Next Article in Journal
User Experience and Perceptions of AI-Generated E-Commerce Content: A Survey-Based Evaluation of Functionality, Aesthetics, and Security
Previous Article in Journal
A Structured Dataset for Automated Grading: From Raw Data to Processed Dataset
 
 
Font Type:
Arial Georgia Verdana
Font Size:
Aa Aa Aa
Line Spacing:
Column Width:
Background:
Article

Rethinking Inequality: The Complex Dynamics Beyond the Kuznets Curve

Department of Computer Science, Metropolitan College, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
These authors contributed equally to this work.
Data 2025, 10(6), 88; https://doi.org/10.3390/data10060088
Submission received: 27 April 2025 / Revised: 1 June 2025 / Accepted: 11 June 2025 / Published: 14 June 2025

Abstract

Income inequality has emerged as a defining challenge of our time, particularly in advanced economies, where the gap between rich and poor has reached unprecedented levels. This study analyzes income inequality trends from 2000 to 2023 across developed countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) and developing nations using World Bank Gini coefficient data. We employ comprehensive visualization techniques, Pareto distribution analysis, and ARIMA time-series forecasting models to evaluate the effectiveness of the Kuznets curve as a predictor of income inequality. Our analysis reveals significant deviations from the traditional inverse U-shaped Kuznets curve across all examined countries, with persistent volatility rather than the predicted decline in inequality. Forecasts using ARIMA and neural networks indicate continued fluctuations in inequality through 2030, with the U.S. and Germany showing upward trends while France and the UK demonstrate relative stability. These findings challenge the conventional Kuznets hypothesis and demonstrate that contemporary inequality patterns are influenced by factors beyond economic development, including technological change, globalization, and policy choices. This research contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence that the Kuznets curve has limited predictive power in modern economies, informing policymakers about the need for targeted interventions to address persistent inequality rather than relying on economic growth alone.

1. Introduction

Income inequality has emerged as one of the most pressing socioeconomic challenges of the 21st century, fundamentally reshaping political discourse, economic policy, and social cohesion across both developed and developing nations. The chasm separating the wealthy from the poor has reached unprecedented levels, particularly in advanced economies where technological progress, financial deepening, and labor market deregulation have created a complex web of distributional consequences [1]. Recent empirical evidence underscores the severity of this crisis: in OECD countries, the richest 10% of the population now earn 9.5 times the income of the poorest 10%, compared to a 7:1 ratio in the 1980s [2]. In the United States, between 1980 and 2022, the bottom 90% of earners experienced wage growth of just 36%, while the richest 1% saw 162% growth and the top 0.1% witnessed a staggering 301% increase [3]. This phenomenon extends far beyond statistical measures, representing a critical threat to democratic institutions, social mobility, and long-term economic sustainability, as excessive inequality can erode social cohesion, lead to political polarization, and lower economic growth [4].
The magnitude of contemporary inequality challenges fundamental assumptions in economic theory about the relationship between growth and distribution. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed similar patterns of inequality as urban centers expanded, attracting low-wage laborers and creating pronounced income disparities—a phenomenon originally documented by Simon Kuznets. The Kuznets curve, proposing an inverted U-shaped relationship between economic development and income inequality, has served as a cornerstone theoretical framework for understanding distributional dynamics during economic growth [5,6]. According to this hypothesis, inequality initially increases during early stages of development as capital accumulates in urban areas, but subsequently declines as economies mature and redistributive mechanisms strengthen. However, mounting empirical evidence suggests that the Kuznets curve has gradually fallen out of favor because its prediction of low inequality in very rich societies cannot be squared with the sustained increase in income inequality that started in the late 1970s in practically all developed nations [7].
Contemporary research increasingly questions the validity of traditional theoretical frameworks in explaining modern inequality patterns. Recent studies examining the Kuznets curve using expanded datasets covering more countries and longer time periods find limited evidence supporting the original hypothesis [8]. The resurgence of inequality since the 1980s, coinciding with the rise of neoliberalism, has fundamentally altered the relationship between economic growth and income distribution [9,10]. Structural transformations including technological change, globalization, declining union membership, and shifts in tax progressivity have created new channels through which inequality perpetuates and amplifies [5,9,11]. These developments necessitate a comprehensive reexamination of traditional theoretical frameworks and their continued relevance for understanding modern distributional dynamics, particularly as digital divides and technological disruption continue to reshape labor markets and income distribution patterns [12].
This study addresses three fundamental research questions that are critical for contemporary inequality research. First, to what extent does the Kuznets curve remain applicable for explaining income inequality trends in major developed economies during the 21st century? Second, how do inequality trajectories differ across developed nations—specifically the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France—and what institutional, policy, and structural factors explain these divergences? Third, what do advanced forecasting models reveal about future inequality trends, and what policy implications emerge from these projections? Our research makes several novel contributions to the inequality literature by providing the most comprehensive empirical assessment to date of the validity of the Kuznets curve using high-frequency Gini coefficient data spanning 2000–2023 across major developed economies, employing an innovative multi-method forecasting approach that combines traditional time-series models with advanced machine learning techniques, and developing a systematic framework for understanding why contemporary inequality patterns deviate from traditional theoretical predictions.
Our empirical strategy employs a comprehensive mixed-methods approach that represents a significant methodological advancement over existing studies. We utilize the World Bank’s inequality dataset, focusing on Gini coefficient measurements as our primary inequality metric due to its international comparability and theoretical grounding [13]. The analytical framework integrates four complementary methodological components. We begin with a detailed, descriptive and comparative analysis, constructing inequality trend profiles for each country in the World Bank’s inequality dataset while identifying periods of rising and declining inequality and mapping these patterns against major economic and political events. This includes construction of stylized Kuznets curves and systematic comparison with observed inequality trajectories. We then implement rigorous theoretical framework testing using correlation analysis and regression techniques to quantitatively assess the degree to which observed inequality patterns conform to Kuznets curve predictions, calculating measures of deviation from theoretical expectations and identifying structural break points in inequality trends.
The study’s most significant methodological innovation lies in our advanced time-series modeling approach, which combines traditional econometric methods with cutting-edge machine learning techniques. We implement a comprehensive suite of forecasting models including Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA), Seasonal ARIMA (SARIMA), Auto-ARIMA, Exponential Smoothing, and Random Forest methods. Additionally, we deploy sophisticated neural network architectures including Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks, Gated Recurrent Units (GRU), and Multilayer Perceptrons (MLP), techniques that have shown superior performance in capturing complex temporal patterns in economic time series [14,15]. Each model is optimized using grid search techniques and validated through rigorous cross-validation procedures. Finally, we construct ensemble forecasts combining predictions from all models to generate robust 10-year inequality projections, a methodological approach that has proven superior to individual model predictions in recent comparative studies [16]. This comprehensive modeling strategy enables us to provide both theoretical insights and practical forecasting capabilities that inform evidence-based policymaking.
The research significance extends across multiple domains of critical contemporary importance. For developed economies experiencing rising inequality, our analysis identifies early warning indicators and provides evidence-based projections essential for policy planning. The timing is particularly crucial as policymakers worldwide grapple with rising inequality, political polarization, and economic instability, with recent studies showing that economic inequality is now seen as a major challenge around the world, with a median of 54% across 36 countries considering the gap between rich and poor a considerable problem [17]. For developing nations, understanding the limitations of traditional growth-focused development models is essential for designing inclusive growth strategies that avoid the inequality challenges experienced by developed countries. For international organizations, our comparative framework offers insights into institutional and policy factors that successfully mitigate inequality, contributing to broader debates about capitalism’s sustainability, democratic governance under conditions of extreme inequality, and the role of technological change in shaping distributional outcomes.
The policy relevance of this research is immediate and multifaceted. Our findings have direct implications for fiscal policy design, social welfare system architecture, and international development strategies. As Thomas Piketty’s influential work has demonstrated, the forces driving inequality are not purely economic but are deeply intertwined with political choices and historical contexts, with his recent research showing how the rise of inequality in Western societies was very much rooted in systems of domination and appropriation [18]. This complexity necessitates a fundamental reevaluation of policy frameworks aimed at addressing inequality, emphasizing the need for targeted interventions that promote equitable growth and social mobility. Furthermore, as artificial intelligence and other technological innovations hold promise for driving prosperity while simultaneously threatening to widen digital gaps, our research provides crucial empirical foundations for understanding how these technological transformations will reshape inequality patterns [19].
In this study, we provide a comprehensive overview of the trend in income inequality for a wide array of countries to extrapolate how closely the variation in income inequality resembles Kuznets’ curve. In specific scenarios where there is a deviation from the trajectory, we outline the underpinning reasons embedded within the society that may have caused this pivot from the norm. The structure of this paper proceeds systematically through our comprehensive analysis, with subsequent sections examining theoretical frameworks, empirical methodology, findings, and policy implications emerging from our research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a comprehensive literature review examining theoretical models linking inequality to economic growth, consumption patterns, and the foundational Kuznets curve theory. Section 3 describes the World Bank dataset and data sources used in the analysis. Section 4 outlines the methodology, integrating traditional econometric approaches with advanced machine learning techniques for forecasting and validation. Section 5 presents the empirical results, including country-specific analyses, model performance comparisons, and Pareto distribution analysis. Section 6 discusses the findings, examining deviations from Kuznets curve predictions and identifying structural factors driving contemporary inequality patterns. Section 7 concludes with policy implications and directions for future research.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Income Inequality and Economic Growth

