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Article

Anti-Sustainability Narratives in Chat Apps: What Shapes the Brazilian Far-Right Discussion About Socio-Environmental Issues on WhatsApp and Telegram

by
Rose Marie Santini
,
Débora Gomes Salles
*,
Marina Loureiro Santos
,
Luciane Leopoldo Belin
and
Thiago Ciodaro
School of Communication, Campus Praia Vermelha, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro 22290-240, Brazil
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Journal. Media 2025, 6(2), 85; https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6020085
Submission received: 5 March 2025 / Revised: 7 May 2025 / Accepted: 28 May 2025 / Published: 10 June 2025

Abstract

:
This study examines how socio-environmental issues are framed and disseminated in far-right WhatsApp and Telegram groups in Brazil. By collecting and analyzing over 87,962 messages shared from 2023 to 2024, we identify how the sustainability agenda is instrumentalized to deepen political polarization. Using a mixed-methods approach guided by a theoretical–methodological perspective in framing theory, we applied topic modeling to identify key themes and conducted qualitative analysis to categorize hyperlinked sites shared by group participants. The results suggest that environmental discussions in these groups are often intertwined with broader cultural war narratives and economic interests, particularly agribusiness. Disinformation, conspiracy theories, and attacks on environmental policies, activists, and NGOs are common strategies used to reinforce the salience of frames that undermine sustainability efforts. This study highlights the role of chat apps in facilitating the spread of anti-environmental narratives due to their decentralized and encrypted nature. Additionally, the findings suggest that hyperlinking practices within these groups can be understood as a framing strategy that contributes to the legitimization of misleading narratives by repeatedly circulating information from biased or unreliable sources.

1. Introduction

The growing prevalence of socio-environmental disinformation presents a significant challenge to global sustainability efforts (CAAD, n.d.), as it distorts public perception about climate change, deforestation, and land use and undermines collective action (Spampatti et al., 2024; Lewandowsky, 2021; Treen et al., 2020). This problem is further compounded by the affordances of digital platforms, in which decentralized and informal communication structures facilitate the rapid dissemination of such narratives (Santini et al., 2021; Rossini et al., 2021; Rogers, 2020).
Despite increased awareness of how sustainability and climate skepticism are debated and framed in digital ecosystems (Russo et al., 2022; Lamb et al., 2020; Doudaki & Carpentier, 2023; King et al., 2022; Vu et al., 2020), there is still a need to understand this phenomenon in pivotal countries such as Brazil. As one of the world’s most biodiverse nations, Brazil plays a central role in global climate policies (Issberner & Léna, 2016). The country’s environmental agenda is also highly politicized, reflecting broader societal divisions (Urbano et al., 2024). The far right, in particular, has leveraged digital communication strategies to spread disinformation about sustainability (Salles et al., 2023, 2024; Campos et al., 2024), often defending economic interests and targeting civil movements that defend the environment. The political and economic weight of agribusiness, together with its prominence on the national agenda, exacerbates this trend, enabling narratives that dismiss environmental concerns while emphasizing economic growth (Miguel, 2020). These dynamics underscore the urgency of examining how socio-environmental issues are discussed within digital platforms.
Considering this scenario through the lens of framing theory (Entman, 1993; Entman et al., 2009; Güran & Özarslan, 2022; Vu et al., 2020), this study examines how the Brazilian far right frames socio-environmental topics on WhatsApp and Telegram groups and how hyperlinking within these chat apps influences the debate. By analyzing over 87,962 messages and 1015 domains shared in far-right groups between 2023 and 2024 using computational and qualitative approaches, we identified key sources and types of shared content. These methods allowed us to uncover the thematic focus of messages and the nature of their sources in order to reveal how disinformation shapes public discourse around sustainability.
This research contributes to the growing body of literature on digital disinformation and the framing of environmental narratives by offering three key insights. First, we reveal the reliance of environmental discussions on disinformation websites and social media links, which facilitate a networked and self-reinforcing ecosystem of anti-sustainability narratives. Second, we highlight how the Brazilian far right frames socio-environmental issues to align with its political agendas. This is achieved by frequently undermining climate action while targeting environmental movements as well as the policies of the federal government led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, of the leftist Workers’ Party. Finally, we observe that far-right groups attempt to create a false opposition between environmental action and economic gains driven by agribusiness and mining interests, often highlighting aspects that portray these sectors as sustainable. The instrumentalization of this sustainability rhetoric is marked by a contradiction, as it is embedded within a broader set of far-right policies and extractivist practices that are environmentally regressive.
The article is structured as follows: the following section presents the theoretical–methodological approach of the framing analysis and provides a comprehensive review of the literature on socio-environmental disinformation and its political dimensions. This is followed by a detailed explanation of the methods used for data collection and analysis, combining computational and qualitative analysis. The results section presents the key themes and hyperlinking patterns identified in the dataset, while the discussion interprets these findings in the context of broader socio-political dynamics and through the lens of framing analysis. The conclusion reflects on the implications of our findings for combating socio-environmental disinformation and fostering sustainable digital communication practices.

