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Systematic Review

Bridging Theoretical Assumptions and Empirical Evidence on Family Firms’ Tax Behavior: A Systematic Review

1
Department of Economics, Management, Industrial Engineering and Tourism, University of Aveiro, 3810-193 Aveiro, Portugal
2
Higher Institute of Accounting and Administration, University of Aveiro, 3810-193 Aveiro, Portugal
3
Research Centre on Accounting and Taxation (CICF), School of Management, Polytechnic University of Cávado and Ave, 4750-821 Barcelos, Portugal
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
J. Risk Financ. Manag. 2026, 19(2), 125; https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm19020125
Submission received: 13 January 2026 / Revised: 26 January 2026 / Accepted: 2 February 2026 / Published: 6 February 2026
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Tax Avoidance and Earnings Management)

Abstract

This article provides a systematic review of the theoretical foundations underlying tax behavior in family firms. Drawing on 69 empirical studies indexed in Scopus and Web of Science, the review identifies three core limitations: the insufficient contextualization of socioemotional wealth (SEW) across cultural and institutional settings; the weak operationalization of SEW dimensions, often relying on indirect proxies; and the limited examination of the concrete actions firms take to minimize corporate income tax. We propose a research agenda anchored in a multi-layered framework that calls for contextual sensitivity, improved SEW measurement, and stronger empirical grounding in tax minimization mechanisms.

