# The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy

## Abstract

**:**

## 1. Introduction

- In Section 2, I sketch an empirical theory of ideology to guide discussions of detrimental ideological bias over fields of inquiry;
- In Section 3, I review some of the evidence that points to the presence of widespread political bias of a “left-wing” or “progressive” variety throughout Western institutions of higher education, including academic philosophy;
- In Section 4, I briefly expose a speculative etiology of PC and attempt to formalize the content of several beliefs associated with PC to understand the underlying worldview;
- In Section 5, building upon some formal constructs I have introduced in the previous section and additional ones from applied science, I defend the epistemic integrity of philosophy as a truth-seeking enterprise and how PC concerns of social justice may undermine the epistemic prowess of philosophy;
- In Section 6, I respond to three lines of argument cogent to the idea that philosophy requires socially progressive political values in order to be truth-seeking;
- In Section 7, I finish this work with some tentative prescriptions of how to reverse existing deleterious ideological effects due to political bias in academic philosophy.

## 2. A Sketch of an Empirical Account of Ideology

**Postulate**

**1**

**(Cultural-Biological**

**Parity).**

**Postulate**

**2**

**(Content**

**Pluralism).**

**Postulate**

**3**

**(Unconscious**

**Processing).**

**Postulate**

**4**

**(The Worldview**

**Constraint).**

**Postulate**

**5**

**(Biocultural**

**Symbiosis).**

**Postulate**

**6**

**(Ideological**

**Core).**

**Postulate**

**7**

**(Rational**

**Dogmatism).**

## 3. Ideological Bias in Contemporary Western Academia

#### 3.1. Political-Ideological Bias in Contemporary Western Philosophy

## 4. A View to the Politically Correct Worldview

#### 4.1. The Underlying Theme Behind Recent Incidents Involving PC Philosophy

- The journal Public Health Ethics rejected a paper on the moral consequences of scientific research in genetic anthropology [50]. The author argues 7 that the reasons for the rejection are due to the fact that the paper considered, ex hypothesi (and not as an actual factual statement) the thesis that racial differences in behavior and cultural achievement are partially genetic in origin.
- A lecturer discontinued the teaching of a popular practical ethics course at the University of Texas, which had run for over three decades 8. His decision was motivated by persisting systematic disruptions of his class in recent years by outsiders and undergraduates that resisted the exposition and debate of viewpoints deemed to be morally unacceptable (un-PC) in topics such as abortion, immigration, and affirmative action.
- The editors of the distinguished Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy, motivated by the empirical hypothesis that pervasive and systematic sexual discrimination towards women in philosophy is the leading cause of their academic undercitation, have led the to ask the invited authors to inflate the citations with publications from scholars of minority status. The truth of the discrimination hypothesis of sexism in academic philosophy has been challenged with bibliometric data [51].
- The American Philosophical Association has been asked by an expert in disability studies [52] to remove the phrase “blind peer review” because it is allegedly discriminatory against blind and visually impaired people.
- The student union from the School of Oriental and Asian Studies of Buckingham University has demanded that most White philosophers studied under the philosophy syllabus be dropped and replaced by philosophers from the African and Asian continents 9.

#### 4.2. The Academic Originators of PC

#### 4.3. Formalizing the Worldview of Contemporary Social Justice Adherents

#### 4.4. Modeling Social Kinds and Human Societies

**Postulate**

**8**

**(Human**

**Society).**

#### 4.5. Social Equality

**Definition**

**1**

**(Inequality**

**of**

**Outcome).**

#### 4.6. Social Oppression Theory

**Axiom**

**1.**

**Axiom**

**2.**

**Axiom**

**3.**

**Axiom**

**4.**

- If $\mathcal{G}$ has two species, both the oppressor x and the oppressed y are the largest aggregates of members from their respective species, being monospecific populations.
- If $\mathcal{G}$ has three or more species, the oppressor x is the largest aggregate of members of the social species, being a monospecific population. The oppressed y is the aggregate formed by the largest aggregates of each remaining social species, being a polyspecific population.

**Axiom**

**5.**

**Axiom**

**6.**

**Axiom**

**7.**

**Postulate**

**9**

**(Oppression-Action-Ideology**

**Parity).**

**Theorem**

**1**

**(Impossibility**

**of**

**Reverse**

**Racism).**

**Postulate**

**10**

**(Necessary Condition for Social**

**Justice).**

#### 4.7. Generalized Difference Principle

**Postulate**

**11**

**(Generalized Difference**

**Principle).**

- If x is oppressed by y, then an assertion of p is morally acceptable
- If y is oppressed by x, then an assertion of p exemplifies an action in the class of immoral acts Z associated with $\mathcal{G}$, being therefore socially oppressive
- If y is oppressed by x and p is not asserted but there exists significant risk of p being interpreted as an assertion, then p also exemplifies an action of the class of immoral acts Z associated with $\mathcal{G}$, being therefore socially oppressive

**Postulate**

**12**

**(Hierarchy of**

**Oppression).**

#### 4.8. PC and Natural Human Equality

#### 4.9. Social Constructionism and Mental Environmentalism

**Postulate**

**13**

**(Necessary Condition for the Social Construction of Social**

**Kinds).**

**Postulate**

**14**

**(Mental**

**Environmentalism).**

**Axiom**

**8.**

**Axiom**

**9.**

**Postulate**

**15.**

**Postulate**

**16.**

**Postulate**

**17.**

**Axiom**

**10.**

**Axiom**

**11.**

#### 4.10. PC redux

**Postulate**

**18**

**(Sufficient Conditions for Political**

**Incorrectness).**

- p involves the denial of the ethical ideal of equality of outcome (Definition 1)
- p is inconsistent with Axioms 1 to 7 of SOT
- p is immoral according to the GDP (Postulate 11)
- p holds that a social genus $\mathcal{G}$ is a natural kind (Postulate 13)

## 5. Philosophy and Political Correctness: An Irreconcilable Marriage

#### 5.1. Philosophy as a Field of Inquiry

**Definition**

**2**

**(Field**

**of**

**Inquiry).**

- A is a set of professionals trained under a given research tradition
- E is a set of research methods and processes enacted by members of A
- G is a set of comparative structures, the goals of the field of inquiry
- R is a set of problematics; the open problems and issues entertained by members of A
- C is a set of constructs, the formal and informal representata (statements, theories, propositions, etc. 27) produced by members of A to answer P
- ˗
- F a proper subset of C, the fund of knowledge of $\mathfrak{F}$
- ˗
- C is partitioned into proper subsets ${K}_{i}$, each pertaining to a class of comparable constructs (rival constructs engaging with a same topic from P)

- V is a set of comparative structures, the values used by members of A to assess members of C under G
- ˗
- V is partitioned into proper subsets ${S}_{i}$ whose members stand under a partial order relation≽, the different families of evaluation standards

#### 5.2. Philosophy and Truth

#### 5.3. A Formal Account of the Relationship between Philosophical Knowledge and Values

**Definition**

**3**

**(Alethic**

**Epistemic**

**Value).**

**Definition**

**4**

**(Politically**

**Correct**

**Value)**

**Definition**

**5**

**(Dummy**

**Alethic**

**Epistemic**

**Value).**

#### 5.4. Epistemic Appraisal as Engineering

**boldface**, conforming to a standard notation. First, let us check the structure of an MDCA problem (adapted from [134] (p. 10)):

**Definition**

**6**

**(Multicriteria**

**Decision**

**Analysis**

**Problem).**

- A is a nonempty finite set of actors enacting the decision-making
- X is a nonempty set, the set of all possible decision variants, the decision space
- ${X}_{0},\left|{X}_{0}\right|\ge 2$, is a nonempty finite proper subset of X, the set of decision variants
- $\mathrm{\Phi}$ is a finite set, the set of $m\ge 2$ criteria functions ${\varphi}_{i},\varphi :X\to \mathbb{R},i=(1,\dots ,m)$
- $\mu $ is the criteria mapping function $\mu :X\to {\mathbb{R}}^{m},\mu =({\varphi}_{1},\dots ,{\varphi}_{m})$
- The actors A intend to select a decision variant $x,x\in {X}_{0}$ for which $\mu \left(x\right)$ is the most preferred multiple criteria valuation

**Definition**

**7**

**(Multiobjective**

**Optimization**

**Problem).**

- $\mathbf{f}$ is a finite column vector of size $m\ge 2$, the vector of m objective functions $\mathbf{f}={\{{\varphi}_{1}\left(\mathbf{x}\right),\dots ,{\varphi}_{m}\left(\mathbf{x}\right)\}}^{T},{\varphi}_{i}:{\mathbb{R}}^{n}\to \mathbb{R}$
- $\mathbf{x}$ is a finite column vector of size $n\ge 2$, the decision vector $\mathbf{x}={\{{x}_{1},\dots ,{x}_{n}\}}^{T}$
- ${\mathbb{R}}^{n}$ is an n-dimensional Euclidean space, the decision space
- ˗
- $S,S\subset {\mathbb{R}}^{n},S\supset \mathbf{x}$, is a nonempty set, the feasible region space

