Kant’s Critique of Rational Theology and His Project of Moral Religion

A special issue of Religions (ISSN 2077-1444).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 31 December 2025 | Viewed by 2745

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Guest Editor
School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China
Interests: German idealism; Kant’s moral and religious philosophy

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Immanuel Kant is unquestionably one of the most distinguished philosophers in history. However, his philosophy of religion has received significantly less recognition compared to his theoretical and moral works, despite a growing acknowledgment of its significance in recent years. Kant’s philosophy of religion can be broadly divided into two main parts: the first is his critique of traditional rational theology or metaphysical theism, primarily expounded in the “Transcendental Dialectic” of the Critique of Pure Reason; the second is his project to develop a moral religion, which is grounded in his moral argument for the existence of God and is thoroughly explored in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. While the former is generally regarded as successful, it has encountered increasing criticism in recent decades. Conversely, the latter, which was initially less emphasized, has recently gained more attention and support, sparking significant scholarly debate.

In the first Critique, Kant argues that the human faculty of cognition is legitimately confined to objects of possible experience, which makes knowledge of God, considered a transcendental idea, unattainable and any attempts to prove God’s existence futile. Kant’s critique of the ontological proof is particularly significant; he asserts that this proof serves as an implicit foundation for both the cosmological and physico-theological proofs and underpins all forms of rational theology. Consequently, rejecting the ontological proof fundamentally denies the possibility of metaphysical theism. In his critique, Kant also introduces the well-known thesis that “existence is not a real predicate”, which Martin Heidegger regards as striking at the real nerve of the ontological proof. Despite this, in recent decades, scholars such as Charles Hartshorne, Norman Malcolm, John Findlay, and Alvin Plantinga have sought to defend the ontological proof and respond to Kant’s critique, provoking a wide range of scholarly discussion and controversy.

In his three Critiques, particularly the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant offers a moral argument for the existence of God, claiming that while morality on its own behalf in no way needs religion, belief in God is essential for the possibility of the highest good, as it is only through God that virtue and happiness can be combined causally and proportionally. This argument has been extensively criticized from the outset, primarily because incorporating happiness into the highest good, regarded as an object of practical reason, is seen as inconsistent with Kant’s deontological moral principles. Moreover, Kant’s project in Religion has also been heavily criticized for seemingly presenting his moral religion as a secular version of Christianity. This has led some critics to accuse him of contradicting his critical philosophy’s anti-religious stance and suspecting insincerity, possibly due to apprehension about the Prussian authorities, while others interpret it as an exposure of his pietistic ideas. Nevertheless, following the publication of Allen W. Wood’s Kant’s Moral Religion (1970) and Michel Despland’s Kant on History and Religion (1973), there has been a noticeable shift in scholarly focus, with increasing research and re-evaluation of Kant’s project from various perspectives.

In the “Editor’s Introduction” to Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion (2006), Chris L. Firestone and Stephen Palmquist outline two primary interpretations of Kant’s philosophy of religion: the traditional or negative interpretation and the affirmative interpretation. Traditional interpreters either stress Kant’s atheistic or skeptical tendencies in his philosophy of religion or consider it as merely supplementary to his moral philosophy. They generally agree that Kant’s contributions in this area are mainly negative and that his project of moral religion is doomed to failure. Conversely, affirmative interpreters maintain that Kant’s philosophy as a whole can provide significant support for theology and religious faith. Since the 1990s, scholars such as Ronald M. Green, John E. Hare, Elizabeth Galbraith, Charles Kielkopf, Palmquist, and others have explored and developed the affirmative aspects of Kant’s philosophy of religion from diverse perspectives, achieving significant academic results. It is encouraging to observe that this trend persists, with an increasing number of young scholars entering the field.

All of this indicates that Kant’s philosophy of religion remains lively and holds comparable significance to other aspects of his philosophical contributions, justifying further scholarly investigation. Thus, we invite academics in philosophy and religious studies to contribute original research articles on themes, including (but not limited to) the following:

  • Kant’s critique of the ontological proof;
  • Kant’s thesis on existence;
  • Kant on the relationship between knowledge and belief;
  • Kant’s moral argument for God;
  • The role of God in Kant’s philosophy;
  • Kant’s theory of radical evil;
  • The teleological elements in Kant’s doctrine of religion;
  • Kant on the historicity of religion.