1. Introduction

A company is characterized as a family firm when its governance and management are predominantly centered on a family unit, and family members actively seek to establish and maintain familial relationships within the organization (Arregle et al., 2007). In family firms, founding families often retain significant ownership stakes and control, passing them down through generations, with family members frequently holding key management and board positions, ensuring a long-term interest and significant influence over the firm’s activities (Arregle et al., 2024; Berrone et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).
A central contribution to the literature on family firms’ behavior is the concept of familiness, introduced by Habbershon and Williams (1999) within the resource-based view (RBV), which describes the unique bundle of resources that emerges from the interaction between the family and the business. While these resources can provide a competitive advantage, they may also introduce inefficiencies that affect decision-making. Chrisman et al. (2005) further explored the dual nature of familiness, highlighting both its resource-based benefits and the agency costs associated with family involvement, emphasizing that it can function as both an asset and a liability. This tension extends to governance dynamics. On one hand, ownership concentration in family firms often aligns the interests of owners and managers, thereby reducing classic agency conflicts (Fama & Jensen, 1983). On the other, dominant family shareholders may pursue goals that prioritize family interests over those of minority shareholders—particularly in weak institutional environments—leading to conflict between principals (Young et al., 2008). Building on these insights, socioemotional wealth (SEW), developed as an extension of the behavioral agency theory (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), has emerged as a key framework in family business research, explaining the distinct decision-making processes in family-controlled firms (Berrone et al., 2012; Calabrò et al., 2025; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). The SEW perspective emphasizes that family firms often make strategic decisions guided by logics that extend beyond pure economic calculation, prioritizing goals such as identity, control, and transgenerational continuity (Berrone et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Zellweger et al., 2012). Martin et al. (2024) advanced the field by transforming scattered studies on nonfinancial outcomes (NFOs) into a coherent framework, with family firm NFOs notably converging around objectives tied to SEW-related priorities. As proposed by Berrone et al. (2012), SEW is operationalized across five dimensions by the FIBER framework: “Family control and influence, Identification of family members with the firm, Binding social ties, Emotional attachment of family members, and Renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession” (p. 262). This multidimensional structure has guided much of the empirical research in the field and is arguably the most widely recognized scale (Calabrò et al., 2025; Gómez-Mejía & Herrero, 2022). In a recent study, Sanchez-Famoso et al. (2025) demonstrated that the salience of these dimensions varies across cultures and institutional environments, highlighting the importance of contextual sensitivity when interpreting family firm behavior.
These distinct priorities common in family businesses extend into domains traditionally viewed through a financial or compliance lens, such as tax behavior (Bauweraerts et al., 2024; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Tax planning involves judgments about risk, visibility, and long-term trade-offs (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010), all of which intersect with SEW-related concerns. In this context, tax behavior offers a useful lens through which to observe how family-specific values shape strategic decision-making. As in other behavioral domains of family firms, their tax behavior often transcends purely financial logic (Berrone et al., 2012; Eddleston & Mulki, 2021; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). In light of this, understanding how family firms approach corporate income tax (CIT) can contribute to advancing theoretical perspectives that account for the interplay between financial logic and noneconomic priorities.
Yet, despite its strategic significance, tax behavior remains underexplored in the family business literature (Carbone et al., 2025; Khelil & Khlif, 2023). While Neubaum and Micelotta (2021) do not directly examine taxation, their call for more comprehensive engagement with the behavioral dynamics of family firms underscores the value of exploring areas such as tax strategy, where economic and socioemotional logics intersect and may conflict. Building on this emerging interest, a growing number of studies have begun to consider tax behavior as a meaningful extension of family firm decision-making. This shift opens the door for a more structured and theory-driven examination of how family-specific goals and constraints shape corporate tax strategies.
Although several theories have been used to explain the tax behavior of family businesses—with agency theory still prevailing—within the broader field of family firm behavior, the SEW approach has emerged as the dominant paradigm and a key differentiator of family firms (Berrone et al., 2012; Calabrò et al., 2025; Gómez-Mejía & Herrero, 2022; Vázquez & Rocha, 2018). SEW offers a more nuanced lens that captures the noneconomic priorities shaping decision-making in family-controlled firms, particularly when traditional agency assumptions fall short (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). SEW also provides an integrative framework through which diverse theories and findings can be understood (Berrone et al., 2012; Ma et al., 2022). Moreover, while the first study to examine CIT minimization in family firms (S. Chen et al., 2010) was grounded in an agency-cost logic applied to principal–principal conflict—emphasizing the non-tax costs of tax aggressiveness (e.g., minority-shareholder valuation discounts, heightened audit risk and penalties, and reputational exposure)—the authors also highlighted family owners’ incentives to protect the family name and preserve the firm as a legacy for future generations, which resonates with the core logic of SEW, even though the framework had not yet been formally articulated in that context. Accordingly, while the review considered a range of theoretical perspectives, the analytical focus was intentionally placed on SEW due to its growing prominence and the significant gaps in its application—particularly the need for greater contextual sensitivity in SEW-based explanations, improved operationalization of its dimensions (notably through the FIBER framework), and clearer links between socioemotional priorities and actual tax strategies.
Against this backdrop, the present study conducts a systematic review of the literature on tax behavior in family firms, with the aim of assessing how the SEW perspective has been used to explain CIT minimization. Specifically, we ask: How has the SEW framework been applied in this domain, and what theoretical and empirical limitations constrain its explanatory power—particularly with respect to contextual sensitivity, construct operationalization, and links to concrete tax strategies? To address this question, we examine 69 empirical studies that investigate CIT minimization practices in relation to family firm characteristics.
The review uncovers a set of recurring weaknesses in how family firms’ tax behavior has been theorized through the SEW lens. In much of the literature, SEW is mobilized in ways that give limited consideration to cross-country variation in institutional arrangements and cultural norms, implicitly treating socioemotional priorities as broadly comparable across settings. This assumption reduces the framework’s ability to explain why similar ownership structures are associated with different tax outcomes in different environments. In addition, despite the conceptual clarity offered by the FIBER framework, empirical applications continue to infer SEW primarily from governance and ownership characteristics, rather than capturing its emotional and symbolic dimensions directly. As a result, SEW is often modeled as a simplified or invariant construct. Finally, although SEW is frequently cited as a key motivation underlying tax-related decisions, most studies stop short of examining how these motivations are reflected in specific CIT minimization practices.
Our review contributes to the family business field by identifying persistent theoretical blind spots (Reuber, 2010/2017), particularly by clarifying how SEW has been used in the tax domain and where greater precision is warranted. While Carbone et al. (2025) offer a multi-level overview of tax avoidance in family firms, Khelil and Khlif (2023) synthesize cross-country empirical findings, and Bergmann (2024) maps how intra-group heterogeneity affects finance, accounting, and tax outcomes, our study takes a more focused approach: it assesses the theoretical foundations underlying family firms’ tax behavior and, in doing so, advances three theory-building contributions. First, it highlights boundary conditions by synthesizing evidence that institutional and cultural contexts are associated with variation in the explanatory power and expected direction of SEW-based arguments, thereby providing a basis for more disciplined theorizing about the conditions under which similar family involvement may lead to different CIT outcomes. Second, it promotes a more refined application of SEW in tax research by critically distinguishing between family involvement proxies (e.g., ownership concentration and board composition) and the multidimensional SEW constructs implied by FIBER, thereby reducing the risk of treating SEW as a generic post hoc label. Third, it contributes to strengthening SEW-based explanations by mapping socioemotional motives onto observable mechanisms of CIT minimization, thereby shifting the literature from motivational assertions toward mechanism-grounded accounts that can be empirically examined.
By addressing key theoretical shortcomings, this study seeks to encourage future research to move beyond the mere application of existing theories to new empirical contexts (Reay & Whetten, 2011). From a practical perspective, it lays the groundwork for studies that may help family business operators translate heterogeneous SEW priorities and context-specific constraints into more robust tax governance—by explicitly calibrating the tax-risk profile, strengthening oversight, and documenting the business rationale behind tax positions. In turn, such empirical evidence could inform tax practitioners by supporting more context-contingent advisory and compliance strategies that reflect which SEW concerns are most salient in a given setting.