**g**is a vector of p inequality constraints, $\mathbf{g}=\{{g}_{1}\left(\mathbf{x}\right),\dots ,{g}_{p}\left(\mathbf{x}\right)\}$**h**is a vector of q equality constraints, $\mathbf{h}=\{{h}_{1}\left(\mathbf{x}\right),\dots ,{h}_{q}\left(\mathbf{x}\right)\}$- For each function ${\varphi}_{i}\left(\mathbf{d}\right)$, ${\varphi}_{i}\left(\mathbf{d}\right)$ is to be either maximized or minimized

#### 5.5. Modelling Epistemic Appraisal

**Postulate**

**19**

**(Non-Optimality).**

**Definition**

**8**

**(Pareto**

**Efficiency).**

- A Pareto-efficient decision vector is strictly Pareto-efficient if and only if ${\varphi}_{j}\left(\mathbf{x}\right)>{\varphi}_{j}\left({\mathbf{x}}^{\prime}\right)$ for at least one index j. Otherwise, it is weakly Pareto-efficient

**Postulate**

**20**

**(Epistemic Effectiveness of a Field of**

**Inquiry).**

- Scalar Optimality, for problems with $m=1$ functions
- Strict Pareto Efficiency, for problems with $m\ge 2$ conflicting functions
- Weak Pareto Efficiency, for problems with $m\ge 2$ conflicting functions
- Approximations of Pareto Efficient solutions, for problems with $m\ge 2$ functions

**Postulate**

**21**

**(The Curse of Multiple**

**Goals).**

**Postulate**

**22**

**(Scalarization of Vectors With the Same Type of**

**Goal).**

#### 5.6. Epistemic Appraisal of Politically Correct Fields of Inquiry

**Definition**

**9**

**(Truth-Seeking**

**Field**

**of**

**Inquiry).**

- $\mathfrak{F}$ has truth, $\langle T\succcurlyeq \rangle $, as a goal in G
- All families of evaluation standards ${S}_{i}$ have at least one (and probably more than one) alethic epistemic value $\langle E,\succcurlyeq \rangle $
- For all non-scalarized design problems, each function ${\u03f5}_{i}$ of the vector of objective functions $\mathbf{f}$ is to be maximized
- For all scalarized design problems, the scalar of truth $\tau \left(x\right)$ is to be maximized
- In the context of any evaluation problem ${M}_{D}$, where ${S}_{i}$ includes at least one non-alethic epistemic value $\langle \Lambda ,\succcurlyeq \rangle $ with an associated monotonic increasing function ${\varphi}_{\Lambda}$, no decision variant ${x}_{1}$ where ${\varphi}_{\Lambda}\left({x}_{1}\right)>{\varphi}_{\Lambda}\left({x}_{2}\right)$ may be preferred by a decision maker in A if for at least one ${\u03f5}_{i}\left({x}_{1}\right),\text{}{\u03f5}_{i}\left({x}_{1}\right){\u03f5}_{i}\left({x}_{2}\right)$

**Definition**

**10**

**(Politically**

**Correct**

**Field**

**of**

**Inquiry).**

- $\mathfrak{F}$ has social justice, $\langle J,\succcurlyeq \rangle $, as a goal in G
- All families of evaluation standards ${S}_{i}$ have at least one politically correct value $\langle P,\succcurlyeq \rangle $
- For all non-scalarized design problems, each function ${\rho}_{i}$ of the vector of objective functions $\mathbf{f}$ is to be maximized
- For all scalarized design problems, the scalar of social justice $\sigma \left(x\right)$ is to be maximized
- In the context of any evaluation problem ${M}_{D}$, a decision variant ${x}_{1}$ may dominate a decision variant ${x}_{2}$ when ${\u03f5}_{i}\left({x}_{1}\right)<{\u03f5}_{i}\left({x}_{2}\right)$ and ${\rho}_{i}\left({x}_{1}\right)>{\rho}_{i}\left({x}_{2}\right)$

**Definition**

**11**

**(Epistemic**

**Appraisal**

**of**

**Politically**

**Correct**

**Philosophy).**

- As a design problem, it is at best a 2-objective MOO problem representing the search for Pareto-efficient constructs $x,x\in C$ in a feasible spaceX with the vector of objective functions $\mathbf{f}=\left\{{[\tau \left(x\right),\sigma \left(x\right)]}^{T}\right\}$ where $\tau \left(x\right)$ is the scalar of truth and $\sigma \left(x\right)$ is the scalar of social justice and both functions are to be maximized
- As an evaluation problem between $n\ge 2$comparable constructs, $\{{x}_{1};\dots ,{x}_{n}\}\in {K}_{i}$ and a set of evaluation standards $S,S\subset V$, it is an ordinal MCDA problem where:
- ˗
- The decision space set X is $\{{x}_{1};\dots ,{x}_{n}\}$
- ˗
- The set of criteria functions $\mathrm{\Phi}$ has as elements the functions associated with the values that are truth and social justice-conducing, $\mathrm{\Phi}=\{{\u03f5}_{1}\left(x\right),\dots ,{\u03f5}_{r}\left(x\right),{\rho}_{1}\left(x\right),\dots ,{\rho}_{s}\left(x\right)\}$

#### 5.7. Consequences of the Model for the Epistemic Appraisal of PC Philosophy

#### 5.7.1. Consequence #1: PC Philosophy Can’t Reasonably Aspire to Be Truth-Seeking

- In the context of both evaluation and design problems, the violation, willful or not, of the priority of alethic epistemic values over everything else in the family of evaluation standards ${S}_{i}$ employed
- In the context of evaluation problems, the underestimation of the actual values (in the sense of assigned information) of alethic epistemic values associated with politically incorrect constructs.
- In the context of design problems, the placement of unwarranted a priori inequality and equality constraints over the objective functions associated with alethic epistemic values which are prejudiciously deemed to be implausible because they are un-PC

#### 5.7.2. Consequence #2: Politically Correct Philosophy is Ineffective as Philosophy

#### 5.7.3. Consequence #3: Politically Correct Philosophy is Ineffective as Social Justice

## 6. Defending the Epistemic Integrity of Truth-Seeking Philosophy

#### 6.1. The Objection from Contextual Empiricism

#### 6.2. The Objection from the “Feminine Voice” in Ethics

**From The Ethics Of Care To social justice**

**P1**- Normative ethics is a truth-seeking field of inquiry
**P2**- The constructs devised by a truth-seeking field of inquiry ought to be truthful
**P3**- For (the constructs of) normative ethics to be truthful, it ought to be sensitive to moral psychology
**P4**- Moral psychology comprises feminine values
**C1**- Therefore, to be truthful, normative ethics ought to be sensitive to feminine values
**P5**- For normative ethics to be sensitive to feminine values, it cannot over-privilege the role of masculine values in moral psychology
**P6**- Normative ethics over-privileges the role of masculine values in moral psychology
**C2**- Therefore, normative ethics is not truthful
**P7**- For a given field of inquiry, an alethic epistemic value is a value that increases the truthfulness of their constructs
**P8**- Truth-seeking fields of inquiry must endorse their respective epistemic values
**P9**- Sexual inclusiveness of women in normative ethics is a value that increases the sensitivity towards feminine values
**C3**- Therefore, for the field of inquiry of normative ethics, the sexual inclusiveness of women is an alethic epistemic value
**C4**- Therefore, the field of inquiry of normative ethics must endorse the value of sexual inclusiveness of women
**P10**- Sexual inclusiveness of women is also a politically correct value that enhances the goal of social justice
**C5**- Therefore, normative ethics ought to adopt a value that enhances the goal social justice
**P11**- If a field of inquiry ought to adopt a value that enhances the goal of social justice, then it is compatible with social justice
**C6**- Therefore, normative ethics is a truth-seeking field of inquiry that is compatible with social justice

**P12**- For a truth-seeking field of inquiry, if the adoption of a dummy epistemic value tracking an epistemic value is more efficient for attaining truth than its avoidance, then the field of inquiry ought to adopt it
**P13**- The adoption of sexual inclusiveness of women in normative ethics is more efficient for attaining truth than its avoidance
**C7**- Therefore, normative ethics ought to adopt a value that enhances social justice
**C8**- Therefore, normative ethics is a truth-seeking field of inquiry that requires the promotion of social justice