2. Literature Review

Although 95% of Brazilians claim to be aware of climate change (CGEE, 2024), a significant share of the population remains skeptical about the severity of its consequences (Spektor et al., 2023). This skepticism has led to disputes over possible solutions and has become even more contentious in recent years, following episodes of floods, droughts, and wildfires in the country (PAHO, 2024; WWA, 2024a, 2024b). A survey carried out by Ejaz and colleagues encompassing Brazil and seven other countries shows that over two-thirds of people are “concerned about the impact of climate change on people and the planet” (Ejaz et al., 2025). Indeed, in the United States, evidence presented by Hornsey and Fielding (2020) suggests that, while people may not doubt the reality and the causes of climate change, they are often unwilling to take action, particularly if such actions require sacrifices.
In this scenario, educational and communicational strategies have emerged as crucial tools for addressing climate change and fostering environmental awareness. Studies such as those conducted by Badullovich et al. (2020) form the basis for a UNESCO (2024) report, which underscores the importance of strategic message framing in encouraging climate action. However, poorly crafted approaches can have counterproductive effects. The report emphasizes that “climate messages that appeal to free market beliefs, security, or patriotism; emphasize the near universalization of the climate scientist consensus; and use tools to enable adults to tackle misinformation are better suited to win over those resistant to action” (UNESCO & MECCE, 2024, p. 13).
Thus, how climate issues are framed in different contexts significantly influences public attitudes and behaviors. As discussed by different perspectives of framing theory, the analysis of communication frames offers “a way to describe the power of a communicating text” (Entman, 1993, p. 51). According to Entman, outlining the framing of a message is a process that involves “selection” and “salience”. That means that the choice of which aspects will be highlighted and which will be hidden or disguised can emphasize one perception or another around a given subject. Or, in the author’s words, it serves “to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Although there are different applications and possibilities of analytical operationalizations of framing theory (Mendonça & Simões, 2012), especially in journalism studies, the analytical perspective of this research is guided by the concept of framing as proposed by Entman, emphasizing the aspects of selection and salience and its application to climate change discussions in digital messaging. We argue that content on the environment and sustainability in far-right groups is framed to emphasize neoliberal perspectives, defend the economic autonomy of agribusiness entrepreneurs, and question evidence on climate change.
According to Vu et al. (2020), framing analysis is a valuable tool for identifying not only how actors emphasize certain aspects of an issue but also how these frames can influence public perception of it. In this sense, Homar and Knežević Cvelbar (2021) argue that engagement is impacted by whether an issue is presented through gain framing (positive outcomes) or loss framing (negative outcomes). Their review of more than 60 studies found that loss framing is generally more effective, leading the authors to hypothesize that people are more likely to respond to potential losses than equivalent gains. This aligns with Patterson et al. (2021), who argue that “emergency framing” is particularly effective for mobilizing rapid responses to environmental problems. They identify five main dimensions of the political effects of emergency framing: public engagement, empowerment/disempowerment, formal political authority, reframing of discourse, and institutional impacts. However, they caution that while emergency framing is effective for addressing specific, immediate problems, its broader application to the climate emergency may have limited impact.
Media narratives and communication framing play a significant role in shaping collective behavior around climate change. Lewandowsky (2021) emphasizes that proper framing can mean the difference between action and inaction, while Miguel (2020) critiques the media’s tendency to present “both sides” of the climate change debate, arguing that this approach has inadvertently given platforms to environmental denialists, undermining efforts to address the crisis. The political disputes surrounding climate change are a common frame given space in newspaper articles, as shown by Lück et al. (2018), after analyzing over 1300 pieces across five countries. Furthermore, despite the ongoing importance of traditional media in this debate, the internet, social media platforms, and chat apps have also become significant players in discussions about climate change.
Meanwhile, a wide range of recent studies have shown that scientific denialism and disinformation are among the biggest challenges to containing climate change and promoting environmental preservation (CAAD, n.d.; Lamb et al., 2020; Lewandowsky, 2021). Global organizations and researchers have alerted to the misuse of science for political purposes as posing a significant obstacle to effective climate action (IPCC, 2022; UN News, 2024). The consequences extend beyond limiting climate change mitigation efforts, affecting areas such as food security, housing, education, and the safety of environmental activists and journalists.
The severity of this issue is deepened when disinformation is instrumentalized for political purposes, since the environmental agenda has increasingly mirrored political polarization in countries such as the United States and Brazil, with the far right becoming the poster child for anti-sustainability stances (Regattieri, 2023; Medeiros et al., 2024; Leiserowitz et al., 2020; Kaiser & Puschmann, 2017).
Furthermore, discussions on environmental issues often select and highlight economic aspects, reflecting the predominance of an anthropocentric perspective, in which human interests are equated with economic growth (Doudaki & Carpentier, 2023). Studies over time have shown how skeptics and deniers manipulate data to build framings that legitimize their claims, discredit scientists and the media, and accuse activists, organizations, and governments of inciting fear to inflict financial harm on the population (Doudaki & Carpentier, 2023; Oreskes & Conway, 2010; La et al., 2024; Lewandowsky et al., 2018). On the other hand, as demonstrated by Vu et al. (2020), when environmental activists talk about climate change on Facebook, they tend to adopt mostly a frame of Impact rather than one of Efficacy. These types of manipulation can also be understood as a form of strategic framing (Entman et al., 2009).
Another critical dimension of the economic influence on climate change and environmental politics lies in distinct local perspectives. From a Global North perspective, climate disputes are largely driven by the interests of the oil industry (Goldberg et al., 2020; Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Bush, 2019). In contrast, in South American countries such as Brazil, the primary sectors shaping environmental policies are closely tied to agribusiness and livestock production (Campos et al., 2024; Miguel, 2020). Moreover, framing disputes between environmentalists and large business owners regarding the damage these industries cause to the environment are often centered around the opposition between representatives of agribusiness and social organizations such as the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST, in its Portuguese acronym, from “Movimento Sem Terra”) (Carter, 2015; Alentejano, 2020).
In this scenario of political and economic disputes surrounding environmental debates, the concept of sustainability remains highly contested. Perspectives such as ecofeminism and social ecology argue that true sustainability requires communities to address the sociological, political, and gender aspects that are specific to their experiences, framing their messages in a way to emphasize the importance of maintaining balance between humans and nature while also paying attention to climate justice (Ogunbode et al., 2024). In contrast, business-oriented approaches view nature primarily as a resource to be utilized for human benefit, prioritizing economic growth frames over ecological harmony perspectives (Frank, 2016).
Moreover, the concept of sustainability is often co-opted by political actors who oppose concrete measures for environmental protection. In pursuit of the label of “environmentally conscious”, individuals, corporations, and political representatives frequently develop symbolically sustainable actions that have minimal impact on actual environmental preservation. These agents publicly claim to be concerned about sustainability while continuing to engage in harmful practices—a practice known as greenwashing (de Freitas Netto et al., 2020; Delmas & Burbano, 2011). By engaging in greenwashing, these actors not only dilute the meaning of sustainability but also hinder genuine efforts to address environmental challenges. Additionally, these narratives frequently suggest that it is possible to achieve sustainability without slowing down industrial growth, which has already been challenged by many studies (Hickel & Kallis, 2020; Haberl et al., 2020). In the political arena, some studies use the concept of “political greenwashing” to explain the far right’s ambiguous attitude towards environmental issues, where discourse on sustainability is used to justify protectionism, exclusionism, and nationalism while promoting a distorted vision of territorial sovereignty (Vicenová & Mišík, 2025).
Around the world, as in Brazil, the far right has consolidated an online media ecosystem, with chat apps emerging as the predominant channels for the dissemination of political and environmental disinformation (Ozawa et al., 2023; Santini et al., 2021; Resende et al., 2019). These platforms allow for rapid dissemination and amplification of ideas, without the gatekeeping processes characteristic of traditional journalism. Especially in the cases of Telegram and WhatsApp, this process occurs without any kind of algorithmic gatekeeping. WhatsApp, widely used in the Global South, with 147 million users only in Brazil (Statista, 2024), grew in popularity due to its low-cost communication and encrypted private groups, which allow users to share messages within closed circles with little external scrutiny. Moreover, there are regions in Brazil, especially in rural areas, where internet access is extremely limited for most websites and applications, but where WhatsApp remains available. Also, its end-to-end encryption ensures that messages cannot be traced back to their sources, making fact-checking and content moderation difficult (Santini et al., 2022). In contrast, Telegram offers an even broader scope for information dissemination, allowing public channels with unlimited subscribers and large chat groups of up to 200,000 participants. Unlike WhatsApp, Telegram provides metadata on message origins, yet its anonymity features and bot automation facilitate the mass coordination of campaigns, including disinformation efforts (Alvisi et al., 2024; Morgia et al., 2021).
Both apps have become a hub for politically motivated actors seeking to evade content moderation and promote alternative narratives that challenge mainstream media and institutional credibility. In Brazil, analyzing the communication dynamics of these applications is crucial for understanding the disinformation ecosystem, especially concerning sustainability and environmental issues. These apps have emerged as powerful tools for political propaganda and far-right mobilization (Júnior et al., 2021; Evangelista & Bruno, 2019; Santini et al., 2021), thus contributing to the development of an anti-sustainability mindset within this political group (Medeiros et al., 2023).
As discussed by Törnberg and Nissen (2023), hyperlinking in chat app groups fosters trust, creates a sense of openness, and builds community. According to the authors (Törnberg & Nissen, 2023, p. 2906), “by sharing links to other websites, actors may call attention to and frame social and political issues, construct political alliances, amplify shared political positions, and coordinate collective action”. However, little is known about hyperlinking in chat app groups, particularly in debates about the environment and climate change, especially in South American countries such as Brazil. Another aspect that is little explored and that we seek to address in this article is the role of linking as a strategic tool in the message framing process.
As Dowling (2023) notes, the circulation of traditional news websites within far-right digital communities remains an understudied topic. On the other hand, sharing junk news websites can provide hyperlinked content designed to be easily shareable in chat groups and on social media, further blurring the lines between credible and non-credible sources (Howard, 2020; Borah, 2014). In Brazil, these websites have become a key tool in testing the audience reception of specific agendas and priming disinformation flows, particularly through platforms like WhatsApp and Telegram. Sharing links directing users to junk news websites can also be a strategy in disinformation campaigns (Santini et al., 2022). This phenomenon not only facilitates the spread of disinformation but also allows politically motivated actors to strategically frame environmental topics to serve their agendas.
Considering the role of these apps and the importance of hyperlinking, this article investigates, through the lenses of framing analysis, how environmental issues are framed, which sources and hyperlinks are shared on far-right WhatsApp and Telegram groups in Brazil, and how these sources and links help to emphasise selected aspects and perspectives.

