Government and Coalition Formation
A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).
Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 October 2020) | Viewed by 3735
Special Issue Editor
Special Issue Information
Dear Colleagues,
In parliamentary democracies, political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. For this reason, most theoretical models of government formation focus on the assumption that agents (the legislative parties) are primarily office-seeking. However, as early suggested by Axelrod (1970), office-motivated politicians are interested not only in maximizing their office benefits but also in minimizing the “transaction costs” of the bargaining process over the government coalition policy. Two major research areas of government formation have emerged from this consideration. On the one hand, what coalition of parliamentary parties is more likely to form and what are the features, as size, ideological congruence, or previous government experience, that determine whether a coalition is more likely to emerge? One the other hand, what features make a government coalition more likely to survive and be stable?
Contributions that address either research area are welcome. Relevant topics include (but are not limited to):
- The qualitative aspect of portfolio allocation. What ministries are prioritized by coalition parties and why?
- The indivisible feature of cabinet portfolio. How do parties bargain over indivisible and heterogeneous cabinet portfolios?
- The effect of uncertainty of future electoral prospects on the government coalition stability.
Dr. Anna Bassi
Guest Editor
Manuscript Submission Information
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Keywords
- government formation
- cabinet portfolio
- bargaining
- government stability
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