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Keywords = distributed auction mechanism

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22 pages, 5056 KiB  
Article
Virtual Power Plant Bidding Strategies in Pay-as-Bid and Pay-as-Clear Markets: Analysis of Imbalance Penalties and Market Operations
by Youngkook Song, Yeonouk Chu, Yongtae Yoon and Younggyu Jin
Energies 2025, 18(6), 1383; https://doi.org/10.3390/en18061383 - 11 Mar 2025
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1061
Abstract
The transition towards renewable energy has increased the importance of virtual power plants (VPPs) in integrating distributed energy resources (DERs). However, questions remain regarding the most appropriate auction mechanisms (pay-as-bid (PAB) versus pay-as-clear (PAC)) and imbalance penalty structures, which significantly influence VPP bidding [...] Read more.
The transition towards renewable energy has increased the importance of virtual power plants (VPPs) in integrating distributed energy resources (DERs). However, questions remain regarding the most appropriate auction mechanisms (pay-as-bid (PAB) versus pay-as-clear (PAC)) and imbalance penalty structures, which significantly influence VPP bidding strategies and market operations. This study employs a three-stage stochastic programming model to evaluate VPP bidding behaviors under these auction mechanisms while also considering the effects of imbalance penalty structures. By simulating various market scenarios, the results reveal that PAC markets offer higher VPP revenues due to settlement at the market-clearing price; they also exhibit greater volatility and elevated imbalance penalties. For instance, power deviations in PAC markets were 52.60% higher than in PAB markets under specific penalty structures, and imbalance penalty cost ranges differed by up to 82.32%. In contrast, PAB markets foster stable, stepwise bidding strategies that minimize imbalance penalties and improve renewable energy utilization, particularly during high- and moderate-generation periods. The findings emphasize the advantages of the PAB mechanism in electricity markets with substantial renewable energy integration, providing significant insights for the design of auction mechanisms that facilitate reliable and sustainable market operations. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Energy Markets and Energy Economy)
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14 pages, 1034 KiB  
Article
Distributed Task Allocation for Multiple UAVs Based on Swarm Benefit Optimization
by Yiting Chen, Runfeng Chen, Yuchong Huang, Zehao Xiong and Jie Li
Drones 2024, 8(12), 766; https://doi.org/10.3390/drones8120766 - 18 Dec 2024
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1609
Abstract
The auction mechanism stands as a pivotal distributed solution approach for addressing the task allocation problem in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarms, with its rapid solution capability well-suited to meet the real-time requirements of aerial mission planning for UAV swarms. Building upon the [...] Read more.
The auction mechanism stands as a pivotal distributed solution approach for addressing the task allocation problem in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarms, with its rapid solution capability well-suited to meet the real-time requirements of aerial mission planning for UAV swarms. Building upon the auction mechanism, this paper proposes a distributed task allocation method for multi-UAV grounded in swarm benefits optimization. The method introduces individual benefit variation to quantify the effect of a task on the benefit of a single UAV, thereby enabling direct optimization of swarm benefit through these individual benefit variations. Within the formulated individual benefit calculation, both the spatial distance between tasks and UAVs and the initial task value along with its temporal decay are taken into account, ensuring a thorough and accurate assessment. Additionally, the method incorporates real-time updates of individual benefits for each UAV, reflecting the dynamic state of task benefit fluctuations within the swarm. Monte Carlo simulation experiments demonstrate that, for a swarm size of 16 UAVs and 80 tasks, the proposed method achieves an average swarm benefit improvement of approximately 2% and 4% over the Consensus-Based Bundle Algorithm (CBBA) and Performance Impact (PI) methods, respectively, thus validating its effectiveness. Full article
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17 pages, 367 KiB  
Article
Comparative Analysis of Market Clearing Mechanisms for Peer-to-Peer Energy Market Based on Double Auction
by Kisal Kawshika Gunawardana Hathamune Liyanage and Shama Naz Islam
Energies 2024, 17(22), 5708; https://doi.org/10.3390/en17225708 - 14 Nov 2024
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1402
Abstract
This paper aims to develop an optimisation-based price bid generation mechanism for the sellers and buyers in a double-auction-aided peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading market. With consumers being prosumers through the continuous adoption of distributed energy resources, P2P energy trading models offer a paradigm [...] Read more.
