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Games
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Games and Psychology
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Games and Psychology

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 April 2012) | Viewed by 17204

Special Issue Editor

Dr. Alan Sanfey

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging, P.O.Box 9101, NL-6500 HB Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Interests: decision neuroscience; perception; action; decision-making

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Recent interdisciplinary work has attempted to explain how people behave in game theoretic scenarios in terms of fundamental psychological and neural mechanisms such as reward processing, attention, emotion, and personality measures, amongst others. This type of work can deliver important insights, from demonstrating that complex interactive behavior can be understood in terms of basic processes to explaining the variability of behavior by individual differences in cognitive and social abilities as well as variation in genes and pharmacology. This Special Issue seeks to better understand the link between psychological processes and behavior in interactive settings. We welcome all contributions which are interested in exploring the psychological processes, defined broadly, underlying interactive decision-making.

Alan Sanfey
Guest Editor

Keywords

  • decision-making
  • choice
  • neuroeconomics
  • game theory
  • experimental economics
  • learning
  • memory
  • attention
  • risk
  • emotion

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Published Papers (2 papers)

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344 KiB  
Article
Responder Feelings in a Three-Player Three-Option Ultimatum Game: Affective Determinants of Rejection Behavior
by Hans-Rüdiger Pfister and Gisela Böhm
Games 2012, 3(1), 1-29; https://doi.org/10.3390/g3010001 - 13 Feb 2012
Cited by 7 | Viewed by 9844
Abstract
This paper addresses the role of affect and emotions in shaping the behavior of responders in the ultimatum game. A huge amount of research shows that players do not behave in an economically rational way in the ultimatum game, and emotional mechanisms have [...] Read more.
This paper addresses the role of affect and emotions in shaping the behavior of responders in the ultimatum game. A huge amount of research shows that players do not behave in an economically rational way in the ultimatum game, and emotional mechanisms have been proposed as a possible explanation. In particular, feelings of fairness, anger and envy are likely candidates as affective determinants. We introduce a three-player ultimatum game with three-options, which permits the responder to either penalize the proposer or to penalize a third party by rejecting offers. This allows for partially distinguishing rejections due to a retaliation motive driven by anger towards the proposer from rejections due to inequity aversion driven by feelings of envy towards a third party. Results from two experiments suggest that responders experience feelings of dissatisfaction and unfairness if their share is small in comparison to the proposer’s share; anger, then, may trigger rejections towards the proposer. Responders also experience dissatisfaction and envy when third party shares exceed their own shares; however, in contrast to anger, envy does not trigger rejections and is dissociated from the decision to accept or reject an offer. We conclude that acting upon anger is socially acceptable, whereas envy is not acceptable as a reason for action. Furthermore, we find that responders generally feel better after rejections, suggesting that rejections serve to regulate one’s affective state. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games and Psychology)
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284 KiB  
Article
The Resolution Game: A Dual Selves Perspective
by Dimitri Migrow and Matthias Uhl
Games 2011, 2(4), 452-462; https://doi.org/10.3390/g2040452 - 9 Dec 2011
Viewed by 6821
Abstract
This article explains the emergence of an unique equilibrium resolution as the result of a compromise between two selves with different preferences. The stronger this difference is, the more generous the resolution gets. This result is in contrast to predictions of other models [...] Read more.
This article explains the emergence of an unique equilibrium resolution as the result of a compromise between two selves with different preferences. The stronger this difference is, the more generous the resolution gets. This result is in contrast to predictions of other models in which sinful consumption is distributed bimodally. Therefore, our result fits better with our daily observations concerning a lot of ambivalent goods where we often form nonrigid resolutions. The normative analysis uses the device of a hypothetical impartial self that regards both conflicting motives as equally legitimate. The result of this analysis is dilemmatic. It demonstrates that the resolution is broken too often to be welfare maximal. However, the introduction of external self-commitment devices results in their overuse and is welfare decreasing. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games and Psychology)
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