The Geopolitisation of the European Union: Strategic Adaptation in a Shifting Global Order

Abstract

This article examines the process of the European Union’s geopolitisation within the context of intensifying geopolitical competition and uncertainty in a shifting global order. It focuses on how this process reshapes the EU’s character as a political actor and identifies the structural constraints that limit its geopolitical agency. The study employs a conceptually oriented qualitative research design based on interpretative analysis and the triangulation of theoretical frameworks, policy documents, and selected empirical cases. The findings demonstrate that the EU’s geopolitical turn does not represent a transformation into a traditional state-centric power; rather, it constitutes a process of strategic adaptation within a complex multi-level governance system. Furthermore, geopolitisation manifests unevenly across policy domains, with the most pronounced impacts identified in enlargement, geoeconomics, and external border management. Despite rising ambitions, the EU’s capacity to act remains constrained by internal fragmentation, dependence on member states, and challenges regarding political legitimacy. The primary contribution of this article lies in its conceptualisation of EU geopolitisation as a hybrid and multidimensional process—one that is not a linear transformation towards a traditional geopolitical power, but an outcome of the interaction between regulatory, market, and strategic logics. These findings contribute to the ongoing academic debate by highlighting the necessity of theoretical pluralism when examining the EU in a geopolitical context.

1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) is increasingly characterised as an actor undergoing a fundamental geopolitical transformation. Over the past decade—and particularly following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022—the language of power, strategy, and security has moved to the forefront of both political discourse and academic debate. This shift is reflected in official EU strategic documents, such as the Versailles Declaration [1,2,3]. An entity traditionally perceived primarily as a normative or regulatory power [4,5,6] is now frequently interpreted as an emergent geopolitical actor striving to adapt to an increasingly competitive and fragmented international environment [7]. This transition is evident not only in political rhetoric but also in a growing body of scholarly work analysing the ‘geopolitisation’ of European policies, institutions, and external relations [8,9].

These developments are unfolding within the broader context of a ‘polycrisis’—the convergence and interconnectedness of multiple crisis phenomena, including security threats, economic turbulence, energy risks, and geopolitical rivalry [10,11]. These dynamics accelerate the integration of previously distinct policy domains—such as trade, industrial policy, and foreign and security policy—into a more comprehensive, albeit still fragmented, geopolitical framework [8,12]. Consequently, the EU is compelled to operate in an environment defined by intense competition with global actors, most notably Russia, China, and, in a distinct capacity, the United States [13].

At the same time, the geopolitical repositioning of the EU is increasingly shaped by debates surrounding strategic autonomy, transatlantic dependence, and the future of the European security order. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, growing uncertainty regarding long-term US commitments to European security, and mounting pressure for greater European responsibility within NATO have intensified discussions concerning the EU’s ability to act independently in geopolitical and security affairs [14,15]. While the Union remains deeply embedded within the transatlantic framework, these developments have reinforced pressures for a stronger European geopolitical role and for the expansion of autonomous strategic, industrial, and defence capacities [12,16].

Despite the rising frequency of the term ‘geopolitical Union’, the nature, scope, and limits of this transformation remain subjects of intense scholarly debate. Existing literature highlights several key dimensions of this process. First, enlargement has been re-established as a strategic instrument, framed explicitly as a geopolitical investment in stability, security, and spheres of influence, particularly within the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood [17,18]. Second, the Union is increasingly deploying geoeconomic tools—including industrial policy, supply chain management, and the pursuit of strategic autonomy—marking a departure from its traditional liberal model of market integration [16,19]. Third, geopolitisation is reflected in shifts within the institutional balance, involving changes in the distribution of power between supranational and intergovernmental actors [20,21]. Finally, geopolitical pressures are leading to a redefinition of the Union’s external borders, manifested through differentiated patterns of openness and closure towards partners and rivals alike [22,23].

However, these analytical approaches often remain fragmented and sector-specific. Most studies focus on individual policies or particular aspects of geopolitisation without establishing a cohesive conceptual framework capable of capturing the EU’s transformation as a political actor in its entirety [10]. Furthermore, a tension persists between interpretations viewing the EU as moving towards a traditional geopolitical power model and those emphasising the Union’s enduring hybrid, multi-level, and institutionally constrained nature [24]. This dichotomy raises the question of whether current developments represent a genuine structural transformation or merely a series of reactive, crisis-driven adaptation processes [25].

An additional conceptual problem concerns the analytical ambiguity surrounding the notion of geopolitisation itself. In contemporary debates, the term is frequently used interchangeably with related concepts such as securitisation, politicisation, strategic autonomy, or crisis-driven integration [9]. Yet these phenomena are not identical. In this article, geopolitisation is understood more specifically as a process through which policy domains, institutional arrangements, and strategic priorities are increasingly interpreted and organised according to considerations of geopolitical competition, security, power projection, and strategic positioning within the international system [7,11]. In this sense, geopolitisation extends beyond securitisation or crisis management, as it involves the broader restructuring of political priorities and governance logics under conditions of intensifying geopolitical rivalry.

This article addresses this analytical gap through a conceptually oriented qualitative analysis of the EU’s geopolitical transformation under conditions of polycrisis. Rather than viewing geopolitisation as a linear and homogenous process, this study conceptualises it as a hybrid, differentiated, and sectorally uneven phenomenon that manifests distinctly across various policy domains and institutional dimensions [11]. The central research question is: How does the process of geopolitisation reshape the character of the European Union as a political actor, and what are the structural limits of this transformation?

In response to this question, the article puts forward three analytical claims. First, the EU’s geopolitical turn does not signify a transformation into a traditional state-centric geopolitical power, but rather a hybrid and selective adaptation of a complex multi-level political system [4]. Second, geopolitisation manifests unevenly across policy sectors, with the most significant impacts observable in enlargement, geoeconomic policy, and the formation of external borders [26,27]. Third, the EU’s geopolitical ambitions are structurally limited by internal institutional fragmentation, the continued dominance of member states in decision-making processes, and tensions regarding democratic legitimacy [28,29].

In contrast to approaches that interpret the EU’s geopolitical evolution primarily through the prism of traditional power politics, this article argues that the Union’s geopolitical transformation should be understood as a process of strategic adaptation emerging from the interaction between regulatory, market, institutional, and security logics [14]. Strategic adaptation is therefore conceptualised not as a synonym for geopolitisation, but as one of its principal outcomes. This distinction is analytically important because it allows for a clearer differentiation between the drivers of geopolitical change and the institutional forms through which the EU responds to external pressures.

Methodologically, the article employs a conceptually oriented qualitative research design, combining interpretative analysis, analytically focused comparison, and the triangulation of theoretical and empirical sources. The analysis draws on contemporary scholarly literature and policy-oriented studies. Its objective is not to test causal hypotheses but to identify recurring mechanisms and patterns that explain the EU’s changing geopolitical role. This approach maintains theoretical rigour while ensuring empirical relevance, explicitly reflecting the limitations inherent in qualitative research.

More specifically, the article analyses selected EU strategic documents, policy initiatives, and institutional developments from the period 2016–2025, focusing on areas where geopolitical considerations became increasingly visible in political discourse and policy practice. The analysis concentrates on enlargement policy, geoeconomic governance, institutional transformation, and external border management because these domains most clearly illustrate the differentiated and multi-dimensional nature of the EU’s geopolitical adaptation. Analytical comparison across these policy fields is conducted according to common criteria, including strategic framing, institutional coordination, the use of geopolitical instruments, and the degree of member-state fragmentation.

The contribution of this article is threefold. At the theoretical level, it integrates insights from European integration theories and recent approaches to geopolitisation into a unified analytical framework. Empirically, it offers a synthesis of developments across multiple policy areas, including enlargement, industrial policy, institutional governance, and external borders. From a public policy perspective, it provides a critical assessment of the gap between the EU’s geopolitical ambitions and its actual capacity to act as a coherent and effective strategic actor in a shifting global environment.

At a broader conceptual level, the article also contributes to ongoing debates concerning the future character of European integration under conditions of intensifying geopolitical competition. Rather than interpreting geopolitisation as evidence of the EU’s convergence towards a conventional great-power model, the analysis highlights the persistence of hybrid governance arrangements that combine supranational coordination, intergovernmental bargaining, regulatory influence, and selective strategic activism.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The subsequent section elaborates on the theoretical framework, situating the analysis within contemporary debates on geopolitisation and European integration. This is followed by a presentation of the methodological approach and research design. The empirical section analyses the core dimensions of the EU’s geopolitical transformation across specific policy domains. The discussion then interprets the findings and evaluates their implications for both theory and practice. The conclusion summarises the primary arguments, identifies the limits of the EU’s geopolitical transformation, and outlines directions for future research.

2. Theoretical Framework: Conceptualising the EU’s Geopolitical Transformation

2.1. Geopolitisation and the Return of Power in EU Studies

In recent years, the concept of geopolitisation has established itself as a pivotal analytical framework for examining the transformation of the European Union [30,31]. Broadly defined, it refers to a process whereby policy issues, frameworks, and strategies are reinterpreted through the lens of power, security, territorial control, and international competition. This signifies a shift from a technocratic and normatively oriented understanding of integration towards a logic dominated by strategic interest and geopolitical rivalry [7].

More specifically, geopolitisation in the EU context can be understood as a gradual restructuring of political priorities and governance practices around concerns related to strategic competition, resilience, security, and external influence. Unlike securitisation, which primarily frames issues as existential threats requiring extraordinary measures, geopolitisation encompasses a broader and more durable transformation in the strategic orientation of political action [31,32]. Similarly, while strategic autonomy constitutes one important policy response to geopolitical pressures, it should be viewed as a component or outcome of geopolitisation rather than as a synonymous concept [7,14]. This distinction is analytically important because it enables a clearer differentiation between the drivers, manifestations, and consequences of the EU’s geopolitical transformation.