This paper aims to develop an optimisation-based price bid generation mechanism for the sellers and buyers in a double-auction-aided peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading market. With consumers being prosumers through the continuous adoption of distributed energy resources, P2P energy trading models offer a paradigm shift in energy market operation. Thus, it is essential to develop market models and mechanisms that can maximise the incentives for participation in the P2P energy market. In this sense, the proposed approach focuses on maximising profit at the sellers, as well as maximising cost savings at the buyers. The bids generated from the proposed approach are integrated with three different market clearing mechanisms, and the corresponding market clearing prices are compared. A numerical analysis is performed on a real-life dataset from Ausgrid to demonstrate the bids generated from sellers/buyers, as well as the associated market clearing prices throughout different months of the year. It can be observed that the market clearing prices are lower when the solar generation is higher. The statistical analysis demonstrates that all three market clearing mechanisms can achieve a consistent market clearing price within a range of 5 cents/kWh for 50% of the time when trading takes place. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section A1: Smart Grids and Microgrids)
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33 pages, 53062 KiB  
Article
An Improved MOEA/D with an Auction-Based Matching Mechanism
by Guangjian Li, Mingfa Zheng, Guangjun He, Yu Mei, Gaoji Sun and Haitao Zhong
Axioms 2024, 13(9), 644; https://doi.org/10.3390/axioms13090644 - 20 Sep 2024
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1402
Abstract
Multi-objective optimization problems (MOPs) constitute a vital component in the field of mathematical optimization and operations research. The multi-objective evolutionary algorithm based on decomposition (MOEA/D) decomposes a MOP into a set of single-objective subproblems and approximates the true Pareto front (PF) by optimizing [...] Read more.
Multi-objective optimization problems (MOPs) constitute a vital component in the field of mathematical optimization and operations research. The multi-objective evolutionary algorithm based on decomposition (MOEA/D) decomposes a MOP into a set of single-objective subproblems and approximates the true Pareto front (PF) by optimizing these subproblems in a collaborative manner. However, most existing MOEA/Ds maintain population diversity by limiting the replacement region or scale, which come at the cost of decreasing convergence. To better balance convergence and diversity, we introduce auction theory into algorithm design and propose an auction-based matching (ABM) mechanism to coordinate the replacement procedure in MOEA/D. In the ABM mechanism, each subproblem can be associated with its preferred individual in a competitive manner by simulating the auction process in economic activities. The integration of ABM into MOEA/D forms the proposed MOEA/D-ABM. Furthermore, to make the appropriate distribution of weight vectors, a modified adjustment strategy is utilized to adaptively adjust the weight vectors during the evolution process, where the trigger timing is determined by the convergence activity of the population. Finally, MOEA/D-ABM is compared with six state-of-the-art multi-objective evolutionary algorithms (MOEAs) on some benchmark problems with two to ten objectives. The experimental results show the competitiveness of MOEA/D-ABM in the performance of diversity and convergence. They also demonstrate that the use of the ABM mechanism can greatly improve the convergence rate of the algorithm. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Mathematical Optimizations and Operations Research)
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21 pages, 7944 KiB  
Article
Analysis of the Prices of Recycling Byproducts Obtained from Mechanical–Biological Treatment Plants in the Valencian Community (Spain)
by Javier Rodrigo-Ilarri and María-Elena Rodrigo-Clavero
Sustainability 2024, 16(16), 6714; https://doi.org/10.3390/su16166714 - 6 Aug 2024
Viewed by 1873
Abstract
Municipal solid waste (MSW) management in Spain, particularly in the Valencian Community, heavily relies on mechanical–biological treatment (MBT) plants followed by landfill disposal. These MBT facilities utilize mechanical processes like shredding, screening, and sorting to segregate recyclables (metals, plastics, paper) from organic material [...] Read more.