**P14**- If the adoption of a value by a field of inquiry assumes the truth of a politically incorrect hypothesis, then the field of inquiry is incompatible with social justice
**P15**- The adoption of a value by a field of inquiry ought to be rational
**P16**- The adoption of the value of sexual inclusiveness of women in normative ethics ought to comply with certain standards of rationality
**P17**- The adoption of the sexual inclusiveness of women in normative ethics implies acknowledging the truth of variation in the moral psychology of men and women
**P18**- The variation in the moral psychology of men and women demands an explanation
**P19**- To rationally endorse a proposition which includes an explanandum requires the endorsement of the best explanans available
**P20**- The best explanation for the existing variation in the moral psychology of men and women implies the existence of significant genetic causes
**C9**- Therefore, to rationally adopt the value the sexual inclusiveness of women in normative ethics is to acknowledge significant genetic causes in the variation of moral psychology
**P21**- To rationally acknowledge the truth of an empirical hypothesis is to endorse the research methods that have led to this truth and their other truthful results
**P22**- The research methods that have led to the truth of the variation in the moral psychology of men and women have concluded that there are socially appraisable traits where men fare in average better than women due to significant biological causes
**P23**- To rationally adopt the value of sexual inclusiveness of women in normative ethics implies acknowledging that there are socially appraisable traits where men fare in average better than women due to significant biological causes
**P24**- The hypothesis that there are socially valuable traits where men in average fare better than women due to significant genetic causes is politically incorrect
**C10**- Therefore, the adoption of sexual inclusiveness of women in normative ethics (due to considerations stemming from the ethics of care) is incompatible with social justice

#### 6.3. The Objection from Political Philosophy

## 7. Epilogue: Make Philosophy Truthful Again

#### 7.1. A Call for Radical Separation

#### 7.2. The Alethic Epistemic Value of Empirical Adequacy

#### 7.3. The Dummy Alethic Epistemic Value of Political Diversity

#### 7.4. The Virtue of Moral Courage

Think dangerously! Build your conferences at the plain sight of social justice warriors! Submit your truth-seeking politically incorrect papers into academic safe spaces! Live at an intellectual war with your academic peers and yourselves! Be brave and uncompromising free thinkers for as long as the PC thought police subsists, you seekers of true knowledge!

## Acknowledgments

## Conflicts of Interest

## Appendix A

#### Appendix A.1. Preliminaries from Measurement Theory

**Definition**

**A1**

**(Generic**

**Relational**

**Structure).**

**Definition**

**A2**

**(Comparative**

**Structure).**

- An homomorphism $\varphi :M\to \mathbb{R}$ exists
- For all $x,y\in M,x\succcurlyeq y\to \varphi \left(x\right)\ge \varphi \left(y\right)$ ($\varphi $ is isotone)

**Theorem**

**A1.**

**Definition**

**A3**

**(Extensive**

**Structure).**

- An homomorphism $\varphi :M\to \mathbb{R}$ exists
- For all $x,y\in M,x\succcurlyeq y\to \varphi \left(x\right)\ge \varphi \left(y\right)$ ($\varphi $ is isotone)
- For all $x,y\in M,\varphi (x\oplus y)=\varphi \left(x\right)+\varphi \left(y\right)$ ($\varphi $ is additive)
- For all $x\in M$ and $z\in \mathbb{R}+$, if ${\varphi}^{\prime}\left(x\right)$ is isotone and additive, then ${\varphi}^{\prime}\left(x\right)=z\xb7\varphi \left(x\right)$ ($\varphi $ is ratio-scalable

#### Appendix A.2. An Ontology of Collectives

**Definition**

**A4**

**(Mereological**

**System).**

- S is a finite set of individuals, called atomic individuals
- ∘ is a finitary, associative, binary operation that is closed in S, the operation of aggregation
- Members of S are indepotent, so that for $x\in S,x\circ x=x$

**Definition**

**A5**

**(Part-Whole**

**Relation).**

- ⊏ is transitive, reflexive and anti-symmetric
- If $x\circ y=y$, then x is a part of the whole y, i.e., $x\u228fy$

**Theorem**

**A2**

**(Suprema**

**of**

**Aggregates).**

- Proof: see [188] (p. 31)

**Postulate**

**23**

**(Suprema of Mereological**

**Systems).**

**Definition**

**A6**

**(Aggregation**

**of**

**Individuals).**

#### Appendix A.3. A Social Taxonomy of Human Populations

**Definition**

**A7**

**(Species**

**of**

**a**

**Population).**

- The set of species $\mathcal{S}=\{{\mathcal{S}}_{1},\dots ,{\mathcal{S}}_{n}\}$ of S are the equivalence classes produced by the quotient set $S/{\sim}_{1}$

**Definition**

**A8**

**(Genus**

**of**

**a**

**Population).**

- The genus $\mathcal{G}$ of S is the equivalent class produced by the quotient set$\mathcal{S}/{\sim}_{2}$ where ${\sim}_{2}$ picks a nontrivial superordinate property or set of properties shared by all members of $\mathcal{S}$

**Definition**

**A9**

**(Monospecific**

**Population).**

**Definition**

**A10**

**(Polyspecific**

**Population).**

#### Appendix A.4. A Toy Model of Wealth

**Definition**

**A11**

**(Material**

**Wealth).**

- $\mathfrak{S}$ is a mereological system $\mathfrak{S}=\langle S,\circ \rangle $ where:
- ˗
- S is a set of atomic individuals, the individual human beings $S=\langle \alpha ,\beta ,\gamma \dots \rangle $
- ˗
- ∘ is an associative binary operation of aggregation among elements of S
- ˗
- x, y, z… are human populations inside S formed by the operation of aggregation
- ˗
- The largest population of S, $\left[S\right]$, is the human society being analyzed

- $\mathfrak{W}$ is an extensive structure$\mathfrak{W}=\langle W,\succcurlyeq ,\oplus \rangle $ where:
- ˗
- W is a set of assets with monetary value $u,v,w\dots $
- ˗
- ≽ is the binary relation “more or equal in value than”
- ˗
- ⊕ is an empirical commutative and associative operation of concatenation

- $\mathfrak{N}$ is a numerical relational structure$\mathfrak{N}=\langle N,\ge ,+\rangle $ where:
- ˗
- $\mathbb{R}+$ is the set of positive real numbers
- ˗
- ≥ is the formal relation “greater or equal than”
- ˗
- + is the arithmetic operation of addition

- ⋖ is a binary relation of ownership between elements of S and elements of W

**Axiom**

**12.**

**Axiom**

**13.**

**Axiom**

**14.**

**Axiom**

**15.**

**Axiom**

**16.**

#### Appendix A.5. Social Oppression Theory

**Definition**

**A12**

**(Social**

**Oppression**

**Theory).**

- $\mathfrak{S}$ is a mereological system$\mathfrak{S}=\langle S,\circ \rangle $ where:
- ˗
- S is a set of atomic individuals, the individual human beings $S=\langle \alpha ,\beta ,\gamma \dots \rangle $
- ˗
- ∘ is the associative binary operation of aggregation among elements of S
- ˗
- The largest population of S, $\left[S\right]$, is the human society being analyzed

- $\mathcal{G}$ is a subset of S, the superset of social genera ,$\mathcal{G}=\langle {\mathcal{G}}_{1},{\mathcal{G}}_{2},{\mathcal{G}}_{3}\dots \rangle $
- ˗
- x, y, z… are human populations inside $\mathcal{G}$
- ∗
- ${n}_{j}$ designates the number of atomic individuals composing a population $j\in \mathcal{G}$

- ˗
- Each social genus ${\mathcal{G}}_{i}$ has as a subset a superset of social species ${\mathcal{S}}_{\mathcal{i}}$

- $\mathfrak{R}=\langle \mathfrak{M},\mathfrak{N},\varphi \rangle $ is the fixed representational standard for monetary value
- ˗
- $\mathfrak{W}$ is an extensive structure$\mathfrak{W}=\langle W,\succcurlyeq ,\oplus \rangle $, the material wealth of the society
- ˗
- $\mathfrak{N}$ is the numerical relational structure $\mathfrak{W}=\langle \mathbb{R}+,\ge ,+\rangle $
- ∗
- ${m}_{k}\in \mathbb{R}+$ is the monetary value of owned concatenations of assets by a population $k\in \mathcal{G}$

- ˗
- $\varphi $ is an homomorphism $\varphi :W\to \mathbb{R}+$

- ${O}_{i}$ is a family of relations closed on S, the relations of social oppression
- ${P}_{i}$ is a family of relations closed on S, the relations of privilege
- f is a function $f:{O}_{i}\to {\mathcal{G}}_{i}$

**Axiom**

**17.**

**Axiom**

**18.**

**Axiom**

**19.**

**Axiom**

**20.**

- $\left(x{O}_{i}y\right)\wedge \left(\right|{\mathcal{S}}_{i}|=2)\to (x=\left[{\mathcal{S}}_{1}\right])\wedge (y=\left[{\mathcal{S}}_{2}\right])$
- $\left(x{O}_{i}y\right)\wedge \left(\right|{\mathcal{S}}_{i}|>2)\to (x=\left[{\mathcal{S}}_{1}\right])\wedge (y=(\left[{\mathcal{S}}_{2}\right]\circ \dots \circ \left[{\mathcal{S}}_{n}\right],n=\left|{\mathcal{S}}_{i}\right|\left)\right)$

