1. Introduction
Money is simultaneously a technological artefact and an institutional arrangement. Commodity money depended on the material scarcity of physical objects, fiat money depends on state authority, legal tender legislation, and public confidence, commercial bank deposits depend on regulated financial intermediation, and contemporary digital money increasingly depends on software architectures, data governance, cryptographic protocols, and platform infrastructures. The ongoing transformation of money, therefore, cannot be reduced to mere digitization. It represents a deeper reconfiguration of the institutions and technologies through which value is issued, transferred, stored, and governed across economies [
1].
The global debate on digital money was catalyzed by the publication of the Bitcoin white paper in 2008 and the subsequent launch of the Bitcoin network in 2009 [
2]. Bitcoin introduced a novel monetary architecture, which is a decentralized, peer-to-peer electronic cash system operating without central intermediaries, relying instead on cryptographic proof and distributed consensus. This innovation challenged foundational assumptions in monetary economics, particularly the necessity of centralized issuance, the role of trusted intermediaries, and the relationship between money and state sovereignty [
3,
4].
The subsequent decade witnessed an explosion of cryptocurrency experimentation, including alternative consensus mechanisms (proof-of-stake (PoS) and delegated proof-of-stake (PoS)), smart contract platforms (Ethereum, Solana, and Cardano), privacy-focused protocols (Monero and Zcash), and decentralized finance (DeFi) applications that replicate traditional financial services, including lending, borrowing, trading, and derivatives on blockchain infrastructure without traditional intermediaries [
5,
6]. As of May 2026, cryptocurrency market capitalization stood at approximately USD 2.56 trillion per CoinMarketCap [
7], with thousands of digital assets in circulation and millions of users globally [
8]. But the extreme price volatility of cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, whose price fluctuated between USD 3000 and USD 69,000 between 2018 and 2021, has limited their utility as media of exchange or stable stores of value [
9]. This volatility problem catalyzed the emergence of stablecoins: digital tokens designed to maintain stable value by pegging to fiat currencies (typically the US dollar), commodities, or algorithmic mechanisms [
10]. Stablecoins, such as Tether (USDT), USD Coin (USDC), and Binance USD (BUSD), rapidly gained adoption in cryptocurrency trading, cross-border remittances, and DeFi protocols, with aggregate market capitalization exceeding USD 150 billion by 2024 [
11], more than doubling to more than USD 300 billion as of May 2026, per DefiLlama [
12]. However, BUSD circulation subsequently declined after Paxos ceased issuing new BUSD in February 2023.
The rise of cryptocurrencies and stablecoins, particularly Facebook’s 2019 announcement of the Libra project (later rebranded as Diem before abandonment in 2022), prompted central banks worldwide to accelerate research and development of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) [
13]. CBDCs represent sovereign digital money: direct liabilities of central banks, issued in digital form, potentially accessible to the general public (retail CBDC) or restricted to financial institutions (wholesale CBDC) [
14]. By May 2026, 146 countries/currency unions representing 98% of global GDP were exploring CBDCs [
15], with more than 20 countries having launched pilot programs or full implementations, including the Bahamas (Sand Dollar, 2020), Nigeria (eNaira, 2021), Jamaica (JAM-DEX, 2022), and China (e-CNY, ongoing pilot since 2020) [
15].
More recently, tokenized deposits have emerged as a fourth pillar of the digital money ecosystem. Tokenized deposits represent commercial bank deposits issued on distributed ledger technology (DLT), combining the regulatory protections and deposit insurance of traditional banking with the programmability and composability of blockchain-based assets [
16]. Major financial institutions, including JPMorgan, Citibank, HSBC, and Standard Chartered, have launched tokenized deposit pilots, and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has explored tokenized deposits through Project Agorá (2024), examining unified ledgers that integrate wholesale CBDC, tokenized deposits, and tokenized securities [
17].
Despite exponential growth in academic research, policy analysis, and industry experimentation, the digital money literature remains fragmented across disciplinary boundaries. Economists focus on monetary policy transmission, financial stability, and macroeconomic implications [
18,
19]. Computer scientists emphasize cryptographic protocols, consensus mechanisms, scalability, and security. Legal scholars examine regulatory classification, jurisdictional challenges, and compliance frameworks [
20,
21]. Information systems researchers investigate adoption drivers, user behavior, and platform governance. Public policy analysts address financial inclusion, cross-border payments, and geopolitical implications [
22,
23]. This disciplinary fragmentation limits holistic understanding of the digital money ecosystem and its systemic implications.