Dr. Kezheng Li
Guest Editor

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Keywords

  • Kant
  • rational theology
  • moral religion
  • moral argument
  • radical evil

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Published Papers (3 papers)

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18 pages, 273 KB  
Article
Kant on the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God: Why Conceivability Does Not Entail Real Possibility
by Lucas Thorpe and Zübeyde Karadağ Thorpe
Religions 2025, 16(10), 1309; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16101309 - 15 Oct 2025
Viewed by 603
Abstract
In the ontological argument for the existence of God, Descartes famously argues that the idea of God is the idea of a perfect being. As such, the idea of God must combine all of the perfections. Now, as (necessary) existence is a perfection, [...] Read more.
In the ontological argument for the existence of God, Descartes famously argues that the idea of God is the idea of a perfect being. As such, the idea of God must combine all of the perfections. Now, as (necessary) existence is a perfection, God must exist. Leibniz criticized Descartes’ argument, pointing out that it rests upon the hidden assumption that God is possible. Leibniz argues, however, that God is really possible because realities cannot oppose one another, and so there could be no real opposition between the perfections. So, at least in the case of God, conceivability entails real possibility. Kant rejects this assumption and insists that the non-contradictoriness of an idea is not an adequate criterion for the real possibility of the object of the idea, for although predicates may be combined in thought to form a concept, this does not entail the properties they indicate may be so combined in reality. For this reason, Kant believes that it is impossible to prove the real possibility of God, and so the ontological argument is not sound. In this paper, I examine Kant’s reasons for reaching this conclusion. I pay particular attention to Kant’s argument in the Amphiboly, which deals with the concepts of agreement and opposition, and where Kant stresses the importance of the distinction between logical and real opposition. I will argue that this distinction plays a crucial role in Kant’s rejection of the ontological argument and rationalist Leibnizian–Wolffian metaphysics in general. I also show how Kant’s rejection of the possibility of what he calls the complete determination of a concept in the Ideal of Pure Reason, plays a role in his rejection of the conceivability entails real possibility principle. Full article
20 pages, 287 KB  
Article
Critique and Transformation: On the Evolution of Kant’s Conception of God and Its Internal Roots
by Jun Wen and Jing Lan
Religions 2025, 16(10), 1258; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16101258 - 30 Sep 2025
Viewed by 658
Abstract
Generally speaking, the conception of God serves as the theoretical focal point and central concern of Kant’s philosophy of religion. Its content is multidimensional, covering many aspects, such as proof of God’s existence, the image of God, and God’s status and functions. The [...] Read more.
Generally speaking, the conception of God serves as the theoretical focal point and central concern of Kant’s philosophy of religion. Its content is multidimensional, covering many aspects, such as proof of God’s existence, the image of God, and God’s status and functions. The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of the concept of God in Kant’s philosophy of religion in three different philosophical periods—the pre-critical period, the period of the critical philosophy and the post-critical period—to analyze the evolution of the internal contradictions in Kant’s philosophy of religion and the course of its systematic construction, and, on this basis, to reveal the three pivotal systemic transformations achieved by Kant’s philosophy of religion—the deconstruction of traditional theology, the reconstruction of rational theology and the construction of moral religion. Finally, this paper elucidates four internal roots which drive these pivotal transformations: (1) methodological foundation: the development of critical philosophy; (2) systematic goal: the establishment of scientific metaphysics; (3) axiological orientation: the secularization of theology into anthropological theology; and (4) practical culmination: the extension of pure moral philosophy. Full article
16 pages, 249 KB  
Article
Kant’s Idealized Imputation of the Propensity to Evil in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
by Hui Yuan
Religions 2025, 16(10), 1236; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16101236 - 25 Sep 2025
Viewed by 547
Abstract
In Religion, Kant posits an innate and natural propensity to evil, which he implicitly designates as “radical evil”. However, this notion has been criticized for its apparent incompatibility with freedom and its problematic atemporality, leading scholars to dismiss it as an obscure [...] Read more.
In Religion, Kant posits an innate and natural propensity to evil, which he implicitly designates as “radical evil”. However, this notion has been criticized for its apparent incompatibility with freedom and its problematic atemporality, leading scholars to dismiss it as an obscure metaphysical speculation or an uncritical residue of Christian doctrine rather than a morally necessary element. Drawing on student notes from Kant’s lectures, I firstly contend that the apparent conflict between an innate–natural propensity to evil and human freedom can be resolved through Kant’s imputation theory and empirical psychology. While evil originates from this innate ground in human nature, it can ultimately be overcome through the exercise of free will. Secondly, my argument proceeds to show that radical evil first emerges in Religion, not as a concept of agnostic metaphysical abstraction, but as a necessary postulate for Kant’s idealized conscience-based imputation. This imputation transcends the constraints of temporality, thereby idealizing the propensity to evil into radical evil. Atemporality is merely an analogy representing this imputation’s independence from temporal constraints. Thirdly, although this idealized imputation and radical evil are absent from Kant’s pre- and post-Religion works, my analysis suggests that the idealized imputation is necessary for his project of advancing the individual and collective moral progress through the mediation of religion. Full article
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