**Axiom**

**21.**

**Axiom**

**22.**

**Axiom**

**23.**

#### Appendix A.6. Anthropological Mental Egalitarianism

**Definition**

**A13**

**(Anthropological**

**Mental**

**Egalitarianism).**

- $\mathfrak{H}$ is a mereological system$\mathfrak{H}=\langle H,\circ \rangle $ where:
- ˗
- H is a set of atomic individuals, the set of all individual human beings $H=(x,y,z\dots )$
- ˗
- ∘ is the associative binary operation of aggregation among elements of H

- $\mathcal{G}$ is a subset of H, the superset of social genera, $\mathcal{G}=({\mathcal{G}}_{1},{\mathcal{G}}_{2},\dots )$
- ˗
- Each social genus ${\mathcal{G}}_{j}$ has as a subset a superset of social species, ${\mathcal{S}}_{i}=({\mathcal{S}}_{j1},{\mathcal{S}}_{j2},\dots )$

- $\mathfrak{M}$ is a superset of k comparative structures $\mathfrak{M}=\langle H,{\succcurlyeq}_{i\in I}\rangle $, the mental attributes, where:
- ˗
- ${\succcurlyeq}_{i\in I}$ is an empirical relation of comparison “greater or equal than”

- I is an index set$I=(1,\dots ,k),k\in \mathbb{N}$ designating specific mental attributes
- $\mathfrak{N}$ is a numerical relational structure $\mathfrak{N}=\langle \mathbb{R},\ge \rangle $ where:
- ˗
- $\mathbb{R}$ is a set of real numbers $\mathbb{R}=(n,o,p\dots )$
- ˗
- ≥ is the formal relation “greater or equal than”

- $\mathfrak{R}$ is a superset of k triples $\mathfrak{R}=\langle \mathfrak{M},\mathbb{N},{\varphi}_{i}\rangle $, the representation standards for mental attributes
- ˗
- ${\varphi}_{i}$ is a homomorphism ${\varphi}_{i\in I}:M\to \mathbb{R}$, the assignment of a numerical value to a human being for a particular mental attribute

- $\mathrm{\Omega}$ is a subset of $\mathbb{R}$, the set of upper bounds of mental attributes
- $\mathrm{\Theta}$ is a set of k functions $\mathrm{\Theta}=({\iota}_{1},{\iota}_{2},\dots )$, the functions of socioeconomic significance${\iota}_{i\in I}:A\times A\to [0,1]$

**Axiom**

**24.**

**Axiom**

**25.**

**Axiom**

**26.**

- If the interval $[{\omega}_{x},{\omega}_{y}]$ is socioeconomically significant, ${\iota}_{i}({\omega}_{x},{\omega}_{y})=1$
- If the interval $[{\omega}_{x},{\omega}_{y}]$ is socioeconomically insignificant, ${\iota}_{i}({\omega}_{x},{\omega}_{y})=0$