This article addresses this gap through a scoping–integrative review that synthesizes multidisciplinary scholarship on cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and tokenized deposits. The review is guided by three research objectives. (1) Synthesis: to provide a structured synthesis of the evolution of digital money across all four categories, mapping their conceptual foundations, design architectures, economic implications, governance models, and regulatory challenges. (2) Comparison: to develop a comparative framework examining trust mechanisms, governance architectures, liability structures, and regulatory exposures across cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and tokenized deposits. (3) Taxonomy: to advance the digital money ecosystem taxonomy (DMET), a structured classification framework that categorizes digital money instruments across fourteen institutional, governance, technological, monetary, and regulatory dimensions, including issuer type, liability structure, governance arrangements, trust mechanisms, monetary control, settlement roles, regulatory exposure, primary use cases, degree of decentralization, privacy level, programmability, scalability, energy efficiency, and interoperability.
The paper makes three principal contributions. First, building on established classification frameworks, including the BIS money flower [
24] and its extensions, it provides a multidisciplinary synthesis that is, to the author’s knowledge, the first to jointly integrate cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and tokenized deposits within a unified analytical framework. Second, it advances a comparative analysis that reveals the trade-offs, complementarities, and tensions among different digital money architectures. Third, it introduces DMET, a multidimensional classification framework that evaluates cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and tokenized deposits across fourteen institutional, governance, technological, monetary, and regulatory dimensions. The taxonomy provides a structured tool for researchers, policymakers, and practitioners to systematically compare and evaluate emerging forms of digital money. The overall conceptual structure of the digital money ecosystem examined in this review is illustrated in
Figure 1.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the conceptual foundations and methodological approach adopted in this review.
Section 3 examines the evolution of digital money across four major pillars: cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and tokenized deposits.
Section 4 provides a comparative analysis of trust mechanisms, governance structures, and regulatory dimensions across these forms of digital money.
Section 5 introduces DMET as a multidimensional classification framework.
Section 6 discusses governance, regulatory, and economic implications associated with emerging digital money systems.
Section 7 examines the global digital money landscape, practical implications, future research directions, and key limitations.
Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Conceptual Foundations and Methodology
2.1. From Money to Digital Money
Money is conventionally defined by three core functions: medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value [
25]. As a medium of exchange, money facilitates transactions by eliminating the double coincidence of wants problem inherent in barter systems. As a unit of account, money provides a common measure for pricing goods, services, and financial assets, enabling economic calculation and comparison. As a store of value, money allows economic agents to transfer purchasing power across time, though this function requires relative price stability [
25].
Historically, money has taken multiple forms: commodity money (gold, silver, and shells), representative money (banknotes backed by precious metals), fiat money (government-issued currency without intrinsic value), and commercial bank money (deposit liabilities of regulated financial institutions) [
26]. Each form embodies different trust mechanisms. Commodity money derives value from intrinsic material properties, representative money from convertibility guarantees, fiat money from state authority, legal tender laws, and public confidence, and commercial bank money from regulatory oversight, deposit insurance, and central bank liquidity support [
27].
Contemporary monetary systems are characterized by a two-tier structure: central banks issue base money (currency and reserves), while commercial banks create broad money through credit intermediation, issuing deposit liabilities backed by loan assets [
28]. This fractional reserve banking system enables credit expansion but introduces maturity transformation risks, liquidity risks, and systemic fragility, necessitating prudential regulation, deposit insurance, and lender-of-last-resort facilities [
29].
2.2. Digitization and Tokenization
The distinction between digitization and tokenization is critical for understanding contemporary digital money. Digitization refers to the representation of information in electronic form. Traditional bank deposits are digitized money, recorded in centralized databases maintained by financial institutions [
30]. Tokenization, by contrast, refers to the representation of assets or liabilities as programmable digital tokens on distributed ledgers, enabling peer-to-peer transfer, smart contract integration, and composability with other tokenized assets [
31].
Tokenization introduces several novel properties. First, programmability allows tokens to embed conditional logic, enabling automated compliance, programmable payments, and integration with smart contracts [
32]. Second, composability enables tokens to interact with other tokens and decentralized applications, enabling complex financial operations without intermediaries. Third, atomic settlement allows delivery-versus-payment and payment-versus-payment to occur simultaneously on-chain, eliminating settlement risk. Fourth, transparency and auditability allow transactions on public blockchains to be transparent and immutable, enabling real-time auditing and regulatory oversight (though privacy-preserving techniques can limit transparency) [
33].
These properties distinguish tokenized digital money from traditional digitized money and underpin many of the claimed advantages of blockchain-based monetary systems.
