
19] interaction-weighted estimator and the [
20] estimator coincide by construction. Staggered adoption enters this setting only through the 2019 expansion, which draws part of the control group into treatment at later dates. We therefore assign each firm a treatment cohort—2018 for pilot industries, the year of contamination for control firms drawn in by the expansion, and never-treated otherwise—so that the heterogeneity-robust estimators speak to timing heterogeneity and control-group contamination simultaneously.
Panel C of
Table 9 reports the results. The Sun and Abraham estimator gives 0.131 (t = 3.547), Callaway and Sant’Anna 0.123 (t = 8.881), and the Gardner two-stage [
21] estimator 0.140 (t = 3.026). The group-time estimates underlying the Callaway and Sant’Anna figure are informative in their own right: the 2018 pilot cohort shows effects of 0.124, 0.100, 0.172 and 0.166 across 2018 to 2021, while the later contamination cohorts are indistinguishable from zero, consistent with the 2019 expansion delivering a much smaller incremental refund. A generalized specification replacing the binary interaction with continuous refund intensity gives 7.654 (t = 2.790).
Panel C also reports a triple difference on the innovation-quality margin. A liquidity windfall could raise filing volume without raising inventive substance, so we stack green invention applications against green utility-model applications within the same firm-year and interact the treatment with the invention indicator. Invention patents require substantive examination for novelty and inventive step; utility models do not, and are the standard low-quality margin in the Chinese patent literature. The triple-difference coefficient is 0.140 (t = 3.349), confirming that the response is concentrated on the substantively examined margin rather than reflecting a general increase in filing activity.
5.4. Placebo Tests, Inference, and Sample Composition
Panel D of
Table 9 reports in-time placebos assigning pseudo-policies to 2015, 2016 and 2017 and estimated on the pre-treatment period only, so that no genuine treatment can contribute. None is significant at the 5 percent level. Panel D also excludes the 2020 pandemic year, which leaves the result intact (0.145, t = 2.778), and reports a propensity-score-matched DID in which treated firms are matched 1:1 without replacement on pre-treatment averages of the six baseline controls [
46]; the effect strengthens to 0.186 (t = 3.223), indicating that the baseline is not an artifact of observable differences between treated firms and the full control pool.
Figure 3 reports a randomization-inference test that reassigns industry eligibility across two-digit industries 1000 times, holding the number of treated industries fixed, and asks how often a placebo assignment produces an effect as large as the one we estimate. The actual estimate lies at the 97.6th percentile of that distribution (
p = 0.027). A wild cluster bootstrap with the null imposed and Rademacher weights [
47], 1999 replications clustered by industry, gives
p = 0.009. An F-test for redundant fixed effects rejects the adequacy of pooled OLS, F(4050, 21,201) = 14.38, and a Hausman test rejects the consistency of random effects, χ
2(7) = 21.63,
p = 0.003, supporting the two-way fixed-effects specification.
Estimates by pilot sub-sector, which show the effect present in both advanced manufacturing and modern services, and further checks on alternative outcome transformations are omitted to save space and are available from the corresponding author on request.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
6.1. Summary of Findings
Using a two-way fixed-effects difference-in-differences design around China’s 2018 industry-targeted VAT credit refund pilot, we find an intention-to-treat effect of 0.172 without controls and 0.157 with a compact control vector, both significant at the 1 percent level (H1). The effect implies a 17.0 percent increase in green invention-patent applications. It survives removal of the control firms drawn in by the 2019 expansion, the addition of sector-by-year and province-by-year fixed effects, three heterogeneity-robust estimators, a propensity-score-matched sample, and randomization inference.
The mechanism evidence is consistent with the proposed pathway: the refund eases the SA financing-constraint index and raises R&D intensity, and the Monte Carlo-bounded indirect effect of the financing-to-R&D chain excludes zero (H2). This is a decomposition consistent with the hypothesized chain rather than identification of a sequential mechanism, since all three variables respond to the same shock within the same year.
The policy’s translation into innovation is conditioned by the firm’s structural governance and its external policy environment. Internal control quality significantly strengthens the conversion (H3). The effect concentrates among firms with greater pre-treatment financial slack and is absent in provinces with high CPU, where the refund raises neither cash holdings nor capital expenditure—an absent conversion rather than an identifiable alternative use.
6.2. Theoretical Implications
This study extends the tax-and-innovation literature beyond price-based instruments to a predominantly liquidity-based one, and in doing so exposes a gap in the theory that motivates most of that literature. Financing-constraints theory predicts that releasing a cash constraint raises investment in activities rationed by internal funds, but because cash is fungible, it cannot predict that the released funds reach any particular use. Our results locate the missing filter in two places: the firm’s structural control architecture, which determines whether an investment intention becomes monitored expenditure, and the credibility of the external policy environment, which determines whether an irreversible commitment is worth making at all. Fiscal liquidity is therefore better understood as a complement to governance quality and regulatory predictability than as a substitute for either, and models of policy transmission should treat the firm as an active filter rather than a passive conduit.