3. Materials and Methods

Since 2021, we have been developing a monitoring infrastructure that continuously expands as we identify and add new public groups and channels to our dataset. These groups and channels were accessed through invitation links retrieved via Google searches. We used queries combining political keywords with platform-specific terms (e.g., “Bolsonaro wa.me group” or “election t.me link”), which led us to directories and websites that compile public group listings. We also identified new groups through invitation links shared within the groups and channels already being monitored, enabling the dataset to expand along the pathways of the networks themselves. Groups were manually selected based on their focus on political discussion and related themes, primarily on far-right content.
To collect data from WhatsApp, we employed the methodology developed by Garimella and Tyson (2018) and, for Telegram, we used Telethon, a Python client library (Telethon 1.24.0—Python 3.8.14) for the Telegram API (Urman & Katz, 2020). We collected 191,561 messages about socio-environmental issues in 467 WhatsApp public groups and 45,895 messages in 136 Telegram public groups and channels between January 2023 and March 2024, totaling 237,456 messages. The difference in the volume of groups and messages collected from each platform can be explained by both platform affordances and user behavior. On WhatsApp, our dataset includes only groups, as the platform does not support channels. On Telegram, we included both groups and channels. Telegram channels typically have lower levels of interaction and message volume compared to WhatsApp groups, which are more conversational. Additionally, due to the relatively low participant limit in WhatsApp groups, we chose to monitor a large number of distinct groups to capture broader user activity on the platform.
The data collection was not restricted to disinformation. However, through computational and qualitative analysis of the content, as well as examining the sources shared in the messages, we sought to identify and highlight disinformation narratives. The query we used to filter the content targeted four main issues: (i) Climate, Energy, and Solutions: focusing on the debate about low-carbon economic incentives and climate change mitigation and adaptation; (ii) Land Use, Agribusiness, and Infrastructure: addressing the impacts of agribusiness, illegal deforestation, mining, and land grabbing; (iii) Indigenous, Quilombola, and Local Communities: covering land claims and mobilizations in defense of indigenous, quilombola, and other traditional peoples; (iv) Forest Fires and Deforestation: encompassing the debate on forest fires, their causes, and the impacts on health and the economy.
Our research complies with the Brazilian General Data Protection Law (LGPD), which allows the collection and analysis of manifestly public data for academic purposes without requiring individual consent. Because we relied exclusively on publicly accessible content and anonymized all data used in publications, our study did not require review by an ethics board under current Brazilian regulations.
In line with previous research (Evangelista & Bruno, 2019; Garimella & Tyson, 2018; Resende et al., 2019), we considered the WhatsApp and Telegram groups and channels that were openly advertised on the internet to attract new members and could be joined by any user with the access link as public. Public group directories and search tools that enable the discovery of such links have proven useful for researchers and provide an operational definition of “public” communication spaces on messaging apps. Telegram itself defines public groups and channels in its documentation (Telegram, n.d.-a, n.d.-b), and the literature has emphasized how these open spaces play an increasingly important role in political mobilization and the dissemination of both reliable and misleading information (Calvo-Gutiérrez & Marín-Lladó, 2023; Evangelista & Bruno, 2019; Ozawa et al., 2023; Smith et al., 2023; Wendratama & Yusuf, 2023).
To analyze the data, we removed messages in languages other than Portuguese and performed text cleaning, such as the removal of stopwords, and text normalization (lower cases, accents, and punctuation). Afterwards, messages with less than 5 words were also removed (Figure 1). To identify key frames, we took out repeated messages and performed a two-step topic modeling. In the first stage, we identified topics and messages outside the research scope. On WhatsApp, 68,611 messages were discarded and on Telegram, 5190 messages. Non-relevant messages occurred because terms related to the socio-environmental agenda—such as “energy”, for example—can be used in different contexts. In the second iteration, we modeled the reduced corpus to cluster climate themes. In both stages, we employed a deep neural network-based model for unsupervised topic identification, using the BERTopic approach (Grootendorst, 2022) with the “all-MiniLM-L6-v2” pre-trained LLM (Large Language Model) to generate text embeddings (Wang et al., 2020), UMAP for dimensionality reduction (McInnes et al., 2018), and HDBSCAN for clustering (Malzer & Baum, 2020). A team of research assistants manually identified overarching categories to aggregate the relevant topics. Many topics are interrelated, but we considered the themes that stood out the most. This categorization consisted of a detailed and iterative qualitative analysis (Kermani et al., 2023), in which the categories were constantly adjusted and reorganized to ensure that they reflected consistent thematic similarities.
Importantly, when including examples of messages in the article, we only selected content that appeared multiple times in our dataset. This decision was aimed at mitigating potential ethical concerns regarding the traceability of individual users, even in public groups, while highlighting narratives that gained traction in the monitored ecosystem.
To identify the sources that underpin disinformation on sustainability, we extracted 26,152 shared links from 2226 domains found in messages relevant to the scope of our study. We manually categorized all domains shared more than 10 times (1015 in total, which amount to 24,179 links), classifying them into 9 types: (i) Junk News and Disinformation; (ii) Social Media; (iii) Minor News Brands; (iv) Major News Brands; (v) Professional Political Content; (vi) Civil Society Organizations; (vii) Sales; (viii) Educational Content; and (ix) Others. The analysis was based on the content available on the linked pages, website interface and function, content production frequency, and the level of editorial professionalism (Santini et al., 2022). We then cross-referenced the topics with the website categories to identify the sources associated with each topic. This analysis enabled us to pinpoint the most frequently cited sources for each topic and to examine how these sources contribute to shaping public perceptions of environmental issues.
Additionally, in order to analyze these messages, a qualitative approach was combined with the computational techniques, grounded in a theoretical–methodological framework based on framing analysis. This has been a functional and useful tool to study social media (Güran & Özarslan, 2022), especially because of the complexity of the networked communication processes. In our case, this approach considered elements such as “images, stereotypes, metaphors, actors, and messages” (Entman et al., 2009, p. 180). Observing how these elements were presented and associated within the messages helped us to identify which aspects were emphasized by their creators—that is, how they selected certain elements to assign salience. Instead of using predefined categories such as “thematic” or “episodic” frames (Rothberg, 2010) or “diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational” frames (Vu et al., 2020), we chose to work with the categories generated through topic modeling and the classification of websites.