This transition is inextricably linked to the broader transformation of the international environment, as reflected in EU strategic documents focused on security and defence [33]. The erosion of multilateralism, the resurgence of great-power politics, and the increasing instrumentalisation of economic relations for strategic ends have led to a gradual blurring of the traditional distinction between internal and external policies [34]. Within the EU context, geopolitisation manifests primarily through the convergence of trade, industrial, energy, and security policies, which are increasingly viewed as instruments for advancing strategic objectives [19].

The geopolitical consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine further accelerated this transformation by intensifying concerns regarding strategic vulnerabilities, external dependencies, and the fragility of the European security order [10,33]. Simultaneously, growing uncertainty surrounding the long-term reliability of US security guarantees and increasing pressure for greater European burden-sharing within NATO have strengthened debates about the EU’s geopolitical agency and defence capabilities [15]. These developments contributed to the expansion of geopolitical reasoning into policy domains previously dominated by technocratic or market-oriented logics.

From a theoretical perspective, these developments signal a departure from the dominant liberal-institutionalist paradigm, which has long interpreted European integration as a process rooted in rules, cooperation, and the mutualisation of interests [29]. In its place, a power-oriented logic has come to the fore, in which both states and supranational institutions reflect on relative gains, security risks, and strategic autonomy. This shift, however, does not imply a total abandonment of normative principles, but rather their reinterpretation within the context of intensifying geopolitical competition [24,35].

A critical question in this regard is the extent to which geopolitisation represents a genuine material transformation versus a discursive construct. Some approaches emphasise that labelling the EU as ‘geopolitical’ is primarily legitimising in nature, serving to mobilise political support for new policies [1]. Others point to concrete empirical changes, such as new instruments in trade defence, investment screening, and sanctions policy, which suggest a tangible shift towards a more strategic application of power [30,36]. In this sense, geopolitisation can be understood as a process possessing both discursive and material dimensions, where their interconnectedness is essential for understanding the EU’s contemporary transformation.

For the purposes of this article, geopolitisation is operationalised through four interrelated indicators: (1) the strategic reframing of policy domains in geopolitical and security terms; (2) the growing use of economic and regulatory instruments for geopolitical purposes; (3) increased institutional coordination around strategic objectives; and (4) the differentiation of external relations according to geopolitical criteria. These dimensions provide the analytical basis for examining how geopolitical reasoning reshapes the EU’s governance structures and policy practices across different sectors.

2.2. The EU as a Hybrid (Compound) Polity

The transformation of the European Union cannot be adequately captured without considering its specific nature as a hybrid, or complex multi-level political system [21,28]. While the EU is not a state in the classical sense, it nevertheless possesses extensive regulatory, economic, and, increasingly, political capacities that enable it to function as a relevant actor in the international arena.

Traditionally, the EU has been characterised primarily as a regulatory power, whose influence stems from its ability to create norms and rules with extraterritorial reach [6]. This model has been complemented by the concept of market power, which highlights the significance of the EU’s internal market size as a source of leverage in global economic relations [37]. Currently, these dimensions are being joined by a growing emphasis on the EU as an emergent geopolitical actor, striving to actively assert its strategic interests amidst international competition [9].

This combination of differing logics suggests that the EU can most accurately be conceptualised as a hybrid or ‘compound polity’—one that integrates elements of supranational governance, intergovernmental coordination, and regulatory authority [11]. This model allows for flexible adaptation to changing conditions, yet it also generates significant tensions, particularly concerning policy coordination, decision-making speed, and the legitimacy of adopted measures [38].

In this article, hybridity is understood specifically as the coexistence and interaction of regulatory, market, intergovernmental, supranational, and geopolitical logics within a single political system. The EU therefore does not operate according to one coherent geopolitical rationality comparable to that of a nation-state [7]. Instead, its external action emerges through the interaction of multiple governance modes, institutional competences, and political interests. This conceptualisation helps explain why the EU’s geopolitical transformation frequently appears fragmented, selective, and uneven across policy sectors.

Furthermore, the multi-level nature of EU governance imposes a substantial limit on its geopolitical agency. The division of competences between member states and EU institutions, coupled with the diverging preferences of various actors, often leads to fragmented decision-making and difficulties in formulating a coherent strategic line [39,40]. Consequently, the EU’s geopolitical ambitions frequently encounter practical constraints arising from its institutional architecture.

Within this framework, geopolitical agency should not be reduced solely to military capabilities or coercive power. Rather, it refers to the EU’s capacity to formulate, coordinate, and implement strategic action across multiple policy domains in pursuit of geopolitical objectives. This includes the ability to align economic, regulatory, diplomatic, and security instruments in a coherent manner. However, the fragmented nature of EU governance means that such coordination often remains partial, contested, and dependent on member-state consensus.

2.3. Competing and Complementary Theoretical Approaches

The current geopolitical transformation of the EU can be interpreted through several theoretical lenses, each providing distinct yet complementary perspectives.

Neo-functionalism emphasises the role of functional pressures and ‘spillover’ mechanisms, whereby integration in one area necessitates deeper cooperation in adjacent sectors [41]. From this vantage point, geopolitisation can be understood as a consequence of increasing policy interconnectedness; for instance, economic integration generates a functional requirement for coordination in security or industrial policy.

This perspective is particularly useful for explaining why geopolitical pressures increasingly penetrate domains previously considered primarily economic or technocratic. The growing interdependence between energy security, industrial resilience, technological sovereignty, and defence policy illustrates how external geopolitical pressures generate functional pressures for deeper coordination across previously separate sectors.

In contrast, intergovernmentalism highlights the enduring dominance of member states, which retain decisive control over core sovereign domains, particularly foreign and security policy [42]. Within this framework, the EU’s geopolitical transformation is interpreted as the result of strategic bargaining between states rather than an autonomous process of supranational integration [43].

This approach helps explain why geopolitical crises often strengthen the role of the European Council and reinforce intergovernmental coordination mechanisms rather than producing straightforward supranational centralisation. The persistence of unanimity requirements and divergent national strategic cultures continues to constrain the emergence of a fully coherent EU geopolitical actor.

Post-functionalism supplements these perspectives by focusing on the politicisation of European integration and the rising significance of legitimacy, identity, and public contestation. Geopolitisation, which often entails redistributive decisions and security commitments, may exacerbate political tensions and complicate further integration [44].

This dimension has become increasingly relevant in light of the growing influence of nationalist and populist political movements across Europe [45,46]. Such actors frequently challenge further integration in sensitive areas related to sovereignty, migration, defence, and external relations, thereby complicating efforts to strengthen the EU’s geopolitical coherence [47]. The resurgence of sovereignty-sensitive politics demonstrates that geopolitical adaptation unfolds within a politically contested environment rather than through purely functional dynamics.

Finally, geopolitical approaches offer a framework for analysing the EU as an actor operating within a landscape of power competition. While realist perspectives underscore the importance of material power, security interests, and rivalry, more recent concepts—such as relational geopolitics—point to the complex, multidimensional nature of geopolitical interactions that encompass institutional and normative aspects alongside power dynamics [23,48].

At the same time, geopolitical approaches also draw attention to the limits of the EU’s strategic autonomy. Despite the expansion of geopolitical ambitions, the Union remains structurally dependent on transatlantic security arrangements and NATO capabilities in several critical domains. This creates a structural tension between aspirations for greater geopolitical agency and the practical realities of European defence dependence, particularly in relation to military capabilities, intelligence, and deterrence [15].

2.4. Towards an Analytical Framework of Hybrid Geopolitical Transformation

Building upon these theoretical foundations, this article formulates an analytical framework for a more comprehensive understanding of the European Union’s geopolitical transformation. This study operates on the premise that geopolitisation is neither a linear nor a homogenous process leading towards a traditional geopolitical power. Instead, it is a hybrid, differentiated, and sectorally uneven phenomenon that reflects the EU’s unique nature as a complex multi-level polity.

Within this framework, geopolitical transformation is conceptualised as the result of the interaction between three fundamental dimensions:

• The strategic dimension, involving the formulation of geopolitical objectives and interests;
• The institutional dimension, concerning the distribution of power and decision-making mechanisms;
• The policy dimension, comprising the specific instruments and policies through which these objectives are realised [8,30,31].

To operationalise this framework more systematically, the analysis examines each selected policy domain according to four analytical criteria: (1) the degree of strategic reframing in geopolitical terms; (2) the extent of institutional coordination and centralisation; (3) the use of geopolitical instruments and strategic policy tools; and (4) the level of fragmentation resulting from member-state divergences or institutional complexity. These criteria enable a structured comparison across policy sectors and provide a clearer analytical connection between theoretical assumptions and empirical observations.

This defined framework enables an analysis not only of where and how geopolitisation manifests but also of why its progression is uneven and subject to structural constraints. Furthermore, it provides the basis for the empirical analysis in the subsequent sections, where the dimensions of geopolitical transformation will be examined across selected policy domains.

Within this analytical perspective, strategic adaptation is conceptualised as the principal outcome of geopolitisation rather than its synonym. The EU adapts strategically by modifying policy priorities, governance arrangements, and institutional coordination mechanisms in response to external geopolitical pressures. However, because these adaptations occur within an already existing hybrid political structure, the resulting transformation remains selective, incomplete, and internally differentiated.

It is, however, necessary to reflect that this process of strategic adaptation is not universally accepted within the academic community. Critical perspectives highlight potential tensions between rising geopolitical ambitions and the maintenance of the EU’s normative integrity, particularly regarding global democracy promotion and human rights [49]. A further risk is that the EU’s transformation into a geoeconomic actor may trigger new forms of global dependencies and destabilise the multilateral trading system [50]. Acknowledging these critical reflections completes the comprehensive view of the EU’s hybrid nature as it seeks to balance its foundational normative identity with emerging strategic imperatives.

3. Methodology and Research Design

3.1. Research Strategy

This article employs a concept-driven qualitative research strategy, which is particularly suited for investigating the complex, multi-level, and dynamic political processes inherent in the European Union’s geopolitical transformation [51,52]. Given the nature of the phenomenon under study—characterised by high levels of conceptual ambiguity, sectoral differentiation, and institutional complexity—a strictly quantitative or hypothesis-testing approach would fail to adequately capture its internal logic and variability.

