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Search Results (3)

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Keywords = fictional anti-realism

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12 pages, 223 KiB  
Article
Identifying Nothing: Anti-Realist Strategies for the Identity of Fictional Characters
by Jansan Favazzo
Humanities 2025, 14(3), 62; https://doi.org/10.3390/h14030062 - 12 Mar 2025
Viewed by 622
Abstract
According to fictional anti-realism, fictional characters should be excluded from the ontological inventory. Even though ficta are not assumed to be genuine entities, some issues concerning their identity seem to be genuine ones. Anti-realist philosophers may adopt three different strategies in order to [...] Read more.
According to fictional anti-realism, fictional characters should be excluded from the ontological inventory. Even though ficta are not assumed to be genuine entities, some issues concerning their identity seem to be genuine ones. Anti-realist philosophers may adopt three different strategies in order to deal with them: the Negation Strategy (i.e., such problems are not genuine ones), the Translation Strategy (i.e., such problems should be translated in terms of ficta-surrogates, genuine entities that replace ficta), and the Simulation Strategy (i.e., such problems should be handled within the pretense that ficta are genuine entities). In this paper, I shall argue in favor of the Translation Strategy as it shows some analytical advantages over its rivals, especially in treating the interplay between identity issues about ficta and ordinary narrative/interpretive practices. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Interpretation of Fictional Characters in Literary Texts: History of Literary Criticism, Philosophy and Formal Ontologies)
17 pages, 966 KiB  
Article
The Paradox of Fictional Creatures
by Louis Rouillé
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 92; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050092 - 28 Sep 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2513
Abstract
Authors create fictional characters; that is a “creationist locution”. Artefactualism takes such statements very seriously and holds that fictional characters are abstract artefacts, i.e., entities that are both created and abstract. Anti-creationists, by contrast, deny that we need to postulate such doubtful entities [...] Read more.
Authors create fictional characters; that is a “creationist locution”. Artefactualism takes such statements very seriously and holds that fictional characters are abstract artefacts, i.e., entities that are both created and abstract. Anti-creationists, by contrast, deny that we need to postulate such doubtful entities to explain creationist locutions. In this paper, I present this debate in the form of a paradox, which organises the many existing theories of creationist locutions in a single logical space. This new way of framing the problem displays the crucial role of so-called “linking principles”. In general, it seems that fictionality entails nonexistence, while creation entails existence. This is why “fictional creatures” are puzzling. I further argue that to create means to invent and to realise, and finally, that fictional characters are invented but not created, contra artefactualism. I thus advocate for a new kind of anti-creationism about fictional characters. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fiction and Metaphysics)
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20 pages, 254 KiB  
Article
Towards Cognitive Moral Quasi-Realism
by Eduardo García-Ramírez
Philosophies 2018, 3(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3010005 - 6 Mar 2018
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 3948
Abstract
There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range from realism—according to which moral discourse is closer to scientific discourse than to fictional discourse—to anti-realism—according to which moral discourse is rather closer to fictional discourse. In this paper, [...] Read more.
There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range from realism—according to which moral discourse is closer to scientific discourse than to fictional discourse—to anti-realism—according to which moral discourse is rather closer to fictional discourse. In this paper, I want to motivate a novel anti-realist account. On this view, there are no moral properties or truths, neither mind-independent nor mind-dependent ones (i.e., anti-realism). However, moral cognition results from the use of higher order cognitive abilities with enough resources to grant moral discourse with all the features of a realist talk (i.e., cognitive quasi-realism). I defend this view based on empirical evidence on human moral development and by showing that the resulting account can meet the demands of robust moral realism. The paper concludes by placing the proposed view within the metaethical landscape by comparing it against other forms of anti-realism, most significantly against expressivism. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Selected Papers from WPCS 2017)
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