Key Aspects of Tax Strategies

The literature on taxation acknowledges the challenge of distinguishing between various strategies used to minimize the corporate tax burden. This includes differentiating between tax planning, tax avoidance, tax aggressiveness, and tax evasion to understand the spectrum of tax behaviors businesses might employ.
Tax planning helps companies reduce tax burdens through legal, abusive, or aggressive strategies, with the latter lacking economic substance and being socially irresponsible (Gomes & Abreu, 2018; Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Tax avoidance covers legal tax planning and contentious practices, including tax shelters and evasion, with varying risks (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Most reviewed studies align with this definition (e.g., Almaharmeh et al., 2024; Chalevas et al., 2024; Cirillo et al., 2025; Lee & Bose, 2021; López-González et al., 2019), though some consider tax avoidance strictly legal (Özbay et al., 2023; Suh et al., 2019). Tax aggressiveness involves reducing taxable income through legal, gray-area, or potentially illegal means, though not necessarily improper (S. Chen et al., 2010), with general consensus in the literature (e.g., Bauweraerts et al., 2020, 2024; Clemente-Almendros et al., 2021; Flamini et al., 2021; Landry et al., 2013; Steijvers & Niskanen, 2014). Tax evasion is illegal and intentional and includes underreporting income or overstating deductions, exemptions, or credits (Alm et al., 2016). The reviewed articles largely align with this definition of unlawful conduct (e.g., Bauweraerts et al., 2020; Clemente-Almendros & González-Cruz, 2023; Eddleston & Mulki, 2021; Ngah et al., 2021, 2022; Özbay et al., 2023; Suh et al., 2019), except Nafti et al. (2020), who, in the Tunisian context, define tax evasion as reducing taxes through loopholes or shortcomings in tax rules—equating it with tax optimization (i.e., legal tax avoidance)—and reserve “tax fraud” for illegal conduct.
The choice of terminology often depends on the study’s objectives and can vary across geographical contexts. As for this, Anesa et al. (2019) propose the term “tax minimization” to refer to any of the strategies adopted by a corporation to reduce tax expenses.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines the methodology of the systematic review; Section 3 presents the results; Section 4 offers concluding insights based on the synthesis of the evidence; and finally, Section 5 proposes directions for future research.

2. Methodology

This systematic review examines empirical studies indexed in Scopus and Web of Science (WoS) that investigate CIT minimization strategies in family firms. The review design follows the typology of literature reviews proposed by Paré et al. (2015), combining elements of a systematic qualitative review with a theoretical review approach.
Scopus and WoS were searched on 3 January 2026, with no restrictions on publication year. No additional sources were consulted (e.g., study registers, websites, or backward/forward citation searching). Titles and abstracts were screened by one reviewer for relevance to the review objectives. No contact with study authors was undertaken, and no automation tools were used in data collection. Search strings were developed to capture both tax-related constructs and family firm characteristics, as follows:
Scopus: (TITLE-ABS-KEY ((“tax behav*” OR “tax aggressiveness” OR “tax avoidance” OR “tax strateg*” OR “tax evasion” OR “tax compliance” OR “tax planning” OR “tax saving*” OR “taxation” OR “tax minimi*”)) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY ((“family characteristic*” OR “family firm*” OR “family business*” OR “family own*” OR “family enterprise*” OR “family influenc*” OR “family control*” OR “family manag*” OR “family govern*” OR “founding family” OR “family compan*” OR “family involve*” OR “family led”))) AND (LIMIT-TO (DOCTYPE, “ar”)) AND (LIMIT-TO (LANGUAGE, “English”));
WoS: TS = (“tax behav*” OR “tax aggressiveness” OR “tax avoidance” OR “tax strateg*” OR “tax evasion” OR “tax compliance” OR “tax planning” OR “tax saving*” OR “taxation” OR “tax minimi*”) AND TS = (“family characteristic*” OR “family firm*” OR “family business*” OR “family own*” OR “family enterprise*” OR “family influenc*” OR “family control*” OR “family manag*” OR “family govern*” OR “founding family” OR “family compan*” OR “family involve*” OR “family led”) AND LA = (English) AND DT = (Article).
This review was conducted and reported in accordance with PRISMA 2020 reporting guidance. The reporting of search methods followed the PRISMA-S extension (Rethlefsen et al., 2021), and the study selection process was documented using the PRISMA 2020 flow diagram (Figure 1; Page et al., 2021b). Compliance with PRISMA 2020 was assessed using the PRISMA 2020 checklist (Page et al., 2021a), which is provided in the Supplementary Materials. The review protocol was not registered.
Studies were eligible if they (i) were empirical; (ii) examined CIT minimization strategies (e.g., tax avoidance, tax aggressiveness, tax planning, or tax evasion); (iii) explicitly included family firm characteristics as explanatory or moderating variables; (iv) were peer-reviewed journal articles; and (v) were written in English. We excluded conceptual papers, literature reviews, book chapters, dissertations, and conference proceedings. We also excluded studies focused on taxes other than CIT (e.g., value-added, payroll, excise, or other non–profit-based corporate taxes).
The searches initially identified a total of 285 records, of which 79 were duplicates. Subsequently, since the studies for this review must include tax minimization strategies related to corporate profit taxation and variables associated with the characteristics of family businesses, we reviewed the abstracts and identified 133 articles that did not meet the review’s objective. This left a total of 73 articles that met the criteria for the systematic review. Of these, 4 articles were not available for download. Consequently, the final sample comprised 69 articles, all of which were thoroughly assessed.
From the 69 included studies, we extracted all reported outcomes related to CIT behavior and family firm characteristics. We also recorded descriptive contextual and methodological information (e.g., country setting, sample features, family firm definitions, and research design) to support interpretation. Consistent with the review’s objective, the synthesis emphasized the theoretical frameworks used to explain CIT behavior rather than estimating comparable quantitative effects.
Because the review aimed to synthesize theoretical foundations rather than evaluate intervention effects, we did not apply a formal risk-of-bias tool and did not produce risk-of-bias judgments. No automation tools were used at any stage of data collection or synthesis.
All included studies contributed to the descriptive overview (Section 3.1). For the thematic syntheses (Section 3.2, Section 3.3 and Section 3.4) and Table 1 in Section 4, studies were mapped based on full-text reading to identify (i) the theoretical lens applied, and whether the article discussed (ii) contextual factors, (iii) SEW operationalization, and/or (iv) specific CIT minimization mechanisms.
To prepare the data for presentation and synthesis, keywords from Scopus/WoS metadata were standardized prior to the VOSviewer co-occurrence mapping, as detailed in the notes to Figure 2 in Section 3. Full texts were reviewed to identify the theoretical perspective and tax-related constructs, and results were synthesized narratively/theoretically by grouping studies according to Section 3.1, Section 3.2, Section 3.3 and Section 3.4. Extracted information was manually tabulated (Table 1 in Section 4) and visually displayed through the VOSviewer map (Figure 2 in Section 3) and a conceptually derived framework (Figure 4 in Section 5). No meta-analysis was conducted; accordingly, no statistical heterogeneity assessment, sensitivity analyses, or data conversions were required.
No quantitative synthesis was conducted; therefore, we did not perform formal assessments of statistical heterogeneity (e.g., subgroup analyses or meta-regression) or sensitivity analyses, as there were no pooled estimates to test for robustness. Instead, differences across studies were discussed qualitatively where relevant.
Because no quantitative synthesis was conducted, we did not formally assess risk of bias due to missing results (e.g., publication bias or selective outcome reporting). As the search was restricted to Scopus and WoS (excluding gray literature), some eligible evidence may have been missed. Study-level effect estimates and summary statistics were not reported because the review synthesized theoretical explanations rather than comparable quantitative outcomes.