**Axiom**

**27.**

## References

- Haidt, J. Why Universities Must Choose One Telos: Truth or Social Justice. Available online: http://heterodoxacademy.org/2016/10/21/one-telos-truth-or-social-justice/ (accessed on 12 July 2017).
- Esser, J.K. Alive and well after 25 years: A review of groupthink research. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process.
**1998**, 73, 116–141. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Gilovich, T.; Griffin, D.; Kahneman, D. Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2002. [Google Scholar]
- Hirstein, W. Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation; The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2004. [Google Scholar]
- Holmes, D.; Murray, S.J.; Perron, A.; Rail, G. Deconstructing the evidence-based discourse in health sciences: Truth, power and fascism. Int. J. Evid.-Based Healthc.
**2006**, 4, 180–186. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Fernández, E.C. Euphemistic strategies in politeness and face concerns. Pragmalingüística
**2010**, 10, 77–86. [Google Scholar] - Lang, K. Poverty and Discrimination; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 2007. [Google Scholar]
- McLellan, D. Ideology; Open University Press: New York, NY, USA, 1995. [Google Scholar]
- Bunge, M. Epistemology and Methodology I: Exploring the World; Vol. 5 of Treatise on Basic Philosophy; Reidel: Dordrecht, The Netherlands; Boston, MA, USA, 1983. [Google Scholar]
- Bunge, M. Epistemology and Methodology II: Understanding the world; Vol. 6 of Treatise on Basic Philosophy; Reidel: Dordrecht, The Netherlands; Boston, MA, USA, 1983. [Google Scholar]
- Bunge, M. Political Philosophy: Fact, Fiction, and Vision; Transaction Publishers: Piscataway, NJ, USA, 2011. [Google Scholar]
- Mesoudi, A. Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory Can Explain Human Culture and Synthesize the Social Sciences; University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL, USA, 2011. [Google Scholar]
- Blackmore, S. The Meme Machine; Oxford Paperbacks: Wang Yuen St, Hongkong, 2000; Volume 25. [Google Scholar]
- Dennett, D.C. The new replicators. Encycl. Evol.
**2002**, 1, E83–E92. [Google Scholar] - Distin, K. The Selfish Meme: A Critical Reassessment; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2005. [Google Scholar]
- Sperber, D. An objection to the memetic approach to culture. In Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics As a Science; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2000; pp. 163–173. [Google Scholar]
- Taylor, T. The Problem of ’Darwinizing’ Culture (or Memes as the New Phlogiston). In Evolution 2.0; Springer: Berlin, Germany, 2012; pp. 65–82. [Google Scholar]
- Dennett, D.C. The Intentional Stance; The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 1987. [Google Scholar]
- Balkin, J.M. Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology; Yale University Press: Yale, CT, USA, 2002. [Google Scholar]
- Dennett, D.C. Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon; Penguin: London, UK, 2006; Volume 14. [Google Scholar]
- Evans, J.S. Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition. Annu. Rev. Psychol.
**2008**, 59, 255–278. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Frankish, K. Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning. Philos. Compass
**2010**, 5, 914–926. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Sowell, T. A Conflict of Visions: Idealogical Origins of Political Struggles; Basic Books: New York, NY, USA, 2007. [Google Scholar]
- Therborn, G. The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology; NLB: New York City, NY, USA, 1980. [Google Scholar]
- Imre, L. Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge; Lakatos, I., Musgrave, A., Eds.; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1970; pp. 91–195. [Google Scholar]
- Garfield, D.A.; Wray, G.A. The evolution of gene regulatory interactions. BioScience
**2010**, 60, 15–23. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Kalisch, M. Islamische Theologie ohne historischen Muhammad—Anmerkungen zu den Herausforderungen der historisch-kritischen Methode für das islamische Denken. In Islamic Theology without Historical Muhammad—Notes about the Challenges of the Historical-Critical Method for Islamic Thinking; 2008; p. 2, unpublished work. [Google Scholar]
- Kahan, D. The expressive rationality of inaccurate perceptions of fact. Behav. Brain Sci.
**2015**, 40. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Anderson, E. Value in Ethics and Economics; Harvard University Press: Harvard, MA, USA, 1995. [Google Scholar]
- Sherman, D.K.; Cohen, G.L. The psychology of self-defense: Self-affirmation theory. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol.
**2006**, 38, 183–242. [Google Scholar] - Kahan, D.M.; Braman, D.; Gastil, J.; Slovic, P.; Mertz, C. Culture and identity-protective cognition: Explaining the white-male effect in risk perception. J. Empir. Legal Stud.
**2007**, 4, 465–505. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Czerniewicz, L. Inequitable Power Dynamics of Global Knowledge Production and Exchange Must Be Confronted Head on. Available online: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2013/04/29/redrawing-the-map-from-access-to-participation (accessed on 13 July 2017).
- Klein, D.B.; Stern, C. Political diversity in six disciplines. Acad. Quest.
**2005**, 18, 40–52. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Stanley Rothman, S.R.L.; Nevitte, N. Politics and Professional Advancement among College Faculty. Forum
**2005**. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Gross, N.; Simmons, S. The Social and Political Views of American Professors. Presented at the Harvard University Symposium on Professors and Their Politics, 6 October 2007. [Google Scholar]
- Gross, N. Why are Professors Liberal and Why do Conservatives Care? Harvard University Press: Harvard, MA, USA, 2013. [Google Scholar]
- Nickerson, R.S. Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Rev. Gen. Psychol.
**1998**, 2, 175. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Lamm, H.; Myers, D.G. Group-induced polarization of attitudes and behavior. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol.
**1978**, 11, 145–195. [Google Scholar] - Del Vicario, M.; Bessi, A.; Zollo, F.; Petroni, F.; Scala, A.; Caldarelli, G.; Stanley, H.E.; Quattrociocchi, W. The spreading of misinformation online. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
**2016**, 113, 554–559. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Duarte, J.L.; Crawford, J.T.; Stern, C.; Haidt, J.; Jussim, L.; Tetlock, P.E. Political diversity will improve social psychological science. Behav. Brain Sci.
**2015**, 38, e130. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Inbar, Y.; Lammers, J. Political diversity in social and personality psychology. Perspect. Psychol. Sci.
**2012**, 7, 496–503. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Brandt, M.J.; Reyna, C.; Chambers, J.R.; Crawford, J.T.; Wetherell, G. The ideological-conflict hypothesis intolerance among both liberals and conservatives. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci.
**2014**, 23, 27–34. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Jussim, L.; Crawford, J.T.; Anglin, S.M.; Stevens, S.T. Ideological bias in social psychological research. In Social Psychology and Politics; Forgas, J.P., Fiedler, K., Crano, W.D., Eds.; Taylor and Francis: New York, NY, USA, 2015; pp. 91–109. [Google Scholar]
- Chilton, A.S.; Posner, E.A. An Empirical Study of Political Bias in Legal Scholarship; University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research: Chicago, IL, USA, 2015. [Google Scholar]
- Hájek, A. Philosophical Heuristics and Philosophical Methodology. In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology; Cappelen, H., Gendler, T.S., Hawthorne, J., Eds.; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2016. [Google Scholar]
- Nado, J. Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise. Philos. Psychol.
**2015**, 28, 1026–1044. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Weinberg, J.M.; Gonnerman, C.; Buckner, C.; Alexander, J. Are philosophers expert intuiters? Philos. Psychol.
**2010**, 23, 331–355. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Schwitzgebel, E.; Cushman, F. Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection. Cognition
**2015**, 141, 127–137. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Sesardic, N. When Reason Goes on Holiday: Philosophers in Politics; Encounter Books: New York, NY, USA, 2016. [Google Scholar]
- Anomaly, J. Race Research and the Ethics of Belief. J. Bioeth. Inq.
**2017**, 14, 1–11. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Sesardic, N.; De Clercq, R. Women in philosophy: Problems with the discrimination hypothesis. Acad. Quest.
**2014**, 27, 461–473. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Tremain, S. Ableist Language and Philosophical Associations. Available online: http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/07/ableist-language-and-philosophical-associations.html (accessed on 19 July 2017).
- Zunac, M. Radicalism’s Yield: Politics and the Illiberal Academy. Acad. Quest.
**2016**, 29, 428–433. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Allingham, M. Distributive Justice; Routledge: Abingdon, UK, 2014. [Google Scholar]
- Dennett, D.C. With a Little Help from My Friends. In Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment; Ross, D., Ed.; The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2000; Chapter 15. [Google Scholar]
- Hicks, S.R.C. Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from Rousseau to Foucault; Scholargy Publishing, Inc.: Tempe, AZ, USA, 2004. [Google Scholar]
- Bunge, M. A Critical Examination of the New Sociology of Science: “Part 1”. Philos. Soc. Sci.
**1991**, 21, 524. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Bunge, M. A Critical Examination of the New Sociology of Science: “Part 2”. Philos. Soc. Sci.
**1992**, 22, 46. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Bunge, M. Social Science under Debate: A Philosophical Perspective; University of Toronto Press: Toronto, ON, Canada, 1999. [Google Scholar]
- Heywood, A. Political Ideologies: An Introduction; Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, UK, 2012. [Google Scholar]
- Pinker, S. The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature; Viking Press: New York, NY, USA, 2002. [Google Scholar]
- Kanazawa, S. Why liberals and atheists are more intelligent. Soc. Psychol. Q.
**2010**, 73, 33–57. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Donald, M. A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness; W. W. Norton & Company: New York, NY, USA, 2002. [Google Scholar]
- Rosenberg, A. The Atheist’s Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life without Illusions; W. W. Norton & Company: New York, NY, USA, 2011. [Google Scholar]
- Mackintosh, N. History of theories and measurement of intelligence. In The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2011; pp. 3–19. [Google Scholar]
- Urbina, S. Tests of intelligence. In The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2011; pp. 20–38. [Google Scholar]
- Willis, J.O.; Dumont, R.; Kaufman, A.S. Factor-analytic models of intelligence. In The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2011; pp. 39–57. [Google Scholar]
- Epstein, B. Ontological individualism reconsidered. Synthese
**2009**, 166, 187–213. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Bunge, M. Treatise on Basic Philosophy: Semantics I: Sense and Reference; Springer Science & Business Media: Berlin, Germany, 1977; Volume 1. [Google Scholar]
- Khalidi, M. Three kinds of social kinds. Philos. Phenomenol. Res.
**2015**, 90, 96–112. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Mason, R. The metaphysics of social kinds. Philos. Compass
**2016**, 11, 841–850. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Thompson, N. Anti-Discriminatory Practice: Equality, Diversity and Social Justice; Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, UK, 2012. [Google Scholar]
- Ruhm, C.J. When ’Equal Opportunity’ Is Not Enough: Training Costs and Intergenerational Inequality. J. Hum. Resour.
**1988**, 23, 155–172. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Phillips, A. Defending equality of outcome. J. Polit. Philos.
**2004**, 12, 1–19. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Cowell, F. Measuring Inequality; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2011. [Google Scholar]
- Marx, K.; Engels, F. Communist Manifesto; Penguin: London, UK, 2002; [1848]. [Google Scholar]
- Abberley, P. The concept of oppression and the development of a social theory of disability. Disabil. Handicap Soc.
**1987**, 2, 5–19. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Shidlo, A. Internalized homophobia: Conceptual and empirical issues in measurement. In Psychological Perspectives on Lesbian and Gay Issues; Volume 1: Lesbian and gay psychology: Theory, research, and clinical applications; Greene, B., Herek, G.M., Eds.; SAGE Publications Ltd.: Thousand Oaks, CA, USA, 1994; pp. 176–205. [Google Scholar]
- Lerner, G. The Creation of Patriarchy; Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA, 1986; Volume 1. [Google Scholar]
- Bonilla-Silva, E. White Supremacy and Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era; Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO, USA, 2001. [Google Scholar]
- Do’Mar Castro, M.; Dhawan, N.; Engel, A. Hegemony and Heteronormativity: Revisiting ’the Political’ in Queer Politics. In The Sage Handbook of Feminist Theory; Ashgate: London, UK, 2011; Volume 324, pp. 71–82. [Google Scholar]
- Baril, A.; Trevenen, K. Exploring ableism and cisnormativity in the conceptualization of identity and sexuality ’disorders’. Annu. Rev. Crit. Psychol.
**2014**, 11, 389–416. [Google Scholar] - Shohat, E.; Stam, R. Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media; Routledge: Abingdon, UK, 2014. [Google Scholar]
- Hehir, T. Eliminating ableism in education. Harvard Edu. Rev.
**2002**, 72, 1–33. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Beauvais, C. The problem of ’Power’: Metacritical implications of aetonormativity for children’s literature research. Children’s Lit. Educ.
**2013**, 44, 74–86. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Robinson, Z.F. Intersectionality. In Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory; Springer: Berlin, Germany, 2016; pp. 477–499. [Google Scholar]
- Pease, B. Undoing Privilege: Unearned Advantage in a Divided World; Zed Books, Ltd.: London, UK, 2010. [Google Scholar]
- Deo, M.E. Two Sides of a Coin: Safe Space & Segregation in Race/Ethnic-Specific Law Student Organizations. Wash. UJL Pol’y
**2013**, 42, 83–129. [Google Scholar] - Goodman, D.J. Oppression and Privilege: Two Sides of the Same Coin. J. Interc. Commun.
**2015**, 18, 1–14. [Google Scholar] - Kamram, O. The American Muslim Dilemma: Christian Normativity, Racialization, And Anti-Muslim Backlash; Texas A & M University: College Station, TX, USA, 2012. [Google Scholar]
- Operario, D.; Fiske, S.T. Racism equals power plus prejudice: A social psychological equation for racial oppression. In Confronting Racism: The Problem and the Response; Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA, USA, 1998; pp. 33–53. [Google Scholar]
- Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 1971. [Google Scholar]
- Rawls, J. Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical. Philos. Public Aff.
**1985**, 14, 223–251. [Google Scholar] - Rawls, J. Political Liberalism; Columbia University Press: New York, NY, USA, 1993. [Google Scholar]
- Sesardic, N. Making Sense of Heritability; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2005. [Google Scholar]
- Sue, D.W. Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Race, Gender, and Sexual Orientation; John Wiley & Sons: Hoboken, NY, USA, 2010. [Google Scholar]
- Rahman, Q.; Wilson, G.D. Large sexual-orientation-related differences in performance on mental rotation and judgement of line orientation tasks. Neuropsychology
**2003**, 17, 25. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Filipovic, J. Offensive feminism: The conservative gender norms that perpetuate rape culture, and how feminists can fight back. In Yes Means Yes; Seal Press: Berkeley, CA, USA, 2008; pp. 13–27. [Google Scholar]
- Hymowitz, K.S. The feminist silence about Islam. Policy J. Public Policy Ideas