2.3. Trust Mechanisms in Monetary Systems
Trust is the foundational element of any monetary system. Economic agents must trust that money will be accepted by others, will retain value over time, and will be protected from counterfeiting, theft, and arbitrary confiscation. Different monetary architectures embody different trust mechanisms. First, algorithmic trust describes cryptocurrencies that rely on cryptographic protocols and distributed consensus mechanisms (proof-of-work (PoW) and PoS to ensure transaction validity, prevent double-spending, and maintain ledger integrity without trusted intermediaries [
2,
34]. Second, reserve-backed trust explains that stablecoins rely on reserve assets (fiat currency, government bonds, and commodities) held by issuers, with trust depending on reserve adequacy, transparency, auditability, and legal enforceability of redemption rights [
35]. Third, sovereign trust describes how CBDCs rely on central bank credibility, legal tender status, and state authority, backed by the full faith and credit of the issuing government [
36]. Fourth, intermediated trust can explain how tokenized deposits rely on regulated commercial banks, prudential supervision, deposit insurance, and central bank liquidity support, combining traditional banking trust mechanisms with blockchain infrastructure [
17].
The evolution of digital money (
Figure 2) can be understood as a contest among these competing trust mechanisms, each offering different trade-offs in terms of decentralization, stability, scalability, privacy, and regulatory compliance.
2.4. Scoping–Integrative Review Approach
This article employs a scoping–integrative review methodology, combining elements of scoping reviews and integrative reviews to synthesize multidisciplinary literature on digital money [
37,
38]. Scoping reviews are designed to map the breadth of literature across a research area, identify key concepts, and clarify working definitions, making them particularly suitable for emerging, multidisciplinary fields [
39]. Integrative reviews synthesize diverse methodologies (quantitative, qualitative, and theoretical) and generate new frameworks or theoretical models [
40].
The scoping–integrative approach is justified by three characteristics of the digital money literature. First, the literature is multidisciplinary and spans economics, finance, computer science, law, public policy, and information systems, requiring synthesis across disciplinary boundaries. Second, the field is evolving rapidly due to technological innovation, regulatory developments, and market dynamics, necessitating an approach that may accommodate emerging concepts and evolving definitions. Third, the literature is conceptually fragmented, where terminology, definitions, and classification schemes vary across disciplines and jurisdictions, requiring conceptual clarification and taxonomic development. The reviewed literature can be broadly classified into four major research streams, as summarized in
Table 1. The review protocol was retrospectively registered with the Open Science Framework (OSF Registries) and is publicly available at:
https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/QYCA9 (accessed on 7 September 2026). As registration occurred after completion of the principal search, screening, and synthesis stages, it represents retrospective protocol registration rather than prospective preregistration.
2.5. Research Questions
The primary research question guiding this review is “How has digital money evolved from cryptocurrencies to stablecoins, CBDCs, and tokenized deposits, and what does this evolution reveal about changing sources of trust, governance arrangements, monetary control, and policy risk?”
Five sub-questions structure the inquiry: (1) What design features distinguish cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and tokenized deposits? (2) How do their governance architectures and liability structures differ? (3) What economic implications are associated with each form across monetary policy, financial stability, and financial inclusion? (4) How are regulators and central banks responding to the rise of private and decentralized digital money? (5) What taxonomy can organize future research and policy analysis on digital money ecosystems?
These questions reflect the need for cross-category synthesis rather than instrument-specific analysis. They are deliberately broad to accommodate the multidisciplinary literature and to enable the development of a comparative framework applicable across jurisdictions and instrument types.
2.6. Search Strategy and Inclusion Criteria
A systematic literature search was conducted across two databases, Scopus and Web of Science, using logically equivalent Boolean queries adapted to each platform’s syntax, as provided in
Appendix A. Both queries were bounded through 2025 at the time of the search. The Scopus search returned 11,229 records and the Web of Science search returned 7745 records (18,974 combined) (see
Supplementary Material section). After deduplication by DOI and normalized title matching, 12,949 unique records remained. Of these, 540 records focused on non-monetary blockchain applications outside the scope of the DMET framework, including IoT, healthcare, supply chain, construction, and energy applications, and were removed before title-and-abstract screening, leaving 12,409 records to be screened. Given the disproportionately rapid pace of development in this field, since the majority of substantive academic literature on stablecoins, CBDCs, and DeFi has been published since 2021, a two-tier temporal strategy was applied, consistent with recommended practice for reviewing rapidly evolving research areas. First, full systematic screening (2021–2025): every record published between 2021 and 2025 was individually screened at the title-and-abstract level against the inclusion and exclusion criteria below. Second, targeted foundational search (2008–2020): Records published before 2021 were not exhaustively screened; instead, this period was searched for landmark and foundational works, meaning publications establishing core theoretical or technical concepts still in active use (e.g., the original Bitcoin and Ethereum protocol descriptions, seminal CBDC design papers, and early treatments of private versus public digital money), identified through targeted keyword and author-based search. Records now bearing a 2026 publication date were treated as falling within the 2021–2025 full-screening tier, since they were retrieved and screened as part of that same window at the time of search.