4. Results and Discussion

On both WhatsApp and Telegram, the topic modeling analysis identified eight main discussion topics: (i) Attacks on MST; (ii) Attacks on the Lula Government environmental policy; (iii) Conspiracy theories; (iv) In defense of agribusiness; (v) Attacks on NGOs; (vi) Bolsonaro helped the environment; (vii) Forest fire; and (viii) Ukraine War and fertilizers (Figure 2). In addition to identifying the topics, we analyzed the frequency with which they occurred from January 2023 to March 2024 in order to understand how the debate on each of them evolved over time (Figure 3).
Part of the criticism registered in the topic Attacks on the Lula Government environmental policy, which was the most frequently discussed topic on Telegram (35.9%) and the second most on WhatsApp (29.6%), point to specific data or events, such as a temporary increase in deforestation indicators to discredit the current government’s environmental management (Table 1 and Table 2). These accusations often echo the discourse of sectors that defend short-term development and push for fewer environmental restrictions to favor economic exploitation, such as the Parliamentary Agricultural Front (Bruno, 2021). Sustainability is often instrumentalized in these kinds of political debates, with deforestation or wildfires being mobilized not only as environmental concerns but also as a means to criticize the government from within broader ideological disputes. These accusations and political clashes can weaken Brazil’s efforts to reposition itself as an environmental leader on the international scene, compromising negotiations in climate forums and reducing investor interest in sustainable projects (D. Silva & Ridart, 2023).
Messages in Attacks on the Lula Government environmental policy also focus on attacking ministers Marina Silva (Ministry of the Environment) and Sonia Guajajara (Ministry of Indigenous Peoples). Both are non-white women with a strong presence in environmental and Indigenous issues and are accused of being “hypocritical environmentalists”. President Lula himself is also a target of attacks and criticism, based on the government’s alleged inaction on environmental issues (Table 1 and Table 2). The topic peaked in January 2023 (Figure 3), when Lula revoked the previous president Jair Bolsonaro government’s anti-environmental laws and declared an emergency in the Yanomami indigenous territory. The Yanomami crisis, which had worsened during the Bolsonaro government due to deforestation, illegal mining, and violence, led to the declaration of a public health emergency in 2023. Meanwhile, allegations of genocide resulted in investigations into the former president, and his subsequent issuing of denialist statements about the crisis (Souza, 2023; Biernath, 2023). This was also the first month of Lula’s government, in which a right-wing crowd invaded and vandalized the Supreme Court, Congress, and presidential palace on January 8th in protest of the 2022 election result (Brito, 2024). Messages about the Yanomami crisis also appear under the topic Bolsonaro helped the environment (0.4% on WhatsApp and 1.2% on Telegram), which focused on defending the former president and claiming that the “repressive Venezuelan regime” was the one to blame for the Yanomami’s malnutrition. This highlights contradictory framing strategies regarding the crisis within the same groups, which can both discredit the crisis to exonerate Bolsonaro or amplify it to blame Lula, according to which argument is being presented.
The topic Attacks on MST, the most prevalent on WhatsApp (32.9% on WhatsApp and 14.9% on Telegram), gained traction during a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (CPI) investigating the activities of the landless worker’s movement, which took place between April and September 2023 (Figure 3) and reinforced previous narratives calling for the criminalization of this social movement. The messages emphasize the relationship between the MST and the Lula government, taking advantage of the fact that this movement has historically been one of the most important political allies and electoral base-building forces for the president. The content shared also falsely accuses the movement of crimes, calling its members “terrorists”. While ecological concerns are not the main focus of this topic, the strategy of using environmental issues as a tool for political polarization mirrors patterns observed in other narratives. It also reveals how the far right, despite claiming to support sustainability, actively campaigns against actors committed to environmental protection.
Similarly, the topic Attacks on NGOs (0.3% on WhatsApp and 6.5% on Telegram) peaked during the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission into NGOs (June to December 2023) which was composed mainly of far-right politicians who made statements accusing these organizations of allegedly committing crimes. Even though the literature demonstrates the crucial role of NGOs in Brazil (Lopes de Oliveira & Lewenstein, 2024; Araujo, 2020; Assahira & Moretto, 2024), these entities are common targets of attacks and conspiracy theories that portray them as enemies of “national interests” and allege misappropriation of resources and abuse of power over indigenous peoples and their lands (Santos et al., 2024). During this inquiry, right-wing media outlets and politicians driven by economic interests in environmental dismantling consistently framed NGOs as enemies to the well-being of local communities (Santos et al., 2024).
Conspiracy theories appear more often on Telegram (32% on Telegram and 9.7% on WhatsApp), which might indicate that, due to its affordances, the app has a greater tendency towards conspiracies when compared to WhatsApp (E. C. d. M. Silva, 2024; Hoseini et al., 2023; Schulze et al., 2022). These theories tend to foster distrust in institutions, authorities, and public policies. The main content claims that laboratory products, such as vaccines and food, are part of a plan that uses sustainability as a pretext for governments to control the global population. Some of the messages also allege that the increase in coverage of extreme weather events is manipulated. In January 2024, a study by WWA (2024b) indicated that droughts in the Amazon were related to climate change. This fueled messages that questioned the study and the existence of a climate crisis (Table 1 and Table 2). The messages in the Conspiracy theories category show how the far right instrumentalizes socio-environmental issues as components of modern culture wars, placed side by side with other conspiratorial claims regarding politics, gender, religion, and other ideological subjects (Salles et al., 2023). Also, conspiracy theories have been instrumentalized as part of broader campaigns of disinformation and public opinion manipulation (Del Vicario et al., 2016; Halpern et al., 2019; Santini et al., 2022).
The In defense of agribusiness argument (26.1% on WhatsApp and 1.5% on Telegram), which frames agribusiness as Brazil’s driving economic force, encompasses several agendas and gained prominence amid the MST CPI and the debate on the Marco Temporal (Temporal Milestone thesis). Marco Temporal is a controversial legal thesis that limits the constitutional right to indigenous lands (APIB, n.d.). In 2023, votes and discussions in the Parliament and Supreme Federal Court boosted messages against land demarcation, arguing that farmers could lose their land. Messages in this category defend the agribusiness sector while claiming that Lula’s policies threaten it. They tend to minimize the environmental political dispute, positioning the left, the government, the Supreme Court, NGOs, and the MST as being the greatest enemies of agribusiness. Defenders of the sector claim that agricultural producers do not negatively impact the Amazon biome and that large-scale production has no relation to environmental issues. However, this statement is misleading, as it disregards significant evidence showing the destructive impact of agribusiness on deforestation and biodiversity in the Amazon (MapBiomas, 2024). Furthermore, Brazilian agribusiness appears in chat app messages as a solution to two major global challenges: food security and conservation of natural resources. Framed in this way, these messages construct an image of agribusiness as not only sustainable but also essential to global challenges, despite evidence of its real impacts on the environment. This aligns with studies that show how far-right actors increasingly incorporate environmental themes into their rhetoric to enhance public appeal, even when their political agendas oppose ecological protection in practice (Vicenová & Mišík, 2025).
Finally, the messages in less broadly discussed topics, Ukraine War and fertilizers (0.5% on WhatsApp and 4.5% on Telegram) and Forest fire (0.2% on WhatsApp and 3.1% on Telegram), are very specific. Ukraine War and fertilizers discuss the consequences of the conflict on the global fertilizer market, especially in Brazil. In 2022, the conflict destabilized the agribusiness sector (Rajão et al., 2022), and in 2023, Brazil mitigated the effects by diversifying its suppliers, such as Canada and Morocco, and increasing fertilizer stocks. Despite the slight stabilization of prices, costs remained high, driving debates about self-sufficiency and alternatives (Rajão et al., 2022). The conflict reinforced the connection between food security and geopolitics, emphasizing Brazil’s exposure to geopolitical risks and sparking efforts to reposition its role in global supply chains. In Forest fire, the messages reported fires in Brazil and other countries, but without necessarily going into depth about their causes and consequences in relation to climate and land use issues.
Thus, by analyzing the main topics present in chat app messages, we identified that far-right discourse on WhatsApp and Telegram revolves around attacking environmental policies, social movements, and NGOs, while promoting agribusiness and conspiracy theories. The debate on sustainability in these spaces is minimal and, for the most part, nonexistent, with environmental issues generally being addressed only in connection with other topics. In this sense, the messages generally adopt a perspective of climate delay and distrust surrounding climate change. Many of these discussions were fueled by political events, such as the MST and NGO CPIs, and leveraged conspiracy theories to undermine climate science and indigenous rights.