Eight theoretical models link income inequality to economic growth: the level of economic development, technological development, social-political unrest, the savings rate, the imperfection of credit markets, political economy, institutions, and fertility rate. A comprehensive literature review is given in [20]. Each model presents different transmission mechanisms through which income inequality can influence economic growth. For instance, the level of economic development suggests that the relationship between inequality and growth may be positive during the early stages of economic development, as Kuznets’ inverted U-hypothesis describes. This theory posits that as economies develop, income inequality initially increases due to labor shifts from agriculture to more productive sectors but eventually decreases as the economy matures. Labor becomes more evenly distributed across sectors.
Conversely, models related to social-political unrest and the political economy indicate that high levels of income inequality can lead to instability, which may inhibit growth [21]. The social-political unrest model presents an inconclusive relationship, suggesting that while inequality can spur unrest that hinders growth, it can also motivate social change that may promote economic development [22]. Theories surrounding the imperfection of credit markets and institutions generally support a negative relationship, indicating that income inequality can limit access to resources and opportunities for lower-income individuals, thereby stifling overall economic growth [23].
Interestingly, the only model that supports a positive relationship between income inequality and growth is the savings rate theory. This theory posits that higher income inequality can lead to increased savings among wealthier individuals, which can then be invested in productive ventures, potentially fostering economic growth [24].

2.2. Income Inequality, Consumption Patterns, and Psychological Well-Being

Exploring the relationship between income inequality, status consumption, and status anxiety reveals significant insights into the psychological and social dynamics underpinning consumer behavior in contemporary society. Heightened income inequality correlates with increased status consumption, where individuals engage in conspicuous consumption to signal their social rank [25]. This concept, originally theorized by Thorstein Veblen in his seminal work The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899), has been empirically validated by contemporary research showing that this phenomenon is particularly pronounced in societies where social hierarchies are emphasized, leading to a culture where material wealth is equated with social status.
In environments that are characterized by stark income disparities, individuals experience heightened status anxiety, which drives them to consume more conspicuously. The need to maintain or elevate one’s social standing compels individuals to invest in luxury goods and brands that are perceived as markers of status. Such consumption patterns not only reflect personal aspirations but also serve as a means of social signaling among peers. The shift towards more subtle branding suggests a response to the growing social stigma associated with overt displays of wealth.
The psychological mechanisms underlying status consumption are complex and multifaceted. Evidence suggests that factors such as political belief systems (i.e., fundamental beliefs of individuals about how society should be organized and governed), biological indicators (measurable physiological markers such as stress hormones or genetic predispositions), and individual values regarding uniqueness versus conformity play crucial roles in shaping consumption behaviors. For instance, individuals who prioritize uniqueness may be more inclined to engage in luxury consumption as a means of distinguishing themselves from others. At the same time, those who value conformity may gravitate towards popular brands that signal belonging within a social group [26].

2.3. Income Inequality and Kuznets Curve

The Kuznets curve, a concept introduced by economist Simon Kuznets in 1955, posits an inverse U-shaped relationship between economic development and income inequality [13]. As a country develops, income inequality initially increases, reaches a peak, and then declines as the benefits of growth become more widely distributed.
Kuznets begins by acknowledging the historical context of income distribution studies, noting the scarcity of reliable data and the prevalence of loosely defined concepts. He emphasizes the importance of understanding past trends and the conditions that shaped them, particularly in underdeveloped countries. This historical perspective is crucial for translating past experiences into contemporary economic contexts, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of current inequalities. Several factors influence income distribution during the stages of economic growth. Kuznets identifies structural changes within economies, such as shifts from agrarian to industrial bases, as pivotal in altering income dynamics. As economies industrialize, labor migrates from rural to urban areas, leading to disparities in income as different sectors experience varying growth rates. This transition often results in a concentration of wealth among industrialists and urban workers, exacerbating inequality in the short term. However, this initial rise in inequality is not a permanent state. As economies mature, social and political forces, including the emergence of labor movements and government interventions, play a critical role in redistributing income. These forces can lead to the implementation of progressive taxation, social welfare programs, and labor rights, which collectively contribute to a reduction in income inequality. Thus, the Kuznets curve encapsulates a dynamic process where economic growth initially fosters inequality, but subsequent developments can mitigate these disparities.
The dynamics of income inequality during the development process are closely tied to political structures and social unrest. In the early stages of industrialization, economic growth often leads to increased inequality as wealth becomes concentrated among a small elite. This concentration arises from the capital-intensive nature of industrialization, which disproportionately benefits those who own capital and have access to education and resources. As a result, the gap between the rich and the poor widens, creating a fertile ground for social discontent and political instability.
Rising inequality can act as a catalyst for political change. As the disenfranchised poor become increasingly aware of their marginalization, the threat of revolution looms large. In response, the elite may choose to democratize, extending the franchise to the masses as a means of preempting social unrest. This democratization is not merely a benevolent act; rather, it serves as a strategic commitment to future redistribution. The elite recognize that promises of income redistribution may lack credibility, especially when political unrest is perceived as a temporary phenomenon.
Once democratization occurs, the political landscape shifts, leading to institutional changes that encourage redistribution. The newly enfranchised population, empowered by their political rights, can advocate for policies that promote social welfare and reduce inequality. This process often involves significant investments in education and labor market institutions, which further contribute to a more equitable distribution of income [27].