3. Results

The results are organized into four parts: an overview of the included studies (Section 3.1), a synthesis of the main theoretical approaches (Section 3.2), and two SEW-focused analyses addressing gaps in contextualization/measurement (Section 3.3) and in links to specific CIT minimization practices (Section 3.4). Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 include only studies that explicitly adopt SEW as a theoretical lens. No risk-of-bias assessment, quantitative synthesis (including meta-analysis), or certainty assessment was conducted; accordingly, we report no pooled effect estimates, precision measures, heterogeneity statistics, or assessments of reporting biases due to missing results.

3.1. Overview of the Selected Studies

The keyword map generated using VOSviewer (version 1.6.20; van Eck & Waltman, 2010) shown in Figure 2, illustrates the key factors influencing family firms’ tax behavior. This analysis offers insights into variables affecting income tax minimization strategies in family firms. The articles examine various aspects, including agency theory, SEW, firm ownership structures, corporate governance, ownership by successive generations, and levels of family involvement.
Figure 2. VOSviewer keyword co-occurrence map. Notes: The map was built using metadata from the 69 articles selected for the systematic review, sourced from Scopus and Web of Science, with a minimum threshold of 2 occurrences per keyword. The original keywords were edited following this protocol: (1) adding keywords related to the theories used, (2) including relevant keywords identified through article review, (3) standardizing keywords based on semantic similarity, and (4) omitting, for visual clarity, keywords representing family firms, nonfamily firms, and corporate income tax (CIT) minimization strategies.
Figure 2. VOSviewer keyword co-occurrence map. Notes: The map was built using metadata from the 69 articles selected for the systematic review, sourced from Scopus and Web of Science, with a minimum threshold of 2 occurrences per keyword. The original keywords were edited following this protocol: (1) adding keywords related to the theories used, (2) including relevant keywords identified through article review, (3) standardizing keywords based on semantic similarity, and (4) omitting, for visual clarity, keywords representing family firms, nonfamily firms, and corporate income tax (CIT) minimization strategies.
Jrfm 19 00125 g002
Figure 3 illustrates the annual number of publications, showing a gradual increase over time. However, the overall volume remains relatively low, indicating an underexplored area with room for further research. The first article on CIT minimization in family firms was published in 2010 (S. Chen et al., 2010) and stands out as a seminal contribution, cited by 65 of the reviewed studies for its influence on subsequent research.
To examine firms’ tax behavior in connection with family characteristics, the reviewed articles compare family businesses with nonfamily businesses, assess family businesses at different levels of family involvement, or, in some cases, conduct both types of analysis.
Several studies (e.g., Bona-Sánchez et al., 2020; Chalevas et al., 2024; S. Chen et al., 2010; Landry et al., 2013; Moore et al., 2017; Steijvers & Niskanen, 2014) suggest that the characteristics of family firms generally lead to less aggressive CIT minimization strategies. In contrast, other studies (e.g., Almaharmeh et al., 2024; Benkraiem et al., 2024; Chakroun & Ben Amar, 2025; Flamini et al., 2021; Gaaya et al., 2017; Kovermann & Wendt, 2019; López-González et al., 2019; Özbay et al., 2023; Parisi & Federici, 2023; Qawqzeh, 2023) suggest opposite results. Furthermore, some studies (e.g., Bauweraerts et al., 2024; Lee & Bose, 2021; Mafrolla & D’Amico, 2016) indicate mixed results, depending on the variables analyzed.

