Recent Advances in Microeconomics and Game Theory

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 29 May 2026 | Viewed by 1333

Special Issue Editor


E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
1. Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis of Organizations (CIRANO), 1130 Rue Sherbrooke O #1400, Montréal, QC H3A 2M8, Canada
2. Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Phayathai Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok 10330, Thailand
Interests: game theory; computational economics; network economics; complex systems
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Digital platforms, climate negotiations, and algorithmic decision-making are reshaping the strategic landscape that microeconomists and game theorists study. This Special Issue, titled “Recent Advances in Microeconomics and Game Theory”, invites cutting-edge contributions that push the analytical frontier while remaining grounded in real-world relevance. We welcome theoretical, empirical, and computational papers that illuminate how strategic interaction, information frictions, and institutional design shape outcomes in markets, networks, and social dilemmas.

Promising topics include, but are not limited to, algorithmic game theory, network formation, behavioral and experimental economics, dynamic games under uncertainty, mechanism and market design for digital platforms, bargaining and matching in labor and housing markets, evolutionary and ecological games, climate and sustainability games, and applications of artificial intelligence to equilibrium computation. Interdisciplinary submissions that connect game theory to data science, complex systems analysis, or policy evaluation are especially encouraged.

Submissions will undergo rigorous peer review and, once accepted, will be published promptly with open access. By gathering diverse perspectives, we aim to chart a coherent research agenda that addresses both foundational questions and pressing societal challenges.

We look forward to your innovative contributions and a stimulating exchange of ideas within the Games community in this landmark forthcoming Special Issue.

Yours sincerely,

Prof. Dr. Arnaud Z. Dragicevic
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 250 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for assessment.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a double-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • algorithmic game theory
  • network formation
  • behavioral economics
  • experimental economics
  • mechanism design
  • dynamic games
  • market design
  • evolutionary games
  • artificial intelligence
  • climate games

Benefits of Publishing in a Special Issue

  • Ease of navigation: Grouping papers by topic helps scholars navigate broad scope journals more efficiently.
  • Greater discoverability: Special Issues support the reach and impact of scientific research. Articles in Special Issues are more discoverable and cited more frequently.
  • Expansion of research network: Special Issues facilitate connections among authors, fostering scientific collaborations.
  • External promotion: Articles in Special Issues are often promoted through the journal's social media, increasing their visibility.
  • Reprint: MDPI Books provides the opportunity to republish successful Special Issues in book format, both online and in print.

Further information on MDPI's Special Issue policies can be found here.

Published Papers (1 paper)

Order results
Result details
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:

Research

16 pages, 319 KB  
Article
A Structural Measure of Bargaining Fragility in Multi-Domain Agreements
by Robert Castro
Games 2026, 17(1), 11; https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010011 - 11 Feb 2026
Viewed by 605
Abstract
Negotiation outcomes are commonly analyzed through equilibrium concepts, yet many agreements fail during implementation for reasons not captured by incentive structure alone This paper introduces a pre-equilibrium screening criterion for bargaining fragility based on a small set of agreement-level quantities characterizing dependency architecture: [...] Read more.
Negotiation outcomes are commonly analyzed through equilibrium concepts, yet many agreements fail during implementation for reasons not captured by incentive structure alone This paper introduces a pre-equilibrium screening criterion for bargaining fragility based on a small set of agreement-level quantities characterizing dependency architecture: strain τ (the number of operative obligations requiring tracking), curvature κ (the density and strength of interdependencies among elements), compressibility σ (the extent to which complexity can be reduced through modularization without altering functional meaning), and the stability quotient Γ = κ/τ (average interdependence burden per element). We use the inequality Γ > σ as a classification rule; agreements with Γ > σ are classified as structurally fragile and, in the data, exhibit higher sensitivity to perturbations. Across 42 documented agreements, the diagnostic correctly classifies nearly all observed outcomes, with only a single false positive and no false negatives. The framework operates as a pre-equilibrium screen that complements (rather than replaces) Nash and bargaining equilibrium analyses by identifying agreement architectures that are structurally brittle under small shocks. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Recent Advances in Microeconomics and Game Theory)
Back to TopTop