The chosen approach is therefore predicated on the objective of identifying analytical patterns, mechanisms, and relationships between the various dimensions of geopolitisation, rather than testing linear causal hypotheses. This type of analysis is well-established in contemporary literature on European integration and geopolitisation, which increasingly utilises exploratory and interpretative research designs, particularly when addressing emergent and theoretically fluid phenomena [9,10].

More specifically, the research seeks to identify how geopolitical reasoning increasingly penetrates EU policy-making, institutional coordination, and strategic discourse across selected policy sectors. The analysis focuses not on measuring geopolitical power quantitatively, but on examining how geopolitical logics reshape governance structures, political priorities, and policy instruments within the EU framework. This approach is particularly suitable for analysing hybrid political systems whose strategic transformation cannot be adequately reduced to measurable indicators of material power alone.

Furthermore, the research is anchored in an interpretative approach, which allows for the analysis of geopolitisation not merely as a set of material changes but as a process of constructing meaning, strategic narratives, and political priorities. This reflects the reality that geopolitics within the EU context cannot be reduced to traditional power indicators; it encompasses discursive and institutional dimensions that collectively determine its specific form.

The interpretative dimension of the analysis is particularly important because the EU’s geopolitical transformation unfolds simultaneously at discursive, institutional, and policy levels. The study therefore examines not only the emergence of new policy instruments, but also the changing language through which EU actors frame strategic priorities, external threats, resilience, sovereignty, and geopolitical competition. This distinction enables a clearer differentiation between rhetorical geopolitisation and substantive institutional or policy transformation.

An additional element of the research design is analytically focused comparison. Rather than comparing individual member states, this method focuses on comparing different policy and institutional dimensions of geopolitisation within the EU. This approach facilitates a systematic examination of the degree of consistency or differentiation in geopolitical transformation across selected policy domains, thereby identifying its uneven character.

The comparative logic of the research is organised around four common analytical criteria applied across all selected policy domains: (1) the extent of geopolitical reframing within political discourse; (2) the development of strategic or geopolitical policy instruments; (3) the degree of institutional coordination and centralisation; and (4) the level of fragmentation arising from diverging member-state preferences or institutional constraints. Applying these criteria systematically allows for a structured comparison of how geopolitisation manifests unevenly across sectors.

This comparative design also serves an analytical rather than illustrative purpose. Instead of merely presenting examples of geopolitical change, the article seeks to identify recurring patterns and structural mechanisms that explain why some policy domains become more geopoliticised than others and why the EU’s strategic adaptation remains differentiated and incomplete.

3.2. Data and Sources

The analysis is based on a purposively selected corpus of academic and policy-oriented sources that represent the current state of knowledge regarding the geopolitisation of the European Union. These sources cover the key dimensions of the phenomenon, including enlargement, geoeconomic transformation, institutional shifts, the formation of external borders, and the broader geopolitical context.

The empirical basis of the study consists of three principal categories of sources. First, the analysis draws on contemporary academic literature addressing geopolitisation, European integration, geoeconomics, strategic autonomy, and EU governance transformation. Second, it examines selected EU strategic and policy documents published primarily between 2016 and 2025, including the Versailles Declaration, the Strategic Compass, European Council conclusions, industrial and geoeconomic initiatives, and policy frameworks concerning enlargement and external borders. Third, the study incorporates selected empirical developments and institutional responses linked to the post-2022 geopolitical environment, particularly those connected to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, strategic autonomy debates, geoeconomic governance, and the EU’s neighbourhood policy.

The selection of sources is intentionally designed to allow for an analytical synthesis across diverse yet interconnected fields of research. This is not intended to be an exhaustive literature review but rather a targeted selection of texts that enable the identification of major trends, concepts, and empirical manifestations of geopolitisation in the EU’s contemporary development.

The corpus of sources was selected according to three principal criteria: relevance to the EU’s geopolitical transformation, analytical significance within contemporary academic and policy debates, and the capacity to illustrate changes across strategic, institutional, and policy dimensions. The selected materials therefore provide both conceptual depth and empirical relevance while enabling a systematic examination of the EU’s evolving geopolitical role.

Methodologically, the study employs triangulation, combining three complementary levels of analysis. First, theoretical literature provides the conceptual foundations for interpreting geopolitical transformation. Second, policy-oriented analyses offer insights into specific political instruments, strategies, and decision-making processes. Third, empirical examples—such as enlargement decisions, the implementation of geoeconomic tools, or changes in external border regimes—serve to illustrate and verify the identified analytical patterns.

Within this framework, triangulation serves not merely to diversify source material but to connect theoretical interpretation with institutional developments and concrete policy manifestations. Theoretical approaches are therefore systematically confronted with policy practice and empirical developments in order to reduce one-sided interpretations and strengthen analytical consistency. In this sense, triangulation functions as a mechanism for validating analytical patterns across multiple levels of evidence rather than simply combining different categories of sources.

This framework of triangulation enhances the analytical robustness of the research by allowing theoretical claims to be confronted with empirical observations while minimising interpretive bias.

The analysis additionally incorporates a temporal comparative element by examining how selected policy domains evolved before and after the geopolitical turning point created by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This allows the study to distinguish between longer-term structural trends and developments directly accelerated by the changing geopolitical environment.

3.3. Analytical Framework

The analytical framework employed in this article is derived from the theoretical synthesis presented in the previous chapter and operationalises geopolitisation through three interconnected dimensions.

First, the strategic dimension focuses on the formulation of the European Union’s geopolitical objectives and interests. This dimension primarily encompasses issues of security, stability, spheres of influence, and strategic autonomy, analysing how these goals are articulated within political discourse and translated into concrete decisions.

Particular attention is paid to the emergence of strategic narratives related to resilience, geopolitical competition, strategic autonomy, security interdependence, and the protection of critical infrastructures and supply chains. The analysis therefore examines not only formal policy outcomes but also the broader strategic reframing of EU priorities within an increasingly competitive international environment.

Second, the institutional dimension examines shifts in the distribution of power and decision-making mechanisms within the EU. Particular attention is paid to the relationship between supranational institutions and member states, as well as the dynamics between centralisation and fragmentation in the context of geopolitisation.

This dimension specifically analyses whether geopolitical pressures contribute to stronger supranational coordination, reinforce intergovernmental bargaining, or generate hybrid governance arrangements combining both tendencies. It also examines how geopolitical crises affect the role of institutions such as the European Commission, the European Council, and member states in shaping strategic responses.

Third, the policy dimension concentrates on the specific instruments and policy domains through which geopolitical ambitions are realised. This includes enlargement, geoeconomic and industrial policy, and external border management, thereby enabling an analysis of the practical implementation of geopolitical strategies.

The selected policy domains were chosen because they represent areas in which geopolitical reasoning became particularly visible after 2022 and because they collectively illustrate the differentiated nature of the EU’s geopolitical adaptation. Enlargement reflects the geopolitical reinterpretation of integration policy; geoeconomics illustrates the strategic use of economic instruments; institutional transformation captures shifts in governance coordination; and border management demonstrates the geopolitical differentiation of openness and exclusion.

This tripartite framework serves as a systematic tool for empirical analysis, allowing for the connection of theoretical concepts with specific manifestations of geopolitisation and the identification of their mutual interactions.

To strengthen analytical consistency, each policy domain is examined according to the same comparative criteria: strategic reframing, institutional coordination, deployment of geopolitical instruments, and the degree of fragmentation or coherence. This structure allows the analysis to move beyond descriptive illustration towards a more systematic identification of patterns, similarities, and divergences across sectors.

3.4. Research Limitations

The chosen research design entails certain limitations, which are inherent to the nature of the phenomenon under study and the selected analytical strategy. First, this article does not employ quantitative hypothesis testing; consequently, its objective is not the identification of universal causal relationships, but rather the explanation of complex processes and their internal dynamics. This approach is, however, consistent with the exploratory nature of the research and the aim of conceptually refining the notion of geopolitisation.

Second, the article does not seek to measure the EU’s geopolitical effectiveness in quantitative terms or to compare the Union systematically with traditional great powers. Instead, the analysis concentrates on understanding how geopolitical reasoning reshapes EU governance structures, institutional dynamics, and strategic priorities. Consequently, the study focuses more on processes of transformation than on evaluating geopolitical performance outcomes.

Second, the selection of policy domains for analysis is purposive, focusing on those dimensions identified in contemporary literature as pivotal to the EU’s geopolitical transformation. While this selection facilitates an in-depth analysis of representative cases, it does not aspire to provide exhaustive coverage of all aspects of the phenomenon.

This means that several important policy fields—such as defence industrial cooperation, cybersecurity, sanctions policy, or EU-China relations—are addressed only indirectly or selectively. Their omission does not imply analytical insignificance but reflects the need to maintain conceptual coherence and analytical depth within the scope of a single study.

Third, the interpretative nature of the analysis implies that the findings are, to some extent, contingent upon the chosen analytical framework. This risk is mitigated through the systematic triangulation of sources and the rigorous alignment of theoretical foundations with empirical observations.

Additionally, because the process of geopolitisation remains ongoing and highly dynamic, some institutional and policy developments analysed in this article may continue to evolve significantly beyond the examined period. The findings should therefore be understood as capturing a transitional phase in the EU’s geopolitical adaptation rather than a completed transformation.

Despite these limitations, the chosen methodological approach provides an adequate and analytically robust framework for investigating the European Union’s geopolitical transformation. It successfully captures the complex, differentiated, and dynamic nature of this process without resorting to reductive causal models.

4. Results

4.1. Enlargement as a Geopolitical Instrument

The enlargement of the European Union represents one of the most prominent domains in which geopolitisation manifests as a strategic tool for shaping the regional order [26]. Although enlargement has traditionally been interpreted through the lens of normative transformation and economic integration, contemporary developments indicate an increasingly explicit geopolitical anchoring [25]. Particularly since 2022, enlargement has returned to the centre of the EU’s political agenda, framed openly as a means of ensuring stability, security, and political influence within the broader European space [53,54].