Disinformation and the Social Media Ecosystem

A key aspect of these discourses in chat apps is the strategic use of hyperlinks, which serve to legitimize claims, spread disinformation, and reinforce ideological narratives through a diverse range of sources. Considering all messages with a hyperlink, Junk news and disinformation (23,081—34.4% of total), social media (22,418—33.4% of total), and minor news brands (16,283—24.2% of total) are overall the most shared types. To understand how they were hyperlinked in the chat app groups and how topics and types of sites overlapped, we cross-analyzed both categories.
Figure 4 shows how the eight website types identified appear around the topics. In messages about three of the four dominant narratives—Attacks on the Lula Government environmental policy, Attacks on MST, In defense of agribusiness, and Conspiracy theories—Social media and Junk news and disinformation are the main sources. In In defense of agribusiness, Minor news brands is the prevalent category. The strong presence of Minor news brands websites in this category reflects the centrality of agribusiness-focused sites in Brazil’s local media ecosystem (Santos et al., 2024). It is important to add that, in Brazil, there is an anti-environmental lobby backed by agribusiness, which leverages its political agendas through the Parliamentary Agricultural Front to promote setbacks in legislation, such as opposition to agrarian reform and land demarcation (Medeiros et al., 2024). Inspired by the climate denialism of the international far right, it uses framing tools and strategies such as corporate marketing and greenwashing to hide anti-ecological practices, manipulate public opinion, and delay energy transition policies and product traceability (Budó, 2017; Regattieri, 2023; Medeiros et al., 2024). As a result, it has consolidated itself as a hegemonic economic, political, and social force, in opposition to the agroecological discourse in the debate on the country’s development (Bittencourt et al., 2022). The discussions in chat app groups reflect these strategies and reproduce, to a certain extent, the same aspects highlighted by the sector.
Attacks on MST and Attacks on NGOs were the topics with the highest percentages of disinformation sites linked, with 48.1% and 48.6%, respectively (Figure 4). In both topics, content produced in the plenary sessions, such as testimonies and speeches by parliamentarians, fed the chat apps with conspiracy narratives. Although the criminalization of environmental defenders is not new (Glazebrook & Opoku, 2018; Birss, 2017), the results demonstrate that the institutionalized attempt to vilify, discredit, intimidate, and silence activists and NGOs in the Amazon region relies not only on legal harassment but also on online campaigns. The high percentage of Junk news and disinformation in both categories highlights how these websites support criminalization and delegitimization campaigns, promoting narratives that associate these actors with criminal practices and conspiracies against “national interests”. These results corroborate previous studies that point to the instrumentalization of anti-sustainability discourses as part of a strategy of cultural warfare and demobilization of socio-environmental movements (Campos et al., 2024). Moreover, this result also highlights how these groups seek to promote a frame of credibility by anchoring their perspectives in so-called “news sites” that are, in fact, disinformation outlets. This appears to be part of a broader framing strategy aimed at selecting a specific type of information and, through particular sources, assigning salience to it—leaving no room for competing interpretations. According to Entman et al. (2009, p. 179), framing involves not only the strategic selection and emphasis of certain elements but also the consideration of which alternative frames it is competing against. From this perspective, scholars understand framing as a strategic tool used by social movements to mobilize the public (Entman et al., 2009, p. 179).
The wide presence of links to Social media in the category of Conspiracy theories (40.6% of links) exposes how the interconnected nature of the online media ecosystem favors the multiplatform proliferation of conspiracy theories (Santini et al., 2022). In addition, hyperlinked sites in conspiracy messages also make extensive use of Junk news and disinformation sites (22.6%) and Minor news brands (25.9%) sites.
Ukraine War and fertilizers have the lowest percentage of disinformation sources (11.3%) and Forest fire the highest percentage of Major news brands (17.6%) when compared to the other topics (Figure 4). This resonates with the idea of “emergency framing” discussed by Patterson et al. (2021) in relation to news coverage of environmental issues, but applies in a different way within far-right debate arenas. Even when news about wildfires or the consequences of the war in Ukraine are shared, the messages in which these news articles are hyperlinked do not generate outrage or mobilization. In fact, they are more frequently framed as evidence that other issues should be prioritized over environmental concerns. In both topics, mainstream media outlets appear more frequently, suggesting that they gain salience selectively when the goal is not to challenge facts but to provide information that reinforces the economic and strategic discourse of agribusiness.
The analysis also shows that the users often share unreliable sources and/or unverified information. The predominance of Junk news and disinformation sites is evidence of this, which was the most shared category (34.4% of shared links | 193 sites). This type of website is the most, or one of the most, significant categories in every topic analyzed in the messages. Websites classified as junk news (Howard, 2020), carrying a hyperpartisan, mostly right-wing bias, often circulate in news lists that propagate conservative agendas and give voice to an anti-democratic opposition of the Lula government. This classification is based on their frequent dissemination of misleading narratives, conspiracy theories, or highly distorted information, which undermines the quality of public debate and reinforces political polarization.
Another type of hyperlink that highlights the fragility of the sources shaping discussions in these groups is the presence of Minor news brands websites. These websites, which vary widely in scope, are particularly prevalent on WhatsApp. They generally exhibit a strong conservative bias, often publishing content centered on government criticism, and attacks on the MST and NGOs. Many of these websites focus on local, regional, or specialized news on agribusiness, predominantly featuring reports and opinion pieces that exclusively promote the perspectives of industry and agribusiness, with little to no space for opposing viewpoints.
Similarly, the predominance of Conspiracy theories (16.6%) highlights how the topic of sustainability is instrumentalized within a broader narrative of institutional distrust. Conspiratorial narratives are adopted to fuel anti-environmental discourse. They serve as ammunition for politicians who engage institutionally with related issues, influencing public policies such as the demarcation of Indigenous lands, as seen during Jair Bolsonaro’s administration from 2019 to 2022 (Campos et al., 2024). As the analyzed data suggest, the high proportion of sources from Social media (40.6%) in the dissemination of these conspiracy theories demonstrates how the far right exploits the affordances and broad accessibility of these platforms to create doubt and spread disinformation. A recent study on public perception of science and technology revealed that at least 40% of participants were more likely to believe information if it was corroborated by multiple sources (CGEE, 2024). Thus, the circulation of many different Social media links replicating the same false or misleading information can enhance its perceived credibility, reinforcing the salience of the intended framing. Another aspect of the results highlights how chat apps and social networks operate in a circular and interconnected way to build community and form an ecosystem of mobilization around climate disinformation. Social media was the second most shared category (33.4% of total shares), in which YouTube videos, mainly from the far right, stood out, corroborating the findings of Júnior et al. (2021) in their study on far-right misinformation groups on Telegram.
On the other hand, Major news brands, which include websites of some of the biggest journalism and media conglomerates from Brazil, have only 6.1% of the total shares, which shows that users in these far-right groups obtain their information more frequently from disinformation sites than from consolidated traditional media sources. This is not unusual, since studies (Chadwick & Vaccari, 2019) have shown that “far-right users are more likely to share disinformation via ‘fake news’ than other users, posing risks to public debate in democratic systems” (Dowling, 2023, p. 39).
These data reflect the far right’s systematic rejection of these media outlets, a characteristic widely documented in studies on informational bubbles and strategies for delegitimizing traditional media (Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2018). Similar results have been identified in studies analyzing the sharing of news links in far-right groups. Dowling (2023, p. 39), for example, explains that “news sharing is a crucial mechanism for creating and sustaining group identity, which is pertinent for understanding the ways in which ideology spreads and consolidates far-right communities as social movements”.
There were also many invitations to join other WhatsApp and Telegram groups, which feeds a network between these groups. The presence of these invitations demonstrates the robustness of a coordinated network that amplifies content, enhancing its penetration across different audiences and contexts. In less significant numbers are social media websites designed for the far-right audience, such as Gettr and Gab.com (Jasser et al., 2023; Naseer & Stocking, 2023). This highlights the robust communications infrastructure of this group in the Brazilian online environment, which reproduces and amplifies its content over all platforms in a coordinated manner (Demuru, 2020).
Group participants and moderators also use social network links to support their arguments, framing strategically disseminated content within WhatsApp and Telegram. These data reinforce the central role of these platforms in the communication infrastructure of the Brazilian far right, especially regarding the amplification of political narratives (Evangelista & Bruno, 2019; Júnior et al., 2021; Santini et al., 2021, 2022). The preponderance of Social media links suggests that the strategy is not limited to distributing information but also seeks to validate and reinforce the role of agents such as former President Jair Bolsonaro, propagate conspiracy theories, and attack political opponents. The presence of attacks against the current federal government, aligned to the left, as well as social movements such as the MST, are examples of this strategy.
The results show that the topics identified promote an anti-sustainability discourse because they often deny the climate crisis, prioritize unregulated economic growth over environmental balance, attack environmental movements, and fight against environmental and indigenous protection policies such as the Marco Temporal. These approaches disregard scientific consensus and environmental sustainability principles by favoring short-term interests and ignoring the preservation of natural resources for future generations. Furthermore, the online campaign strategy in chat apps was supported by a network of heterogeneous websites that reproduced content between each other, varying in relation to professional infrastructure, publication frequency, and reach.

