Search Results (20)

Hell in orthodox Christian eschatology is presented as a place of eternal punishment for the damned or sinners. Damnation follows from disobedience to God’s will. Hell is contrasted with heaven, a place of eternal reward and benefits for the righteous. In contrast to this eschatology, African Traditional Religion (ATR) broadly denies the existence of hell. ATR rather asserts that violators of God’s moral codes receive their punishment on earth while those who have lived ethically laudable lives transition to a new phase of existence in the ancestral realm, the ideal home. Given that the ancestral realm can be compared with the Christian heaven, more or less, African eschatology paints a less gloomy picture of human destiny than orthodox Christian eschatology. We assert, in this article, that the ATR eschatology that denies the existence of hell is more ethically attractive than the Christian eschatology that punishes temporally bounded wrongdoing with eternal damnation. We argue the attractiveness of the African view from the perspective of the understanding of God as a benevolent being, which both orthodox Christian theism and traditional African theism endorse. Full article

A central tenet of classical theism is that God is Pure Act. Among other things, this indicates that while God can act on creatures, he cannot be acted on by those creatures, for there is no receptivity in God. Yet this seems to imply that God cannot enter into interpersonal relationships with human persons, for such relationships are intrinsically reciprocal and therefore require activity and receptivity from all participants. Since the Christian faith is ostensibly committed to the claim that God can and does engage humans in interpersonal relationship, classical theism appears to be incompatible with Christianity. Nevertheless, in this paper I propose a Thomistic version of classical theism that avoids this apparent tension. Drawing on a Thomistic philosophical anthropology, as well as recent work on the second-person relation, I suggest that there is, in fact, receptivity in God. However, I argue that God’s receptivity is a feature of his Pure Activity, and thus the claim that God engages humans in interpersonal relationship proves to be consistent with the doctrines of classical theism. Full article

This essay reflects on the concept of the death of God as part and parcel of modern philosophical theology: a genre of thinking that came into existence with Hegel’s announcement of the “speculative Good Friday” as the most natural expression of die Religion der neuen Zeiten, “the religion of modern times”. In my interpretation, the death of God not only does not spell the end of the era of atheism but, on the contrary, inaugurates a new era of characteristically modern theism that steers away from theological absolutism. The new theos is no longer conceived as the eternal omnipotent Absolute but as the Derridean diminished Infinite: contracted and self-negated—even “unto death”. Such God, however, although coming to the foremost visibly in modernity, is not completely new to the monotheistic religions, which from the beginning are engaged in the heated debate concerning the status of the divine power: is it absolute and unlimited or rather self-restricted and conditioned? I will enter this debate by conducting a comparison between the two traditional models of divine self-restriction—Christian kenosis and Jewish-kabbalistic tsimtsum—and then present their modernised philosophical variants, most of all in the thought of Hegel. Full article

Some classical theists contend that the Christian tradition demands affirmation of the following four tenets—divine simplicity, timelessness, immutability, and impassibility—in their absolute or strict senses, a position I refer to as strict classical theism. These four tenets, however, are the subject of considerable debate in recent scholarship. This article engages the ongoing debate by focusing on some significant difficulties strict classical theism faces relative to meeting two widely held standards of Christian theological method: the standard of biblical warrant and the standard of systematic coherence. First, highlighting classical Christology as a test case, this article suggests that strict classical theism faces pressure to either revise or abandon some contested tenets or confront the prospect of abandoning the standard of systematic coherence. Second, the article turns to highlighting some ways that strict classical theism struggles to meet the standard of biblical warrant, which might necessitate a reevaluation of some of its core claims and the viability of common appeals made to the Christian tradition in support of such claims. This article is not intended as a conclusive argument against strict classical theism but aims at the more modest goal of pressing these points regarding theological method, calling for serious consideration, and inviting further discussion. Full article

In this paper, I aim to defend a robust concept of “person” as it relates to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. I begin by situating the debate in the current context between Social Trinitarianism (ST) and Latin Trinitarianism (LT) and then zero in on Thomas Aquinas’s view of the divine Persons as subsistent relations. I will argue that such an understanding of divine Persons has two significant difficulties. First, Aquinas’s view of a strong doctrine of divine simplicity is susceptible to modal collapse. For on such a view, there are no real distinctions within God; such distinctions are conceptually only. If there are no real distinctions within God, then how can we make sense of the eternal relations within God? Second, I question whether a relation can be equated with a Person. After all, relations do not know things, perform actions, or love in the way Scripture portrays the divine Persons. I will then offer a constructive and more robust view of the divine Person—one that aligns with the control of Scripture. In doing so, I consider two objections, one centering on whether defenders of ST fall into tri-theism and the other on whether divine Persons can indeed work together. Full article