3.2. Mapping the Theoretical Foundations of Family Firms’ Tax Behavior

This section outlines the main theoretical perspectives used to explain tax behavior in family firms. It first examines agency theory and SEW, which dominate the empirical literature, and then discusses alternative frameworks that emphasize institutional, social, and normative influences. The synthesis draws on the studies that explicitly articulated a theoretical lens to explain family firms’ CIT behavior (see Table 1 in Section 4). Risk of bias was not assessed, consistent with the review’s theory-focused objective.

3.2.1. Agency Theory and SEW in Explaining Family Firms’ Tax Behavior

Agency conflicts emerge as the predominant conceptual framework for explaining tax behaviors in family firms. Among the 69 articles that met the review criteria, 54 studies (78.3%) emphasize agency conflicts. Additionally, SEW is widely used to explain family firms’ tax behavior, with 23 articles (33.33%) relying on SEW as a foundational concept (see Table 1 in Section 4).
In the context of comparing family firms with their nonfamily counterparts, it is expected that family-owned firms inherently diminish agency conflict. This is because ownership concentration, a typical feature of family involvement, grants family members both the motivation and the means to effectively supervise management, fostering the convergence of interests; this contrasts with nonfamily firms, where the separation of ownership and management can lead to significant agency costs (S. Chen et al., 2010; Landry et al., 2013; Mafrolla & D’Amico, 2016; Parisi & Federici, 2023). However, this very concentration of ownership in family firms amplifies conflicts between principals (S. Chen et al., 2010; Mafrolla & D’Amico, 2016; Parisi & Federici, 2023). The dual nature of family firms may foster a scenario where, while they are adept at mitigating management-related agency issues due to direct oversight, they simultaneously face heightened risks of internal conflicts where dominant family shareholders might prioritize personal gains over the interests of minority nonfamily shareholders and the interest of the company as a going concern.
Distinguishing agency conflicts in family firms from those in nonfamily firms is relevant for interpreting their tax behavior. However, recognizing that the agency theory lens alone might not sufficiently explain such behavior, several studies (e.g., Chalevas et al., 2024; Clemente-Almendros et al., 2021; Clemente-Almendros & González-Cruz, 2023; Flamini et al., 2021; Landry et al., 2013; Mafrolla & D’Amico, 2016; Steijvers & Niskanen, 2014) have extended the agency perspective with insights based on SEW. Furthermore, some studies have interpreted tax behaviors in family firms exclusively through the lens of SEW, without incorporating agency theory (e.g., Bauweraerts et al., 2024; Bauweraerts & Vandernoot, 2019; Brune et al., 2019a; Cao et al., 2023).

3.2.2. Alternative Theoretical Perspectives on Family Firms’ Tax Behavior

In addition to agency theory and the SEW framework, a smaller subset of studies adopts alternative theoretical perspectives to explain family firms’ tax behavior beyond the dominant paradigms. These approaches include legitimacy theory, particularly in the context of political connections and public scrutiny (Bona-Sánchez et al., 2020); social norm and social trust theories, emphasizing how societal norms and trust environments shape tax compliance incentives (Shi et al., 2023; Niu et al., 2024); and neo-institutional theory, focusing on coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures that influence firms’ tax and sustainability strategies (Souguir et al., 2024b). This set of perspectives should be viewed as illustrative rather than exhaustive, but it underscores that family firms’ tax behavior can reflect broader institutional, social, and normative forces beyond the dominant agency/SEW lenses.

3.3. Theoretical Blind Spots in SEW-Based Explanations of Family Firms’ Tax Behavior

Contextual grounding remains a major gap in SEW-based tax research. Although the SEW framework has become an influential lens for explaining tax-related behavior in family firms, it is often applied without sufficient attention to the cultural and institutional environments in which these firms operate. SEW priorities vary significantly across societies, shaped by national cultures, institutional frameworks, and historical legacies (Berrone et al., 2012; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013; Chrisman et al., 2012; Sanchez-Famoso et al., 2025). As demonstrated by Sanchez-Famoso et al. (2025), dynastic control tends to be more prominent in collectivist or high power-distance contexts, whereas family identity is especially salient in more individualistic settings. Overlooking such contextual variation risks producing overgeneralized findings and obscuring how local norms and institutional quality shape the trade-offs that family firms make between tax efficiency and SEW preservation.
A second, related gap concerns the empirical measurement of SEW. Although the FIBER framework (Berrone et al., 2012) provides a robust multidimensional model, most studies still rely on indirect structural proxies—such as family ownership, the presence of a family CEO, or board representation—to infer socioemotional priorities. These proxies often fail to capture the symbolic, relational, and affective dimensions that are central to SEW. As a result, theoretical claims frequently rely on assumed rather than observed socioemotional constructs (Gómez-Mejía & Herrero, 2022), undermining empirical precision.
Despite these limitations, relevant advances include Sánchez-Marín et al. (2016), who apply the F-PEC scale to capture power, experience, and culture in Spanish family SMEs. While not explicitly framed through the SEW lens, the study measures dimensions closely aligned with affective attachment and family identification, offering an empirically grounded approach to examining tax behavior. Eddleston and Mulki (2021) provide a more direct application of SEW in the Indian context, integrating regulatory and cultural pressures to measure the identification dimension of FIBER. Their findings highlight how emotional attachment and reputational concerns interact with firm performance to shape tax evasion behavior. Chalevas et al. (2024) adopt a cross-national perspective by testing how the effect of family ownership on tax avoidance varies with national power distance, although SEW is not formally modeled in their study. Finally, Bauweraerts et al. (2024) advance by examining Belgian family firms under a high-tax regime while directly operationalizing SEW through restricted and extended dimensions based on the FIBER model. Their scale was validated through confirmatory factor analysis, offering a relevant example of a conceptually grounded SEW measurement in the tax domain (see Table 1 in Section 4).