Municipal solid waste (MSW) management in Spain, particularly in the Valencian Community, heavily relies on mechanical–biological treatment (MBT) plants followed by landfill disposal. These MBT facilities utilize mechanical processes like shredding, screening, and sorting to segregate recyclables (metals, plastics, paper) from organic material and other nonrecyclables. While public funding supports these plants, private entities manage them through complex, long-term concession contracts. This structure restricts access to crucial data on the sale prices of the byproducts generated during MBT. Publicly available information on relevant company and administration websites is typically absent, hindering transparency surrounding byproduct revenue. This study addresses this gap by analyzing 2012’s available data on revenues obtained from byproduct sales following mechanical treatment at MBT plants within the Valencian Community and comparing them with Spanish national data. This research revealed a significant finding—the statistical distribution of average prices obtained from Ecoembes auctions in the Valencian Community mirrored the corresponding distribution for prices calculated from auctions conducted in other Spanish regions. This suggests a potential uniformity in byproduct pricing across the country. It has also been found that none of the analyzed price distributions exhibited a normal (Gaussian) distribution. The findings also highlight the need for alternative pricing models that move beyond simple averages and account for regional variations and outliers. As actual prices are not available after 2012, this lack of transparency poses a challenge in comprehensively evaluating the economic viability of MBT plants. Furthermore, it raises concerns regarding whether the revenue generated from byproduct sales reflects fair market value. Limited public access to this information can potentially indicate conflicts of interest or inefficiencies within the waste management system. Full article
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15 pages, 2084 KiB  
Article
Blockchain-Based Joint Auction Model for Distributed Energy in Industrial Park Microgrids
by Li Wang, Zihao Zhang, Jinheng Fan, Shunqi Zeng, Shixian Pan and Haoyong Chen
Energies 2024, 17(13), 3140; https://doi.org/10.3390/en17133140 - 26 Jun 2024
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1357
Abstract
To address the centralized trading demand within industrial parks and the scattered peer-to-peer trading demand outside industrial parks, this paper proposes a blockchain-based joint auction architecture for distributed energy in microgrids inside and outside industrial parks. By combining blockchain technology and auction theory, [...] Read more.
To address the centralized trading demand within industrial parks and the scattered peer-to-peer trading demand outside industrial parks, this paper proposes a blockchain-based joint auction architecture for distributed energy in microgrids inside and outside industrial parks. By combining blockchain technology and auction theory, the architecture integrates the physical energy transactions within industrial parks with the distributed transactions in external microgrids to meet the centralized trading demand within industrial parks and the scattered peer-to-peer trading demand outside industrial parks, optimizing resource allocation and improving system resilience. In the microgrid auction mechanism for industrial parks, considering distributed energy providers (sellers) and distributed energy buyers, an auction mechanism with power transmission distance, average electricity price, and enterprise nature as its main attributes was constructed to maximize social welfare, realizing efficient energy flow in a multi-microgrid environment and enabling coordinated mutual benefits for producers and consumers within the region. Finally, a case study was conducted on the joint auction mechanism for microgrids inside and outside industrial parks, including the impacts of market dynamics and user preferences on electricity prices using different trading methods, the computational results using different trading matching methods (comparing single-attribute and multi-attribute methods), and multi-dimensional verification of user satisfaction with peer-to-peer transactions in a blockchain environment. The effectiveness of the joint trading between physical energy transactions within industrial parks and external microgrids was demonstrated, which could efficiently coordinate energy allocation inside and outside the parks and reduce the cost of energy configuration. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section A: Sustainable Energy)
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16 pages, 4444 KiB  
Article
Using Privacy-Preserving Algorithms and Blockchain Tokens to Monetize Industrial Data in Digital Marketplaces
by Borja Bordel Sánchez, Ramón Alcarria, Latif Ladid and Aurel Machalek
Computers 2024, 13(4), 104; https://doi.org/10.3390/computers13040104 - 18 Apr 2024
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 2604
Abstract
The data economy has arisen in most developed countries. Instruments and tools to extract knowledge and value from large collections of data are now available and enable new industries, business models, and jobs. However, the current data market is asymmetric and prevents companies [...] Read more.