Within contemporary Christian philosophical theology, there are three broad theories of providence being debated. These are theological determinism, Molinism, and open theism. Of course, there are nuances amongst proponents of each theory, but the nuances are not terribly important for my purposes in this essay. I will argue that the basic conceptual machinery of each theory seems to entail divine temporality. Since open theists are already committed to divine temporality, there is nothing for me to argue there. Things get interesting when I consider theological determinism and Molinism. There are proponents of each view who already affirm divine temporality, but there are also proponents of each view who affirm divine timelessness. What I will argue is that theological determinism and Molinism are incompatible with divine timelessness. In order to make my case, I will start by defining some terms. Then, I will offer some arguments related to acting for a reason, divine freedom, and so-called logical moments in the life of a timeless God. Full article

With regard to the assertion of the nature of the world, primitive Buddhism advocates “all phenomena that arise from causes” and opposes the existence of “God” or “Creator”, who created everything in the universe, which is significantly different from monotheistic beliefs such as Brahmanism, Christianity, and Islam and is therefore often called “atheism”. This paper introduces the Buddhist cosmology of Mount Sumeru and the tri-sahasra mahā-sahasra lokadhātu under the perspective of comparative religions and the first human beings who came to this world from the ābhāsvara-deva as recorded in the Buddhist scriptures and explores the question of whether Buddhism is atheistic. It is believed that the key to the debate between Chinese and Western scholars on whether Buddhism is atheistic is the difference in understanding the concept of “God”. Buddhism does not deny the supernatural power of “ghosts and gods”, so its essence is still theism. Full article

The classical doctrine of the eternal relations or origin (ERO) claims that these relations are (1) atemporal and (2) causal. In this paper, I investigate the casual nature of the ERO, highlighting that the patristic and medieval Christian thinkers who developed this doctrine understood causality in terms of Aristotle’s efficient causality, highlighting that these are casual acts that produce an effect. I then provide an analysis of some of the major theories of efficient causation on offer in contemporary metaphysics to see which theory best comports with how the ancient and medieval Christian thinkers understood the efficient–causal aspect of the ERO, concluding that a powers theory of causation seems to work best. I conclude by discussing the implications the classical doctrine of the ERO has for models of God, arguing that they are compatible only with classical theism and neoclassical theism. Full article

This paper is an attempt to consider an alternative pluralist pantheism (Mary Jane Rubenstein) as the next step in the evolution of interpersonal, interspecies, and God–human–nature relationships and its possible realisation in (post-)Christian ecofeminism and its epistemology. It follows the methodology and epistemology of theological ecofeminism, which assumes that the oppression of women and the exploitation of nature stem from the same constellation of phenomena: patriarchal domination, dualistic anthropologies, and global hypercapitalism. Recognising that pantheism is a very complex phenomenon and should not be viewed as a single codified viewpoint, but rather as a diverse family of different doctrines, this paper understands pantheism primarily as the paradigm that asserts that everything is part of a divine unity consisting of an all-encompassing, manifested deity or God/Goddess. The paper first explains the pan-en-theistic turn in Christian ecofeminism as a tool for deconstructing the dominant Cartesian dualistic binaries and their symbolism and metanarratives, and as the first “safe” phase of transition from Christian anthropocentrism. From this standpoint, Grace M. Jantzen’s defense of pantheism as an alternative to transcendental theism is further explored as she argues that divinity is found “in” the physical and material world and nowhere else. The paper then moves to the second phase, proposed in the final part of the paper, on the possibility of the theoretical adoption of pluralist pantheism in (post-)Christian ecofeminist ecotheology. Here, the question of the “fear and horror of pantheism” in Western thought is discussed. Full article