This database-driven process was applied in addition to a separate, parallel targeted search of gray literature and institutional sources, including publications from BIS, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), FSB, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Financial Action Task Force. This additional search was necessary because these repositories are not comprehensively indexed by Scopus or Web of Science and do not support equivalent standardized search syntax. This purposive search identified 48 institutional publications, of which 37 met inclusion criteria.
Inclusion criteria specified the temporal scope described above, together with three further conditions. Eligible publication types included peer-reviewed journal articles, working papers from central banks and international financial institutions, such as the BIS, the IMF, and the World Bank, policy reports, and selected conference proceedings. Publications were limited to those written in English. Relevance was defined as addressing conceptual foundations, design architectures, economic implications, governance models, regulatory frameworks, or empirical evidence related to cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, or tokenized deposits.
Exclusion criteria comprised purely technical cryptographic papers without monetary or economic analysis, opinion pieces without empirical or theoretical grounding, and publications focused exclusively on non-monetary blockchain applications, such as supply chain, healthcare, or general IoT applications.
The complete search, screening, and selection process, including the number of sources of evidence identified, screened, assessed for eligibility, and included, together with reasons for exclusion at each stage, is reported in the PRISMA-ScR flow diagram [
41] (
Figure 3).
2.7. Quality Assessment
Quality assessment in a scoping–integrative review differs from appraisal in systematic reviews of clinical interventions, where standardized risk-of-bias tools are applied. In this review, quality screening operates across three source categories.
Peer-reviewed academic articles are assessed on four criteria: (1) relevance to the research questions, (2) methodological rigor, including transparency of data, analytical approach, and replicability, (3) citation contribution, reflecting the influence of the work within the field, and (4) conceptual value, particularly where empirical data are limited and theoretical contributions are primary.
Policy and institutional reports (BIS, IMF, FSB, ECB, Federal Reserve, World Bank, and national central banks) are assessed for (1) the credibility and mandate of the issuing institution, (2) recency and alignment with the 2008–2025 search window, (3) jurisdictional scope (global, regional, or national), and (4) analytical depth, distinguishing substantive policy analysis from purely descriptive or promotional content.
Industry and market sources are used sparingly and only where they provide descriptive or quantitative data not available through academic or institutional channels (e.g., stablecoin market capitalization data and CBDC tracker statistics). Such sources are clearly identified and not used as primary evidence for conceptual or causal claims.
This tiered quality-screening approach addresses a common critique of scoping reviews that they aggregate documents without evaluating their epistemic reliability while preserving the breadth necessary to map a rapidly evolving, multidisciplinary field. Sources that did not meet minimum quality thresholds (e.g., undifferentiated popular media, anonymous commentary, and documents without institutional provenance) were excluded at the screening stage.
2.8. Data Extraction and Synthesis
Data extraction mainly focused on five key questions. First, how are cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and tokenized deposits defined and classified in the existing literature? Second, what technical, governance, and operational design architectures characterize these forms of digital money? Third, what are their implications for monetary policy, financial stability, payment systems, and financial inclusion? Fourth, what regulatory frameworks and policy approaches have been proposed or implemented to govern their development and use? Finally, what empirical evidence exists regarding adoption, usage patterns, performance outcomes, and broader economic and societal impacts? These questions provided the analytical framework for organizing, comparing, and synthesizing the findings of the reviewed studies.
Synthesis followed a thematic analysis approach, identifying recurring themes, tensions, and gaps across the literature. The DMET Framework is developed iteratively through comparative analysis of classification schemes proposed in the literature and refinement based on conceptual coherence and practical applicability.
2.9. Limitations of the Methodology
The scoping–integrative review methodology has inherent limitations. First, the rapid evolution of the field means that some recent developments may not yet be reflected in peer-reviewed literature. Second, the multidisciplinary nature of the field introduces terminological inconsistencies and conceptual ambiguities that complicate synthesis. Third, the review prioritizes breadth over depth, providing comprehensive coverage at the cost of detailed analysis of specific sub-topics. Fourth, the inclusion of gray literature (central bank reports and policy papers) introduces potential publication bias, as these sources may reflect institutional perspectives rather than independent analysis. These limitations are addressed through triangulation across multiple sources, explicit acknowledgment of conceptual ambiguities, and transparent reporting of inclusion criteria and synthesis methods.