3.4. Missing Links to CIT Minimization Concrete Practices

A key gap in the literature on family firms’ tax behavior is the limited analysis of how underlying motivations—such as those linked to SEW—translate into concrete tax strategies. Although SEW offers a useful framework for interpreting tax aggressiveness, studies on tax behavior in family firms rarely connect these motivations to specific mechanisms, such as income shifting through transfer pricing and the use of subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions (e.g., Rathke, 2021), or leveraging patents to shift profits through intangible assets (e.g., Cheng et al., 2021). Other techniques, such as leveraging special tax regimes or tax relief (e.g., Cruz & Soares, 2022; Dinis & Martins, 2022), are also seldom examined in this context. Exceptions include H. Cho (2020), who examines how disclosure requirements under the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) framework—particularly country-by-country reporting—alter international tax behavior, with a focus on the moderating role of family ownership and intangible asset intensity. Other contributions include Clemente-Almendros et al. (2021) and Clemente-Almendros and González-Cruz (2023) on thin capitalization rules and Parisi & Federici (2023) on foreign activity, group affiliation, and the allowance for corporate equity regime (see Table 1 in Section 4).

4. Main Conclusions

This article aims to systematically review the theoretical foundations of tax behavior in family firms, with a particular focus on CIT minimization strategies. The analysis identifies agency theory as the dominant framework—cited in 78.3% of the studies—for explaining and distinguishing the tax behavior of family and nonfamily firms. The SEW perspective also features prominently, appearing in 33.3% of the studies, and highlights the influence of nonfinancial motivations in family firms alongside traditional agency dynamics. Beyond these two core approaches, the literature incorporates additional theoretical perspectives, including legitimacy theory, social norm and social trust theories, and institutional theory. Taken together, these frameworks suggest that family firms’ tax behavior is shaped by a combination of financial incentives, SEW preservation, ethical commitments, and the need to conform to societal expectations and regulatory pressures. This interpretation is consistent with prior evidence indicating that tax behavior in family firms reflects both governance-related incentives and noneconomic priorities, while also extending earlier reviews by showing that SEW-based explanations remain unevenly contextualized, weakly operationalized, and only sporadically linked to specific CIT minimization mechanisms.
Specifically regarding SEW, our review identifies three key limitations. First, it is often applied without considering how cultural and institutional contexts influence its dimensions. Second, most studies rely on indirect proxies, leaving SEW’s dimensions empirically underexplored. Third, few investigate the specific actions firms take—or avoid—to minimize taxes. These gaps hinder the development of generalizable insights and predictive theories, pointing to important directions for future research.
When captured through structural proxies in tax research, SEW dimensions are often treated as static or uniformly influential across contexts, even though evidence suggests that their salience may vary considerably depending on institutional and cultural conditions. For example, depending on the specific setting, dynastic succession (Renewal of family bonds) may—or may not—be associated with more conservative tax strategies aimed at preserving long-term legitimacy. Similarly, reputational concerns (Identification) could potentially deter aggressive practices in environments with strong public scrutiny but may lose salience where enforcement is weak. Moreover, SEW dimensions might not always align; for instance, emotional attachment to the firm may come into tension with financial pressures that push family members toward riskier tax strategies as a means of safeguarding family control. These are theoretical propositions that remain speculative and require empirical testing.
As noted by Zellweger et al. (2012), even family firms with similar ownership and control structures often behave differently, suggesting that the salience of SEW varies across cases. Explaining this variation requires closer attention to which SEW dimensions drive decision-making in different settings and under what conditions they reinforce or compete with one another. Advancing the SEW perspective depends on clarifying these dynamics and linking them more explicitly to observable strategic behaviors—such as CIT minimization.
Table 1 provides a simplified and structured overview showing that, although the SEW approach has gained traction in tax research on family firms, the direct measurement of its dimensions and the use of clearly defined mechanisms for CIT minimization remain limited.
This review has process-related limitations. First, the search was limited to Scopus and WoS and did not include gray literature or backward/forward citation searching, which may have led to missed eligible studies. Second, title and abstract screening was conducted by a single reviewer, which may have increased the risk of selection error. Third, four potentially eligible reports could not be retrieved, which reduced the final sample. Fourth, we did not conduct formal risk-of-bias or certainty assessments; this aligns with the review’s theory-focused objective but limits the ability to appraise internal validity across studies. In addition, because the review emphasizes SEW-based theorizing and the dominant agency/SEW paradigms, the discussion of alternative theoretical lenses is selective and does not provide an exhaustive inventory of all frameworks used in the broader tax and family-business literature (e.g., stewardship, stakeholder, upper echelons, deterrence, or mixed-gamble approaches).