The data economy has arisen in most developed countries. Instruments and tools to extract knowledge and value from large collections of data are now available and enable new industries, business models, and jobs. However, the current data market is asymmetric and prevents companies from competing fairly. On the one hand, only very specialized digital organizations can manage complex data technologies such as Artificial Intelligence and obtain great benefits from third-party data at a very reduced cost. On the other hand, datasets are produced by regular companies as valueless sub-products that assume great costs. These companies have no mechanisms to negotiate a fair distribution of the benefits derived from their industrial data, which are often transferred for free. Therefore, new digital data-driven marketplaces must be enabled to facilitate fair data trading among all industrial agents. In this paper, we propose a blockchain-enabled solution to monetize industrial data. Industries can upload their data to an Inter-Planetary File System (IPFS) using a web interface, where the data are randomized through a privacy-preserving algorithm. In parallel, a blockchain network creates a Non-Fungible Token (NFT) to represent the dataset. So, only the NFT owner can obtain the required seed to derandomize and extract all data from the IPFS. Data trading is then represented by NFT trading and is based on fungible tokens, so it is easier to adapt prices to the real economy. Auctions and purchases are also managed through a common web interface. Experimental validation based on a pilot deployment is conducted. The results show a significant improvement in the data transactions and quality of experience of industrial agents. Full article
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19 pages, 4644 KiB  
Article
Economic Pricing in Peer-to-Peer Electrical Trading for a Sustainable Electricity Supply Chain Industry in Thailand
by Adisorn Leelasantitham, Thammavich Wongsamerchue and Yod Sukamongkol
Energies 2024, 17(5), 1220; https://doi.org/10.3390/en17051220 - 4 Mar 2024
Cited by 5 | Viewed by 2482
Abstract
The state-owned power Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), a monopoly market in charge of producing, distributing, and wholesaling power, is the focal point of Thailand’s electricity market. Although the government has encouraged people to install on-grid solar panels to sell electricity as [...] Read more.
The state-owned power Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), a monopoly market in charge of producing, distributing, and wholesaling power, is the focal point of Thailand’s electricity market. Although the government has encouraged people to install on-grid solar panels to sell electricity as producers and retail consumers, the price mechanism, i.e., purchasing price and selling prices, is still unilaterally determined by the government. Therefore, we are interested in studying the case where blockchain can be used as a free trading platform. Without involving buying or selling from the government, this research presents a model of fully traded price mechanisms. Based on the study results of the double auction system, data on buying and selling prices of electrical energy in Thailand were used as the initial data for the electricity peer-to-peer free-trading model. Then, information was obtained to analyze the trading price trends by using the law of demand and supply in addition to the principle of the bipartite graph. The price trend results agree well with those of price equilibrium equations. Therefore, we firmly believe that the model we offer can be traded in a closed system of free-trade platforms. In addition, the players in the system can help to determine the price trend that will occur according to various parameters and will cause true fairness in the sustainable electricity supply chain industry in Thailand. Full article
(This article belongs to the Topic Energy Economics and Sustainable Development)
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13 pages, 1932 KiB  
Article
The Paradox of Privatization in Inland Fisheries Management: Lessons from a Traditional System
by Irkhamiawan Ma’ruf, Mohammad Mukhlis Kamal, Arif Satria, Sulistiono, Alin Halimatussadiah and Yudi Setiawan
Sustainability 2023, 15(23), 16273; https://doi.org/10.3390/su152316273 - 24 Nov 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1902
Abstract
Privatization, often proposed as a means to regulate natural resource use, sometimes paradoxically leads to overexploitation and social exclusion. Within the unique context of Ogan Komering Ilir (OKI) Regency, Indonesia, the privatization of swamp floodplains and rivers via the “Lelang Lebak, Lebung, Sungai” [...] Read more.