5. The Digital Money Ecosystem Taxonomy (DMET)
While
Table 5,
Table 6 and
Table 7 compare digital money across trust, governance, and regulatory dimensions, a broader classification framework is needed to systematically organize the growing diversity of digital money instruments. To address this need, DMET is proposed as an integrative framework that captures the key structural dimensions underlying cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and tokenized deposits. Before detailing the DMET’s structure, it is useful to situate it against the classification frameworks it builds on.
Classification frameworks for digital money have a substantial prior literature. The most widely cited is the BIS “money flower” [
24], which sorts instruments by issuer (central bank vs. other), form (digital vs. physical), accessibility (widely available vs. restricted), and transfer mechanism (centralized vs. peer-to-peer). Later frameworks build on it. The IMF “money tree” [
77] adds claim-based attributes, and R3′s 2021 CBDC taxonomy [
105] extends both to cover CBDC design choices.
These frameworks share two gaps that DMET addresses. First, tokenized deposits emerged as a distinct category only after 2019 to 2023 pilots by JPMorgan, Citibank, HSBC, and others, and no prior taxonomy, including the money flower and R3′s extension, treats them as a structurally distinct fourth category alongside cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and CBDCs. Second, none of these frameworks combine operational and technological dimensions, such as programmability, scalability, energy efficiency, and interoperability, with the institutional, governance, and trust dimensions they already cover. DMET is not the first multidimensional taxonomy of digital money. To the author’s knowledge, it is the first to jointly classify all four instrument types across both institutional and technological dimensions within a single framework. With this positioning established, the following paragraph sets out DMET’s structure in full.
DMET provides a multidimensional framework for classifying digital money instruments across fourteen institutional, governance, technological, monetary, and regulatory dimensions (
Table 8).
These dimensions include issuer type, liability structure, governance arrangements, trust mechanisms, monetary control, settlement roles, regulatory exposure, primary use cases, degree of decentralization, privacy level, programmability, scalability, energy efficiency, and interoperability. Together, these dimensions capture both the structural foundations and functional characteristics of cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and tokenized deposits, enabling systematic comparison across diverse forms of digital money. The taxonomy provides a practical tool for researchers, policymakers, and practitioners to analyze, compare, and evaluate digital money instruments while supporting evidence-based policy development and strategic decision-making [
4].
The evolution of digital money can also be understood through a comparative institutional framework that reflects changing trust mechanisms, governance structures, monetary control, and regulatory exposure across different forms of digital money, as illustrated in
Figure 5.
Unlike the money flower [
24] and its direct extensions, the IMF money tree [
77] and R3′s CBDC taxonomy [
105], all of which classify instruments along institutional and legal attributes but omit operational-technological dimensions, the DMET adopts a multidimensional perspective that captures the institutional, technological, and governance characteristics of digital money simultaneously. The framework recognizes that digital money instruments cannot be adequately understood through binary distinctions, such as public versus private money or centralized versus decentralized systems. Instead, they exist along multiple continuums reflecting varying degrees of trust, governance, monetary control, programmability, and regulatory oversight. By integrating these dimensions within a single framework, the DMET facilitates systematic comparison across heterogeneous digital money instruments and provides a foundation for future empirical, policy, and theoretical research.
The DMET taxonomy reveals several key insights:
No single instrument dominates across all fourteen DMET dimensions. Each digital money instrument offers distinct advantages and disadvantages across different use cases.
Trade-offs are fundamental, and decentralization, privacy, scalability, regulatory compliance, and stability involve inherent trade-offs. Instruments that excel in one dimension often underperform in others.
Complementarity: The four pillars are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Cryptocurrencies provide censorship-resistant infrastructure, stablecoins provide price stability, CBDCs provide risk-free public money, and tokenized deposits provide regulated programmable money. A layered ecosystem incorporating all four may be optimal.
Evolution and convergence: The boundaries among categories are blurring. Some stablecoins are seeking banking licenses, some banks are issuing tokenized deposits, and some CBDCs are exploring DLT architectures. Convergence and hybridization are likely.
7. Practical Implications, Discussion, and Future Research
7.1. Implications for Policymakers
The evolution of digital money presents policymakers with complex challenges involving monetary sovereignty, financial stability, innovation, and consumer protection. Key policy decisions include the potential issuance and design of CBDCs, the regulatory treatment of stablecoins and cryptocurrencies, and the development of frameworks that balance innovation with risk mitigation [
36,
75,
76]. Given the inherently cross-border nature of digital money, strengthening international regulatory coordination remains essential to address regulatory arbitrage, systemic risks, and interoperability challenges. Policymakers must also consider how digital money can support broader public policy objectives, including financial inclusion, payment system modernization, and economic resilience, while balancing privacy rights with AML/CTF compliance and law enforcement requirements [
22].