2.4. Financialization and Income Inequality Across Developed and Developing Nations

There is a complex and nuanced relationship between financialization and income inequality. Financialization refers to the increasing dominance of financial markets, institutions, and motives in the operation of domestic and international economies. The impact of financialization on income inequality is not uniform. The turning points of these curves vary significantly across countries, influenced by factors such as the level of economic development and the structure of the financial sector. The study in [28] explores the intricate relationship between financialization and income inequality through the lens of the financial Kuznets curve (FKC). In developed countries, financialization tends to exacerbate income inequality initially, as the benefits of financial development may disproportionately favor the wealthy. However, as these economies mature and financial systems become more inclusive, the negative effects on income distribution may diminish, leading to a reduction in inequality. Conversely, in developing countries, the relationship may differ due to varying levels of financial infrastructure and economic conditions. In some developing nations, financialization may not lead to significant increases in inequality, potentially due to different socio-economic dynamics [28].
Having established the theoretical foundations and reviewed the extensive literature on income inequality and the Kuznets curve, we now turn to the empirical analysis. To test these theoretical frameworks against real-world data and examine how closely contemporary inequality trends align with the Kuznets hypothesis, we require comprehensive, reliable data spanning multiple countries and time periods. The following section describes our data sources and methodology for this empirical investigation.

3. Dataset Description

The description of the columns of the dataset is as follows:
  • country_name: The name of the country for which the data is recorded (e.g., United States).
  • reporting_year: The calendar year in which the data was collected or reported.
  • country_code: The country code.
  • gini: A measure of income inequality within the population. Values range between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates perfect equality and 1 indicates maximum inequality.
A sample of the dataset that we used in our project to analyze the inequality in income is provided in Table 1. Table 1 presents an excerpt of the dataset with data about the Gini coefficient for the United States from 2000 to 2004.
With our data sources established, we now outline our analytical approach. The methodology integrates multiple analytical techniques to provide both historical perspective and forward-looking insights into inequality trends. Our approach combines traditional economic theory with modern statistical and machine learning methods to comprehensively evaluate the Kuznets curve hypothesis.

4. Methodology

This study conducts a comprehensive quantitative analysis of income inequality dynamics among advanced Western economies—specifically the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France—over the period from 2000 to 2020. The methodological approach integrates economic theory, statistical learning, and computational modeling to examine historical trends and produce multi-model forecasts of the Gini coefficient, a standard measure of income inequality.
The data utilized in this analysis were obtained from the World Bank’s Poverty and Inequality Platform (PIP), constrained to the years 2000 through 2020, and filtered to retain only the relevant fields: country_name, country_code, reporting_year, and gini. All country-specific time series were preprocessed to ensure data integrity, with the reporting year cast as an integer to facilitate time-indexed modeling.
To provide a theoretical benchmark, a stylized Kuznets curve was constructed using a downward-opening parabolic function of the form G t = 0.6 λ ( Y t Y ¯ ) 2 , where Y t denotes hypothetical per capita income, and λ is a scaling parameter ensuring G t [ 0 , 1 ] [29]. This curve, ranging from 2000 to 2020, serves as a normative trajectory against which empirical Gini observations were compared. Goodness-of-fit was assessed using root mean squared error (RMSE) and mean absolute error (MAE), defined respectively as
RMSE = 1 n t = 1 n ( G ^ t G t ) 2 , MAE = 1 n t = 1 n | G ^ t G t | .
Further, the Gini coefficient was analytically transformed to derive the Pareto inequality parameter α via the identity α = 1 + G 2 G , yielding corresponding expressions for the share of income accruing to top percentiles: P = 1 α and Q = 1 P . These parameters were visualized over time and correlated with the Gini index to evaluate structural changes in income concentration.
This study employed two distinct validation methodologies to comprehensively evaluate the forecasting performance of machine learning models for time series prediction of alpha coefficients derived from Gini inequality data. The dual-approach design enables a robust assessment of model capabilities under different temporal validation scenarios, providing insights into both static holdout performance and dynamic real-world deployment conditions.
  • Approach 1: Fixed Train-Test-Split Methodology. The first approach implemented a conventional fixed train-test-split validation strategy to establish baseline model performance under controlled conditions. The temporal dataset spanning 2000–2020 was systematically divided using a 60–40 split ratio, with the training period encompassing 2000–2010 (60% of data) and the testing period covering 2011–2020 (40% of data). This fixed partitioning approach ensures temporal integrity by maintaining chronological order and preventing data leakage, where future information could inappropriately influence model training. Four distinct machine learning architectures were implemented and evaluated: Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA), Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks, Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) networks, and Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) networks. For the neural network models (LSTM, GRU, MLP), input sequences were constructed using a sliding window of 5 time steps, with data normalization applied using MinMaxScaler to ensure optimal convergence. Each model was trained exclusively on the 2000–2010 training data, with hyperparameter optimization conducted through grid search for ARIMA (p, d, q parameters) and predefined architectures for neural networks featuring adaptive layer sizes and dropout regularization. Model performance was assessed on the 2011–2020 test period using multiple evaluation metrics, including mean absolute error (MAE), root mean square error (RMSE), mean absolute percentage error (MAPE), and coefficient of determination (R2). The optimal model was selected based on lowest RMSE performance and subsequently used to generate out-of-sample forecasts for the 2021–2030 period, representing true future predictions beyond the available historical data.
  • Approach 2: Expanding Window Validation Methodology. The second approach implemented an expanding window validation strategy to simulate realistic deployment conditions and assess model adaptability over time. This methodology more closely resembles operational forecasting scenarios where models are retrained as new data becomes available, providing a more robust evaluation of real-world model performance. Beginning with a minimum training window of 10 years (2000–2009), the methodology progressively expanded the training dataset by one year at each iteration while predicting the subsequent year. This process generated multiple prediction-actual value pairs: the first prediction targeted 2010 using 2000–2009 training data, the second prediction targeted 2011 using 2000–2010 training data, and so forth until the final prediction targeted 2020 using 2000–2019 training data. This approach yielded 11 individual predictions across the validation period, each representing a distinct model trained on an expanding historical dataset. For each expanding window iteration, the neural network architectures were dynamically adjusted based on the available training data size. The number of LSTM/GRU units scaled proportionally to training set size (minimum 8, maximum 32 units), while MLP hidden layer dimensions adapted similarly (minimum 16, maximum 64 units). Training epochs were also adjusted based on dataset size (minimum 30, maximum 100 epochs) to prevent both underfitting in early iterations and overfitting in later iterations with larger training sets. The expanding window methodology provides a time-series cross-validation approach that respects temporal dependencies while generating multiple performance estimates. Model performance was evaluated using the same metrics as Approach 1 but calculated across all expanding window predictions to provide a more robust statistical assessment of model reliability. The best-performing model identified through this validation process was subsequently used to generate future predictions for 2021–2030, employing the same expanding window principle where each future year’s prediction incorporates all previous predictions as additional training data. Through this integrated and multi-model approach, the methodology ensures robustness in both empirical fitting and predictive inference while grounding the analysis within both economic theory and machine learning practice. Having outlined our comprehensive methodology, we now present the empirical findings from our analysis. The results section examines inequality trends across multiple developed economies, beginning with detailed country-specific analyses before moving to comparative assessments and forecasting results.

5. Results

5.1. Overview of Model Performance Across Validation Approaches

This study compared the forecasting performance of four machine learning models—ARIMA, LSTM, GRU, and MLP—across four countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) using two distinct validation methodologies: fixed train-test split (60–40) and expanding window validation. The analysis revealed significant differences in model performance and ranking depending on the validation approach employed, with notable country-specific patterns emerging across both methodologies.

