Search Results (10)

The determination of the capital structure is a critical component of a company’s financial decision-making process. The question of how to optimize a firm’s capital structure to increase its value has been a significant topic of interest within the financial community. The employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) has developed rapidly in China’s capital market over the past decade, providing a suitable context for studying the impact of employee equity incentives on capital structure decisions. This paper employs cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression models and unbalanced panel fixed effect models to investigate the impact of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) on firms’ capital structure decisions. The analysis is conducted on a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The research considers both static capital structure choice and dynamic capital structure adjustment. We find that the implementation of an ESOP reduces the level of corporate debt and accelerates the dynamic adjustment of capital structure, suggesting that employee equity incentives play a role in optimizing firms’ capital structure decisions. We also find that the impact of ESOPs on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure is asymmetric. Specifically, the implementation of ESOPs markedly accelerates the downward adjustment of capital structure, yet has no impact on the upward adjustment of capital structure. Further analysis demonstrates that the impact of ESOPs on capital structure decisions is contingent upon the macroeconomic environment, industry characteristics, corporate governance, and ESOP contract designs. First, the optimization of ESOPs on capital structure decisions is more pronounced in an economic boom environment, in a poor market climate, or in competitive industries. Second, the reduction effect of ESOPs on corporate debt is more pronounced in non-state-owned companies, high-tech companies and those with lower ownership concentration. In contrast, the acceleration effect of ESOPs on capital structure adjustment is more pronounced in state-owned companies, non-high-tech companies and those with higher ownership concentration. Ultimately, ESOPs financed by loans from a firm’s major shareholders—or with a longer lock-up period, smaller shareholding size or executive subscription ratio—demonstrate a more pronounced optimization effect on capital structure decisions. This paper not only contributes to the existing literature on the relationship between equity incentives and capital structure decisions, but also provides guidance for listed companies on the reasonable design of their ESOPs and the optimization of their capital structure decisions. Full article

This research paper aims to investigate the impact of ownership concentration, insider ownership, and board size on employee productivity for 136 Jordanian public shareholding firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) from 2012 to 2021. Ownership concentration has been measured by Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), whereas insider ownership and board size have been represented as the proportion of shares held by insiders and by the number of board members, respectively. Lastly, employee productivity has been measured using a data envelopment analysis (DEA) tool. We employed ordinary least squares regression (OLS) including firm-year-fixed effects. Our empirical results indicate a non-linear relation between ownership concentration and employee productivity, whereby the productivity of employees increases in firms with a proportion of ownership concentration less than 60%. In addition, we found a non-linear relation between insider ownership and employee productivity, whereby the productivity of employees increases in firms with proportion of insider ownership less than 50%. Moreover, we found a non-linear relation between board size and employee productivity, whereby the productivity of employees increases in firms that have less than 11 board members. Our outcome contributed to the knowledge found in the previous literature, as it is the first to highlight the productivity of employees in emerging economies, such as the economy in Jordan. Furthermore, our findings could be useful for the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) and the ASE on their continuous process to improve and develop corporate governance instructions. Full article

Research work on the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and financial performance has been going on for seven decades. Even when the prevailing studies are those that found a positive influence of social responsibility on financial performance, strong conclusive results are still unavailable. Some explanations for this situation are based, among other reasons, on the fact that the variables have a relation mediated by multiple factors. Additionally, it is still unknown whether the results obtained can be extrapolated to all types of companies since the majority of studies have focused on large companies listed on the stock exchange. This research studied how one of those factors (stakeholder satisfaction) mediated in companies of different sizes (including SMEs) and different types of companies (publicly listed companies or private ownership companies). A questionnaire was used, including indices relative to (1) the degree of development of the company’s social responsibility policies, (2) the changes in the satisfaction of four key stakeholders (employees, customers, suppliers, and shareholders) and financial performance (sales and profitability). Findings show the existence of a correlation between social responsibility and financial performance and also that such a relationship is mediated by the satisfaction of stakeholders. That relationship was also found to be independent of company sizes and the type of company This research work is intended to be a contribution towards that field of study, as it has detected a relationship between variables in medium-sized and private ownership companies. Full article