5. Final Considerations

This study has demonstrated how sustainability and environmental issues are addressed superficially in conservative groups and used as mechanisms to defend neoliberal perspectives. The topic In defense of agribusiness, identified in nearly one-fifth of the messages (18.6% of total), for example, reflects a discursive strategy that frames this sector as central to the economy and global sustainability. At the same time, this narrative disregards the environmental implications of large-scale agricultural practices, promoting an anti-environmental lobby that frames environmental protection policies and Indigenous rights as economic threats.
Another relevant aspect in this regard is the concept of gain or loss framing. As loss framing, which emphasizes negative outcomes, tends to be more effective in raising environmental awareness (Homar & Knežević Cvelbar, 2021), messages advocating for the importance of agribusiness also adopt this perspective of losses and gains to criticize efforts that prioritize the environment over industry, agriculture, and livestock. These messages mobilize users by highlighting and emphasizing that excessive environmental regulations and laws result in losses for agricultural producers and the population in general. This discourse is amplified by Minor news brand and junk news websites, which often reproduce content aligned with the sector’s interests, and by greenwashing strategies aimed at legitimizing anti-ecological practices while manipulating public opinion.
In many of the messages analyzed, the narrative constructs a dichotomy between environmental protection and economic growth. A neoliberal perspective dominates, portraying agribusiness not as a threat but as a solution to sustainable development. Conversely, actors advocating for environmental protection are framed as villains seeking to hinder the country’s economic development and the success of its entrepreneurs. The construction of these narratives, rooted in disinformation and in a strategy of creating enemies by portraying certain actors as villains or criminals, aligns with Lewandowsky’s (2021) idea of the strategies of “organized climate denial” identified in climate media coverage.
Thus, by analyzing the content of messages and the types of links shared in chat app groups between 2023 and 2024—the first two years of the left wing’s return to the Federal Government—this study identifies that the sustainability agenda is both reflected and strategically used as a form of camouflage to deepen political polarization. The Brazilian far right frames socio-environmental issues in a way that aligns environmental discussions with its political agenda, intertwining them with other culture war topics. The dispute is fueled by strategies such as attacks on the president, the Workers’ Party, land rights movements, and any organizations, particularly NGOs, that promote environmental causes. Moreover, the messages also show how the far right presents an ambiguous stance on environmental issues, sometimes using environmental discourse to legitimize nationalist projects without committing to environmental action, which aligns with the concept of political greenwashing (Vicenová & Mišík, 2025).
As elaborated by Entman (1993, p. 52), the way a message is framed influences how individuals perceive reality and how they define a problem and its possible solutions. When conservative groups, primarily composed of far-right individuals, circulate perspectives that link sustainability and environmental issues to political disputes, this framing contributes to the perception that, in local contexts, environmental advocacy is a “left-wing agenda”. If messages emphasize political conflicts, making them “more noticeable, meaningful, and memorable to audiences” (Entman, 1993, p. 53), either through framing or repetition, they also play a role in shaping the worldview of these social groups. By examining communication within these restricted, like-minded spaces, this study contributes to our understanding of the communicational dynamics related to sustainability and the environment.
The investigation also provides insights for future research to deepen the analysis of this topic. One possible direction for future research involves investigating media coverage itself, as this study categorized websites and analyzed their impact but did not examine news articles individually. Additionally, the broad perspective adopted did not allow for an in-depth analysis of specific cases, such as megaprojects with significant socio-environmental impacts. Future studies could explore how these specific cases are discussed online, whether by digital publics or the media, and how these projects affect the regions concerned. One example of a case that could be studied in greater depth is the discourse surrounding extractive activities, including identifying which projects are linked to environmental degradation and how they are framed within these spaces. It is also essential to examine the role of corporations in environmental discourse, particularly regarding greenwashing—how companies that present themselves as sustainable are portrayed, conduct campaigns, or influence the media beyond explicit disinformation.
Finally, this paper contributes to debates on climate disinformation and the digital media ecosystems by demonstrating how far-right actors in Brazil adopt strategic framing to advance anti-environmental narratives. We argue that agribusiness interests and conspiratorial claims are mobilized to delegitimize environmental organizations and climate action. This use is not random, but rather functions strategically to reinforce a worldview that opposes environmental regulation while legitimizing extractivist practices. We also demonstrate how disinformation hinges on hyperlinks that connect a network of ideologically aligned sites, social media posts, and chat app groups, thereby sustaining an alternative media ecosystem in Brazil. Ultimately, we propose understanding hyperlinks as a framing strategy in themselves, functioning as a mechanism through which toxic narratives are amplified, legitimized, and rendered persistent.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, R.M.S., D.G.S., M.L.S. and L.L.B.; methodology, T.C., M.L.S. and D.G.S.; software, T.C.; analysis, T.C., M.L.S., D.G.S. and R.M.S.; data curation, T.C. and M.L.S.; writing—original draft preparation, L.L.B. and M.L.S.; writing—review and editing, M.L.S., L.L.B., D.G.S. and R.M.S.; visualization, T.C. and M.L.S.; supervision, D.G.S. and R.M.S.; project administration, R.M.S.; funding acquisition, R.M.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research is part of “NetLab Disinformation and Digital Propaganda Research Program” at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, funded by Open Society Foundations (Grant number OR2022-85817), Climate and Land Use Alliance (Grant number G-2304-58935), OAK Foundation (Grant number OCAY-22-491), Instituto Serrapilheira, CNPQ fellowship, Instituto Galo da Manha and Ford Foundation (Grant number 146223).