Compared to the pre-2022 period, when enlargement policy was frequently characterised by stagnation and ‘enlargement fatigue’, the post-2022 geopolitical environment has fundamentally altered the strategic significance of accession policy. Enlargement is increasingly presented not merely as a mechanism of normative convergence, but as an instrument for stabilising the EU’s neighbourhood, limiting external influence, and strengthening the geopolitical resilience of the broader European order. This shift is particularly visible in political discourse surrounding Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans, where accession policy has become more directly linked to security and geopolitical considerations [54,55].

From the perspective of the strategic dimension of geopolitisation, enlargement can be interpreted as an instrument of power projection, enabling the EU to expand its regulatory, economic, and political space without resorting to traditional forms of hard coercion [17,56]. The decisions to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, as well as the opening of accession negotiations, mark a significant departure from the preceding period of so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’. This shift was explicitly confirmed by European Council decisions in 2022, including the Versailles Declaration—which emphasised the need to bolster the EU’s geopolitical role in response to the Russian invasion—and the subsequent granting of candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. This move was widely interpreted as a geopolitical response rather than the outcome of a standard assessment of candidate readiness [2,55]. This transition was not primarily motivated by a sudden improvement in the domestic conditions of the candidate countries, but rather by a shift in the geopolitical context, where enlargement serves as a tool for responding to security threats and strategic competition [7,57].

The geopolitical reinterpretation of enlargement is also reflected in the growing linkage between accession policy and broader questions of European security architecture. Candidate countries are increasingly viewed not only as future members of the internal market but also as strategic buffers, partners in security cooperation, and components of a wider geopolitical sphere aligned with the EU and the transatlantic community [55,58]. In this regard, enlargement policy increasingly intersects with debates on strategic autonomy, regional stability, and the containment of external geopolitical influence, particularly from Russia.

Analysis of decision-making processes at the European Council level reveals that geopolitical motives—specifically issues of security, stability, and influence—have long played a significant role in enlargement decisions [53,59], even if their explicit articulation in political discourse is a relatively recent phenomenon. In this sense, the current geopolitisation of enlargement does not represent an entirely new phenomenon, but rather the explicit surfacing of a logic that was previously more implicit [58].

However, the geopolitical framing of enlargement introduces new tensions, particularly regarding traditional membership criteria and the EU’s internal capacity. The classical logic of conditionality, based on normative and institutional requirements, is increasingly in tension with geopolitical imperatives that prioritise speed and strategic relevance over full convergence [25]. This shift raises questions about the consistency, credibility, and long-term sustainability of enlargement policy, suggesting that the deepening friction between normative and geopolitical logics may undermine its legitimacy in the long run.

This tension is particularly evident in the differentiated treatment of candidate countries. While geopolitical urgency accelerated the integration perspective of Ukraine and Moldova, progress in parts of the Western Balkans has remained comparatively slow and politically contested [60]. Such asymmetries indicate that geopolitical considerations increasingly shape the practical prioritisation of enlargement policy, thereby complicating the EU’s traditional narrative of merit-based conditionality.

Within the institutional dimension, enlargement manifests as a domain where member states maintain a dominant position. Key decisions regarding the opening and closing of accession chapters remain within the remit of the European Council, reinforcing the intergovernmental character of this policy [29]. The geopolitical context further accentuates the role of national interests, as individual member states may perceive enlargement differently according to their specific security, economic, or political preferences.

This dynamics is evident in the patterns of selective support or the blocking of individual accession processes, highlighting persistent decision-making fragmentation [22]. Thus, while geopolitisation enhances the strategic significance of enlargement, it does not remove its institutional constraints. On the contrary, it may exacerbate them, as the rising importance of enlargement as a geopolitical tool increases the political sensitivity of the associated decisions.

The continued influence of member states is also visible in differing national approaches towards Türkiye, the Western Balkans, and Eastern Partnership countries. These divergences reflect broader disagreements regarding migration, regional security, relations with NATO, and the future geographical boundaries of the Union itself. As a result, enlargement policy increasingly functions not only as an external instrument of geopolitical influence but also as an arena of internal geopolitical contestation within the EU [60].

From the policy dimension, enlargement can be understood as an instrument of differentiated integration, allowing the EU to engage flexibly with various levels of candidate involvement. This approach is reflected, for instance, in the gradual integration of candidate states into selected policy areas prior to formal membership, creating space for incremental alignment without the immediate necessity of full accession [41].

This differentiated approach reflects the EU’s attempt to reconcile geopolitical urgency with institutional and political constraints. Mechanisms such as phased integration, participation in selected EU programmes, and enhanced security and economic cooperation provide the Union with greater flexibility in managing candidate relations under rapidly changing geopolitical conditions. At the same time, however, these arrangements may create new forms of semi-integration and institutional ambiguity, potentially complicating the long-term coherence of the enlargement framework.

Nevertheless, this model also exposes the limitations of the EU’s geopolitical agency. As analyses of developments in the Union’s neighbourhood suggest, a persistent gap remains between declared ambitions and the EU’s actual capacity to effectively shape the political and security environment in its periphery [54]. While enlargement as a geopolitical tool provides a powerful signal of strategic commitment, its implementation is often sluggish, contingent upon internal compromises, and limited by institutional complexity [58,59].

The geopolitical stress generated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine therefore revealed both the strategic importance and the structural limits of enlargement policy. Although the EU demonstrated an unprecedented willingness to use enlargement geopolitically, the practical implementation of accession processes continues to depend on slow institutional procedures, political consensus, and the varying strategic preferences of member states. This suggests that enlargement has become more geopolitical in its rationale than in its operational capacity.

In conclusion, enlargement serves as a paradigmatic example of the multi-layered nature of the EU’s geopolitical transformation. On one hand, it is a tool with significant strategic potential that allows the EU to expand its influence and stabilise its neighbourhood. On the other hand, it remains constrained by internal structural factors that hinder its full effective deployment. Within the context of the analytical framework, the geopolitisation of enlargement confirms both the first and third analytical claims of this article, illustrating the selective and multi-layered nature of the EU’s geopolitical adaptation while revealing the structural limitations stemming from institutional fragmentation and the continued dominance of member states.

4.2. Geoeconomics and Industrial Policy

The geoeconomic dimension represents one of the most salient areas in which the geopolitisation of the European Union manifests as a qualitative shift in its functional logic. While EU economic integration was historically framed as a technocratic process oriented towards efficiency, liberalisation, and market regulation, contemporary developments indicate a decisive move towards the strategic utilisation of economic instruments to advance geopolitical objectives [61,62]. This transition is intrinsically linked to the burgeoning emphasis on strategic autonomy and the perception of global markets as arenas for geopolitical competition [16,63].

Compared to the pre-2022 period, when economic governance was still largely dominated by liberal market assumptions and regulatory coordination, the post-2022 geopolitical environment accelerated the securitisation of economic policy and strengthened the perception of economic interdependence as a strategic vulnerability. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, disruptions in global supply chains, technological competition with China, and concerns regarding economic coercion contributed to a growing understanding of geoeconomics as an integral component of European security and strategic resilience [64,65].

From a strategic perspective, geoeconomics enables the EU to compensate for the absence of traditional hard power instruments. In an environment where the Union lacks a unified military capacity or a centralised foreign policy, economic tools have become primary vehicles for power projection [66,67]. Policies aimed at securing supply chains, screening foreign direct investment (FDI), or protecting critical sectors are increasingly articulated as components of a broader security and geopolitical strategy [63,68,69]. This evolution reflects a wider trend wherein economy and security are no longer viewed as discrete spheres but are becoming increasingly intertwined.

The strategic logic underpinning these developments reflects the growing recognition that external dependencies in areas such as energy, semiconductors, rare earths, digital infrastructure, and critical technologies may generate geopolitical vulnerabilities. Consequently, economic resilience is increasingly framed as a prerequisite for geopolitical agency. In this sense, geoeconomics functions not merely as an economic policy adjustment, but as a broader strategic response to intensifying global competition and systemic rivalry.

A primary manifestation of this shift is the transformation of European industrial policy. The EU is progressively pivoting away from a traditional model rooted in open-market principles and minimal intervention towards a more active shaping of market processes [70,71]. Investments in strategic sectors and renewable energy sources, the promotion of technological sovereignty, and efforts to diversify supply chains constitute the concrete instruments of this transformation [72,73]. This trend is exemplified by initiatives such as the Net-Zero Industry Act, the European Chips Act, and the implementation of foreign investment screening mechanisms, all of which explicitly link economic policy with security and geopolitical goals [74,75,76].

Additional initiatives, including the Anti-Coercion Instrument and the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), further illustrate the EU’s transition towards a more interventionist and strategically oriented economic governance model. These measures indicate that the EU increasingly perceives global markets not as politically neutral spaces but as arenas shaped by power asymmetries, strategic dependencies, and geopolitical rivalry [30,77].

This form of ‘market activism’ signals that economic policy is no longer perceived as neutral but as a politically and strategically conditioned activity with a direct impact on the EU’s standing within the global system. Consequently, economic instruments are no longer merely supplementary elements of EU policy; they are becoming integral to the pursuit of strategic interests.

From an institutional standpoint, however, this geoeconomic transformation generates new tensions. On one hand, the role of the European Commission and other supranational actors is being bolstered, as they play a pivotal role in formulating and implementing industrial and trade policies [20,78]. On the other hand, member states retain significant influence, particularly regarding the financing, implementation, and political oversight of these initiatives [42]. The result is a complex dynamic in which geopolitisation drives partial centralisation while simultaneously preserving the fragmented nature of governance.

This tension became particularly visible in debates surrounding industrial subsidies, fiscal flexibility, defence-related industrial investments, and energy transition financing. While geopolitical pressures encouraged stronger coordination at the EU level, member states frequently pursued divergent national strategies reflecting different economic capacities, industrial structures, and security priorities [20,51]. As a result, geoeconomic governance increasingly combines supranational coordination with intensified intergovernmental bargaining.