It is of great value to study the stickiness of enterprise cost for reducing enterprise cost and improving enterprise performance. This paper selected all A-share non-financial listed companies from 2014 to 2019 to study the impact of executive power and employee stock ownership plans on cost stickiness. The study found that the higher the executive power, the stronger the cost stickiness of the enterprise. By reducing the adjustment costs and optimistic expectations of management and improving the performance sensitivity of executive compensation and quality of information disclosure, an employee stock ownership plan plays a role in suppressing the cost-stickiness effect of executive power. The larger the scale and the more times the employee stock ownership plan is implemented, the stronger the inhibition effect is. An employee stock ownership plan has a stronger inhibiting effect on the cost-stickiness effect of executive power in enterprises with a large proportion of state-owned and institutional shares and high employee status. Combining the research themes of management accounting and financial accounting, this study discusses the economic consequences of ESOP from the perspective of enterprise cost control, which is helpful for internal and external stakeholders of enterprises to understand the characteristics and effects of ESOP in the new era, and also provides new evidence for enterprise cost control while enlightening policy makers and listed companies to explore the feasible mechanism of enterprise cost control from the staff level. It is of great value to study the stickiness of enterprise cost for reducing enterprise cost and improving enterprise performance. This paper selected all A-share non-financial listed companies from 2014 to 2019 to study the impact of executive power and an employee stock ownership plan on cost stickiness. It is found that the higher the executive power, the stronger the cost stickiness. An employee stock ownership plan has a stronger inhibiting effect on the cost-stickiness effect of executive power in enterprises with a large proportion of state-owned and institutional shares and high employee status. This study provides new evidence for corporate cost control. Full article

High-quality development of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is of great significance to the transformation of the dynamic energy of the Chinese economy in the new development stage and the improvement of quality and efficiency. To this end, we selected 32 evaluation indicators based on three perspectives: social responsibility, effectiveness and efficiency, and independent innovation. Then, we applied the fixed-base efficacy coefficient method and the longitudinal and horizontal pull-out gearing method to obtain the indexes for measuring the level of high-quality development of SOEs by linear weighting. On this basis, a model constructed by an integrated machine learning algorithm was used to explore the impact of changes in the ownership structure of SOEs on the level of high-quality development of enterprises. The study shows that (1) the overall development quality of SOEs has been on an upward trend since 2008, among which the quality of competitive SOEs has been on an upward trend, while the performance of public welfare SOEs is slightly less; (2) the property rights reform of SOEs introduces the shareholding ratio of the largest non-state shareholder and the level of high-quality development as a sine function, keeping the nature of state property rights unchanged, while maintaining the ratio in the range of 25.2–50%; (3) the relationship between the ratio of the share capital of the employee stock ownership plan to the total share capital and the level of high-quality development of SOEs is increasing, then decreasing, and then stabilizing, the ratio is maintained at about 5%, and the marginal effect of the employees’ motivation on the improvement of the quality of enterprise development is stronger; (4) the implementation of an employee stock ownership plan by SOEs more than twice a year can play a positive role in improving the quality of enterprise development. This can provide theoretical guidance for measuring the level of high-quality development of SOEs, reforming the ownership structure of SOEs, and promoting the process of high-quality macroeconomic development. Full article

Enterprise innovation is a key driver of national economic growth. How to stimulate employees’ innovation vitality to improve the company’s innovation input and output has always been a hot topic. Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is one of the effective means to stimulate employees’ innovation vitality by linking employee wealth with firm value. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ESOP implementation and contract design on enterprise innovation investment in the context of the recent booming development of ESOP in China. First, we use a treatment effect model to examine the impact of ESOP implementation on innovation investment, taking firms that implement ESOPs as the treatment group and firms that do not implement ESOPs as the control group. Second, we use multivariate regression models to test the impact of ESOP contract design (including fund source, stock source, lockup period, duration, shareholding scale, executive subscription ratio, participation degree, and management mode) on innovation investment using the treatment group. The results indicate that the implementation of ESOP is helpful in increasing enterprise innovation investment, and the impact of ESOP on innovation investment varies significantly with the design of incentive contracts. Full article