Table 1. Empirical Studies on Tax Behavior in Family Firms: Theoretical Lenses, SEW Constructs, Institutional Contexts, and CIT Mechanisms.
Table 1. Empirical Studies on Tax Behavior in Family Firms: Theoretical Lenses, SEW Constructs, Institutional Contexts, and CIT Mechanisms.
Studies Employing the SEW Approach, Alone or in Combination with Other Theories (n = 23) *
Integration of National Context into SEW-Based Analyses (even when partial or indirect)Direct Measurement of SEW Dimensions and Identification of CIT Minimization Mechanisms
YES (n = 19):
Abdelfattah and Aboud (2020); Abu-Rajab et al. (2024); Bauweraerts et al. (2024); Brune et al. (2019a); Brune et al. (2019b); Cao et al. (2023); Chalevas et al. (2024); Clemente-Almendros and González-Cruz (2023); Clemente-Almendros et al. (2021); Eddleston and Mulki (2021); Flamini et al. (2021); Herawati et al. (2021); Kolias and Koumanakos (2022); Kuo (2022); Landry et al. (2013); Mafrolla and D’Amico (2016); Özbay et al. (2023); Sánchez-Marín et al. (2016); Steijvers and Niskanen (2014)
NO (n = 4):
Ajmal et al. (2026); Bauweraerts and Vandernoot (2019); Bauweraerts et al. (2020); López-González et al. (2019) **
Operationalized through FIBER Dimensions:
Bauweraerts et al. (2024); Eddleston and Mulki (2021)
SEW not operationalized; F-PEC scale used instead:
Sánchez-Marín et al. (2016)
CIT Minimization Mechanism Explicitly Modeled:
H. Cho (2020); Clemente-Almendros et al. (2021); Clemente-Almendros and González-Cruz (2023); Parisi and Federici (2023)
Studies Not Employing the SEW Approach (n = 46)
Incorporating Agency Theory (n = 37)Not Incorporating Agency Theory (n = 9)
Almaharmeh et al. (2024); Benkraiem et al. (2024); Bona-Sánchez et al. (2020); Boubaker et al. (2022); Chakroun and Ben Amar (2025); M.-C. Chen and Li (2025); S. Chen et al. (2010); H. Cho (2020); S.-A. Cho et al. (2025); Gaaya et al. (2017); Haryadi et al. (2025); Itan et al. (2024); Kałdoński and Jewartowski (2024); Kartadjumena and Nuryaman (2024); Kerr et al. (2024); Khalil et al. (2023); Kovermann and Wendt (2019); Lakhal et al. (2025); Lastiati et al. (2020); Lee and Bose (2021); Moore et al. (2017); Mulya et al. (2024); Nafti et al. (2020); Ngah et al. (2021); Ngah et al. (2022); Nuritomo et al. (2020); Palalangan et al. (2024); Parisi and Federici (2023); Puji et al. (2019); Qawqzeh (2023); Sari and Nuryanah (2024); Shi et al. (2023); Souguir et al. (2024a); Suh et al. (2019); Supantri and Rahmiati (2020); Sutrisno et al. (2022); Sutrisno et al. (2023)Baatwah et al. (2025); Belahouaoui and Attak (2024); Cirillo et al. (2025); Jedlička (2023); Oktaviani et al. (2024); Souguir et al. (2024b); Niu et al. (2024); Sucahyo et al. (2020); Sumiati et al. (2023)
Notes: SEW = socioemotional wealth; CIT = corporate income tax. * Of the 23 articles, 17 combine SEW with agency theory. ** No specific national context discussed; country dummies used to control for cross-country institutional differences.

5. Future Research

Family business researchers are expected to explain relationships between constructs in ways that challenge, extend, or refine theoretical understanding (Neubaum & Micelotta, 2021). In line with this expectation, we propose three avenues for future research aimed at addressing the main gaps identified in the literature on tax behavior in family firms. These research directions are visually represented in Figure 4, which organizes the key layers of inquiry—from contextual influences to theoretical foundations and empirical mechanisms—necessary to advance a more comprehensive and context-sensitive application of the SEW approach in family firm tax research. As this systematic literature review provides a synthesis-based foundation for theory refinement, the patterns identified here should be validated and extended through primary empirical research (e.g., surveys, experiments, interviews, or case studies) that directly examines family owners’ motives, decision processes, and tax practices.
Figure 4. Multilayered framework for advancing research on family firms’ tax behavior. Notes: The diagram presents concentric circles nested within a contextual frame to represent a relationship of inclusion and dependency: concrete mechanisms of corporate income tax (CIT) minimization should be grounded in a well-operationalized socioemotional wealth (SEW) framework, which, in turn, must be embedded within the firm’s cultural and institutional setting. While the figure focuses on the SEW perspective, it does not exclude the relevance of other theoretical approaches.
Figure 4. Multilayered framework for advancing research on family firms’ tax behavior. Notes: The diagram presents concentric circles nested within a contextual frame to represent a relationship of inclusion and dependency: concrete mechanisms of corporate income tax (CIT) minimization should be grounded in a well-operationalized socioemotional wealth (SEW) framework, which, in turn, must be embedded within the firm’s cultural and institutional setting. While the figure focuses on the SEW perspective, it does not exclude the relevance of other theoretical approaches.
Jrfm 19 00125 g004
The purpose of this agenda is not to replace established lenses (e.g., agency, institutional, or legitimacy theories), but to explore how an SEW perspective may be applied to explain family firms’ corporate tax behavior, including the contextual and organizational conditions that may shape its relevance.