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

The raw data supporting the analysis and conclusions of this article is available at https://osf.io/ft5db/files/osfstorage?view_only=ba3eb62fefad4622b6629c10080ff257 (accessed on 28 May 2025). DOI: 10.17605/OSF.IO/FT5DB.

Acknowledgments

We express our gratitude to Bianca Melo, Thamyres Magalhães, Julia Dias, João Gabriel Haddad, Bruno Martins, Felipe Loureiro, Amanda Borges, Rafael Cardoso, Felipe Grael, Vinícius Scortegagna, Bernardo Yoneshigue, Felipe Maia, Rowena Jameson and Vitor do Carmo for their invaluable contributions to this research. Their support and engagement were essential to the development and refinement of this study.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Figure 1. Data collection and filtering design.
Figure 1. Data collection and filtering design.
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Figure 2. Volume of messages in each topic. The graph above displays the 60,926 messages from WhatsApp and the graph below the 27,042 from Telegram.
Figure 2. Volume of messages in each topic. The graph above displays the 60,926 messages from WhatsApp and the graph below the 27,042 from Telegram.
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Figure 3. The graphs show how the monthly volume of the eight topics evolved over the period of January 2023 to March 2024 on WhatsApp (above) and Telegram (below).
Figure 3. The graphs show how the monthly volume of the eight topics evolved over the period of January 2023 to March 2024 on WhatsApp (above) and Telegram (below).
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Figure 4. Percentage of sources by topic category. The y-axis represents the 8 topics and the x-axis represents the percentage of posts with each of the 8 content sources. Sources classified as “Others” have been removed from the visualization.
Figure 4. Percentage of sources by topic category. The y-axis represents the 8 topics and the x-axis represents the percentage of posts with each of the 8 content sources. Sources classified as “Others” have been removed from the visualization.
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Table 1. Examples of messages from each category shared on WhatsApp.
Table 1. Examples of messages from each category shared on WhatsApp.
TopicExample of Message Shared on WhatsApp (Portuguese)Example of Message Shared on WhatsApp (English Translation)
Attacks on the Lula Government environmental policyManaus tem o pior índice de Queimadas para o mês de outubro dos últimos 25 anos e novamente fica encoberta por fumaça EFEITO LULA, DEVASTANDO A AMAZÔNIA EM QUEIMADAS E A MÍDIA E ONGs COMPRADA RECEBENDO RIOS DE DINHEIRO FICAM CALADOSManaus has the worst rate of fires for the month of October in the last 25 years and is once again covered in smoke. THE LULA EFFECT, DEVASTATING THE AMAZON BY FIRE AND THE MEDIA AND NGOs PAID OFF, RECEIVING RIVERS OF MONEY, STAY SILENT
Attacks on MSTMulher, ex-assentada do MST enfrenta ameaças e fake news após denunciar MST na CPI
#COMPARTILHE
Woman, former MST settler faces threats and fake news after reporting MST to the Parliamentary Inquiry #SHARE
In defense of agribusiness “O Brasil não é o país do carnaval; nem é o país do futebol. O Brasil é o país do AGRO, que alimenta boa parte do mundo, exportando para mais de 170 países” O AGRO MERECE RESPEITO!“Brazil is not the land of carnival; nor the land of soccer. Brazil is the land of AGRIBUSINESS, which feeds a large part of the world, exporting to more than 170 countries” AGRIBUSINESS DESERVES RESPECT!
Conspiracy theoriesMelhor virar vegetariano kkkkk Embrapa anuncia filé de frango de laboratório para final desse ano *
AGENDA 2030 Journalmedia 06 00085 i001
Comida sintética, o futuro da humanidade, bem vindo a agenda sustentável, continue confiando nos governos OMS ONU e no Tio Bill pois eles só querem o seu bem!
Better to become a vegetarian lol * Embrapa announces lab-grown chicken fillet for the end of this year
2030 AGENDA Journalmedia 06 00085 i001
Synthetic food, the future of humanity, welcome to the sustainable agenda, keep trusting the governments WHO UN and Uncle Bill because they only want the best for you!
Ukraine War and fertilizersLá vem a guerra lascando os Fertilizantes…Here comes the war, destroying the Fertilizers…
Attacks on NGOsÉ para isso que servem as ongs instaladas na Amazônia, escravizar os índios fazer fortuna as custas de uma falsa política de preservação do meio ambiente, canalhas…This is what the NGOs installed in the Amazon are for, to enslave the indigenous people and make a fortune at the expense of a false environmental preservation policy, scoundrels…
Bolsonaro helped the environmentSE ALGUÉM PERGUNTAR O QUE FOI QUE O PR.BOLSONARO FEZ DE BOM PARA O BRASIL, MOSTRE ESSA LISTA ABAIXO COM ALGUMAS COISAS QUE ELE FEZ. 1. Criou o PIX 2. Deu 33% de aumento aos professores. (…) 7. Obteve recordes na exportação brasileira. 8. Obteve superavit na balança comercial do Brasil. (…) 18. Transposição do Rio São Francisco, parada há décadas—Água para o Nordeste.IF SOMEONE ASKS WHAT GOOD THINGS PR. BOLSONARO DID FOR BRAZIL, SHOW THEM THIS LIST BELOW WITH SOME THINGS HE DID.
1. Created PIX 2. Gave 33% raises to teachers. (…) 7. Obtained records in Brazilian exports. 8. Obtained a surplus in Brazil’s trade balance. (…) 18. Transposition of the São Francisco River, stopped for decades—Water for the Northeast.
Forest fireJournalmedia 06 00085 i002 Chile declara estado de emergência devido a grandes incêndios florestais, mais de 1000 casas destruídas, 10 mortes relatadas.Journalmedia 06 00085 i002 Chile declares state of emergency due to massive wildfires, over 1000 homes destroyed, 10 deaths reported.
Note: We have chosen to reproduce the messages in their entirety, preserving the original formatting (including the use of *, all-caps and emojis, as any alteration could change the meaning or emphatic effects inherent to the content under analysis).
Table 2. Examples of messages from each category shared on Telegram.
Table 2. Examples of messages from each category shared on Telegram.
TopicExample of Message Shared on Telegram (Portuguese)Example of Message Shared on Telegram (English Translation)
Attacks on the Lula Government environmental policyAs queimadas na Amazônia continuam sem solução, mesmo após vários meses do governo Lula com Marina Silva a frente do Ministério do Meio Ambiente. Nesta quinta-feira (06), a capital do Amazonas, Manaus, amanheceu com o ar tomado por fumaça, devido às queimadas que estão ocorrendo na região. The fires in the Amazon remain unresolved, even after several months of the Lula government with Marina Silva at the head of the Ministry of the Environment. This Thursday (06), the capital of Amazonas, Manaus, woke up to the air filled with smoke, due to the fires that are occurring in the region.