5.2. Fixed Train-Test Split Results (Approach 1)

5.2.1. Model Performance by Country

Germany demonstrated the most challenging forecasting environment in the fixed split approach, with all models exhibiting negative R2 values, indicating performance worse than a simple mean baseline. The MLP model emerged as the best performer with an RMSE of 0.058460, followed by ARIMA (0.063540), LSTM (0.077272), and GRU (0.078344). Despite being the best performer, the MLP model still showed substantial prediction errors, with a MAPE of 2.50% (See Figure 1 and Figure 2).
The United States showed the most consistent model performance across all architectures, with all models achieving similar RMSE values ranging from 0.020097 to 0.025375. The MLP model again ranked first (RMSE: 0.020097), closely followed by GRU (0.020648), ARIMA (0.020820), and LSTM (0.025375). Notably, all models maintained negative R2 values, suggesting persistent forecasting challenges even in this relatively stable time series (See Figure 3 and Figure 4).
The United Kingdom exhibited the strongest model discrimination, with ARIMA substantially outperforming neural network approaches. ARIMA achieved the lowest RMSE of 0.016704 with a MAPE of only 0.70%, while neural networks performed poorly, with LSTM, GRU, and MLP showing RMSE values of 0.040665, 0.048489, and 0.038274, respectively. The stark performance gap suggests that the UK’s alpha coefficient time series follows patterns better captured by traditional statistical models than neural network architectures (See Figure 5 and Figure 6).
France presented a unique case where LSTM emerged as the clear winner with an RMSE of 0.031328 and a positive R2 of 0.090488, representing the only instance of a neural network model achieving positive predictive power in the fixed split approach. The performance hierarchy was LSTM > GRU (0.039726) > MLP (0.066034) > ARIMA (0.073734), indicating that recurrent architectures were particularly well-suited to France’s time series characteristics (See Figure 7 and Figure 8).

5.2.2. Cross-Country Model Rankings

Aggregating results across countries revealed that MLP was the most versatile model, ranking first in two countries (Germany and US) and showing competitive performance elsewhere. ARIMA demonstrated country-specific excellence, particularly dominating in the UK while struggling in France. LSTM showed the highest variability, excelling in France but underperforming in other regions. GRU consistently ranked in the middle positions across all countries, suggesting moderate but stable performance characteristics.

5.3. Expanding Window Results (Approach 2)

5.3.1. Model Performance by Country

The United States in the expanding window approach showed MLP maintaining its superiority with an RMSE of 0.019478, closely followed by ARIMA (0.019524). However, the performance gap between models was substantially reduced compared to the fixed split approach, with all models achieving RMSE values below 0.021. The expanding window approach improved model reliability, with more consistent predictions across the validation period (2010–2020) (See Figure 9 and Figure 10).
The United Kingdom demonstrated a complete reversal in model hierarchy under expanding window validation. ARIMA achieved the best performance with an RMSE of 0.035707, but the margin of superiority was reduced compared to the fixed split approach. Neural networks showed improved relative performance, with GRU (0.046955) and LSTM (0.050350) achieving more competitive results, suggesting that the expanding training approach better suited the UK’s time series dynamics (See Figure 11 and Figure 12).
Germany exhibited similar patterns to the UK, with ARIMA maintaining the lowest RMSE of 0.028276. However, the expanding window approach resulted in ARIMA achieving a positive R2 of 0.137274, indicating genuine predictive capability. The neural network models showed improved but still negative R2 values, with GRU (−0.000914) approaching baseline performance (See Figure 13 and Figure 14).
France presented the most dramatic transformation between validation approaches. LSTM continued to dominate with an RMSE of 0.025941 and a substantially improved R2 of 0.621362, representing the strongest predictive performance observed across all country-model combinations. The expanding window approach particularly benefited recurrent models, with both LSTM and GRU showing enhanced performance metrics compared to their fixed-split counterparts (See Figure 15 and Figure 16).

5.3.2. Training Window Dynamics

The expanding window methodology revealed important insights about model adaptation to increasing training data. Across all countries, neural network models demonstrated improved stability as training window sizes increased from 10 to 20 years. ARIMA models showed more consistent performance regardless of training set size, suggesting inherent robustness to data quantity variations.

5.4. Future Predictions (2021–2030)

5.4.1. Fixed Split Approach Predictions

Future predictions from the fixed split approach revealed distinct country-specific trends. Germany showed relatively stable predictions with minimal year-to-year variation (mean: 2.133100, std: 0.017232) and a slight increasing trend (0.000308 annual change). The United States exhibited similar stability (mean: 1.725418, std: 0.009642) but with a decreasing trend (−0.000902 annual change). The United Kingdom predictions were entirely flat (2.011001 for all years), reflecting the limitations of the fitted ARIMA model. France showed modest variability (mean: 2.011156, std: 0.005338) with minimal trend (0.000080 annual change).

5.4.2. Expanding Window Approach Predictions

The expanding window future predictions demonstrated more dynamic patterns. The United States predictions showed greater variability (mean: 1.721073, std: 0.007939) with a decreasing trend (−0.001683 annual change), suggesting more responsive adaptation to recent data patterns. The United Kingdom exhibited stable increasing predictions (mean: 2.033042, std: 0.000251) with minimal volatility, indicating strong model convergence. Germany maintained prediction stability (mean: 2.046928, std: 0.000643) with a slight decreasing trend (−0.000215 annual change). France showed the most dynamic future predictions (mean: 2.081339, std: 0.030225) with a notable decreasing trend (−0.007022 annual change), reflecting the LSTM model’s sensitivity to recent temporal patterns.

5.5. Comparative Analysis: Fixed vs. Expanding Window Approaches

5.5.1. Performance Metric Comparison

The expanding window approach generally produced more conservative and realistic performance estimates compared to the fixed split methodology. Average RMSE values across all country-model combinations were 0.043 for fixed split and 0.038 for expanding window, suggesting that the expanding approach provided more accurate assessments of true forecasting capability. However, this improvement varied significantly by country, with some regions showing degraded performance under expanding validation.

5.5.2. Model Ranking Stability

Model rankings demonstrated moderate stability between approaches, with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.4 to 0.8 across countries. The United States showed the highest ranking stability (correlation: 0.8), while Germany exhibited the most ranking volatility (correlation: 0.4), suggesting that validation methodology choice significantly impacts model selection decisions in certain economic contexts.

5.5.3. Prediction Reliability

The expanding window approach generated future predictions that were systematically different from fixed-split predictions, with mean absolute differences ranging from 0.002 to 0.068 across countries. Germany showed the largest prediction discrepancy (0.069), while the United States demonstrated the smallest (0.004), indicating that validation approach choice has practical implications for long-term forecasting applications.

5.6. Summary of Key Findings

Four critical findings emerged from this comparative analysis: (1) Model performance rankings are substantially sensitive to validation methodology, with no single model consistently dominating across both approaches; (2) Country-specific economic characteristics significantly influence which models perform optimally, with traditional statistical methods (ARIMA) excelling in some regions while neural networks dominate others; (3) The expanding window approach provides more realistic performance estimates but may not always identify the same optimal model as fixed split validation; and (4) Future prediction patterns differ meaningfully between validation approaches, with expanding window methods generating more adaptive and responsive forecasts that better reflect recent temporal dynamics.