5.1. Improved Operationalization of SEW and the FIBER Framework

Future research should move beyond the structural proxies typically used to approximate SEW—such as ownership concentration or board composition—and instead prioritize more direct assessments of its emotional, symbolic, and relational dimensions, consistent with the multidimensional logic of the FIBER framework (Berrone et al., 2012). Importantly, Swab et al. (2020) underscore that SEW is inherently multidimensional and argue that its dimensions may differ in necessity and sufficiency. Building on an ability–willingness distinction, they propose that SEW is more plausibly inferred when the dominant family coalition has the ability to pursue noneconomic goals (reflected in F and R) and also exhibits willingness, captured by the presence of at least one of I, B, or E. Strengthening the precision of SEW measurement along these lines would enable more robust empirical tests of its role in shaping family firms’ tax behavior.

5.2. Cross-National Comparative Designs

The influence of national culture and institutional context remains underexplored. Comparative studies across countries can clarify how these environments moderate the relevance of SEW dimensions and shape tax behavior. Such work could uncover context-specific boundary conditions that help explain why similar firms adopt different strategies in different jurisdictions.

5.3. Greater Focus on Observable CIT Minimization Mechanisms

Finally, future research should place greater emphasis on the concrete tax minimization practices adopted by family firms, such as the use of foreign subsidiaries, intra-group transactions, or hybrid financial instruments. Investigating whether—and how—these practices differ from those of nonfamily firms can shed light on the strategic logic underlying tax decisions, especially when shaped by SEW-related priorities. The investigation of behavioral changes before and after major tax reforms could yield valuable insights. For instance, do family firms respond differently from nonfamily firms to recent domestic legislative changes aligned with the structural reforms proposed by the OECD—such as those related to Pillar Two or the updated transfer pricing guidelines? Which FIBER dimensions best explain any observed differences?
By pursuing these directions, scholars can bridge the gap between theoretical frameworks and empirical reality, ultimately enhancing our understanding of how family-specific values and structures shape corporate tax behavior.
This article contributes to the family business literature by offering a systematic review of how tax behavior has been theorized in the context of family firms. It is the first to consolidate evidence on the incomplete and fragmented application of the SEW perspective to tax behavior, calling attention to underdeveloped construct operationalization and the lack of behavioral grounding in many studies. By highlighting these shortcomings, the study not only synthesizes what is known but also charts a path forward for more integrative and empirically grounded theorizing.
This synthesis also informs practice by clarifying where future empirical work can generate actionable guidance: helping family-firm leaders strengthen tax decision processes (risk profiling, oversight, and justification of positions) and helping tax practitioners tailor advisory and compliance approaches to the institutional setting and the SEW concerns most likely to drive behavior.

Supplementary Materials

The following supporting information can be downloaded at: https://www.mdpi.com/article/10.3390/jrfm19020125/s1.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, C.V., S.C. and A.D.; methodology, C.V.; validation, C.V.; formal analysis, C.V.; investigation, C.V.; resources, C.V.; data curation, C.V.; writing—original draft preparation, C.V.; writing—review and editing, C.V., S.C. and A.D.; visualization, C.V.; supervision, S.C. and A.D.; project administration, S.C. and A.D. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Metadata from records not included in the review are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. No analytic code was used.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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Figure 1. PRISMA 2020 flow diagram for the article selection process.
Figure 1. PRISMA 2020 flow diagram for the article selection process.
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Figure 3. Annual document publication.
Figure 3. Annual document publication.
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MDPI and ACS Style

Viana, C.; Cruz, S.; Dinis, A. Bridging Theoretical Assumptions and Empirical Evidence on Family Firms’ Tax Behavior: A Systematic Review. J. Risk Financ. Manag. 2026, 19, 125. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm19020125

AMA Style

Viana C, Cruz S, Dinis A. Bridging Theoretical Assumptions and Empirical Evidence on Family Firms’ Tax Behavior: A Systematic Review. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2026; 19(2):125. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm19020125

Chicago/Turabian Style

Viana, Cledilson, Sérgio Cruz, and Ana Dinis. 2026. "Bridging Theoretical Assumptions and Empirical Evidence on Family Firms’ Tax Behavior: A Systematic Review" Journal of Risk and Financial Management 19, no. 2: 125. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm19020125

APA Style

Viana, C., Cruz, S., & Dinis, A. (2026). Bridging Theoretical Assumptions and Empirical Evidence on Family Firms’ Tax Behavior: A Systematic Review. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 19(2), 125. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm19020125

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