Privatization, often proposed as a means to regulate natural resource use, sometimes paradoxically leads to overexploitation and social exclusion. Within the unique context of Ogan Komering Ilir (OKI) Regency, Indonesia, the privatization of swamp floodplains and rivers via the “Lelang Lebak, Lebung, Sungai” (L3S) system is a testament to this dilemma. L3S grants auction winners exclusive rights to fish, thereby privatizing common-pool resources. This study delves into the intricacies of the L3S mechanism, highlighting its significance in guiding inland fisheries’ management. Through stakeholder analysis, we pinpoint the crucial actors, as well as their interests, influence, and interrelationships. Our investigation revealed 20 distinct stakeholders, each playing different roles within the L3S framework. Based on their influence and vested interests, these stakeholders are categorized as key players, subjects, context setters, and crowds. This classification aids in discerning potential conflicts, cooperation, and synergies. Effective L3S execution hinges on collaboration, especially with pivotal entities such as fishery services, village and district heads, and village-owned enterprises. Insights gathered during the study indicate that while privatization has streamlined resource distribution, it intensifies overfishing and deepens socioeconomic divisions. This study calls for a harmonious blend of historical insights and modern governance, with a central focus on stakeholder collaboration and community involvement. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Roles of Culture and Values in Sustainable Development)
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13 pages, 3168 KiB  
Article
A Resource Allocation Scheme with the Best Revenue in the Computing Power Network
by Zuhao Wang, Yanhua Yu, Di Liu, Wenjing Li, Ao Xiong and Yu Song
Electronics 2023, 12(9), 1990; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12091990 - 25 Apr 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1423
Abstract
The emergence of computing power networks has improved the flexibility of resource scheduling. Considering the current trading scenario of computing power and network resources, most resources are no longer subject to change after being allocated to users until the end of the lease. [...] Read more.
The emergence of computing power networks has improved the flexibility of resource scheduling. Considering the current trading scenario of computing power and network resources, most resources are no longer subject to change after being allocated to users until the end of the lease. However, this practice often leads to idle resources during resource usage. To optimize resource allocation, a trading mechanism is needed to encourage users to sell their idle resources. The Myerson auction mechanism precisely aims to maximize the seller’s benefits. Therefore, we propose a resource allocation scheme based on the Myerson auction. In the scenario of the same user bidding distribution, we first combine the Myerson auction with Hyperledger Fabric by introducing a reserved price, which creates conditions for the application of blockchain in auction scenarios. Regarding different user bidding distributions, we propose a Myerson auction network model based on clustering algorithms, which makes the auction adaptable to more complex scenarios. The experimental findings show that the revenue generated by the auction model in both scenarios is significantly higher than that of the traditional sealed bid second-price auction, and can approach the expected revenue in the real Myerson auction scenario. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cybersecurity and Data Science, Volume II)
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21 pages, 649 KiB  
Article
A Blockchain-Based Distributed Computational Resource Trading Strategy for Internet of Things Considering Multiple Preferences
by Tonghe Wang, Songpu Ai, Junwei Cao and Yuming Zhao
Symmetry 2023, 15(4), 808; https://doi.org/10.3390/sym15040808 - 26 Mar 2023
Cited by 9 | Viewed by 2941
Abstract
The architecture of cloud–edge collaboration can improve the efficiency of Internet of Things (IoT) systems. Recent studies have pointed out that using IoT terminal devices as destinations for computing offloading can promote further optimized allocation of computational resources. However, in practice, this idea [...] Read more.