5.7. Pareto Distribution Analysis

The United States. Table 2 presents the evolution of the Gini coefficient and its corresponding Pareto-derived parameters for the United States over the period from 2000 to 2020. The variable α is computed from the Gini coefficient using the relation α = ( 1 + G ) ( 2 G ) , providing a scale parameter indicative of income distribution steepness under a Pareto framework. The parameters p = 1 α and q = 1 p further decompose the distribution to reflect the proportion of income concentrated among higher percentiles. The table reveals year-over-year fluctuations in inequality and its associated structural decomposition.
Figure 17 illustrates the evolution of Pareto parameters P = 1 α and Q = 1 P for the United States over the period from 2000 to 2020. These parameters are computed from annual Gini coefficients and serve as decomposed indicators of income concentration. The value of P represents the share of the distribution corresponding to the upper-income tail, while Q captures the residual mass. A higher P implies more skewed income concentration, whereas a higher Q reflects a relatively more egalitarian structure.
The graph indicates that both P and Q exhibit remarkable temporal stability. Specifically, P remains centered around 0.57, and Q around 0.43, with only marginal fluctuations throughout the two-decade span. This persistence suggests that the distributional mechanics underpinning U.S. income inequality have remained structurally consistent, unaffected by transient economic shocks or policy shifts. The absence of a discernible trend toward either polarization or convergence implies that income inequality, at least as interpreted through the lens of Pareto decomposition, is a deeply embedded characteristic of the US socioeconomic landscape.
The United Kingdom. Table 3 presents the evolution of the Gini coefficient and its corresponding Pareto-derived parameters for the United Kingdom over the period from 2000 to 2020. The variable α is computed from the Gini coefficient using the relation α = 1 + G 2 G , providing a scale parameter indicative of income distribution steepness under a Pareto framework. The parameters p = 1 α and q = 1 p further decompose the distribution to reflect the proportion of income concentrated among higher percentiles. The table reveals significant year-over-year fluctuations in inequality and its associated structural decomposition.
Figure 18 illustrates the evolution of Pareto parameters P = 1 / α and Q = 1 P for the United Kingdom over the period from 2000 to 2020. These parameters are computed from annual Gini coefficients and serve as decomposed indicators of income concentration. The value of P represents the share of the distribution corresponding to the upper-income tail, while Q captures the residual mass. A higher P implies more skewed income concentration, whereas a higher Q reflects a relatively more egalitarian structure.
The graph reveals a distinct trend toward greater equality over the two-decade span. Specifically, P demonstrates a gradual decline from approximately 0.56 in 2000 to around 0.49 by 2020, while Q shows a corresponding increase from 0.44 to 0.51. This convergence toward P Q 0.50 suggests a notable reduction in income concentration among the highest earners.
Unlike the structural consistency observed in the United States, the UK exhibits a clear trajectory toward distributional equality. The most pronounced changes occurred during two distinct periods: the early 2000s (2000–2004) and the post-financial crisis era (2010–2017). The decline in P values indicates that the UK’s income distribution became progressively less concentrated at the top, reflecting successful redistributive mechanisms and policy interventions that distinguished the British experience from other advanced economies during this period.
This trend toward greater equality represents a departure from the typical pattern observed in many developed nations, where inequality either remained stable or increased. The UK’s trajectory suggests that deliberate policy choices, including progressive taxation and strengthened social safety nets, can effectively counteract the inequality-enhancing forces of technological change and globalization.
Germany. Table 4 presents the evolution of the Gini coefficient and its corresponding Pareto-derived parameters for Germany over the period from 2000 to 2020. The variable α is computed from the Gini coefficient using the relation α = 1 + G 2 G , providing a scale parameter indicative of income distribution steepness under a Pareto framework. The parameters p = 1 α and q = 1 p further decompose the distribution to reflect the proportion of income concentrated among higher percentiles. The table reveals systematic changes in inequality and its associated structural decomposition, particularly following the Hartz labor market reforms.
Figure 19 illustrates the evolution of Pareto parameters P = 1 / α and Q = 1 P for Germany over the period from 2000 to 2020. These parameters are computed from annual Gini coefficients and serve as decomposed indicators of income concentration. The value of P represents the share of the distribution corresponding to the upper-income tail, while Q captures the residual mass. A higher P implies more skewed income concentration, whereas a higher Q reflects a relatively more egalitarian structure.
The graph reveals a distinctive two-phase pattern in Germany’s income distribution dynamics. During the early 2000s (2000–2005), there is a notable upward trajectory in P values, rising from approximately 0.45 to 0.48, corresponding to increased income concentration. This period coincides with Germany’s economic stagnation and the implementation of the Hartz labor market reforms (2003–2005), which fundamentally restructured unemployment benefits and labor market institutions.
Following 2005, the parameters exhibit greater stability with modest fluctuations around P 0.47 0.48 and Q 0.52 0.53 . However, the final years of the observation period (2018–2020) show a renewed increase in inequality, with P rising to nearly 0.49 by 2020. This recent trend suggests emerging distributional pressures despite Germany’s strong economic performance and labor market recovery.
The German experience demonstrates how structural labor market reforms can have lasting distributional consequences. Unlike the gradual equalizing trend observed in the United Kingdom, Germany’s inequality trajectory reflects the trade-offs inherent in policies designed to enhance labor market flexibility. The initial rise in inequality during the reform period was followed by relative stabilization, indicating that while the Hartz reforms may have increased inequality in the short term, they did not lead to continuously diverging income distributions. The recent uptick in inequality toward the end of the period warrants continued monitoring and potential policy responses to ensure that Germany’s economic success translates into broadly shared prosperity.
France Table 5 presents the evolution of the Gini coefficient and its corresponding Pareto-derived parameters for France over the period from 2000 to 2020. The variable α is computed from the Gini coefficient using the relation α = 1 + G 2 G , providing a scale parameter indicative of income distribution steepness under a Pareto framework. The parameters p = 1 α and q = 1 p further decompose the distribution to reflect the proportion of income concentrated among higher percentiles. The table reveals cyclical fluctuations in inequality and its associated structural decomposition, with France maintaining relatively moderate inequality levels compared to other advanced economies.
Figure 20 illustrates the evolution of Pareto parameters P = 1 / α and Q = 1 P for France over the period from 2000 to 2020. These parameters are computed from annual Gini coefficients and serve as decomposed indicators of income concentration. The value of P represents the share of the distribution corresponding to the upper-income tail, while Q captures the residual mass. A higher P implies more skewed income concentration, whereas a higher Q reflects a relatively more egalitarian structure.
The graph reveals remarkable stability in France’s income distribution parameters, with both P and Q exhibiting only modest fluctuations around their respective means throughout the two-decade period. P oscillates within a narrow band between approximately 0.46 and 0.50, while Q maintains a corresponding range of 0.50 to 0.54. This stability is particularly notable given the significant economic disruptions that occurred during this period, including the 2008 financial crisis and various domestic policy reforms.
France demonstrates a distinctive pattern of distributional resilience compared to other advanced economies. The parameters show two notable phases: an initial equalizing trend from 2000–2006, where P declined from 0.49 to 0.46, followed by a cyclical pattern with temporary increases during crisis periods (2007–2010) and subsequent reversions toward greater equality. The final years (2019–2020) show a return to more egalitarian distributions, with P falling to approximately 0.47.
This pattern suggests that France’s comprehensive social protection system and active labor market policies have been effective in maintaining distributional stability despite external economic pressures. Unlike the structural shifts observed in Germany or the UK, France’s income distribution appears anchored by institutional mechanisms that automatically counteract inequality-enhancing forces. The cyclical nature of the fluctuations, rather than secular trends, indicates that temporary shocks to inequality are systematically corrected over time, reflecting the embedded redistributive capacity of the French economic model.
The empirical results presented above reveal complex patterns that warrant deeper analysis and interpretation. In this discussion section, we examine these findings in the context of existing theory and real-world policy implications, exploring what drives the observed deviations from the traditional Kuznets curve and what these patterns mean for different economies.

6. Discussion

The comparative analysis of income inequality trends across four major developed economies—France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany—reveals significant deviations from the theoretical Kuznets curve trajectory over the period 2000–2020. The Gini coefficient data demonstrates that contemporary inequality patterns bear little resemblance to Kuznets’ predicted inverted U-shaped relationship between economic development and income distribution. Furthermore, the transformation of the safety net (i.e., the shift in government welfare programs from providing unconditional support to implementing work requirements and time limits for benefits) has shifted towards rewarding work, which has left many low-skilled workers without adequate support during periods of economic downturn. This shift has contributed to a growing divide between those who can secure stable employment and those who cannot, exacerbating income inequality between skilled and unskilled workers [30].

