Search Results (97)

Generally speaking, traditional theism has stressed God’s immutability as an aspect of his transcendent reality. By contrast, modern and postmodern thought foreground the highly mutable nature of the divine across time and place, reckoning God as just a subjective concept immanent in human minds without any objective referent. Here I outline a new kind of metamodern theology that would synthesize elements from these different paradigms, suggesting a God both mutable and immanent but also ontologically real in his own right. I call this a developmental, emergent, participatory theology of harmonization—or the DEPTH model for short. After unpacking the meaning of each of these elements individually, I show how they hang together as a coherent, naturalistic theological framework with promising new interpretative possibilities and suggest directions for future work. Full article

The Thin Red Line is a film by Terrence Malick that is usually read in a Heideggerian key, due precisely to the intellectual formation of the author, who was a professor of phenomenology and translator of Heidegger before becoming a filmmaker. However, read in the light of some of his later works, it can be seen as an oblique preamble for the manifest theism that The Tree of Life and A Hidden Life, two manifestly 21st-century religious films, unfold. In The Thin Red Line, Malick gives cinematographic form to some Heideggerian concepts in order to go beyond Heideggerian post-Christian philosophy and make the viewers adopt a mystical gaze that allows them to contemplate creation from a point of view that is neither utilitarian nor technical, but rather characterised by the perspective of Gelassenheit. A religious reading of this Heideggerian idea allows access to Heidegger’s source, which is Meister Eckhart, who is as present in Malick’s film(s) as Heideggerian philosophy itself. Full article

In his innovative and creative attempt to reconcile empiricism and religion, William James made the case for finite theism and a pluralistic conception of the cosmos involving overlapping minds of several scales. In doing so, James also cautioned against abandoning functional psychology in favor of what he called entitative points of view. In his work, Ralph Barton Perry critiqued James for understating the role of embodiment in cognition. In Perry’s view, the central role the body plays in cognition suggests that so-called social or composite minds lack integration and are thus cognitively inferior to embodied minds. However, Perry also believed that the emergent character of embodied cognition provides grounds for an alternative, humanistic spirituality. In this article, I compare James and Perry on theology, and I argue that Perry’s concerns about the importance of embodiment in cognitive integration help illuminate a tripartite distinction between what I call impersonal, subpersonal, and personal theologies that scholars looking for more embodied approaches to theology would do well to consider. Full article

James Sterba recently presented arguments against theories which ground morality in God and attempted “to provide an account of the norms on which an ethics without God can be appropriately grounded ….” In particular, Sterba noted that “Robert Adams is best known for his attempt to ground morality in God’s nature” and “[r]ecently, Adam Johnson significantly developed Adams’s view ….” In 2024, Sterba and I had a public debate concerning this issue at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in which I argued that the trinitarian God of Christianity provides the best explanation for objective morality whereas Sterba argued that morality can be objective without God and proposed a nontheistic account. In this paper, I argue that my theistic theory, which I call Divine Love Theory, is a better explanation of objective morality than Sterba’s nontheistic theory. First, I provide a summary of both my theory and Sterba’s. Second, I respond to Sterba’s arguments against theories which ground morality in God. Third, I provide reasons to conclude my Divine Love Theory is a better explanation for objective morality than Sterba’s theory. Full article

In this essay I argue that there are necessarily true synthetic a priori moral propositions whose truth does not depend on the existence of God. To make my case, I appeal to an analogy with arithmetic truths such as 2 + 2 = 4 whose truth does not depend on the existence of God. I criticize views like Peter Railton’s that hold that moral truths are like truths about natural kinds such as water and heat, and non-cognitivists who hold that there are no robust moral truths. The point of my criticisms is to answer challenges to my view that there are necessarily true synthetic a priori moral propositions and, in the case of Railton, to block an argument by Robert Adams for a Divine Command Theory of ethics. Second, I argue by example that there can be conflicts between what is best for me and those for whom I care and what is morally required that cannot be reconciled by a theistic ethics. It can be rational to violate moral requirements that have the same contents as the commands of a loving God even if there would be most reason to adhere to those requirements IF God exists, just as it can be rational to leave your umbrella at home even if there would be most reason to take it IF it rained. This will be true regardless of whether the reason to adhere to God’s commands, IF God exists, is because our greatest good is the love of God (and that requires adhering to his commands) or because God will punish you if you do not and reward you if you do. The problem of evil is the primary reason to believe that God does not exist, and so to believe that there are no divine commands that there would be most reason to follow if God did exist. Full article