This multi-layered institutional configuration reflects broader coordination challenges. The implementation of geoeconomic strategies requires a high degree of alignment between diverse policies and actors, which is inherently difficult within the EU’s multi-level governance framework. Divergent economic structures, national interests, and political priorities among member states can lead to inconsistent approaches that undermine the overall coherence of the geopolitical strategy [39,51].

In the policy dimension, geopolitisation is manifested through specific instruments that fuse economic and security objectives [56]. These include the introduction of FDI screening mechanisms, the use of trade instruments to counter economic coercion, and the support of strategic industries through public investment [69,79]. Such measures indicate that the EU is seeking to actively shape the global economic environment rather than merely reacting to its evolution [63].

The growing overlap between economic and security policy is also evident in the expansion of defence-industrial cooperation and strategic investment frameworks. Instruments linked to defence production, supply-chain resilience, and technological sovereignty increasingly blur the distinction between economic governance and security policy. This trend reflects the broader transformation of the EU towards a model in which economic governance is progressively embedded within strategic and geopolitical calculations [80].

Nevertheless, these developments also highlight the limitations of a geoeconomic approach. Despite rising ambitions to address global challenges through strategic autonomy, the EU remains significantly dependent on external actors in critical areas such as energy, technology, and security [14,16]. Thus, the geoeconomic transformation frequently encounters structural dependencies that constrain the EU’s capacity for fully autonomous action [50,76].

Moreover, the pursuit of strategic autonomy itself remains politically contested within the Union. While some member states advocate stronger economic sovereignty and reduced external dependencies, others remain concerned about protectionism, market fragmentation, and the potential weakening of transatlantic economic relations [79]. This demonstrates that geoeconomic adaptation does not eliminate political divisions within the EU but may instead generate new tensions regarding the balance between openness, competitiveness, and strategic protection.

Furthermore, the geopolitisation of economic policy raises new questions of legitimacy. More active intervention in market processes, the selective support of specific sectors, and the tightening nexus between economy and security mean that decisions in this field have more pronounced distributive impacts [62,63]. This increases the political sensitivity of such measures and may lead to the further politicisation of economic integration.

Ultimately, the geoeconomic dimension confirms the article’s second analytical claim, which posits that geopolitisation manifests unevenly across policy domains. This process is particularly visible in economic and industrial policy, marking a clear shift from a regulatory to a strategic logic. Simultaneously, this dimension illustrates the first and third claims: the development of these instruments reflects the complexity of the EU’s institutional architecture while highlighting the persistent institutional and systemic constraints that limit its overall agency.

4.3. Institutional Power Shifts and Governance Transformation

One of the most intensely debated dimensions of the European Union’s geopolitisation is its impact on internal institutional arrangements and the distribution of power among various actors [20]. The EU’s geopolitical turn entails more than a shift in policy priorities; it exerts significant pressure to transform decision-making processes, policy coordination, and the overall governance architecture. A pivotal question, therefore, is whether geopolitisation facilitates a fundamental move towards a more centralised and efficient governance model, or whether it merely reproduces the EU’s existing structural characteristics as a hybrid political system.

Compared to the pre-2022 period, geopolitical pressures have intensified demands for faster coordination, greater strategic coherence, and stronger executive capacity at the EU level. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the energy crisis, sanctions coordination, and broader concerns regarding European security exposed the limitations of fragmented decision-making structures and increased political pressure for more effective strategic governance [13]. At the same time, these developments revived debates concerning the long-term balance between supranational coordination and member-state sovereignty within the EU institutional framework.

From a strategic perspective, geopolitisation generates a robust demand for more rapid, coherent, and decisive decision-making. In an environment of heightened geopolitical competition and security threats, the capacity to respond promptly to crises has become a prerequisite for effective action [12,13,33]. This pressure is particularly evident in domains such as sanctions policy, energy security, and responses to military conflicts [81,82], where a coordinated and unified response is expected.

The growing emphasis on strategic coordination also reflects broader concerns regarding the EU’s geopolitical credibility. Delayed or internally fragmented responses may undermine the Union’s ability to act as a reliable geopolitical actor, particularly in a context where external competitors often operate through more centralised decision-making structures. Consequently, institutional effectiveness has become increasingly intertwined with questions of strategic legitimacy and geopolitical influence.

From an institutional standpoint, however, this demand encounters the fundamental characteristic of the EU as a multi-level and fragmented system. While geopolitisation exerts adaptive pressures on existing institutions, it does not automatically lead to a fundamental structural overhaul. As analyses of the institutional impacts of geopolitisation suggest, this process triggers incremental and sector-specific shifts in the distribution of power rather than a systematic transformation of the entire governance framework [83].

A key trend is the partial strengthening of executive capacities at the EU level, particularly in areas requiring a coordinated response. The European Commission plays an increasingly proactive role in formulating strategic initiatives, notably in geoeconomics, energy, and industrial policy [61]. Nevertheless, these shifts do not undermine the fundamental balance between supranational and intergovernmental logics. In many critical domains—most notably foreign and security policy—member states retain decisive control [29,84].

This hybridisation of governance does not represent an entirely new phenomenon in the history of European integration. Earlier initiatives aimed at strengthening political and defence coordination, including debates surrounding the European Defence Community during the 1950s, similarly revealed the persistent tension between ambitions for deeper strategic integration and the resilience of national sovereignty in security affairs [12,38]. Contemporary geopolitical pressures therefore reinforce rather than eliminate longstanding structural dilemmas embedded within the EU’s institutional architecture.

This situation results in a hybrid governance model that combines elements of centralisation and fragmentation. While coordination mechanisms are being reinforced, decision-making remains highly dependent on consensus among member states, which constrains the EU’s overall agency.

This dynamic became particularly visible in debates concerning sanctions packages, military assistance to Ukraine, energy diversification, and defence-industrial cooperation. Although geopolitical urgency encouraged closer coordination, member states continued to pursue partially divergent strategic priorities shaped by national economic interests, domestic political constraints, and differing threat perceptions [13,79]. Institutional adaptation therefore often proceeds through temporary compromises and flexible coordination mechanisms rather than through comprehensive structural centralisation.

Furthermore, geopolitisation elevates the significance of the European Council as a primary strategic actor. Decisions with geopolitical ramifications are frequently made at the highest political level, thereby reinforcing the intergovernmental character of governance. This trend aligns with broader theoretical frameworks highlighting the dominance of member states in ‘high politics’ scenarios [24,79].

The strengthened role of the European Council also reflects the limits of supranational geopolitical authority within the EU. While the European Commission has expanded its influence in economic and regulatory domains, strategically sensitive decisions concerning defence, enlargement, sanctions, or external relations continue to depend heavily on political consensus among national governments. This demonstrates that geopolitisation may increase institutional coordination without fundamentally altering the sovereignty-sensitive nature of core geopolitical decision-making.

In the policy dimension, there is a growing necessity for horizontal coordination between policy areas that were previously relatively distinct. Geopolitisation drives the convergence of trade, industrial, energy, and security policies, requiring new forms of governance and inter-institutional cooperation [34]. However, this process is neither linear nor seamless. Disparate procedural rules, legal frameworks, and institutional cultures within individual policy sectors complicate effective integration.

The increasing overlap between internal and external governance also contributes to the expansion of executive and technocratic authority within strategic policy domains. Crisis-driven governance mechanisms, emergency coordination frameworks, and accelerated decision-making procedures may improve responsiveness, yet they can also reduce transparency and complicate democratic oversight [85]. Geopolitisation therefore intensifies broader debates regarding accountability and political legitimacy within EU governance.

A critical aspect is the question of legitimacy. The expansion of executive capacities and the increasing complexity of decision-making may lead to perceptions of a democratic deficit, especially when pivotal decisions are made within narrow political circles or under the duress of crisis [85,86,87]. Thus, geopolitisation not only transforms institutional dynamics but also exacerbates existing tensions between efficiency and legitimation.

These legitimacy concerns are further amplified by the politicisation of strategic and security-related policies across Europe. The growing influence of nationalist and populist political actors in several member states complicates consensus-building regarding sovereignty transfers, defence cooperation, migration governance, and external commitments [46]. As a result, geopolitical adaptation unfolds within an increasingly polarised political environment that constrains deeper strategic integration.

Analytically, this dimension clearly corroborates the article’s first and third claims. The EU’s geopolitical transformation is not leading to the emergence of a centralised geopolitical actor with a clearly defined power hierarchy; rather, it represents an adaptation of the existing multi-level governance model. Simultaneously, it underscores the structural limits of this transformation, as fragmented decision-making and the persistent dominance of member states hamper the EU’s ability to act swiftly and coherently.

In this context, geopolitisation can be interpreted as a process that increases the pressure for institutional change while simultaneously exposing the resilience of existing structures. The EU is not evolving into a unified geopolitical actor in the classical sense, but rather towards a flexible—yet internally strained—form of governance that remains only partially capable of addressing geopolitical challenges.

4.4. External Boundaries and Geopolitical Rebordering

The formation and management of the European Union’s external boundaries represent another critical domain in which geopolitisation manifests as a response to a shifting security and strategic environment [23]. Traditionally, the EU was characterised by processes of ‘debordering’—the gradual removal of barriers to the movement of people, goods, and capital. However, contemporary developments suggest a parallel trend of geopolitical ‘rebordering’, involving the selective reinforcement of controls and the differentiation of boundaries based on geopolitical relations [22].

Compared to the pre-2022 period, when debates on external borders were dominated primarily by migration governance and mobility management, the post-2022 geopolitical environment significantly strengthened the strategic and security dimensions of border policy. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, hybrid threats, energy insecurity, and concerns regarding external interference accelerated the perception of borders as geopolitical instruments linked not only to migration control but also to strategic resilience, security governance, and the protection of the EU’s political space [33,48].

From a strategic perspective, this shift is inextricably linked to the heightened perception of external threats and the necessity of protecting the integrity of the EU’s political, economic, and security space [88,89]. Geopolitical competition, hybrid threats, and the securitisation of migration have transformed external borders from mere administrative tools for regulating mobility into strategic instruments for managing relations with external actors [90,91]. This process is evidenced by a differentiated approach to various countries and regions; EU borders are increasingly ‘selectively open’ towards partners and ‘selectively closed’ towards rivals. This trend was tangibly illustrated following the 2022 invasion through a combination of unprecedented sanctions and restrictions against Russia, coupled with the introduction of temporary protection and facilitated entry for Ukrainian citizens—a clear case of border differentiation based on geopolitical criteria [36,48].