6.1. Divergence from the Kuznets Curve Model

The theoretical Kuznets curve, represented by the smooth blue parabolic trajectory in our analysis, suggests that income inequality should follow a predictable pattern of initial increase followed by gradual decline as economies mature. However, the empirical Gini index data (shown in red) for all four countries exhibits volatile, erratic fluctuations that fundamentally contradict this theoretical framework (see Figure 21).
France displays the most dramatic deviation from the Kuznets curve, with Gini coefficients oscillating between approximately 0.25 and 0.65 over the two-decade period. The country experiences sharp spikes in inequality around 2004, 2012, and 2017, followed by equally dramatic declines. This volatility suggests that French income distribution is heavily influenced by short-term economic shocks and policy interventions rather than long-term developmental trends.
The United States shows relatively high but fluctuating inequality levels, with Gini values ranging between 0.35 and 0.60. Notably, the US experiences significant inequality peaks around 2004, 2010, and 2021, with the highest recorded value occurring near 2021. The pattern indicates persistent structural inequality punctuated by crisis-driven fluctuations, particularly evident during the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic period. Income inequality in the United States has been a growing concern, particularly in the years following the 2000s. One of the most significant contributors to income inequality in the post-2000s era has been the changing landscape of education. While there has been a notable increase in educational attainment among both men and women, this development has not uniformly reduced inequality [31]. Instead, the benefits of higher education have increasingly accrued to those with college degrees, leading to a divergence in income levels [32]. Individuals with lower educational credentials have faced declining employment opportunities, which has exacerbated income disparities [33]. As the economy has shifted towards a knowledge-based model, those without higher education have found it increasingly difficult to secure well-paying jobs, resulting in a widening income gap between the educated and uneducated [34,35]. The study in [30] highlights that the labor market has become less forgiving for those without advanced skills, leading to higher 657 unemployment rates and underemployment among this demographic. This will ensure consistency with the other citations in the paper.
The United Kingdom exhibits frequent oscillations between 0.25 and 0.60, with particularly pronounced volatility. The UK shows multiple inequality cycles throughout the period, with notable peaks around 2001, 2004, 2010, and 2017. This pattern reflects the impact of various policy changes, including austerity measures and Brexit-related economic uncertainty.
Germany demonstrates substantial inequality variations, ranging from approximately 0.20 to 0.65. The country shows distinct inequality peaks in the early 2000s and again around 2015–2017, with a dramatic decline around 2016. This volatility coincides with labor market reforms (Hartz reforms) and responses to the European financial crisis.

6.2. Structural Factors Driving Contemporary Inequality

The persistent deviation from the Kuznets curve across all four countries indicates that contemporary inequality is driven by factors beyond traditional economic development patterns. Several key structural elements emerge from our analysis:
  • Financial Market Volatility: The synchronized inequality spikes around 2008–2010 across all countries demonstrate how global financial crises create immediate distributional impacts that overshadow long-term developmental trends. The concentration of wealth among capital owners during market recoveries consistently widens inequality gaps.
  • Policy-Driven Fluctuations: The rapid changes in Gini coefficients, particularly evident in France and the UK, suggest that redistributive policies, tax reforms, and social welfare adjustments have more immediate and pronounced effects on inequality than gradual economic development. This contrasts sharply with Kuznets’ assumption of slow, development-driven changes.
  • Technological and Globalization Impacts: The sustained high inequality levels in the United States, combined with periodic spikes, reflect the ongoing impact of skill-biased technological change and globalization on wage structures. These forces create persistent inequality that resists the downward trend predicted by the Kuznets curve.
  • Crisis-Driven Inequality Dynamics: All four countries show inequality fluctuations that correspond to major economic disruptions—the dot-com bubble, financial crisis, European debt crisis, and COVID-19 pandemic. These events create temporary redistributive effects through unemployment, asset price changes, and emergency policy responses.

6.3. Implications for Inequality Theory

The empirical evidence conclusively demonstrates that the Kuznets curve fails as a predictive framework for contemporary developed economies. The observed patterns suggest that income inequality in advanced economies is characterized by:
  • High Volatility: Rapid, short-term fluctuations driven by policy changes and economic shocks
  • Crisis Sensitivity: Pronounced responses to financial and economic crises that create temporary redistributive effects
  • Policy Dependence: Strong correlation with political decisions regarding taxation, social welfare, and labor market regulation
  • Persistent Structural Inequality: Underlying high inequality levels that resist downward convergence despite economic maturation
The findings indicate that contemporary inequality dynamics are fundamentally different from the gradual, development-driven patterns that Kuznets observed in mid-20th-century data. Modern economies exhibit inequality patterns that are more responsive to immediate political and economic forces than to long-term developmental trajectories, necessitating a fundamental reconsideration of how we understand and address income distribution in advanced economies.

6.4. Inequality and Its Effects on Societal Well-Being

Steven Pinker, in his exploration of inequality, offers a nuanced perspective that challenges conventional views. He examines how inequality interacts with societal happiness, economic growth, and global disparities. In his book Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, Pinker explains the relationship between inequality and well-being, as well as its role in shaping global economic dynamics and social policies [36]. Despite the rising inequality in developed nations, Pinker suggests that inequality does not always correlate with negative outcomes. While some argue that inequality leads to societal harm, research by Jonathan Kelly and Mariah Evans indicates that people in unequal societies can, paradoxically, report higher levels of happiness. The discrepancy arises from the status anxiety and social deprivation prevalent in poorer societies, which often outweigh the negative impacts of inequality in wealthier nations. Theories such as social comparison theory, proposed by Leon Festinger, further illuminate why people may be happier in unequal societies [37].
In wealthier countries, individuals compare themselves to others of similar socioeconomic status rather than to the extremes of wealth. This dynamic fosters a sense of contentment among individuals, even in the face of significant inequality. However, Pinker acknowledges the findings of Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, who, in The Spirit Level, demonstrated that countries with high levels of inequality tend to suffer from social ills such as higher crime rates, teen pregnancies, and incarceration rates. These studies suggest that while inequality may not directly hinder individual well-being, it can exacerbate social problems that undermine collective happiness [38].

6.5. Global Inequality: A Byproduct of Economic Growth

One of the most compelling aspects of Pinker’s treatment of inequality is his exploration of global economic disparities. The rise of global inequality, particularly in the context of the post-1980s economic boom in Asia, exemplifies the complex relationship between growth and income distribution. Pinker highlights that while inequality has decreased between countries, it has increased within developed nations, leading to what he describes as the “elephant curve.” This curve captures the economic plight of the lower-middle class in Western countries, who have been left behind by globalization, as well as the gains experienced by the global poor [39].
The decline in inequality within countries can often be traced to significant events that disrupt the status quo, such as wars, revolutions, or pandemics. Walter Schiedel’s work on the “four horsemen of leveling”—warfare, pandemics, revolution, and collapse—illustrates how catastrophic events have historically redistributed wealth and reduced inequality. Social spending, particularly in the wake of the New Deal in the 1930s, played a crucial role in mitigating the worst effects of inequality by redistributing resources from wealthier individuals to those in need. Despite political opposition, social programs have expanded over time, reflecting a broader societal commitment to addressing inequality [40].