Against those who think that only believers in a personal God are entitled to be grateful for their existence and for reality itself (cosmic gratitude), I show that there are non-theistic views on which everything that happens is part of an overall good order, supporting gratitude toward that order’s source. However, most non-theist views that affirm reality’s goodness, including pantheism, axiarchism, and ultimism, hold that an individual’s existence has value as part of a larger whole. Some things may be bad for me but good for the whole. In such cases, acceptance is the best available positive attitude. Many versions of theism, by contrast, support constitutional gratitude, a characteristic attitude of thankfulness toward the ultimate source of goodness. Using Marilyn Adams’ distinction between global and local goods, I show how Christianity, Islam, and other theistic views that affirm a personal God who cares for the well-being of each individual as such enable constitutional gratitude. If the evils you experience will be defeated by greater goods that you personally experience, you can be grateful to God for God’s presence and plan even in suffering. Whether this attitude is more appropriate than acceptance or endurance depends on facts about reality and value. Full article

Most people rely on their conscience as a source of moral intuitions needed to test ethical proposals. Assume that the conscience can deliver knowledge of moral obligations under the right conditions. What ontological resources are needed to explain such a faculty? That depends on (1) the nature of moral obligations, and (2) what it takes to be receptive to them. I argue that close attention to (1) and (2) shows that materialism cannot account for the conscience, but that Christian theism plausibly provides the requisite resources. This is because moral obligations are naturally received as commands, they are prescriptive, personal, and express a kind of universal normative necessity that cannot be grounded in the local contingencies of a materialist world. Moral obligations are expressed as commands of practical reason, and they are knowable only if the world is governed by a divine personal Logos, and there are “Logos beings”, beings like God in their receptivity to these commands. Moral obligations are themselves immaterial entities and only a being with an immaterial dimension of the right sort can be receptive to them. This argument parallels a version of the argument from reason that sees theism as the best explanation of our logical reasoning abilities. Full article

The positive psychology movement has increased and deepened our understanding of gratitude and its contribution to human well-being. Most of the literature to date has focused on gratitude to human benefactors, and the same has been true of philosophical analyses of gratitude. More recently, scholars of gratitude have turned their attention to gratitude to God, but relatively little work has been done on the relationship between particular theologies and spiritualities on the one hand and the phenomenology and structure of gratitude on the other. This essay makes a contribution to that strand of investigation by surveying the work of six Christian theologians, each of whom make bold, sometimes cryptic, claims about the distinctiveness of Christian gratitude and gratitude to God. The essay challenges universalist assumptions about the structure and phenomenology of gratitude, including gratitude to God. Full article

The article presents problems that the concepts of God’s immutability, impassibility, and simplicity pose for Christian theism. Through the critical analysis, the author indicates the roots of these ideas (mostly, but not only, in ancient Greek philosophy) and the consequences of absolutizing them for the image of God and His relationship to the world. The more general purpose of the paper is to highlight the danger of the strong dependence of religious depictions on philosophical grounds. As concluded in the article, it is a mistake to absolutize the particular solutions that appeared at the junction of fides et ratio at one of the historical stages. The awareness of this becomes extremely important when reflecting on the divine immutability, impassibility, and simplicity. The author shows some proposals to reformulate their understanding in light of contemporary analytic philosophy. Partial reinterpretation in this regard may help to rethink the concept of the Creator’s interaction with creation and to reconcile the biblical image of God with the philosophical one. Full article

Launonen and Mullins argue that if Classical Theism is true, human cognition is likely not theism-tracking, at least, given what we know from cognitive science of religion. In this essay, we develop a model for how classical theists can make sense of the findings from cognitive science, without abandoning their Classical Theist commitments. We also provide an argument for how our model aligns well with the Christian doctrine of general revelation. Full article

The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, is underpinned by maturationally natural cognitive biases and systems (Natural Religion). It is unclear, however, whether theism is natural. Does the god concept that our cognitive biases and systems give rise to approximate theism? In other words, is Natural Religion “theism-tracking”? As Christian theologians have different views of what God is like, we argue that the answer depends partly on one’s model of God. We discuss two models: classical theism and open theism. We argue that classical theism is far from being natural. The classical divine attributes are very hard to comprehend. Moreover, people naturally conceptualize God as a special sort of person, but the classical God strongly deviates from our cognitive expectations about persons. Open theism is much more natural. However, recent findings in CSR challenge the suggestion that Natural Religion tracks open theism. The possibility that we are “born idolaters” rather than “born believers” might undermine the Christian doctrine of general revelation and attempts to make CSR compatible with theology. Full article