**2003**, 19, 29. [Google Scholar] - Sommers, C.H. The subjection of Islamic women and the fecklessness of American feminism. Wkly. Stand.
**2007**. Available online: http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-subjection-of-islamic-women/article/14753 (accessed on 31 July 2017). - Entine, J. Taboo: Why Black Athletes Dominate Sports and Why We’re Afraid to Talk about It; PublicAffairs: New York, NY, USA, 2008. [Google Scholar]
- Maughan, R. The limits of human athletic performance. Ann. Trans.
**2004**, 10, 52–54. [Google Scholar] - Lippi, G.; Longo, U.G.; Maffulli, N. Genetics and sports. Br. Med. Bull.
**2010**, 93, 27–47. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Lehre, A.C.; Lehre, K.P.; Laake, P.; Danbolt, N.C. Greater intrasex phenotype variability in males than in females is a fundamental aspect of the gender differences in humans. Dev. Psychobiol.
**2009**, 51, 198–206. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Michell, J. Quantitative science and the definition of measurement in psychology. Br. J. Psychol.
**1997**, 88, 355–383. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Roberts, F.S. Measurement Theory with Applications to Decisionmaking, Utility, and the Social Sciences; Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its Applications (Book 7); Reissue edition (12 March 2009); Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2009. [Google Scholar]
- Edouard, M.; Luc, F. Social Construction and the Concept of Race. Philos. Sci.
**2005**, 72, 1208–1219. [Google Scholar] - Turkheimer, E. Three laws of behavior genetics and what they mean. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci.
**2000**, 9, 160–164. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Hird, M.J. Gender’s nature Intersexuality, transsexualism and the ’sex’/’gender’ binary. Fem. Theory
**2000**, 1, 347–364. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Blackless, M.; Charuvastra, A.; Derryck, A.; Fausto-Sterling, A.; Lauzanne, K.; Lee, E. How sexually dimorphic are we? Review and synthesis. Am. J. Hum. Biol.
**2000**, 12, 151–166. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Slatkin, M. Epigenetic inheritance and the missing heritability problem. Genetics
**2009**, 182, 845–850. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Zuk, O.; Hechter, E.; Sunyaev, S.R.; Lander, E.S. The mystery of missing heritability: Genetic interactions create phantom heritability. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
**2012**, 109, 1193–1198. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - McCrae, R.R.; Costa, P.T.; de Lima, M.P.; Simões, A.; Ostendorf, F.; Angleitner, A.; Marušić, I.; Bratko, D.; Caprara, G.V.; Barbaranelli, C.; et al. Age differences in personality across the adult life span: Parallels in five cultures. Dev. Psychol.
**1999**, 35, 466. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Chalmers, D.J. The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis. J. Conscious. Stud.
**2010**, 17, 9–10. [Google Scholar] - Seibert, S.E.; Kraimer, M.L. The five-factor model of personality and career success. J. Vocat. Behav.
**2001**, 58, 1–21. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Viinikainen, J.; Kokko, K.; Pulkkinen, L.; Pehkonen, J. Personality and labour market income: Evidence from longitudinal data. Labour
**2010**, 24, 201–220. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Zagorsky, J.L. Do you have to be smart to be rich? The impact of IQ on wealth, income and financial distress. Intelligence
**2007**, 35, 489–501. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Chalmers, D.J. Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy? Philosophy
**2015**, 90, 3–31. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Nietzsche, F. Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks; Regnery Publishing Inc.: Washington, DC, USA, 1962. [Google Scholar]
- Dietrich, E. There Is No Progress in Philosophy. Essays Philos.
**2011**, 12, 9. [Google Scholar] - Strickland, L. Philosophy and the Search for Truth. Philosophia
**2013**, 41, 1079–1094. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Brogaard, B. The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism. Or How I Learned to Stop Caring about Truth. In Epistemic Value; Haddock, A., Millar, A., Pritchard, D., Eds.; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2008. [Google Scholar]
- Dennett, D. A Conversation with Daniel Dennett. Available online: http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/digicult/dennett.htm (accessed on 14 July 2017).
- Dennett, D.C. Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanins of Life; Simon & Schuster: New York, NY, USA, 1995. [Google Scholar]
- Haddock, A.; Millar, A.; Pritchard, D. Epistemic Value; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2009. [Google Scholar]
- Grimm, S.R. Epistemic Normativity. In Epistemic Value; Haddock, A., Millar, A., Pritchard, D., Eds.; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2009; pp. 243–264. [Google Scholar]
- Laudan, L. The epistemic, the cognitive, and the social. In Science, Values, and Objectivity; University of Pittsburgh Press: Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 2004; pp. 14–23. [Google Scholar]
- Douglas, H. The Value of Cognitive Values. Philos. Sci.
**2014**, 80, 796–806. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Diekmann, S.; Peterson, M. The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Engineering Models. Sci. Eng. Ethics
**2013**, 19, 207–218. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Graybeal, C.D. Mathematical Lies We Tell Students. Teach. Child. Math.
**2014**, 21, 197–199. [Google Scholar] - Glynn, I. Elegance in Science: The Beauty of Simplicity; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2010. [Google Scholar]
- Okasha, S. Theory choice and social choice: Kuhn versus Arrow. Mind
**2011**, 120, 83–115. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef][Green Version] - Welch, J.R. New tools for theory choice and theory diagnosis. Stud. Hist. Philos. Sci. Part A
**2013**, 44, 318–329. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Kaliszewski, I.; Miroforidis, J.; Podkopaev, D. Multiple Criteria Decision Making by Multiobjective Optimization; Springer: Berlin, Germany, 2016. [Google Scholar]
- Deb, K.; Miettinen, K. Multiobjective Optimization: Interactive and Evolutionary Approaches; Springer Science & Business Media: Berlin, Germany, 2008; Volume 5252. [Google Scholar]
- De Weck, O.L. Multiobjective optimization: History and promise. In Proceedings of the Third China-Japan-Korea Joint Symposium on Optimization of Structural and Mechanical Systems, Kanazawa, Japan, 30 October–2 November 2004; Volume 2, p. 34. [Google Scholar]
- Ho, Y.C.; Zhao, Q.C.; Jia, Q.S. Ordinal Optimization: Soft Optimization for Hard Problems; Springer Science & Business Media: Berlin, Germany, 2008. [Google Scholar]
- Mahner, M. Science and Pseudoscience How to Demarcate After the (Alleged) Demise. In Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem; Pigliucci, M., Boudry, M., Eds.; University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL, USA, 2013; p. 29. [Google Scholar]
- Bunge, M. The complexity of simplicity. J. Philos.
**1962**, 59, 113–135. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Chaitin, G. On the intelligibility of the universe and the notions of simplicity, complexity and irreducibility. In Thinking about Gödel and Turing: Essays on Complexity, 1970-2007L; World Scientific Publishing: Singapore, 2007; pp. 201–226. [Google Scholar]
- Bunge, M. The weight of simplicity in the construction and assaying of scientific theories. Philos. Sci.
**1961**, 28, 120–149. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - McAllister, J.W. The simplicity of theories: Its degree and form. J. Gen. Philos. Sci.
**1991**, 22, 1–14. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Caramia, M.; Dell’Olmo, P. Multi-Objective Management in Freight Logistics: Increasing Capacity, Service Level and Safety with Optimization Algorithms; Springer Science & Business Media: Berlin, Germany, 2008. [Google Scholar]
- Triantaphyllou, E. Multi-criteria decision making methods. In Multi-Criteria Decision Making Methods: A Comparative Study; Springer: Berlin, Germany, 2000; pp. 5–21. [Google Scholar]
- Dubois, D.; Fargier, H.; Perny, P.; Prade, H. Towards a qualitative multicriteria decision theory. In Proceedings of the EUROFUSE Workshop on Preference Modelling and Applications, Granada, Spain, 25–27 April 2001; pp. 121–129. [Google Scholar]
- Narens, L. Theories of Meaningfulness; Scientific Psychology Series; Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, NJ, USA, 2002. [Google Scholar]
- Bellman, R. Dynamic Programming, 1st ed.; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 1957. [Google Scholar]
- Deb, K.; Thiele, L.; Laumanns, M.; Zitzler, E. Scalable Test Problems for Evolutionary Multiobjective Optimization; Springer: Berlin, Germany, 2005. [Google Scholar]
- Bringmann, K.; Friedrich, T. Approximating the least hypervolume contributor: NP-hard in general, but fast in practice. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Evolutionary Multi-Criterion Optimization, Nantes, France, 7–10 April 2009; Springer: Berlin, Germany, 2009; pp. 6–20. [Google Scholar]
- Akbarzadeh-T, M.; Jamshidi, M. Incorporating a-priori expert knowledge in genetic algorithms. In Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE International Symposium on Computational Intelligence in Robotics and Automation, CIRA’97, Monterey, CA, USA, 10–11 July 1997; pp. 300–305. [Google Scholar]
- Tetlock, P. Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 2005. [Google Scholar]
- Mironov, V.V. On Progress in Philosophy. Metaphilosophy
**2013**, 44, 10–14. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Brockhoff, D.; Zitzler, E. Are all objectives necessary? On dimensionality reduction in evolutionary multiobjective optimization. In Parallel Problem Solving from Nature-PPSN IX; Springer: Berlin, Germany, 2006; pp. 533–542. [Google Scholar]
- Sesardic, N. Race: A social destruction of a biological concept. Biol. Philos.
**2010**, 25, 143–162. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Ren, D.; Zhou, H.; Fu, X. A deeper look at gender difference in multitasking: Gender-specific mechanism of cognitive control. In Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Natural Computation, ICNC’09, Tianjin, China, 14–16 August 2009; Volume 5, pp. 13–17. [Google Scholar]
- Dennett, D.C. Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking; WW Norton & Company: New York, NY, USA, 2013. [Google Scholar]
- Harding, S. Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is Strong Objectivity? In Feminist Epistemologies; Alcoff, L., Potter, E., Eds.; Routledge: Abingdon, UK, 1993. [Google Scholar]
- Longino, H.E. Cognitive and non-cognitive values in science: Rethinking the dichotomy. In Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science; Springer: Berlin, Germany, 1996; pp. 39–58. [Google Scholar]
- Koertge, N. A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths about Science; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 1998. [Google Scholar]
- Longino, H.E. Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 1990. [Google Scholar]
- Stanford, C.B. The Hunting Apes: Meat Eating and the Origins of Human Behavior; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 1999. [Google Scholar]
- Fedigan, L.M. The changing role of women in models of human evolution. Annu. Rev. Anthropol.
**1986**, 15, 25–66. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Henrich, J.; Heine, S.J.; Norenzayan, A. The weirdest people in the world? Behav. Brain Sci.
**2010**, 33, 61–135. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Ruphy, S. “Empiricism all the way down”: A defense of the value-neutrality of science in response to Helen Longino’s contextual empiricism. Perspect. Sci.
**2006**, 14, 189–214. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Kirsanow, K.; Burger, J. Ancient human DNA. Ann. Anat.
**2012**, 194, 121–132. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Vitti, J.J.; Grossman, S.R.; Sabeti, P.C. Detecting natural selection in genomic data. Annu. Rev. Gen.
**2013**, 47, 97–120. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Winship, T. Zetetic Cosmogony; Or, Conclusive Evidence That the World Is Not a Rotating-Revolving-Globe, But a Stationary Plane Circle, 2nd ed.; Cullingworth, T.L.: Durban, Natal; Durban, South Africa, 1899. [Google Scholar]
- Gilligan, C. In a Different Voice; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 1982. [Google Scholar]
- Noddings, N. Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education; University of California Press: Berkeley, CA, USA, 1984. [Google Scholar]
- Noddings, N. The Maternal Factor: Two Paths to Morality; Univ of California Press: Berkeley, CA, USA, 2010. [Google Scholar]
- Schmitt, D.P.; Realo, A.; Voracek, M.; Allik, J. Why can’t a man be more like a woman? Sex differences in Big Five personality traits across 55 cultures. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol.
**2008**, 94, 168. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Ngun, T.C.; Ghahramani, N.; Sánchez, F.J.; Bocklandt, S.; Vilain, E. The genetics of sex differences in brain and behavior. Front. Neuroendocrinol.
**2011**, 32, 227–246. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Ruigrok, A.N.; Salimi-Khorshidi, G.; Lai, M.C.; Baron-Cohen, S.; Lombardo, M.V.; Tait, R.J.; Suckling, J. A meta-analysis of sex differences in human brain structure. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev.
**2014**, 39, 34–50. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Fine, C. Delusions of Gender: How Our Minds, Society, and Neurosexism Create Difference; WW Norton & Company: New York, NY, USA, 2010. [Google Scholar]
- Prinz, J. Beyond Human Nature: How Culture and Experience Shape the Human Mind; WW Norton & Company: New York, NY, USA, 2014. [Google Scholar]
- Eagly, A.H. Sex Differences in Social Behavior: A Social-Role Interpretation; Psychology Press: Hove, UK, 2013. [Google Scholar]
- Bowling, J.; Martin, B. Science: A masculine disorder. Sci. Public Policy
**1985**, 12, 308–316. [Google Scholar] - Van der Vossen, B. In Defense of the Ivory Tower: Why Philosophers Should Stay Out of Politics. Philos. Psychol.
**2015**, 28, 1045–1063. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Kovács, Á. Gender in the substance of chemistry, Part 1: The ideal gas. HYLE Int. J. Philos. Chem.
**2012**, 18, 95–120. [Google Scholar] - Winegard, B.; Winegard, B.; Boutwell, B. Human Biological and Psychological Diversity. Evol. Psychol. Sci.
**2017**, 3, 159–180. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Rowe, D.C.; Rodgers, J.E. Under the skin: On the impartial treatment of genetic and environmental hypotheses of racial differences. Am. Psychol.
**2005**, 60, 60. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Putman, D. Psychological courage. Philos. Psychiatry Psychol.
**1997**, 4, 1–11. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Olsthoorn, P. Military Ethics and Virtues: An Interdisciplinary Approach for the 21st Century; Routledge: Abingdon, UK, 2010. [Google Scholar]
- Frigerio, A.; Giordani, A.; Mari, L. Outline of a general model of measurement. Synthese
**2009**, 175, 123–149. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Luce, D.; Krantz, D.; Suppes, P.; Tversky, A. Foundations of Measurement; Vol. I: Additive and Polynomial Representations; Academic Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 1971. [Google Scholar]
- Falmagne, J.C. A Set of Independent Axioms for Positive Holder Systems. Philos. Sci.
**1975**, 42, 137–151. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Narens, L. A general theory of ratio scalability with remarks about the measurement-theoretic concept of meaningfulness. Theory Decis.
**1981**, 13, 1–70. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Bunge, M. Treatise on Basic Phylosphy; Volume 3: Ontology I–The Furniture of the World; Reidel Pub. Co.: Boston, MA, USA, 1977. [Google Scholar]
- Mahner, M.; Bunge, M. Foundations of Biophilosophy; Springer Science & Business Media: Berlin, Germany, 1997. [Google Scholar]

