Towards Quantum-Secured Permissioned Blockchain: Signature, Consensus, and Logic
2. Unconditionally Secure Signature
2.1. Toeplitz Hash Message Authentication Code
- We map the first n elements of S into the first column of M, starting from the bottom to the top .
- We map the last elements of S into the first row of M, starting from the left to the right .
2.2. Toeplitz Group Signature
- The set is the set of the communication participants including the signer , and the n potential receivers to . We assume that a proportion of δ participants are honest, where ;
- is the set of possible messages of length ;
- is the set of possible signatures of length ;
- is a function that takes a message and outputs a signature . There are two stages for signing a message—the distribution stage and the signing stage:
- The distribution stage:
- The sender randomly generates a bit strings . The length of every is . We use to denote the Toeplitz hash functions determined by these strings;
- The sender securely sends to each recipient ;
- Each receiver sends to every other receiver ;].
- The signing stage: The signature for the message is defined as .
- is a function that takes a message , a signature σ, and a participant and returns a Boolean value based on the validity of the signature, as verified by the participant .Formally, upon receiving a message/signature pair , where σ is a signature of the form , the receiver calculates the following test:
- Unforgeability: It is not possible for an adversary to create a valid signature with the probability higher than some negligible level;
- Transferability: If an honest receiver accepts a signature, then any other honest receiver would also accept the signature;
- Non-repudiation: It is not possible for a signer to repudiate a legitimate signature he has created with the probability higher than some negligible level.
3. Quantum-Secured Consensus
3.1. The QSYAC Protocol
- The proposing phase. After checking the validity of signatures of transactions, the proposing peer generates a block proposal and sends it to voting peers. The block proposal contains an ordered list of transactions that will potentially be added to the blockchain in this round. The proposal is signed by the TGS scheme with the proposing peer being the sender and all voting peers as receivers;
- The voting phase. The proposal is sent to all voting peers. Voting peers enter the voting phase, during which they exchange votes across the network:
- The voting peer calculates a verified proposal after it receives a proposal from the proposing peer. A verified proposal is a subset of transactions from the proposal, defined to be valid by the voting peer. The block, that is generated by a voting peer, consists of transactions from the verified proposal and the hash value (Here the hash function is a collision-resistant hash function, not a Toeplitz hash. We require the length of the hash value of this hash function to be the same as the length of hash value of the Toeplitz hash.) of the collection of those transactions;
- The vote on the block generated by the voting peer is formed by a pair which contains the hash value of this block and the TGS of this hash value. In this TGS scheme, the voting peer is the sender and all other peers (including the proposing peer) are receivers;
- When a peer votes for a block, it generates an order for all peers for the current round. The order is generated by a function that takes the hash value of the block as the input and returns an order for all peers as the output. An order function f is required to produce a uniformly distributed output. That is, for two orders of peers and , it holds that , where l is the length of the hash value and calculates the cardinality of a set.
- The decision phase. Votes for a block are sent to each peer in the specified order. Let the order be . Acceptance or rejection of a block is achieved by the following decision phase:
- Let ;
- All votes are sent to the peer ;
- Supermajority is defined to be a number greater than of all peers in the network. When has collected a supermajority of votes for one block, this set of votes enables the creation of an accepting message for the block. broadcasts the accepting message to all peers. Every peer who receives this accepting message adds the block to its local blockchain, broadcasts the accepting message to all peers and this round ends.A rejecting message is created when Oi has not collected the supermajority of votes for any block. broadcasts the rejecting message in the same way as the accepting message. Every peer sends its vote to the peer if it receives a rejecting message or it did not receive an accepting message within a predefined waiting period.The decision procedure then continues with peer ;
- If no accepting message is broadcast at the end the decision procedure, then this round ends with the block rejection and there is no update of the blockchain.