7.2. Implications for Financial Institutions
Financial institutions must adapt their strategies, technologies, and business models to remain competitive in an increasingly digital monetary environment. Banks and other financial intermediaries face strategic decisions regarding participation in CBDC ecosystems, issuance of tokenized deposits, and the provision of cryptocurrency-related services [
100]. At the same time, digital money requires substantial investment in technological infrastructure, including distributed ledger technologies, smart contract capabilities, and interoperability solutions [
125]. These developments introduce new operational, cybersecurity, regulatory, and reputational risks that require enhanced risk management frameworks [
76]. More broadly, digital money is likely to reshape traditional banking activities, creating both competitive pressures and new opportunities in payments, custody, settlement, and digital asset services while increasing the importance of regulatory compliance across multiple jurisdictions [
21].
7.3. Implications for Technology Providers
Technology providers play a central role in enabling the digital money ecosystem through the development of secure, scalable, and interoperable infrastructure. This includes blockchain platforms, payment networks, custody solutions, and technical standards that facilitate interoperability across diverse digital money systems [
4,
100]. As privacy, security, and regulatory compliance become increasingly important, technology firms are also expected to advance privacy-enhancing technologies, including zero-knowledge proofs, secure multi-party computation, and confidential transaction frameworks [
22]. In addition, the emergence of quantum computing highlights the need for quantum-resistant cryptographic solutions capable of protecting future digital money infrastructures [
126]. Beyond technical performance, widespread adoption will depend on improving user experience through intuitive interfaces, seamless integration with existing financial systems, and accessible digital wallet solutions [
82].
7.4. Implications for Users
Digital money expands the range of financial services available to households and businesses by enabling faster, potentially lower-cost payments, broader access to financial services, and new investment opportunities [
23,
60]. These benefits may be particularly significant for underserved and underbanked populations. However, users must also navigate important challenges, including trade-offs between privacy and regulatory compliance, exposure to financial surveillance, and increased responsibility for safeguarding digital assets and personal credentials [
22,
54]. As digital money becomes more widely adopted, financial literacy, digital skills, and user awareness will play an increasingly important role in ensuring safe and effective participation in digital financial ecosystems.
7.5. Future Research Directions
The rapid evolution of digital money continues to generate important technical, economic, regulatory, and societal questions that remain insufficiently understood. Future research should move beyond conceptual discussions and focus increasingly on empirical evaluation, comparative analysis, and interdisciplinary inquiry to support evidence-based policy and institutional decision-making.
7.5.1. Technical Research
Future technical research should focus on enhancing the scalability, interoperability, security, and privacy of digital money systems. Key priorities include the development of scalable blockchain architectures and Layer-2 solutions capable of supporting mainstream transaction volumes, interoperable infrastructures that facilitate seamless interaction across digital money platforms, and privacy-enhancing technologies that balance confidentiality with regulatory compliance [
81]. In addition, the emergence of quantum computing highlights the need for quantum-resistant cryptographic standards and more robust approaches to smart contract security, verification, and auditing [
126].
7.5.2. Economic Research
Future economic research should move from general conceptual analysis toward testable causal and comparative designs. Priority questions include whether CBDC launches alter bank deposits and credit creation, whether stablecoin de-pegging generates contagion in traditional markets, and whether private digital money adoption weakens monetary policy transmission [
18,
85]. These questions could be examined through event studies, cross-country panels, difference-in-differences designs, and household- or firm-level adoption data. Research should also estimate effects on payment costs, financial inclusion, currency substitution, and cross-border transactions while distinguishing announced projects, limited pilots, and operational systems [
82,
102]. Such distinctions are necessary to avoid treating heterogeneous stages of CBDC development as equivalent empirical interventions.
7.5.3. Regulatory and Legal Research
The continued expansion of digital money requires further research on regulatory design, governance, and legal frameworks. Important priorities include the classification and regulation of crypto-assets, prudential requirements for stablecoin issuers, governance arrangements for DeFi, and mechanisms for improving international regulatory coordination [
75,
76]. Future studies should also examine legal questions related to privacy, surveillance, property rights, insolvency treatment, conflict of laws, and emerging governance models involving public–private partnerships, multi-stakeholder structures, and decentralized autonomous organizations [
22,
47].