In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, the evil God challenge has been developed by several authors as a parody argument. Proponents of this challenge contend that, given the goods in our world, the hypothesis of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnimalevolent God or the Evil God is absurd. Similarly, they argue, we should conclude that the hypothesis of a good God is also absurd due to the evils present in our world. This paper argues that, with the aid of this challenge and other contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion, one can make the case that a reintroduction of Manichaeism into philosophy of religion is worthwhile. This argument will propose that, considering our total evidence, the Good-God and the Evil-God demonstrate a similar level of support. Additionally, under a reconstructed Manichaean hypothesis, good and evil are seen as mutually explanatory. Furthermore, the natural order can be understood within this framework. Therefore, the Manichaean hypothesis could serve as a viable alternative to monotheistic theism; it can account for the co-existence of good and evil and is compatible with the observed order in nature. Full article

A prominent contemporary cultural trope is the use of humour by the critics of theism against their opponents, in the form of satire, sarcasm, ‘zingers,’ whimsy, and ridicule. The journalist Christopher Hitchens and the philosophers Daniel Dennett and Galen Strawson are well-known examples from within the cultural and intellectual context of critics that employ the tool of humour. This cultural trope is interesting because it occurs in the academic context as much as popular cultural media such as stand-up comedy and satirical news shows like The Daily Show and Last Week Tonight. This article outlines some ‘ground rules’ for the use of humour as a rhetorical ploy in religious debate. I argue that the use of humour is (1) permitted but (2) ought to be backed by good argumentation when it is used in ‘truth tracking’ contexts. I then use these heuristics to criticise two sorry examples of satire and ridicule employed by the biologist Richard Dawkins and comedian Shaun Micallef. Full article

Protection of the environment and its life forms has become a significant concern among philosophers and theologians alike in recent years. There is disagreement, however, over the best way to formulate the grounds of this concern. Some philosophers and theologians favor an instrumental or anthropocentric approach, claiming that adequate preservation of wildlife is warranted solely on the basis of benefits provided to humans, whether couched in terms of the satisfaction of material, medicinal, recreational, or psychological needs. Others claim that wild nature should be preserved for its own sake, due to its life forms possessing intrinsic value. How best to articulate and defend the intrinsic value of wildlife, however, has been much disputed. This paper first compares the adequacy of anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics. It concludes that a non-anthropocentric theory of the intrinsic value of living creatures is best suited to motivate care for and action on behalf of the environment, and, in addition, most accurately reflects the basis of human concern for the environment. This paper next goes on to examine the philosophical underpinnings required for a theory of the intrinsic value of nature. It argues that an objective account of the intrinsic value of nature, founded on some form of non-naturalist ethics or minimal theism, seems necessary to account for the intrinsic value of nature (in contrast with a purely subjective or naturalist approach). In particular, a sacramental view of nature wherein creation issues from a creator who is goodness itself seems ideal for grounding the intrinsic value of wildlife, along with motivating humans to contribute energy and resources to their conservation and even to sacrifice some of their interests in order to do so. This being the case, rather than being a hindrance to environmental ethics, religion, if properly formulated, can be a most helpful ally. Full article

This essay explores the question: can we have an objective ethics without God? This question is raised by James Sterba, who argues in the affirmative. As an atheistic ethicist, Sterba is motivated to maintain an objective morality that is not based in theism and that can withstand the problems with Darwinism. Sterba examines what he sees as one of the most popular theistic attempts to ground human morality, viz., divine command theory. In rejecting both divine command theory and theism, Sterba offers what he believes can offer objective morality: a basic moral norm that all people should adhere to. This article examines Sterba’s criticism of divine command theory along with his own efforts at establishing an objective morality in what he considers a universal abstract principle. In the end, this article argues that Sterba’s axiomatic principle is unclear as to its ontological foundation as well as its causal efficacy in attempting to obligate objective human ethics. It will be argued that Sterba is correct about human nature being the locus of morality, but that atheism fails at providing human teleology to account for such morality. Full article