Why the effect concentrates where it does follows from the same logic. Green R&D is intangible, poorly collateralized and long-gestating, and it generates environmental benefits the firm cannot fully capture, all of which push it toward the back of the financing pecking order [
23] whenever internal funds are the marginal source of finance. Ordinary capital expenditure, being tangible and verifiable ex ante, can draw on external debt even when cash is scarce. A liquidity injection that leaves relative prices unchanged should therefore be redirected disproportionately toward the investments most starved of internal funds, which is the pattern the baseline, mechanism and financial-slack results jointly document. Institutional quality complements the instrument rather than substituting for it because a liquidity injection lowers the financing hurdle for green R&D without raising the expected private return to holding a green patent or resolving uncertainty about the regulation the resulting technology will face. The same refund produces a 25.2 percent increase in green invention applications where climate policy is predictable and no measurable increase where it is not.
A methodological point also generalizes beyond this setting. When a policy’s proposed mechanism variable is itself a plausible mediator, including it as a control in the headline regression introduces bias rather than guarding against it. Excluding the SA index from the baseline control set while retaining it as the object of the mechanism test follows from this reasoning, as does forming every subsample split on pre-treatment rather than contemporaneous values.
Policy Implications
For governments designing environmental fiscal policy, the most immediate lesson is that liquidity-based instruments can complement price-based incentives at the higher-quality tier of green innovation. The triple-difference evidence shows the response concentrating in substantively examined invention applications rather than in unexamined utility models, so the refund is not simply purchasing filing volume. That said, because the effect concentrates in firms with greater financial slack and stronger internal controls, untargeted refunds may deliver limited environmental returns where those conditions bind, and pairing liquidity support with governance-aware targeting could raise the environmental return on a given fiscal outlay. The absence of any response where CPU is high carries a further implication: liquidity alone is not sufficient when the future direction of environmental regulation is unclear, so credible and well-communicated climate roadmaps are a necessary companion to fiscal support rather than an unrelated policy track.
These lessons are not specific to China. Uncredited input-VAT balances arise mechanically in any credit-invoice VAT system whenever firms make large, front-loaded purchases of capital goods or research inputs, and slow or restricted refunding is a well-documented feature of VAT administration across many emerging and developing economies. Accelerating VAT refunds can be implemented quickly, requires no new rates or credits, and reaches firms that price-based incentives systematically miss, among them young, loss-making, or capital-intensive firms with little taxable income against which to claim a deduction. Because refunded cash remains fungible, however, the environmental return is not automatic, and jurisdictions with weaker internal-control and disclosure regimes should expect a smaller green dividend from the same outlay.
Our sample covers listed firms, so these conclusions apply directly only to them, and the likely direction of external validity is not neutral. The effect concentrates among firms with greater financial slack, and unlisted small and medium enterprises are typically more constrained, so the marginal value of a refund may well be higher there; yet those same firms typically operate weaker internal control architecture, which our results identify as the structural condition for conversion. Since the two considerations pull in opposite directions, we would suggest extending refunds to unlisted firms with simplified claim procedures, given that administrative complexity deters small firms disproportionately and fewer than half of even listed eligible firms claimed, while calibrating expectations of the environmental return to the weaker control environment rather than extrapolating from listed-firm estimates. Evaluation using tax-administration microdata covering unlisted firms would resolve the question directly.
Because the mechanism we document runs from public fiscal design through corporate financing to green technological output, the findings speak to two Sustainable Development Goals in particular. Targets 9.4 and 9.5 call for upgrading industry toward clean technologies and enhancing technological capabilities, and our mechanism evidence shows the refund raising R&D intensity, while the baseline shows that input translates into green invention-patent applications. The boundary-condition results add a design lesson for this goal: liquidity relief upgrades industrial R&D capability most reliably where the firm has both the headroom and the control architecture to convert cash into a monitored research program. Target 13.2 calls for integrating climate measures into national planning, and our CPU result is in effect an empirical statement about what happens when that integration is incomplete. Because we measure invention rather than deployment, the contribution is upstream: the policy expands the stock of low-carbon technology available for later diffusion rather than reducing emissions directly.
6.3. Limitations and Conclusion
Several limitations temper these conclusions. Refund take-up within eligible industries was not exogenous, so defining treatment as industry eligibility yields an intention-to-treat effect diluted by non-claiming eligible firms; administrative refund records would sharpen identification. Financing constraints, R&D investment and innovation are plausibly jointly determined, so the decomposition is consistent with the proposed chain without establishing its temporal ordering. Patent applications measure inventive commitment rather than emissions reduced, and counts do not measure technological significance: the triple difference against utility models establishes that the response is on the examined margin, but cannot distinguish a marginal invention from a significant one, and citation-weighted counts, patent family size and originality indices would allow that distinction. Spillovers are a further limitation, since treated and control firms compete in input and technology markets and the direction of any spillover is not identified in our design. Finally, the CPU measure is a provincial aggregate merged to firms by registered province and year, which may mask city-level heterogeneity, and our attribution of the effect to a predominantly liquidity-based channel rests on the refund’s institutional design rather than on an instrument that mechanically rules out improved borrowing capacity or altered lender expectations.
Improving firms’ cash position through the tax system can promote high-quality green innovation, but conditionally, and on more dimensions than financing constraints alone. The VAT credit refund raises green invention-patent applications by 17.0 percent through a channel consistent with financing relief and R&D expansion, and the result is stable across every specification, estimator and placebo we test. Its efficacy hinges on conditions we can specify: it is stronger where internal controls are robust and financial slack is ample, and it is essentially absent where CPU is high. For governments turning to fiscal liquidity to pursue environmental goals, the instrument works, but selectively. Internal governance and external policy predictability jointly determine how much green innovation a given refund ultimately buys, and fiscal liquidity is, based on this evidence, a complement to institutional quality rather than a substitute for it.