The architecture of cloud–edge collaboration can improve the efficiency of Internet of Things (IoT) systems. Recent studies have pointed out that using IoT terminal devices as destinations for computing offloading can promote further optimized allocation of computational resources. However, in practice, this idea encounters the problem that participants might lack the motivation to take over computational tasks from others. Although the edge and the terminal are provided with symmetrical positions in collaborative offloading, their computational resources and capabilities are asymmetric. To mitigate this issue, this paper designs a distributed strategy for the trading of computational resources. The most prominent feature of our strategy is its multi-preference optimization objective that takes into account the overall satisfaction with task delay, energy cost, trading prices, and user reputation of participants. In addition, this paper proposes a system architecture based on the Blockchain-as-a-Service (BaaS) design to give full play to the good distributed technology features of blockchain, such as decentralization, traceability, immutability, and automation. Meanwhile, BaaS delivers decentralized identifier (DID) based distributed identity infrastructure for the distributed computational resource trading stakeholders as well. In the simulation evaluation, we compare our trading strategy based on a matching mechanism called multi-preference matching (MPM) to trading using the classical double auction (DA) matching mechanism. The results show that our computational resource trading strategy is able to offload and execut more tasks, achieving a better throughput compared to the DA-based strategy. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Computer)
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14 pages, 1082 KiB  
Article
A Distributed Double-Loop Optimization Method with Fast Response for UAV Swarm Scheduling
by Runfeng Chen, Jie Li, Yiting Chen and Yuchong Huang
Drones 2023, 7(3), 216; https://doi.org/10.3390/drones7030216 - 21 Mar 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1928
Abstract
An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarm has broad application prospects, in which scheduling is one of the key technologies determining the completion of tasks. A market-based approach is an effective way to schedule UAVs distributively and quickly, meeting the real-time requirements of swarm [...] Read more.
An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarm has broad application prospects, in which scheduling is one of the key technologies determining the completion of tasks. A market-based approach is an effective way to schedule UAVs distributively and quickly, meeting the real-time requirements of swarm scheduling without a centre. In this paper, a double-loop framework is designed to enhance the performance of scheduling, where a new task removal method in the outer loop and a local redundant auction method in the inner loop are proposed to improve the optimization of scheduling and reduce iterations. Furthermore, a deadlock detection mechanism is introduced to avoid endless loops and the scheduling with the lowest local cost will be adopted to exit the cycle. Extensive Monte Carlo experiments show that the iterations required by the proposed method are less than the two representative algorithms consensus-based bundle algorithm (CBBA) and performance impact (PI) algorithm, and the number of allocated tasks is increased. In addition, through the deadlock avoidance mechanism, PI can completely converge as the method in this paper. Full article
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26 pages, 842 KiB  
Article
Insights on the Statistics and Market Behavior of Frequent Batch Auctions
by Thiago W. Alves, Ionuţ Florescu and Dragoş Bozdog
Mathematics 2023, 11(5), 1223; https://doi.org/10.3390/math11051223 - 2 Mar 2023
Viewed by 2739
Abstract
This paper extends previous research performed with the SHIFT financial market simulation platform. In our previous work, we show how this order-driven, distributed asynchronous, and multi-asset simulated environment is capable of reproducing known stylized facts of real continuous double auction financial markets. Using [...] Read more.