Divine Command Theory holds that what is morally right is what is commanded by God. This view faces a form of the Euthyphro dilemma: either God commands actions because they are right, in which case moral standards are independent of God, or actions are right because God commands them, in which case morality appears arbitrary. A currently influential response among theistic philosophers draws on a distinction between moral duties and moral values. On this view, duties arise from God’s commands, while values are understood—following a neo-Platonist approach—to be grounded in God’s nature. Proponents of this account appeal to an analogy with the role of the standard metre in the metric system: just as a metre is defined by reference to a paradigmatic length, so goodness is defined by reference to God’s character. On this basis, they argue that the existence of moral value depends on God’s existence, and that moral objectivity requires theism. We argue, however, that moral language cannot be understood as involving God in a structurally analogous way to the standard metre. Moreover, the neo-Platonist account does not provide a successful explanation of the normativity of moral language. Full article

This essay defends the position that ethics must be grounded in God, where the notion of ‘God’ is understood as a transcendental source of normativity, though not necessarily a personal being who ‘commands’ moral behavior. The essay argues that the true debate is between the naturalistic reduction of ethics and the idea of a transcendental ground for moral normativity. I claim that only the latter can provide a sufficient basis for morality. Full article

This article examines the assumption that, in order to respond adequately to the question in the title, one must have the classical concept of God in mind. Classical theism is criticized and neoclassical/process theism is briefly defended. Specifically, the classical theistic attribute of omnipotence receives four criticisms. The hope is that these criticisms prepare the way for a more fruitful response to the question in the title than is possible when the classical concept of God is assumed. Full article

The question of whether ethics is possible without God is a non-issue. While many believe that without God, morality collapses, I contend that the existence or non-existence of God has no bearing on whether ethics is possible, whether moral truths exist, or whether ethical inquiry is viable. Ethics is no more secure within a theistic framework than an atheistic one. I establish this by critically examining Divine Command Theory (DCT) and its variants, including Divine Nature Theory, demonstrating that they fail to provide truthmakers for moral statements, explain moral truths, generate moral knowledge, or serve as a practical guide for ethical decision making. If one seeks a way to justify ethical principles or resolve moral dilemmas, appealing to God does not improve the situation; supernatural explanations, including those invoking divine commands or nature, fail to meet the criteria of explanatory adequacy. I conclude by suggesting a secular approach to ethics—drawing from Ted Schick’s inference to the best action—that does not depend on God’s existence. Ultimately, if moral nihilism is a concern, God’s existence offers no solution. If ethics is possible at all, it is possible regardless of whether God exists. Full article

Sterba has argued that ethics does not require God and that an atheistic objectivist ethics is compatible with an evolutionary account of our development. This paper argues that though ethics does not require God specifically, it does require a god of some sort, for all normative reasons require a god and moral reasons are simply a subset of normative reasons. Sterba’s criticisms of more orthodox divine command theories of ethics are shown to raise no challenge to my view. Furthermore, even if Sterba’s alternative atheistic objectivist ethics is coherent, it would leave moral norms vulnerable to a particular kind of evolutionary debunking threat in a way that my theistic alternative does not. Full article

Jack Warman and Joshua Cockayne have recently claimed that the arguments that William James provides in his famous lecture ‘The Will to Believe’ to justify passional theism would equally justify passional atheism. They are correct in this claim, but there is in fact more than one way that a non-theistic doxastic attitude can be passionally justified given what is said in James’s lecture. In addition to outright, passionally motivated, atheistic belief, there is also the possibility of arriving at theistic non-belief (henceforth ‘agnosticism’) when the passional reasons for adopting theism (even where that option is “live”) are overcome by the passional reasons for not adopting theism. James takes great pains to argue against the claim that we must prefer passional non-belief over passional belief, but he does not argue that we must prefer passional belief over passional non-belief and, in fact, he explicitly denies this, or so I shall argue. Thus, on my interpretation of the lecture, the choice to go without religious belief, even where that option is presented as forced, momentous and live, can be passionally justified. Moreover, so can the adoption of outright atheistic belief for passional reasons. Full article