In the context of corporate sustainability, studies on the role that managerial incentives play in improving corporate environmental performance have so far focused on incentives provided either to executives and senior managers or to plant managers. However, few studies have considered the role of employee incentives. Drawing on the opportunity provided by the China Securities Regulatory Commission in restarting employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in 2014, this paper investigates the impact of employee incentives on environmental performance of high-polluting enterprises. The results indicate that ESOPs are significantly positively related to corporate environmental performance. The positive effect is particularly pronounced in subsamples with weak free-riding problems, high human capital quality, and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). Further analysis reveals that ESOPs improve corporate environmental performance through enhancing productivity and green technology. Overall, this paper reveals the micro-mechanisms behind the actual effects of employee incentives on corporate environmental management, thus providing timely implications for high-polluting enterprises to improve environmental performance. Full article

The mixed ownership reform aims to improve the property rights structure of the state−owned enterprises (SOEs) and reduce agency costs, and the current mixed reform strategies mainly include equity blending by introducing external non−state capital, executive assignments, and employee stock ownership. In this paper, 953 valid data of A−shares listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2020 are used as samples to construct the indicators of mixed reform strategy by the literature statistics method. After obtaining multiple impact indicators, the regression impact model of corporate agency cost suppression strategy is constructed by MATLAB software using a machine learning algorithm. On this basis, the performance of multiple machine learning algorithms is compared, and it is found that the integrated optimization−based bag−boosting model is used to study the effect of hybrid reform strategy to reduce the agency costs of SOEs, and the proportional setting of indicators when the effect is optimal is also explored. Finally, the laws of different influencing factors on the agency costs of enterprises are explored separately by the eigenvalue method. The results of the study show that the proportion of shareholding of the first largest non−state shareholder is sin−functional with the agency costs of SOEs when non−state majority shareholders are introduced into SOEs’ equity mix, and the agency costs tend to decrease after SOEs become privately held enterprises. The greater the number and proportion of supervisors appointed by non−state shareholders, the greater the supervisory restraint effect on SOE managers and the better the effect of suppressing agency costs. The participation of non−state−owned shareholders in the company’s business decisions by appointed executives and the special resource advantages of SOEs intensify the occurrence of the self−interest of appointed executives and the increase of agency costs of SOEs. The implementation of an employee stock ownership plan plays the role of employee supervision and restraint on SOE managers, which reduces the agency costs of SOEs. Based on this, it can provide support for the government to improve the hybrid reform policy and promote the process layer by layer, and also provide theoretical reference for SOEs to deepen the equity mix, incentivize employee shareholding, and empower non−state shareholders to govern and thus reduce agency costs. Full article

The difference in wages between executives and employees reflects the class conflict in corporate governance. To investigate the political factors within the practice of corporate governance related to employees, this paper empirically tests the relationship among political connections, ownership and within-firm pay gaps. We take the A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the example, design hypothesis tests and examine the effects of political connections on the pay gap in two distinctive groups of companies, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the non-stated-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). The overall result indicates that political connections increase the average salary of executives and decrease the average salary of employees, thereby expanding the within-firm pay gap. Pay gaps in companies with political connections are 16% higher than companies without political connections. The further test results of distinguishing property rights show that in non-SOEs, political connections increase the executives’ compensation and decrease the average compensation of employees, resulting in an increase of the within-firm pay gap. Similar relationships appear in SOEs but without statistical significance. These findings expand the research on income distribution effects of political connections theoretically, and provide useful insights for SOEs’ reform and income distribution system reform in practice. Full article

Few studies have discussed the relationship between employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using a sample of 895 A-share public firms in China, this research examines the effects of ESOPs on CSR, and the moderating effects of wedge structure and firm size on this relationship. This research mainly used the OLS model to test the research hypotheses, and all regressions were performed in Stata15. The results show that the ESOPs of Chinese public firms provide external economic incentives and internal psychological incentives for employees, increase their motivation to engage in CSR activities, and ultimately contribute to CSR. At the same time, this research finds that this relationship is stronger for firms without wedge structure and small firms. This research provides insights for understanding the relationship between ESOPs and CSR and has important managerial implications for firms to pay attention to the interests of employees to achieve sustainable development. Full article