This differentiated approach illustrates how geopolitical considerations increasingly shape the calibration of openness and exclusion within EU external relations. Border governance is no longer determined solely by economic or humanitarian considerations, but also by assessments concerning strategic alignment, security risks, and geopolitical partnership. In this sense, external boundaries have become instruments for structuring the EU’s geopolitical environment and signalling political inclusion or exclusion.

From an institutional standpoint, however, geopolitical rebordering has not precipitated a fundamental centralisation of border control at the EU level. Despite the increasing need for coordination, core executive competences remain in the hands of member states, reflecting the enduring nature of the EU as a regulatory, rather than a fully centralised, political system [20]. Consequently, the EU responds to geopolitical pressures primarily by regulating the conditions of entry, mobility, and economic exchange, rather than by constructing a robust, centralised enforcement capacity [88].

This institutional configuration reveals a broader paradox of the EU’s geopolitical transformation. While geopolitical pressures generate growing demand for coordinated border governance and strategic control capacities, member states remain reluctant to fully centralise sovereignty-sensitive competences related to territorial control, migration management, and security enforcement. As a result, geopolitical rebordering proceeds primarily through regulatory coordination and differentiated governance mechanisms rather than through the creation of a unified border authority comparable to that of a state.

This dynamic highlights the divergence between two theoretical expectations. From a realist perspective, one might expect intensifying geopolitical competition to lead to reinforced centralised border control and the development of state-like capacities. However, empirical evidence instead supports the interpretation of the EU as a regulatory polity that addresses geopolitical challenges through differentiated regulation rather than the centralisation of power [7].

In the policy dimension, the geopolitisation of borders is manifested through the differentiated calibration of mobility, trade, and cooperation regimes. Relations with countries such as Ukraine and Moldova are characterised by progressive opening and integration, whereas regimes governing interactions with Russia and other rivals have seen significant tightening and restriction [55]. This selective approach reflects a broader EU strategy that combines elements of inclusion and exclusion tailored to the geopolitical context.

A similarly differentiated dynamic can be observed in the EU’s relationship with Türkiye, which occupies a particularly complex geopolitical position at the intersection of migration governance, regional security, NATO cooperation, and neighbourhood policy. While accession negotiations have largely stagnated, cooperation with Türkiye in areas such as migration management and regional security remains strategically important for the EU [92,93]. This demonstrates that geopolitical considerations may simultaneously generate pressures for both strategic cooperation and political distancing, depending on the specific policy domain involved.

Nevertheless, this model exposes the limitations of the EU’s capacity to effectively control its boundaries within a complex international environment. While differentiated regulation allows for a flexible response to diverse scenarios, it simultaneously creates a fragmented and occasionally incoherent system vulnerable to external pressures [22]. This suggests that flexibility in border management is achieved at the expense of overall coherence, thereby deepening the structural fragmentation of the EU as a geopolitical actor. The lack of centralised capacities and the continued dependence on member states lead to implementation gaps and diminished overall effectiveness.

The persistence of fragmented implementation capacities became particularly visible during periods of intensified migratory pressure and in responses to hybrid threats at the EU’s eastern borders [94]. Divergent national approaches towards asylum policy, border protection, and burden-sharing continue to complicate the emergence of a fully coherent external border regime [95]. Consequently, geopolitical rebordering increases strategic coordination pressures without eliminating the structural asymmetries embedded within the EU’s governance system.

Geopolitical rebordering carries broader implications for the character of the EU as a political project. The hardening of boundaries and the selective control of mobility represent a departure from the original vision of an open and inclusive European space. This evolution may impact not only external relations but also the EU’s internal legitimacy, as it alters the balance between openness and security [96].

At the same time, geopolitical rebordering also demonstrates that the EU’s strategic adaptation does not necessarily imply convergence towards a classical territorial state model. Rather than constructing fully centralised sovereign border capacities, the EU continues to rely predominantly on regulatory instruments, differentiated partnerships, and multi-level governance arrangements. This confirms that the Union’s geopolitical transformation remains embedded within its historically hybrid institutional structure.

Analytically, this dimension further confirms the hybrid nature of the EU’s geopolitical transformation. On one hand, there is a clear shift towards the strategic utilisation of boundaries as a geopolitical tool. On the other hand, the implementation of this tool reflects an enduring regulatory logic and the absence of centralised state power. The geopolitisation of external boundaries thus corroborates the article’s second analytical claim, as it is a domain where this process is markedly visible. Simultaneously, it reinforces the first and third claims, demonstrating that the EU remains a multi-level actor whose agency is inherently conditioned by its institutional architecture and governance model.

4.5. The EU’s Neighbourhood as a Geopolitical Stress Test

The European Union’s immediate neighbourhood represents the primary arena in which its geopolitical transformation is manifested most tangibly, yet also most problematically [3,38]. It is within this space that the Union’s declared ambitions collide with the practical constraints of its agency, allowing the neighbourhood to be conceptualised as a ‘geopolitical stress test’ of the EU’s capacity to function as a strategic actor [58,97]. Developments in the Eastern Partnership, the Western Balkans, and the broader Black Sea region demonstrate that geopolitisation is not merely a matter of discourse or internal policy, but fundamentally a question of the actual capacity to influence outcomes in a competitive international environment [14].

Compared to the pre-2022 period, when the EU’s neighbourhood policy remained largely centred on stabilisation, economic cooperation, and gradual normative convergence, the post-2022 geopolitical environment transformed the neighbourhood into a significantly more contested strategic space. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine fundamentally altered the security architecture of Eastern Europe and accelerated the geopolitical reinterpretation of the EU’s eastern and south-eastern peripheries [3]. As a result, the neighbourhood increasingly functions not only as a zone of cooperation, but also as a frontline arena of geopolitical competition involving security, energy, migration, and strategic influence.

From a strategic perspective, the EU’s neighbourhood has transformed from a relatively stable ‘buffer zone’ into a space of active geopolitical contestation. The conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s increasing assertiveness in the post-Soviet space, and China’s economic expansion in the region have fundamentally altered the security and political landscape in which the EU operates [14,79]. These developments expose the limitations of traditional EU instruments, which were primarily predicated on normative transformation, economic integration, and incremental approximation.

The growing geopolitical significance of the Black Sea region further illustrates this transformation. The region increasingly occupies a central position within broader European debates concerning energy security, military mobility, transport corridors, and strategic resilience. Consequently, neighbourhood policy is becoming progressively intertwined with wider geopolitical and security considerations extending beyond the EU’s traditional normative framework [98,99].

The EU’s response suggests a pivot towards a more strategic approach—incorporating enlargement, security cooperation, economic investment, and political support for partner countries—as reflected in frameworks such as the Strategic Compass [33,53]. The granting of candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, alongside bolstered engagement in the Western Balkans, represents concrete manifestations of this strategy. However, these steps also reveal that the EU’s geopolitical engagement is frequently reactive, driven by external shocks rather than a long-term, consistent strategic vision [7,49].

This reactive dimension became particularly visible after 2022, when several major strategic decisions—including accelerated enlargement initiatives, energy diversification measures, sanctions coordination, and military assistance mechanisms—were implemented under the pressure of rapidly escalating geopolitical developments [33]. While these measures demonstrate increasing strategic adaptation, they also suggest that the EU’s geopolitical transformation is often crisis-driven rather than the result of a fully consolidated long-term geopolitical doctrine.

From an institutional standpoint, the neighbourhood highlights the EU’s limited capacity to coordinate its diverse external instruments. Fragmentation across policy domains—ranging from foreign and security policy to trade and developmental cooperation—hampers the creation of a coherent approach. Furthermore, the continued reliance on member-state consensus often results in compromised solutions that diminish both the effectiveness and the speed of the Union’s response [12,42].

The neighbourhood additionally reveals the tension between supranational coordination and national strategic preferences. Member states often prioritise different geopolitical concerns depending on their geographical position, historical experience, energy dependencies, migration pressures, or security perceptions [42]. These differences complicate the formulation of a unified strategic approach towards Russia, the Western Balkans, Türkiye, the Eastern Partnership, and the Southern neighbourhood.

This fragmentation is further exacerbated when interacting with external actors. The EU must operate in an environment where its activities are confronted by the policies of other powers that often possess more centralised decision-making structures and more clearly defined strategic objectives [14]. Consequently, the EU’s ability to assert its interests is contingent not only on its own capacities but also on its interactions with these global rivals.

The role of Türkiye illustrates this complexity particularly clearly [100]. Although accession negotiations remain largely frozen, Türkiye continues to occupy a strategically indispensable position in areas such as migration governance, Black Sea security, NATO cooperation, and regional energy connectivity. The EU’s relationship with Türkiye therefore reflects the broader contradictions of geopolitical adaptation, where strategic necessity may coexist with persistent political tensions and normative disagreements [92,93].

In the policy dimension, the neighbourhood serves as a testing ground for the efficacy of specific geopolitisation tools, such as enlargement, geoeconomic initiatives, and border regulation [79]. While these instruments provide the EU with a degree of leverage, their effectiveness is often constrained by time-intensive processes, administrative complexity, and the diverging interests of various actors. For instance, while enlargement sends a powerful strategic signal, its implementation is a long-term process that may struggle to respond to rapidly shifting geopolitical conditions [101].

Similarly, geoeconomic instruments—including energy diversification policies, infrastructure investments, sanctions regimes, and strategic connectivity initiatives—demonstrate both the strengths and the limitations of the EU’s geopolitical toolkit. While the Union possesses substantial regulatory and economic leverage, the effectiveness of these instruments often depends on lengthy coordination processes and the willingness of member states to sustain collective strategic commitments over time [79].