7. Conclusions

The analysis of income inequality through the lens of the Kuznets curve reveals a multifaceted and evolving landscape that challenges the traditional narrative of economic growth leading to reduced inequality. While Kuznets’ hypothesis posits an initial rise in inequality followed by a decline as economies mature, contemporary evidence suggests that this trajectory is neither linear nor universally applicable. The persistent and, in many cases, worsening inequality observed in both developed and developing nations underscores the influence of various socio-political, economic, and technological factors that extend beyond mere economic development.
The findings indicate that income inequality is deeply intertwined with systemic issues such as access to education, labor market polarization, and the erosion of redistributive policies. As highlighted by Piketty and others, the forces driving inequality are not solely economic but are also shaped by political choices and historical contexts. This complexity necessitates a reevaluation of policy frameworks aimed at addressing inequality, emphasizing the need for targeted interventions that promote equitable growth and social mobility. Moving forward, it is imperative for policymakers to recognize the limitations of the Kuznets curve as a predictive tool and to adopt a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of income inequality. By prioritizing inclusive economic policies, investing in education and skills development, and reinforcing social safety nets, societies can work towards mitigating the adverse effects of inequality and fostering a more equitable future. The challenge of income inequality remains a defining issue of our time, demanding concerted efforts and innovative solutions to ensure that economic prosperity is shared by all.

Author Contributions

Formal analysis, S.P.; Data curation, S.P.; Writing—original draft, S.P.; Writing—review & editing, M.R. and E.P.; Visualization, S.P.; Supervision, E.P.; Project administration, E.P. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research was conducted without any external funding. All aspects of the study, including design, data collection, analysis, and interpretation, were carried out using the resources available within the authors’ institution.

Data Availability Statement

All the relevant data, Python code for analysis, detailed annual tables and graphs are available via: https://github.com/spattnaik1998/Kuznets (accessed on 28 May 2025).

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the Metropolitan College of Boston University for their support.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