This paper extends previous research performed with the SHIFT financial market simulation platform. In our previous work, we show how this order-driven, distributed asynchronous, and multi-asset simulated environment is capable of reproducing known stylized facts of real continuous double auction financial markets. Using the platform, we study a pricing mechanism based on frequent batch auctions (FBA) proposed by a group of researchers from University of Chicago. We demonstrate our simulator’s capability as an environment to experiment with potential rule changes. We present the first side-by-side comparison of frequent batch auctions with a continuous double auction. We show that FBA is superior in terms of market quality measures but we also discover a potential problem in the technical implementation of FBA. Full article
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20 pages, 1016 KiB  
Article
Blockchain Enabled Credible Energy Trading at the Edge of the Internet of Things
by Dongdong Wang, Xinyu Du, Hui Zhang and Qin Wang
Mathematics 2023, 11(3), 630; https://doi.org/10.3390/math11030630 - 26 Jan 2023
Cited by 5 | Viewed by 1943
Abstract
In order to promote the value circulation of energy resources and improve energy efficiency, credible energy sharing between Internet of Things Devices (IoTDs) came into being. However, sometimes IoTDs do not obtain the required energy in the required time period, resulting in less [...] Read more.
In order to promote the value circulation of energy resources and improve energy efficiency, credible energy sharing between Internet of Things Devices (IoTDs) came into being. However, sometimes IoTDs do not obtain the required energy in the required time period, resulting in less active participation in energy sharing. To address these challenges, this paper first proposes a credible energy transaction model based on the distributed ledger blockchain at the Edge of the Internet of Things, where the Edge Cloud Server (ECS) can collect a large number of surplus energy resources of IoTDs in a secure and credible energy sharing environment and share them with other IoTDs in urgent need of charging. Meanwhile, in order to attract IoTDs to participate in energy sharing for a long time and meet the energy demand of ECS to the maximum extent, a smart contract-based Expected Social Welfare Maximized double auction incentive mechanism of Single ECS to Multi-IoTDs (ESWM-StM) is proposed to enable dynamic and adaptive energy sharing from multiple IoTDs to a single ECS. In addition, this paper compares the proposed algorithm with the benchmark method in terms of energy-sharing cost and long-term utility. The simulation results show that the proposed incentive mechanism can enable IoTDs to provide more surplus energy per unit cost to meet the energy demand of ECSs, and can sustainably attract more energy trading participants to enhance the expected social welfare in the long term. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Advances in Coding Theory and Cryptography)
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23 pages, 948 KiB  
Article
A Truthful and Reliable Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning Based on Reputation Mechanism and Reverse Auction
by Ao Xiong, Yu Chen, Hao Chen, Jiewei Chen, Shaojie Yang, Jianping Huang, Zhongxu Li and Shaoyong Guo
Electronics 2023, 12(3), 517; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12030517 - 19 Jan 2023
Cited by 9 | Viewed by 4299
Abstract
As a distributed machine learning paradigm, federated learning (FL) enables participating clients to share only model gradients instead of local data and achieves the secure sharing of private data. However, the lack of clients’ willingness to participate in FL and the malicious influence [...] Read more.
As a distributed machine learning paradigm, federated learning (FL) enables participating clients to share only model gradients instead of local data and achieves the secure sharing of private data. However, the lack of clients’ willingness to participate in FL and the malicious influence of unreliable clients both seriously degrade the performance of FL. The current research on the incentive mechanism of FL lacks the accurate assessment of clients’ truthfulness and reliability, and the incentive mechanism based on untruthful and unreliable clients is unreliable and inefficient. To solve this problem, we propose an incentive mechanism based on the reputation mechanism and reverse auction to achieve a more truthful, more reliable, and more efficient FL. First, we introduce the reputation mechanism to measure clients’ truthfulness and reliability through multiple reputation evaluations and design a reliable client selection scheme. Then the reverse auction is introduced to select the optimal clients that maximize the social surplus while satisfying individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and weak budget balance. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that this incentive mechanism can motivate more clients with high-quality data and high reputations to participate in FL with less cost, which increases the FL tasks’ economic benefit by 31% and improves the accuracy from 0.9356 to 0.9813, and then promote the efficient and stable development of the FL service trading market. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Artificial Intelligence Technologies and Applications)
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