Ultimately, the neighbourhood exposes the ambition-capacity gap that serves as a defining feature of the EU’s geopolitical transformation. On one hand, the Union possesses extensive economic, regulatory, and political tools. On the other, its ability to effectively coordinate and deploy these tools in a competitive environment is structurally limited by its institutional architecture and political fragmentation.

The neighbourhood therefore functions as the clearest empirical illustration of the EU’s hybrid geopolitical character. The Union is capable of exercising significant influence through regulatory, economic, diplomatic, and enlargement-related instruments, yet it frequently struggles to translate these resources into rapid and fully coherent strategic action comparable to that of more centralised geopolitical actors.

Analytically, the EU’s neighbourhood corroborates all three core claims of this article. First, it demonstrates that the EU does not function as a traditional geopolitical power capable of autonomously shaping its periphery, but rather as a hybrid actor whose influence is conditioned by complex internal and external factors. Second, it illustrates the uneven nature of geopolitisation, as various instruments yield differing degrees of impact. Third, it underscores the structural limits of this transformation stemming from fragmentation, dependence on member states, and a constrained capacity for rapid response.

The neighbourhood thus represents the most significant empirical test of the EU’s ability to translate geopolitical ambition into genuine agency. The results of this test suggest that while the EU is undergoing a process of geopolitical adaptation, this transition remains incomplete, differentiated, and significantly curtailed by its own structural makeup.

5. Discussion: Interpreting the EU’s Geopolitical Turn

5.1. Transformation vs. Adaptation

A pivotal question emerging from the empirical analysis is whether the European Union’s current geopolitical turn represents a genuine structural transformation or rather a form of strategic adaptation to a shifting international environment [3]. Although political discourse increasingly labels the EU as a ‘geopolitical Union’, the results of this analysis suggest that this shift does not constitute a transformation into a geopolitical power in the classical sense. Instead, it possesses the character of a selective and contextually contingent adaptation.

Empirical findings across enlargement, geoeconomics, institutional shifts, and external border management demonstrate that while the EU is expanding its instruments and ambitions, it does so in a manner heavily circumscribed by its existing institutional architecture and normative legacy. Consequently, geopolitisation does not manifest as a linear transition from a ‘normative power’ to a ‘hard geopolitical actor’, but rather as the layering of new strategic elements onto an established operational model [5].

The analysis further demonstrates that the EU’s geopolitical adaptation is differentiated both sectorally and institutionally. Geopolitical reasoning has become particularly pronounced in enlargement, geoeconomic governance, and border management, while other domains remain more strongly shaped by traditional regulatory and market-oriented logics. This unevenness suggests that geopolitisation should not be understood as a uniform transformation affecting the EU equally across all sectors, but rather as a selective process conditioned by varying strategic pressures and institutional constraints.

This conclusion corroborates the article’s first analytical claim, according to which the EU’s geopolitical turn does not lead to the emergence of a state-centric power, but to the adaptation of a complex multi-level political system [20]. While the EU increasingly operates within the categories of power, security, and strategic competition, its capacity for action remains predicated on internal fragmentation and the prerequisite of consensus among member states.

At the same time, the findings indicate that strategic adaptation should be interpreted as an outcome of geopolitisation rather than its equivalent. Geopolitisation creates pressures for institutional adjustment, policy coordination, and strategic reframing, whereas strategic adaptation represents the practical responses developed within the EU’s existing governance framework. This distinction helps explain why the EU increasingly adopts geopolitical instruments without simultaneously evolving into a fully centralised geopolitical actor.

Furthermore, it can be observed that geopolitisation remains markedly reactive in nature. Many of the analysed shifts—such as the renewed impetus for enlargement or the bolstering of geoeconomic tools—were triggered in response to external shocks, primarily the deterioration of the European security environment [10,50]. Thus, the EU’s geopolitical transformation does not stem from a coherent strategic doctrine, but rather from cumulative and often ad hoc reactions to changing external conditions.

This reactive character represents one of the principal differences between the EU and more traditional geopolitical actors. Whereas state-centric powers may formulate long-term geopolitical strategies through centralised strategic institutions, the EU’s geopolitical adaptation frequently emerges through crisis-driven coordination processes shaped by compromise, institutional negotiation, and external pressures. Consequently, the Union’s geopolitical evolution remains highly contingent upon the broader international environment and the political willingness of member states to sustain collective strategic responses over time.

5.2. The Hybrid Nature of EU Geopolitics

The analysis clearly confirms that the EU’s geopolitical transformation is multi-layered, resulting from a combination of three fundamental logics: regulatory, market, and geopolitical [6]. This synthesis represents a specific model of geopolitics that diverges from traditional state-centric approaches.

The regulatory dimension remains a cornerstone of EU influence, particularly regarding the setting of rules and standards with extraterritorial reach. The market dimension, predicated on the size and attractiveness of the single market, provides the Union with significant leverage in global economic relations [37]. The geopolitical dimension—manifested in the growing emphasis on security, strategic autonomy, and power projection—complements these existing logics without superseding them [43].

The empirical findings suggest that these dimensions do not operate independently but increasingly overlap within the EU’s strategic practice. Geoeconomic instruments simultaneously serve market, regulatory, and geopolitical purposes; enlargement policy combines normative, security, and strategic objectives; and border governance increasingly merges regulatory coordination with geopolitical differentiation. This interconnectedness demonstrates that the EU’s geopolitical transformation cannot be adequately captured through singular theoretical categories or narrowly defined policy logics.

The result is a complex and often strained operational model in which different logics overlap, complement, and occasionally conflict with one another. For instance, the pursuit of market openness may clash with the necessity of protecting strategic sectors, while a regulatory approach may prove insufficient in scenarios requiring a rapid, coordinated response [34].

Similarly, tensions emerge between the EU’s normative commitments and the growing pressures for strategic pragmatism. The increasing prioritisation of resilience, security, and geopolitical competition may conflict with traditional EU principles centred on openness, multilateralism, and rule-based governance. The differentiated treatment of external actors according to strategic considerations illustrates how geopolitical adaptation can gradually reshape the balance between normative and strategic priorities within European integration.

This composite nature also explains why geopolitisation is uneven across policy domains, thereby confirming the article’s second analytical claim. In certain areas, such as geoeconomics or enlargement, the geopolitical logic is highly pronounced, whereas in others, it remains secondary or significantly constrained. Conversely, policy areas closely tied to core national sovereignty, such as direct military deployment or harmonised fiscal policies for defence financing, illustrate the limits of this trend, representing domains where geopolitisation remains discursively prominent but materially constrained.

The findings also indicate that geopolitisation does not eliminate the EU’s traditional regulatory identity but rather restructures it within a more competitive strategic environment. Regulatory power therefore remains central to EU external influence, although it is increasingly complemented by security-oriented and geoeconomic considerations. This suggests that the EU’s geopolitical transformation involves the adaptation of existing governance capacities rather than their replacement by purely state-centric instruments of power.

From this perspective, EU geopolitics should not be understood as a singular strategic project, but rather as the outcome of the concurrent operation of multiple, and at times incompatible, governance logics [44,102]. This multi-layered nature of EU geopolitics does not represent a transient state but a stable characteristic of its functioning. Rather than convergence toward a single dominant model, we can expect a continuation of this ‘pluralist’ arrangement, where various logics are dynamically combined depending on the specific context.

This interpretation additionally helps explain why the EU’s geopolitical transformation remains structurally incomplete. The coexistence of supranational, intergovernmental, regulatory, and strategic logics simultaneously enhances flexibility while limiting coherence. The EU therefore develops geopolitical capacities without fully overcoming the institutional fragmentation and political pluralism that define its governance model.

5.3. Structural Constraints and Internal Tensions

The EU’s geopolitical transformation is profoundly shaped by structural constraints and internal tensions that fundamentally limit its capacity to function as a coherent and effective actor [21]. The empirical analysis highlights three pivotal areas of constraint: fragmentation, legitimacy, and decision-making processes.

Fragmentation remains one of the most salient issues. The division of competences between different levels of governance, as well as between disparate policy domains, leads to a lack of coherence and coordination. This problem is particularly acute in external relations, where various instruments and actors overlap without a clear strategic centre [103].

The persistence of fragmentation became especially visible in responses to the war in Ukraine, energy security challenges, sanctions coordination, migration pressures, and defence-industrial initiatives. Although geopolitical crises intensified demands for strategic coherence, member states continued to pursue partially divergent priorities shaped by differing economic interests, security perceptions, and domestic political dynamics. This demonstrates that geopolitical urgency does not automatically generate institutional unity within the EU framework.

The second significant factor is the question of legitimacy. Geopolitisation often entails decisions with substantial distributive and security implications, which can be politically sensitive. The bolstering of executive capacities and the increasing complexity of decision-making simultaneously deepen the perception of a democratic deficit, complicating the political acceptance of these processes [104].

These legitimacy tensions are further reinforced by the growing politicisation of sovereignty-sensitive issues across Europe. Defence cooperation, migration governance, strategic autonomy, sanctions policy, and industrial intervention increasingly provoke domestic political contestation, particularly in contexts marked by the rise of nationalist and populist political movements. As a result, geopolitical adaptation unfolds within an environment of intensified political polarisation that constrains deeper centralisation and complicates long-term consensus-building.

The third key constraint lies in decision-making mechanisms, which remain largely dependent on member-state consensus. While this model ensures political control, it severely curtails the speed and flexibility of the Union’s response. In the context of geopolitical competition, where the temporal factor is often decisive, this aspect represents a fundamental barrier to effective action [79].

This tension between efficiency and sovereignty is one of the defining structural dilemmas of the EU’s geopolitical transformation. While external pressures encourage faster and more centralised strategic coordination, member states remain reluctant to relinquish control over core areas related to foreign policy, defence, migration, and national security. Consequently, the EU’s geopolitical evolution proceeds primarily through hybrid coordination mechanisms rather than through the establishment of fully supranational strategic authority.