1. | Naturally, to talk about “truth” and “social justice” in theses cases is an abstraction; save for hardcore Fregeans, seekers of truth do not aim for a particular object called The True but intend to reach at the end of rational investigations true truth-bearers (beliefs, statements, theories, etc.). Analogously, what sincere partisans of social justice desire are actual concrete changes in the socioeconomic sphere. |

2. | It must be pointed out that postmodernism, stipulated as one of the central progenitors of this ideology I criticize, has generated virulent thought patterns which overtly promote anti-scientific thinking that may end up with the loss of lives; for instance, the accusation that evidence-based medicine is “fascist” [5] may influence the adoption of non-evidence-based medicine. |

3. | In analytic philosophy, one of the most comprehensive expositions of ideology is Mario Bunge’s set-theoretical account of a sociopolitical ideology, which is a kind of belief system, a subtype of epistemic field (see [9] ( p. 91); [10] (pp. 228–237) and [11] (Chapter 4)) for description and discussion). Such an approach would be especially congenial to my work given my usage of his construct of a field of inquiry, the other type of epistemic field, which structurally is very similar to sociopolitical ideologies. |

4. | The literature of cultural evolution is extensive and evolving very rapidly. Memetics differs from other theoretical accounts of cultural evolution due to an assumption that the processes of cultural evolution are isomorphic to biological evolution concerning details of the individuation of cultural information (discrete) and transmission (relatively high fidelity). For an evolutionary account of culture outside memetics, see [12]. Introductory defenses of memetics are found in [13,14]. A comprehensive critical assessment is found in [15]. For some incisive criticism of memetics, see [16,17]. |

5. | Such a theological hypothesis is explored in [27]. |

6. | For a quantitative measure of this, the Scimago Journal & Country Rank maintained by the company Scimago Lab has bibliometric data up to 2015 which can be accessed in http://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php. See also [32]. |

7. | |

8. | |

9. | |

10. | The phrase entered public consciousness to such a degree that it merited an entry in Oxford’s Dictionary: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/socialjusticewarrior |

11. | I refer the reader to some partly historical contemporary investigations and expositions of these trends which are consonant with this project. For a detailed incursion into PC and postmodernism and hypotheses on its intellectual ancestors, see [56]. For the ideological takeover of social science by frameworks developed by critical theory and postmodernism, see [57,58,59]. An introductory exposition of the origin and content of social liberalism as the hybridization of classical liberalism with socialist thought can be found in [60]. For the academic efforts to practice social science irrespective of relevant empirical generalizations from the biological sciences, a classic exposition comes from cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker [61]. |

12. | |

13. | Economist Christopher J. Ruhm has described a mathematical model of this exact situation [73]. |

14. | The existence of an ideology of “Christian normativity” present in Western societies under which that which is non-Christian is devalued by default has already been proposed [90]. |

15. | See for example the following bold article, which neatly summarizes common arguments for the inexistence of reverse racism http://www.dailydot.com/via/reverse-racism-doesnt-exist/. |

16. | This was chiefly inspired by Neven Sesardić’s similar use of the difference principle [95]. ( p. 224) |

17. | Given the intimate integration of the endocrine and nervous systems, studied in the epistemic field of neuroendocrinology, and given the role of hormones modulating behavioral responses of all kinds, one who acknowledges natural group differences in endocrinology but denies natural differences in behavior may be at risk of being inconsistent. |