7.5.4. Interdisciplinary Research
Digital money should increasingly be studied as a socio-technical phenomenon shaped by interactions among technology, institutions, markets, and users. Future interdisciplinary research should translate these questions into testable empirical designs. Behavioral surveys and experiments, combined with transaction and adoption data, could examine the drivers of trust and adoption [
4,
102]. Comparative institutional analysis could investigate how financial inclusion, capital control, and monetary sovereignty priorities shape digital money governance across jurisdictions. Additional work is needed to evaluate the ethical and societal implications of digital money, including issues of privacy, surveillance, financial inclusion, algorithmic governance, and environmental sustainability [
22,
127]. These approaches connect economics, behavioral science, political science, law, computer science, and sustainability research within an empirically actionable agenda.
7.6. Discussion
The evolution of digital money represents a fundamental transformation in the institutions and technologies through which value is issued, transferred, stored, and governed. This transformation is not a linear technological progression but rather a contest among competing sources of trust, algorithmic consensus, private reserve backing, and sovereign monetary authority, each embodying different trade-offs in terms of decentralization, stability, scalability, privacy, and regulatory compliance. Several key themes emerge from this review. (1) Pluralism and complementarity: The digital money ecosystem is characterized by pluralism rather than winner-take-all dynamics. Cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and tokenized deposits each offer distinct advantages and disadvantages, serving different use cases and user segments. Cryptocurrencies provide censorship-resistant infrastructure and DeFi applications, stablecoins provide price stability and programmability, CBDCs provide risk-free public money and monetary policy integration, and tokenized deposits provide regulated programmable money with deposit insurance. The DMET framework further demonstrates that these instruments differ across institutional, technological, monetary, and regulatory dimensions, reinforcing the complementarity argument developed throughout
Section 4,
Section 5 and
Section 6 [
100]. (2) Trade-offs and tensions: Digital money involves fundamental trade-offs among policy objectives. Decentralization enhances censorship resistance but complicates governance and regulatory compliance. Privacy protects individual autonomy but raises AML/CTF concerns. Scalability enables mainstream adoption but may require centralization or complexity. Stability requires reserve backing or central bank issuance but limits decentralization. Consistent with the DMET framework, no single digital money instrument dominates across all institutional, technological, monetary, and regulatory dimensions, requiring policymakers and market participants to make explicit choices regarding the trade-offs they prioritize [
36]. (3) Institutional and technological co-evolution: Digital money is not purely a technological phenomenon but rather a co-evolution of technology and institutions. Technological innovations (blockchain, smart contracts, and cryptographic protocols) enable new monetary architectures, but their adoption and impact depend on institutional factors (regulation, governance, trust, and social norms). Conversely, institutional innovations (new regulatory frameworks, multi-stakeholder governance, and international coordination) shape the trajectory of technological development. Understanding digital money requires integrating technological and institutional analysis [
4]. (4) Regulatory divergence in emerging economies: Nigeria and China illustrate how similar commitments to sovereign digital currency can produce different regulatory configurations. Nigeria has linked the eNaira to financial inclusion and payment efficiency while moving from restrictive banking measures toward cautious accommodation of private crypto-assets [
90]. China has combined extensive e-CNY experimentation with continuing restrictions on cryptocurrency trading and mining, reflecting stronger priorities concerning state oversight, capital controls, and monetary sovereignty [
114]. Under DMET, both CBDCs share sovereign trust and centralized issuance, but their governance arrangement and regulatory exposure differ because digital money policy is conditioned by domestic institutional capacity, inclusion objectives, and attitudes toward private monetary innovation. This comparison explains why regulatory convergence on common risks can coexist with substantial national divergence [
104].
7.7. Unresolved Questions
Several critical questions remain unresolved.
Will CBDCs be widely adopted? The success of CBDCs depends on design choices, user experience, merchant acceptance, and competition from private digital money. Early evidence from pilot projects is mixed [
82]. Will stablecoins be regulated as banks? Regulatory approaches to stablecoins are evolving, with increasing convergence toward banking-like regulation, but significant variation remains across jurisdictions [
76]. Will DeFi be integrated with traditional finance or remain a parallel system? DeFi’s future depends on regulatory developments, scalability improvements, and the resolution of security and governance challenges [
47]. Will digital money enhance or undermine financial inclusion? Digital money offers potential benefits for financial inclusion but also risks exacerbating digital divides and excluding populations without digital literacy or infrastructure. Will digital money reshape the international monetary system? The geopolitical implications of digital money, including currency competition, dollar dominance, and monetary sovereignty, remain uncertain and contested [
102].
