Social and Environmental Behavior and Game Theory

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 October 2019) | Viewed by 5076

Special Issue Editors


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Guest Editor
Departamento de Antropología Social, University of Granada, Spain
Interests: experimental economics; behavioral economics; social preferences

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Guest Editor
Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain
Interests: social norms; behavioral economics; social capital; environmental psychology; cross-cultural

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Guest Editor
Burgundy School of Business, University Bourgogne Franche-Comté, France
Interests: organizational behavior; behavioral finance; social preferences; cognition; personnel economics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Integrating other-regarding preferences into game theory resulted in a very successful advancement in behavioral sciences. It increased our understanding of how people interact in social environments and led to the development of models explaining social behavior, such as theories of altruism, inequity aversion, and reciprocity. One open question relates to the generalizability of these models across domains and situations. More data, both in and outside the laboratory, are needed to test and calibrate the newly developed models. Of particular interest is environmental behavior: from recycling to buying green and from supporting green policies to having shorter showers, all environmental behaviors are social in nature given their social externalities. A general theory of social behavior should therefore be able to explain them. In this Special Issue, we invite studies that can offer new insights into these models. Experimental, theoretical, and empirical works alike are welcome. The papers should not necessarily include a theoretical model, but implications on these models should be drawn. Papers focusing on environmental behavior are especially welcome.

Dr. Antonio M. Espin
Dr. Filippos Exadaktylos
Prof. Roberto Hernán-González
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

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Keywords

  • behavior
  • environment
  • experiments
  • externalities
  • game theory
  • incentives
  • social norms
  • social preferences

Published Papers (1 paper)

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21 pages, 2765 KiB  
Article
Binding Contracts, Non-Binding Promises and Social Feedback in the Intertemporal Common-Pool Resource Game
by Wojtek Przepiorka and Andreas Diekmann
Games 2020, 11(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010005 - 13 Jan 2020
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 4703
Abstract
In the intertemporal common-pool resource game, non-cooperative behavior produces externalities reducing subjects’ payoffs in both the present and the future. In this paper, we investigate through two experiments whether binding contracts, non-binding promises and social feedback help to promote sustainable behavior. We find [...] Read more.
In the intertemporal common-pool resource game, non-cooperative behavior produces externalities reducing subjects’ payoffs in both the present and the future. In this paper, we investigate through two experiments whether binding contracts, non-binding promises and social feedback help to promote sustainable behavior. We find that cooperation is higher in groups where a contract can be signed or where subjects made a promise to cooperate throughout the experiment. However, not all groups sign the contract unanimously and subjects who made a promise adjust their cooperation downwards over time. We find no difference between the control condition without any regulation and the treatment condition in which subjects receive feedback on their past behavior in private. However, if received feedback can be learned by all group members, cooperation is significantly higher. Our findings show that non-binding promises and social feedback increase cooperation, but the former only in the short-run and the latter only if made public. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social and Environmental Behavior and Game Theory)
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