18. | A transcription of his speech can be found via the InternetWaybackMachine at http://web.archive.org/web/20080130023006/http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/2005/nber.html |

19. | |

20. | |

21. | But even this may be disputed for the empirical generalization known as the “first law of behavioral genetics” [108] state that there exists no human behavioral trait with zero heritability. |

22. | The concept of heritability has been subjected to intense scrutiny by scientists and philosophers of science. For a recent novel criticism, contemporary geneticists have been struggling with the so-called “missing heritability problem” (often in the context of heritability in the narrow sense; see [95] (p. 21); for several given phenotypical traits measured as having a high heritability, the associated genetic variants which have been traced via genetic sequencing appear to explain very little of the total predicted heritability. Some scientists [111] have proposed transgenerational epigenetic inheritance to account for the missing heritability; this account is more consonant with PC for the causes of epigenetic factors may exist inside the range of environmental modifiability. However, alternative explanations which secure the notion of heritability in genetic factors exist. For instance, a team of statistical geneticists [112] has argued that the “missing heritability” problem emerges under the assumption that the contribution of a conjunction of expressed genetic variants can be modeled as a linear (“additive”) combination. When the interactions among genetic variants are modeled as nonlinear, the problem may significantly dissolve. |

23. | For this particular example, current empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case; extraversion has significant positive correlation with income, new promotions and negatively correlated with unemployment [115,116]. It appears to be unlikely that the other tail of this continuum sports a significant violation of this monotonicity. |

24. | For instance, feminist philosopher Anne Phillips writes: “Despite my scepticism about whether systematic differences of ability or disposition can be mapped onto these particular categories (“gender, ethnicity and race”), I am not so naïve as to doubt the existence of individual difference. Individuals vary in their abilities, characters, and dispositions, and though the variance is often exaggerated by social and educational inequalities, people are indeed different in what they want and are able to do” [74]. (p. 13) |

25. | The same study establishes a connection between higher IQs and financial distress, pointing to possible nonlinear relationships between wealth and general intelligence. |

26. | In Bunge’s original scheme, epistemic fields come in two types; fields of inquiry and belief systems, of which I take ideologies to be one of its species. |

27. | Naturally, to treat logical formulae as individuals $x,x\in C$ is an abstraction. Treating them as logical formulae proper would require the framework to employ second-order logic which would be extremely cumbersome. |

28. | An easy and risky way to characterize this feature under this framework is this; let ${F}_{{t}_{0}}$ be the fund of knowledge of philosophy at a time ${t}_{0}$ and ${F}_{{t}_{+}}$ the fund of knowledge of philosophy at an arbitrary future time ${t}_{+}$. Then the statement $\left|{F}_{{t}_{+}}\right|>\left|{F}_{{t}_{0}}\right|$ is probably true. |

29. | The relevant quote comes from Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks: “The very first experience that philosophy had on Greek soil, the sanction of the Seven Sages, is an unmistakable and unforgettable feature of the Hellenic image. Other peoples have saints; the Greeks have sages” [119] |

30. | There exists extensive metaphilosophical disagreement on the possibility of progress in philosophy. The sort of progress envisioned by my example would not be considered properly philosophical [120]. But even the case that perennial problems (such as the mind-body problem and free will) are unsolvable, if true, would itself be a positive epistemic result by demarcating limits to human knowledge |

31. | This strong thesis resonates with Berit Brogaard’s [122] account of epistemic value monism under which truth is a primary, overriding and non-negotiable epistemic goal. |

32. | Dennett attributes this adage to philosopher Ronald de Souza, referring to philosophical apologetics |

33. | Larry Laudan [127] distinguishes cognitive from epistemic values. In his account, cognitive values encompass epistemic values as a proper subset and the “epistemic” is strictly construed as the domain of necessary and sufficient truth-conditions for a construct. My sketched account of what I call alethic epistemic values is not as strong and may involve weaker contingencies between a value and the goal of truth. |

34. | As a matter of fact, in the context of modeling a design problem (Section 5.4), engineers do not need to expend resources computing the truth of natural science which has already stood to massive empirical scrutiny. It is already a given, a part of the fund of knowledge F. |

35. | Several examples of simplicity and elegance in the history of science are described by biologist Ian Glynn [131]. |

36. | Critics of a postmodern or non-naturalistic verve may object and claim that such inferences are “scientistic” (or any other number of smear words). I reject any such charges of “scientism” as deliberate buzzword-infused ploys meant to avoid the satisfaction of external consistency and the loss of epistemic value such a constraint would cause for philosophical theories that ignore empirical truth. |

37. | As framed in [135], the MCDA evaluation problem is actually a proper part of a major MOO problem “It should be clear that multiobjective optimization consists of three phases: model building, optimization, and decision making (preference articulation)”. |

38. | Likert scales are a staple of survey data designed to extract information regarding preferences. They usually involve a small even number of sentences ranked from either the most positive or most negative valence (such as “strongly agree”, “agree”, “indifference”, “disagree” and “strongly disagree”. |

39. | An extensive discussion of several technical senses of “meaningfulness” in the context of the axiomatic representational theory of measurement is found at [146]. |

40. | Helen Longino used very similar words to summarize her most important work: “I argued in Science as Social Knowledge that social or non-cognitive values could and did serve as cognitive values” [158] (p. 41). |

41. | Placing this distinguished philosopher in the same cluster as postmodern feminist critics of science whose output is of limited quality is decidedly unfair. This general sentiment is also echoed, for instance, throughout essays in [159]. |

42. | Some of the feminist values or “feminist theoretical virtues” Longino advances to guide scientific reasoning, such as old-fashioned empirical adequacy and theoretical novelty, are difficult to be framed as properly “feminist” or even as related to social justice [158]. But criteria such as “applicability to human needs” as in preferring scientific knowledge that “improves the material conditions of human life” instead of mere science “for knowledge’s sake” and “diffusion of power”, under which explanatory models that incorporate “dominant-subordinate relationships” are to be deferred, decidedly strike us as politically correct values. |

43. | And of the psyches of potentially other oppressive groups, such as White people |

44. | |

45. | Winegard et al. in turn are mentioning the approach originally described in [181]. |

46. | Not many centuries ago throughout Medieval and Modern Era Europe, this could have been a literal stake depending on which heretical thoughts you uttered. |

47. | The excerpt was adapted from Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Gay Science, § 283 |

Genus | Oppressor | Oppressed | Immoral Act | Oppressive Ideology |
---|---|---|---|---|

Sex | Men | Women | Sexism | The Patriarchy [79] |

Race | Whites | non-Whites | Racism | White Supremacy [80] |

Sexual Orientation | Heterosexuals | Homosexuals | Homophobia | Heteronormativity [81] |

Gender Identity | Cisgenders | Transgenders | Transphobia | Cisnormativity [82] |

Body type | Thin people | Overweight people | Fat shaming | N/A |

Nationality | Western citizens | non-Western foreigners | Xenophobia | Eurocentrism [83] |

Ability | Able people | Disabled people | Ableism | Ablenormativity [84] |

Age | Adults | Children and seniors | Ageism | Aetonormativity [85] |

MCDA and MOO | Field of Inquiry |
---|---|

Set of actors A of an evaluation problem ${M}_{C}$ | Set of professionals A from a field of inquiry $\mathfrak{F}$ |

Decision space X of an evaluation problem ${M}_{C}$ | Constructs in C from a same class ${K}_{i}$ |

Set of criteria functions $\mathrm{\Phi}$ from an evaluation | The set of functions ${\varphi}_{1}$, ${\varphi}_{2}$… associated with |

problem ${M}_{C}$ | the values of a family of evaluation standards ${S}_{i}$ |

Vector of objective functions $\mathbf{f}$ from a design | As above |

problem ${M}_{O}$ | |

Inequality and equality constraints $\mathbf{g}$ and $\mathbf{h}$ | A priori impositions by members of A given |

from a design problem ${M}_{O}$ | the set of goals G |

Theory | Internal Consistency | Empirical Adequacy | ¬ad hocness | Simplicity |
---|---|---|---|---|

Moral cognitivism | 10 | 5 | 4 | 5 |

Moral noncognitivism | 10 | 7 | 6 | 7 |

Hybrid theory | 7 | 5 | 2 | 2 |

Theory | Explanatory Power | Simplicity | Empirical Adequacy | Intuitiveness |
---|---|---|---|---|

Animalism | 7 | 7 | 6 | 5 |

Lockeanism | 8 | 5 | 5 | 6 |

Eliminativism | 5 | 9 | 6 | 0 |

© 2017 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

## Share and Cite

**MDPI and ACS Style**

Doria, M. The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy. *Philosophies* **2017**, *2*, 17.
https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies2030017

**AMA Style**

Doria M. The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy. *Philosophies*. 2017; 2(3):17.
https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies2030017

**Chicago/Turabian Style**

Doria, Manuel. 2017. "The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy" *Philosophies* 2, no. 3: 17.
https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies2030017