Although these questions remain unresolved, the literature identifies several proportionate policy responses. These include phased and user-centered CBDC pilots, holding limits and tiered remuneration to reduce deposit migration, reserve transparency, and enforceable redemption requirements for stablecoins, and risk-based oversight of DeFi governance and user-facing interfaces. Offline access and digital literacy measures can support financial inclusion, while interoperability standards and coordinated supervision can mitigate cross-border risks.
7.8. Limitations
Several limitations should be acknowledged when interpreting the findings of this review. First, the digital money ecosystem is evolving rapidly, and recent technological, regulatory, and market developments may not yet be fully reflected in the peer-reviewed literature. Although this review incorporates authoritative gray literature, including central bank and international institutional reports, some emerging industry developments may remain underrepresented.
Second, while the review adopts a multidisciplinary perspective, it necessarily emphasizes economics, finance, and public policy. Consequently, more detailed technical discussions of cryptographic protocols, consensus mechanisms, and smart contract architectures fall outside the scope of the analysis. Similarly, the review focuses primarily on developments in major economies and international institutions, providing less detailed coverage of smaller economies and regional experiences.
Third, empirical evidence remains limited for several areas of the digital money ecosystem, particularly CBDCs and tokenized deposits, which remain in relatively early stages of development and deployment. As a result, many proposed benefits, risks, and policy implications continue to rely on theoretical arguments, simulations, or pilot-project evidence rather than extensive real-world observations.
Finally, the review aims to provide a balanced and analytical synthesis; however, the selection and interpretation of evidence inevitably reflect certain assumptions and perspectives. In addition, the DMET framework represents a heuristic classification tool designed to simplify a complex and rapidly evolving ecosystem. As boundaries among cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and tokenized deposits continue to blur, future refinements may be required to accommodate emerging hybrid forms of digital money.
Despite these limitations, the review provides a multidisciplinary synthesis of the evolving digital money ecosystem that extends existing classification frameworks (such as the money flower taxonomy) and offers a structured framework for future research, policy analysis, and institutional decision-making.
8. Conclusions
Digital money has evolved from a peripheral technological experiment to a central concern of monetary economics, financial regulation, and public policy. The contemporary digital money ecosystem rests on four pillars, which are cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and tokenized deposits, each embodying different trust mechanisms, governance architectures, and regulatory exposures.
This scoping–integrative review has synthesized multidisciplinary scholarship on digital money, mapping conceptual foundations, design architectures, economic implications, governance models, and regulatory challenges. The review advances three principal contributions: (1) Synthesis: a structured synthesis of the evolution of digital money across all four pillars, integrating insights from economics, finance, computer science, law, and public policy. (2) Comparison: a comparative framework examining trust mechanisms, governance architectures, and regulatory exposures, revealing fundamental trade-offs among decentralization, stability, scalability, privacy, and regulatory compliance. (3) Taxonomy: DMET, a structured classification framework that categorizes digital money instruments according to issuer type, liability structure, governance arrangement, trust mechanism, monetary control, settlement role, regulatory exposure, primary use cases, degree of decentralization, privacy level, programmability, scalability, energy efficiency, and interoperability.
The evolution of digital money is not a linear technological progression but rather a contest among competing sources of trust, algorithmic consensus, private reserve backing, and sovereign monetary authority. No single trust mechanism dominates across all dimensions, suggesting that future monetary systems will be pluralistic and increasingly interoperable, combining public money, regulated private money, tokenized deposits, stablecoins, and selected crypto-asset infrastructures within layered governance arrangements. The emerging digital money ecosystem is, therefore, likely to be characterized by coexistence and complementarity rather than replacement by any single monetary instrument.
The digital money transformation poses profound questions for monetary policy, financial stability, payment systems, financial inclusion, privacy, and the international monetary system. Policymakers must navigate fundamental trade-offs, balancing innovation with risk mitigation, privacy with regulatory compliance, and decentralization with stability. Effective governance of the digital money ecosystem requires comprehensive regulation, international coordination, adaptive frameworks, and ongoing research to inform evidence-based policy.
Future research should address critical gaps in empirical evidence, particularly regarding CBDC impacts, stablecoin run dynamics, DeFi systemic risks, and digital money adoption patterns. Interdisciplinary research integrating technological, economic, legal, and socio-political perspectives is essential to understand digital money as a complex socio-technical system.
The digital money revolution is still in its early stages. The coming decade will determine whether digital money fulfils its promise of more efficient, inclusive, and resilient monetary systems or whether it introduces new risks and instabilities that undermine financial stability and monetary sovereignty. The choices made by policymakers, financial institutions, technology providers, and users will shape the future of money and, with it, the future of economic organization and governance.