Attacks on MSTMINISTRO DO STF É ‘FLAGRADO’ DESCONTRAIDAMENTE EM EVENTO DO MST Bem à vontade.“SUPREME COURT MINISTER IS ‘CAUGHT’ AT MST EVENT, LOOKING AT EASE. Very comfortable.
In defense of agribusiness O agronegócio brasileiro é um dos setores mais importantes da economia do país, pois trata se do setor primário, representando cerca de 1/3 do PIB nacional. O Brasil é um dos maiores produtores e exportadores de grãos do mundo. Além disso, agro é responsável por gerar milhões de empregos em todo o país, tanto no campo como na agro-indústria e comércio. O agro brasileiro merece respeito, e estou na Câmara dos Deputados para defender essa classe que alimenta o mundoBrazilian agribusiness is one of the most important sectors of the country’s economy, as it is the primary sector, representing about 1/3 of the national GDP. Brazil is one of the largest producers and exporters of grain in the world. In addition, agribusiness is responsible for generating millions of jobs throughout the country, both in the countryside and in agro-industry and commerce. Brazilian agribusiness deserves respect, and I am in the Chamber of Deputies to defend this sector that feeds the world.
Conspiracy theoriesCientistas nos Estados Unidos estão recebendo financiamento maciço para testar novos sistemas de vacinas de mRNA em roedores, gado e produtos agrícolasScientists in the United States are receiving massive funding to test new mRNA vaccine systems in rodents, livestock and agricultural products
Ukraine War and fertilizersA Única coisa que o Bolsonaro buscava com o Putin era fertilizantes, adotando o pragmatismo. O Putin é muito mais próximo do LULA, e inclusive da respaldo pra invasão da Ucrania por meio do Itamaraty e do Celso Amorim. O Lula ja criticou diversas vezes a OTAN e ja culpou a otan pela guerra da Ucrânia. Se não for o bastante, ele ainda é a favor da mesma ideia de mundo “multipolar” que a Rússia prega junto da China e da quebra da hegemonia do Dólar. Até mesmo o atual cotado Pro STF, Flavio Dino, que deveria ser seu ídolo, estava a favor de tirar o Brasil da TPI pra receber seu Putin de braços abertos! The only thing Bolsonaro was after with Putin was fertilizer, being pragmatic. Putin is much closer to LULA, and even supports the invasion of Ukraine through Itamaraty and Celso Amorim. Lula has criticized NATO several times and has already blamed NATO for the war in Ukraine. If that is not enough, he is also in favor of the same idea of a “multipolar” world that Russia preaches together with China and overturning the dominance of the Dollar. Even the current candidate for the Supreme Court, Flavio Dino, who should be his idol, was in favor of removing Brazil from the ICC to welcome Putin with open arms!
Attacks on NGOsOs americanos não são burros, eles já exploram a Amazônia sem precisar de intervenção militar na região. Fazem isso através de políticos vendidos que colocam no congresso para proteger suas ONGs. O fundo Amazônia por exemplo… não vai um centavo pra beneficiar alguma prefeitura ou governo local… todo dinheiro que eles mandam pra esse fundo só pode ir para suas próprias ONGs na Amazônia, que servem como mineradoras clandestinas na região.The Americans are not stupid. They already exploit the Amazon without needing military intervention in the region. They do this through corrupt politicians who they put in Congress to protect their NGOs. The Amazon Fund, for example… not a single cent goes to benefit any city hall or local government… all the money they send to this fund can only go to their own NGOs in the Amazon, which serve as clandestine mining companies in the region.
Bolsonaro helped the environment“INDÍGENAS EM ESTADO DE DESNUTRIÇÃO EM RORAIMA SÃO VENEZUELANOS E FRUTO DO COMUNISMO”. ENTENDA; Entre os milhares de venezuelanos que fogem da ditadura bolivariana estão estes indígenas yanomamis, que necessitam de todo acolhimento e cuidado.“INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN A STATE OF MALNUTRITION IN RORAIMA ARE VENEZUELANS AND THE RESULT OF COMMUNISM”. UNDERSTAND; Among the thousands of Venezuelans fleeing the Bolivarian dictatorship are these Yanomami indigenous people, who need care and support
Forest fireJournalmedia 06 00085 i003 A AMAZÔNIA ESTÁ QUEIMANDO: Com quase 7000 incêndios florestais registrados até 29 de setembro, o estado do Amazonas teve seu pior mês do ano em termos de incêndios florestais. É o segundo pior setembro já registrado desde o início da série histórica em 1998, sendo que em apenas 2022 teve maior número de incêndios florestais, com 8600.Journalmedia 06 00085 i003 THE AMAZON IS BURNING: With almost 7000 forest fires registered up to September 29, the state of Amazonas had its worst month of the year in terms of forest fires. It is the second worst September on record since records began in 1998, and only 2022 saw a higher number of forest fires, with 8600.
Note: We have chosen to reproduce the messages in their entirety, preserving the original formatting (including the use of *, all-caps and emojis, as any alteration could change the meaning or emphatic effects inherent to the content under analysis).
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Santini, R.M.; Salles, D.G.; Santos, M.L.; Leopoldo Belin, L.; Ciodaro, T. Anti-Sustainability Narratives in Chat Apps: What Shapes the Brazilian Far-Right Discussion About Socio-Environmental Issues on WhatsApp and Telegram. Journal. Media 2025, 6, 85. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6020085

AMA Style

Santini RM, Salles DG, Santos ML, Leopoldo Belin L, Ciodaro T. Anti-Sustainability Narratives in Chat Apps: What Shapes the Brazilian Far-Right Discussion About Socio-Environmental Issues on WhatsApp and Telegram. Journalism and Media. 2025; 6(2):85. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6020085

Chicago/Turabian Style

Santini, Rose Marie, Débora Gomes Salles, Marina Loureiro Santos, Luciane Leopoldo Belin, and Thiago Ciodaro. 2025. "Anti-Sustainability Narratives in Chat Apps: What Shapes the Brazilian Far-Right Discussion About Socio-Environmental Issues on WhatsApp and Telegram" Journalism and Media 6, no. 2: 85. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6020085

APA Style

Santini, R. M., Salles, D. G., Santos, M. L., Leopoldo Belin, L., & Ciodaro, T. (2025). Anti-Sustainability Narratives in Chat Apps: What Shapes the Brazilian Far-Right Discussion About Socio-Environmental Issues on WhatsApp and Telegram. Journalism and Media, 6(2), 85. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6020085

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