3.2. Evaluation: Correctness, Scalability, and Security
- If is honest, then will collect a supermajority of votes, generate an accepting message, and send it to all peers. This means every honest peer will receive an accepting message and add the same block to its blockchain;
- If is dishonest, since cannot counterfeit other peers’ vote, it cannot create a rejecting message. Now, another damaged can cause it to not send any message to other peers. There are two possible situations:
To sum up, all honest peers will receive an accepting message and add the same block to its blockchain even if is dishonest.
- No honest peer receives an accepting message from . Then after the pre-defined waiting period all honest peers will send their votes to . As long as is honest, then all honest peers will make the same update of their blockchain.
- Some honest peers receive an accepting message from . Assume is an honest peer who receives an accepting message. Since will broadcast the accepting message, all honest peers will receive the accepting message.
4. Script Language and Smart Contracts for Logicontract
- Logical contracts are often more compact than their procedural counterparts. This is because writing procedural contracts forces the programmer to write explicitly what has to be done and how to do it; while in the logical contracts the programmer only needs to write down what has to be done, without specifying how to achieve it.
- Writing contracts in a procedural language is error prone  since the order of instructions affects the correctness of the resulting contract, while logical contracts can be seen as a set of specifications, and the contracts are guaranteed to be correct with respect to the specifications.
- It is easier to formally verify a logical contract than to verify a procedural contract. To verify a procedural contract, a common technique is to construct a formal calculus with rigorous semantics and translate the procedural contract to expressions of the formal calculus [41,47]. Since logic by itself is a formal calculus, the verification of logical contracts is relatively easier.
- is the sender of this transaction;
- rece is the set of receivers of this transaction and the amount of the currency they will receive. Formally, ;
- is the source, which is a list of transactions to be redeemed by T;
- is the , which is a list of formulas. The number of formulas must be the same as the number of receivers. Formally, . If a receiver wants to redeem T, then has to make true by providing appropriate certifications;
- is the certification, which is a list of valuation functions that map variables to natural numbers. The functionality of certifications is to satisfy the protection of the source transactions. The number of valuations must be the same as the number of the source transactions. Formally, .
- T is properly signed by its sender;
- The sender of T is one of the receivers in each of its source transactions;
- The certification of T evaluates the protections of all its source to be true;
- None of its source transaction has been redeemed.
5. Application: A Lottery Protocol on Logicontract
- Randomness. All tickets are equally likely to win;
- Unpredictability. No player can predict the winning ticket;
- Unforgeability. Tickets cannot be forged. Especially, it is impossible to create a winning ticket after the outcome of the random process is known;
- Verifiablity. The number and the revenue of winning tickets are publicly verifiable;
- Decentralization. The random process does not rely on a single authority.
- Quantum resistance. Even an adversary with a realistic quantum computer cannot rig the lottery.
- Alice sends a conditional transfer to Alice and Bob. Bob sends a conditional transfer to Alice and Bob (see Figure 7).Here, AliceWin is specified by . BobWin is specified by .
- Alice reveals her secret and gets her deposit back. Bob reveals his secret and gets his deposit back (see Figure 8).
- Now both Alice and Bob’s secrets are public and the winner can be determined. The winner redeems the loser’s conditional transfer and his/her own conditional transfer. If Alice is the winner, then she redeems and (see Figure 9).If Bob is the winner, then he redeems and (see Figure 10).
6. Related Work
7. Conclusions and Future Work
Conflicts of Interest
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Sun, X.; Sopek, M.; Wang, Q.; Kulicki, P. Towards Quantum-Secured Permissioned Blockchain: Signature, Consensus, and Logic. Entropy 2019, 21, 887. https://doi.org/10.3390/e21090887
Sun X, Sopek M, Wang Q, Kulicki P. Towards Quantum-Secured Permissioned Blockchain: Signature, Consensus, and Logic. Entropy. 2019; 21(9):887. https://doi.org/10.3390/e21090887Chicago/Turabian Style
Sun, Xin, Mirek Sopek, Quanlong Wang, and Piotr Kulicki. 2019. "Towards Quantum-Secured Permissioned Blockchain: Signature, Consensus, and Logic" Entropy 21, no. 9: 887. https://doi.org/10.3390/e21090887