These structural factors corroborate the article’s third analytical claim and explain why the EU’s geopolitical transformation remains incomplete and uneven. In this regard, the analysis supports Youngs’ (2024) thesis that the EU’s geopolitisation encounters deep normative fissures among member states [49]. The sluggish pace of strategic adaptation is thus not merely a consequence of bureaucratic inertia but reflects a fundamental struggle to preserve the Union’s democratic and normative identity in an environment that demands pragmatic power politics. Findings suggest that this is not simply a matter of lacking political will, but of deeply rooted systemic characteristics that limit the Union’s transformative potential. These constraints should not be viewed as temporary but as inherent features of the EU’s institutional architecture, which will continue to determine the boundaries of its geopolitical agency.

The findings therefore challenge interpretations portraying the EU’s geopolitical turn as a straightforward transition towards classical great-power behaviour. Instead, the analysis suggests that the Union’s geopolitical adaptation will likely remain constrained by the coexistence of strategic ambitions, normative commitments, institutional fragmentation, and democratic pluralism. These tensions appear not as temporary anomalies but as structural characteristics of the EU’s hybrid political order.

5.4. Implications for European Integration Theory

The findings of this article have significant implications for theoretical approaches to European integration, as geopolitisation alters the context in which these theories operate while revealing both their limitations and complementarities [83].

From a neo-functionalist perspective, geopolitisation can be interpreted as a form of ‘external spillover’, where pressures from the international environment drive deeper integration into new domains. However, this approach struggles to fully explain the unevenness and selectivity of this process [41].

The empirical findings demonstrate that external geopolitical pressures may indeed stimulate stronger coordination and integration in areas such as industrial policy, energy governance, or enlargement. Nevertheless, these spillover dynamics remain conditional and politically contested rather than automatic or linear. Geopolitical crises therefore generate pressures for integration while simultaneously intensifying fragmentation and sovereignty-sensitive contestation.

Intergovernmentalism provides a compelling explanation for the enduring dominance of member states, particularly in politically sensitive areas. Empirical findings confirm that even under conditions of geopolitisation, states remain the pivotal actors in decision-making, which significantly restricts the scope of supranational transformation [21].

This is particularly evident in foreign policy, sanctions coordination, enlargement decisions, defence cooperation, and strategic responses to geopolitical crises, where the European Council and national governments continue to exercise decisive authority. Geopolitisation therefore strengthens the strategic importance of the EU without eliminating the intergovernmental foundations of sovereignty-sensitive decision-making.

Post-functionalism highlights the increasing importance of politicisation and legitimacy, which play an ever-larger role in the context of geopolitical decisions. Geopolitisation increases the visibility and political sensitivity of integration, potentially leading to new forms of conflict and contestation [28].

The rise of populist and nationalist political forces across Europe further reinforces the relevance of post-functionalist insights. Strategic adaptation increasingly intersects with domestic political conflicts regarding sovereignty, migration, economic intervention, and defence cooperation, thereby complicating the political sustainability of deeper geopolitical integration.

Finally, geopolitical approaches allow for the EU to be situated within the broader context of power competition but often understate its specific multi-layered and non-state nature. The results of this analysis suggest that the EU cannot be adequately understood through traditional realist categories; rather, it requires a combination of multiple theoretical perspectives [14]. From this viewpoint, geopolitisation does not imply the replacement of existing theories of European integration but rather the necessity of their systematic synthesis within a broader analytical framework.

The findings additionally suggest that geopolitical approaches focusing exclusively on material capabilities may underestimate the importance of regulatory, institutional, and economic forms of power within the EU context. Conversely, approaches centred solely on normative or regulatory influence may insufficiently capture the growing strategic and security dimensions of contemporary European integration. The EU’s geopolitical transformation therefore requires a multidimensional analytical perspective capable of integrating internal governance dynamics with external geopolitical pressures.

In conclusion, the EU’s geopolitical transformation necessitates a theoretical synthesis that transcends the boundaries of individual approaches. Rather than convergence toward a single dominant theory, these developments point to an increasing need for theoretical pluralism. This differentiated character suggests that future research should focus on integrating various theoretical frameworks and gaining a better understanding of the interactions between the internal and external drivers of European integration.

6. Conclusions

This article has analysed the geopolitical transformation of the European Union within the context of the contemporary poly-crisis, employing a concept-driven qualitative approach. The objective was to address the research question of how the process of geopolitisation reshapes the EU as a political actor and to identify the structural limits of this transformation. Based on the theoretical synthesis and empirical analysis across selected policy domains, the study arrives at several key conclusions.

First, the EU’s geopolitical turn does not constitute a transformation into a traditional, state-centric geopolitical power. Instead, it represents a hybrid process of strategic adaptation, wherein the EU expands its instruments and ambitions in a manner fundamentally conditioned by its multi-level structure and institutional complexity. Thus, the EU remains a unique type of political actor whose geopolitical role cannot be adequately captured through the conventional categories of international relations.

The findings demonstrate that strategic adaptation should be understood as a consequence of geopolitisation rather than its synonym. Geopolitisation generates pressures for institutional adjustment, strategic reframing, and policy coordination, while strategic adaptation reflects the concrete ways in which the EU responds to these pressures within its existing governance framework. This distinction helps explain why the Union increasingly adopts geopolitical instruments without simultaneously transforming into a fully centralised geopolitical actor comparable to traditional great powers.

Second, the analysis demonstrates that geopolitisation manifests unevenly across policy domains. The most pronounced impacts are observable in enlargement, geoeconomics, and external border management, where a clear shift toward a strategic logic is evident. In other areas, however, the geopolitical dimension remains less developed or is significantly constrained by existing institutional and political frameworks. Consequently, geopolitisation does not emerge as a homogenous process but as a differentiated and sectorally variable phenomenon.

The empirical analysis additionally indicates that the EU’s geopolitical transformation remains strongly conditioned by external shocks and crisis-driven developments, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Rather than emerging through the implementation of a coherent long-term geopolitical doctrine, many of the analysed adaptations developed reactively in response to rapidly changing security and strategic conditions. This reactive character represents one of the defining features of the EU’s contemporary geopolitical evolution.

Third, the article identifies key structural limits to the EU’s geopolitical transformation. Internal fragmentation of decision-making, the enduring dominance of member states, and tensions regarding democratic legitimacy fundamentally curtail the EU’s capacity to act swiftly, coherently, and strategically—particularly in an environment of intense geopolitical competition.

The findings also reveal a persistent tension between the EU’s growing geopolitical ambitions and the institutional realities of its hybrid governance model. While geopolitical pressures encourage stronger coordination, strategic autonomy, and more centralised responses, member states remain reluctant to transfer sovereignty in core areas related to foreign policy, defence, migration, and security governance. As a result, the EU’s geopolitical transformation proceeds primarily through selective coordination mechanisms and differentiated integration rather than through comprehensive institutional centralisation.

Based on these findings, it can be concluded that the EU’s geopolitical transformation is a real yet incomplete process. While the Union is progressively adapting to a landscape characterised by the return of power politics and rising rivalry, its capacity to function as a coherent geopolitical actor remains contingent upon its own institutional architecture.

The primary contribution of this article lies in the conceptualisation of EU geopolitisation as a hybrid and multidimensional process—not a linear transformation into a traditional power, but the result of the interaction between regulatory, market, and strategic logics. This approach facilitates a transcendence of the dichotomy between normative and realist interpretations of the EU, highlighting the necessity of their systematic synthesis within a broader analytical framework.

More broadly, the article contributes to contemporary debates on the future trajectory of European integration under conditions of intensifying geopolitical competition. The findings suggest that the EU’s geopolitical evolution is unlikely to culminate in the emergence of a conventional state-like power structure. Instead, the Union is more likely to continue developing as a hybrid geopolitical actor that combines supranational coordination, intergovernmental bargaining, regulatory influence, and selective strategic activism within a differentiated governance framework.

From a public policy perspective, the results suggest that the EU’s ambition to act as a geopolitical player requires not only the development of new instruments but also the resolution of internal structural issues. Without improvements in coordination, decision-making mechanisms, and legitimacy, its ability to respond effectively to geopolitical challenges will remain limited.

At the same time, the findings indicate that strengthening the EU’s geopolitical agency does not necessarily require abandoning its normative and regulatory foundations. Rather, the challenge lies in balancing strategic imperatives with the preservation of democratic legitimacy, institutional pluralism, and openness within an increasingly competitive international environment.

It is also necessary to reflect on the limitations of this research. The analysis is based on a qualitative and concept-oriented approach, which precludes the testing of causal hypotheses or the formulation of universal conclusions. The selection of policy domains is inevitably selective, and the findings are, to some extent, contingent upon the chosen analytical framework. Future research could expand the empirical basis, for instance, through a systematic comparison of additional policy areas or a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.

Future research could also explore the long-term implications of geopolitical adaptation for the balance between supranational and intergovernmental governance, the evolution of strategic autonomy, and the interaction between internal politicisation and external geopolitical pressures. Such research would contribute to a deeper understanding of how the EU’s hybrid political structure adapts under conditions of prolonged geopolitical instability.

Despite these limitations, this article demonstrates that geopolitisation is a key analytical concept for understanding the current evolution of the European Union. While this process does not lead to the EU’s transformation into a traditional geopolitical power, it fundamentally alters how the Union formulates its interests, deploys its instruments, and reacts to global dynamics. Although scholarly discussion often highlights the risks associated with this shift, the results of this study suggest a process of seeking a new equilibrium between normative foundations and strategic imperatives. Geopolitisation, in the EU’s case, does not imply a resignation from its original values, but their reconfiguration within a hybrid model where regulatory and market power coexist with a burgeoning emphasis on security and strategy.

At the same time, the findings caution against overly deterministic interpretations portraying the EU either as an emerging great power or as a purely normative actor incapable of strategic adaptation. The empirical evidence instead points towards a differentiated and evolving model of geopolitical agency shaped simultaneously by strategic necessity, institutional fragmentation, and the enduring pluralism of European integration.

In this sense, the EU’s geopolitical transformation should be understood not as a final state, but as an open-ended and ongoing process. Its future trajectory will depend on the dynamic interaction between internal institutional factors and a shifting global and regional environment, which will continue to test both the limits and the adaptive potential of the Union.