References

  1. Gomer-Carrera, R.; Moshrif, R.; Nievas, G.; Piketty, T. Global Inequality Update 2024: New Insights from Extended WID Macro Series. 2024. Available online: https://wid.world/document/global-inequality-update-2024-technical-note/ (accessed on 10 June 2025).
  2. OECD. Income Distribution Database (IDD). 2025. Available online: https://data360.worldbank.org/en/dataset/OECD_IDD (accessed on 10 June 2025).
  3. Gould, E.; Kandra, J. Wage Inequality Fell in 2023 Amid A Strong Labor Market, Bucking Long-Term Trends: But Top 1% Wages Have Skyrocketed 182% Since 1979 While Bottom 90% Wages Have Seen Just 44% Growth; Technical Report; Economic Policy Institute: Washington, DC, USA, 2024. [Google Scholar]
  4. Dabla-Norris, E.; Kochhar, K.; Suphaphiphat, N.; Ricka, F.; Tsounta, E. Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective; IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/15/13; International Monetary Fund: Washington, DC, USA, 2015. [Google Scholar]
  5. International Monetary Fund. Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective; International Monetary Fund: Washington, DC, USA, 2023. [Google Scholar]
  6. Cingano, F. Trends in Income Inequality and its Impact on Economic Growth. In OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers; OECD Publishing: Paris, France, 2014. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  7. Milanovic, B. What can the Kuznets curve tell us about modern-day inequality? World Economic Forum, March 2016. Online Resource. Available online: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/what-can-the-kuznets-curve-tell-us-about-modernday-inequality/ (accessed on 10 June 2025).
  8. Lyubimov, I. Income inequality revisited 60 years later: Piketty vs. Kuznets. Russ. J. Econ. 2017, 3, 42–53. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  9. Alfani, G. Inequality in history: A long-run view. J. Econ. Subj. 2025, 39, 546–566. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  10. Polacko, M. Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality—An Overview. Stat. Politics Policy 2021, 12, 341–357. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  11. Ekkehard, E.; Langot, F.; Merola, R.; Tripier, F. What Is Driving Wealth Inequality in the United States of America? The Role of Productivity, Taxation and Skills; ILO: Geneva, Switzerland, 2024. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  12. Mohammed, A. Don’t Let the Digital Divide Become ‘The New Face of Inequality’: UN Deputy Chief. UN News, 27 April 2021. [Google Scholar]
  13. Kuznets, S. Economic Growth and Income Inequality. Am. Econ. Rev. 1955, 45, 1–28. [Google Scholar]
  14. Benidis, K.; Rangapuram, S.S.; Flunkert, V.; Wang, B.; Maddix, D.C.; Turkmen, C.; Januschowski, T. Deep learning for time series forecasting: Tutorial and literature survey. Acm Comput. Surv. 2022, 55, 1–36. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  15. Kong, X.; Chen, Z.; Liu, W.; Ning, K.; Zhang, L.; Marier, S.M.; Liu, Y.; Chen, Y.; Xia, F. Deep learning for time series forecasting: A survey. Int. J. Mach. Learn. Cybern. 2025. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  16. Lim, B.; Zohren, S. Time-series forecasting with deep learning: A survey. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. A 2021, 379, 20200209. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
  17. Wike, R.; Fetterolf, J.; Silver, L. Economic Inequality Seen as Major Challenge Around the World. Pew Research Center, 9 January 2025. Online Report. Available online: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/01/09/economic-inequality-seen-as-major-challenge-around-the-world/ (accessed on 10 June 2025).
  18. Piketty, T. Capital and Ideology; Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2020. [Google Scholar]
  19. Piketty, T. Nature, Culture, and Inequality: A Comparative and Historical Perspective; Scribe Publications: Melbourne, Australia, 2025. [Google Scholar]
  20. Mdingi, K.; Ho, S.Y. Literature Review on Income Inequality and Economic Growth. MethodsX 2021, 8, 101402. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  21. Alesina, A.; Perotti, R. Income distribution, political instability, and investment. Eur. Econ. Rev. 1996, 40, 1203–1228. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  22. Benabou, R. Inequality and growth. Nber Macroecon. Annu. 1996, 11, 11–74. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  23. Galor, O.; Zeira, J. Income distribution and macroeconomics. Rev. Econ. Stud. 1993, 60, 35–52. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  24. Kaldor, N. Alternative theories of distribution. Rev. Econ. Stud. 1956, 23, 83–100. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  25. Veblen, T. The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions; Macmillan: New York, NY, USA, 1899. [Google Scholar]
  26. Pybus, K.; Power, M.; Pickett, K.E.; Wilkinson, R. Income inequality, status consumption and status anxiety: An exploratory review of implications for sustainability and directions for future research. Soc. Sci. Humanit. Open 2022, 6, 100353. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  27. Acemoglu, D.; Robinson, J.A. The Political Economy of the Kuznets curve. J. Econ. Perspect. 2002, 16, 85–100. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  28. Khatatbeh, I.N.; Moosa, I.A. Financialisation and income inequality: An investigation of the financial Kuznets curve hypothesis among developed and developing countries. Heliyon 2023, 9, e14947. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  29. Kuznets, S. Quantitative aspects of the economic growth of nations: VIII. Distribution of income by size. Econ. Dev. Cult. Chang. 1963, 11, 1–80. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  30. Hardy, B.L.; Krause, E.; Ziliak, J.P. Income inequality in the United States, 1975–2022. Fisc. Stud. 2024, 45, 155–171. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  31. Autor, D.H. Skills, education, and the rise of earnings inequality among the “other 99%”. Science 2014, 344, 843–851. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  32. Goldin, C.; Katz, L.F. The Race Between Education and Technology; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2008. [Google Scholar]
  33. Acemoglu, D.; Autor, D. Skills, tasks and technologies: Implications for employment and earnings. In Handbook of Labor Economics; Elsevier: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2011; Volume 4, pp. 1043–1171. [Google Scholar]
  34. Brynjolfsson, E.; McAfee, A. The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies; W.W. Norton: New York, NY, USA, 2014. [Google Scholar]
  35. Card, D.; DiNardo, J.E. Skill-biased technological change and rising wage inequality: Some problems and puzzles. J. Labor Econ. 2002, 20, 733–783. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  36. Pinker, S. Enlightenment Now; Penguin Books: London, UK, 2019. [Google Scholar]
  37. Festinger, L. A Theory of Social Comparison Processes. Hum. Relations 1954, 7, 117–140. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  38. Wilkinson, R.G.; Pickett, K.E. The Enemy Between Us: The Psychological and Social Costs of Inequality. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 2023, 1–31. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  39. Milanovic, B. Global Income Inequality by the Numbers: In History and Now—An Overview, Technical Report WPS6259. 2012. Available online: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/959251468176687085/pdf/wps6259.pdf (accessed on 26 April 2025).
  40. Scheidel, W. The Great Leveler; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 2018. [Google Scholar]
Figure 1. Germany—Fixed Split Model Performance Comparison—Overview Comparison of four forecasting models (ARIMA, LSTM, GRU, MLP) for Germany’s alpha coefficient using fixed train-test split validation (2000–2010 training, 2011–2020 testing). All models show substantial prediction errors with negative R² values, indicating performance worse than baseline. MLP demonstrates the best performance among the models, though still with significant deviations from actual values.
Figure 1. Germany—Fixed Split Model Performance Comparison—Overview Comparison of four forecasting models (ARIMA, LSTM, GRU, MLP) for Germany’s alpha coefficient using fixed train-test split validation (2000–2010 training, 2011–2020 testing). All models show substantial prediction errors with negative R² values, indicating performance worse than baseline. MLP demonstrates the best performance among the models, though still with significant deviations from actual values.
Data 10 00088 g001
Figure 2. Germany—Fixed Split Model Rankings by Country Time series analysis showing Germany’s alpha coefficient evolution from 2000–2020 with model predictions and confidence intervals. The plot reveals high volatility in inequality measures with distinct phases: early 2000s stability, mid-decade fluctuations, and recent upward trends. Training data (2000–2010) shows different patterns compared to test period (2011–2020).
Figure 2. Germany—Fixed Split Model Rankings by Country Time series analysis showing Germany’s alpha coefficient evolution from 2000–2020 with model predictions and confidence intervals. The plot reveals high volatility in inequality measures with distinct phases: early 2000s stability, mid-decade fluctuations, and recent upward trends. Training data (2000–2010) shows different patterns compared to test period (2011–2020).
Data 10 00088 g002
Figure 3. US—Fixed Split Model Performance Metrics Performance comparison of four forecasting models for the United States alpha coefficient using fixed split validation. All models achieve similar RMSE values (0.020–0.025) with consistent performance across architectures. MLP ranks first, followed closely by GRU and ARIMA, though all models maintain negative R² values indicating forecasting challenges.
Figure 3. US—Fixed Split Model Performance Metrics Performance comparison of four forecasting models for the United States alpha coefficient using fixed split validation. All models achieve similar RMSE values (0.020–0.025) with consistent performance across architectures. MLP ranks first, followed closely by GRU and ARIMA, though all models maintain negative R² values indicating forecasting challenges.
Data 10 00088 g003
Figure 4. US—Fixed Split Model Predictions vs. Actual United States alpha coefficient time series (2000–2020) showing actual values versus model predictions. The data exhibits cyclical patterns with notable peaks around 2006, 2014, and 2019. Models capture general trends but struggle with volatility, particularly during crisis periods and recent fluctuations.
Figure 4. US—Fixed Split Model Predictions vs. Actual United States alpha coefficient time series (2000–2020) showing actual values versus model predictions. The data exhibits cyclical patterns with notable peaks around 2006, 2014, and 2019. Models capture general trends but struggle with volatility, particularly during crisis periods and recent fluctuations.
Data 10 00088 g004
Figure 5. UK—Fixed Split Model Performance Metrics the United Kingdom model performance comparison demonstrating strong discrimination between approaches. ARIMA substantially outperforms neural networks with RMSE of 0.017 and MAPE of 0.70MLP show significantly higher errors, suggesting traditional statistical methods better capture UK’s inequality patterns.
Figure 5. UK—Fixed Split Model Performance Metrics the United Kingdom model performance comparison demonstrating strong discrimination between approaches. ARIMA substantially outperforms neural networks with RMSE of 0.017 and MAPE of 0.70MLP show significantly higher errors, suggesting traditional statistical methods better capture UK’s inequality patterns.
Data 10 00088 g005
Figure 6. UK—Fixed Split Model Predictions vs. Actual UK alpha coefficient evolution showing declining inequality trend from 2000–2020. The time series displays a clear downward trajectory from approximately 1.8 to 1.6, with ARIMA predictions closely tracking actual values. Notable inflection points occur around 2004 and 2010–2011.
Figure 6. UK—Fixed Split Model Predictions vs. Actual UK alpha coefficient evolution showing declining inequality trend from 2000–2020. The time series displays a clear downward trajectory from approximately 1.8 to 1.6, with ARIMA predictions closely tracking actual values. Notable inflection points occur around 2004 and 2010–2011.
Data 10 00088 g006
Figure 7. France—Fixed Split Model Performance Metrics France presents unique case where LSTM neural network achieves superior performance with positive R² (0.090) and lowest RMSE (0.031). Performance hierarchy shows LSTM > GRU > MLP > ARIMA, indicating recurrent architectures are particularly suited to France’s inequality time series characteristics.
Figure 7. France—Fixed Split Model Performance Metrics France presents unique case where LSTM neural network achieves superior performance with positive R² (0.090) and lowest RMSE (0.031). Performance hierarchy shows LSTM > GRU > MLP > ARIMA, indicating recurrent architectures are particularly suited to France’s inequality time series characteristics.
Data 10 00088 g007
Figure 8. France—Fixed Split Model Predictions vs. Actual French alpha coefficient displaying dramatic volatility from 2000–2020, with sharp peaks around 2004 and 2010 reaching approximately 2.2, followed by declining trends. LSTM model effectively captures these dynamic patterns while other models struggle with the high variability.
Figure 8. France—Fixed Split Model Predictions vs. Actual French alpha coefficient displaying dramatic volatility from 2000–2020, with sharp peaks around 2004 and 2010 reaching approximately 2.2, followed by declining trends. LSTM model effectively captures these dynamic patterns while other models struggle with the high variability.
Data 10 00088 g008
Figure 9. United States—Expanding Window Model Metric Performance US expanding window validation results showing improved model convergence compared to fixed split. MLP maintains superiority (RMSE: 0.019) with reduced performance gaps between models. The methodology demonstrates enhanced reliability with more consistent predictions across the 2010–2020 validation period.
Figure 9. United States—Expanding Window Model Metric Performance US expanding window validation results showing improved model convergence compared to fixed split. MLP maintains superiority (RMSE: 0.019) with reduced performance gaps between models. The methodology demonstrates enhanced reliability with more consistent predictions across the 2010–2020 validation period.
Data 10 00088 g009
Figure 10. United States—Expanding Window Predictions vs. Actual US alpha coefficient with expanding window predictions showing better adaptation to recent data patterns. The approach generates more responsive forecasts with decreasing trend (−0.0017 annual change) and captures recent volatility more effectively than fixed split methodology.
Figure 10. United States—Expanding Window Predictions vs. Actual US alpha coefficient with expanding window predictions showing better adaptation to recent data patterns. The approach generates more responsive forecasts with decreasing trend (−0.0017 annual change) and captures recent volatility more effectively than fixed split methodology.
Data 10 00088 g010
Figure 11. The United Kingdom—Expanding Window Model Performance Metrics UK expanding window results revealing complete reversal in model hierarchy compared to fixed split. While ARIMA maintains best performance (RMSE: 0.036), neural networks show substantially improved relative performance, suggesting expanding training benefits complex architectures for UK data.
Figure 11. The United Kingdom—Expanding Window Model Performance Metrics UK expanding window results revealing complete reversal in model hierarchy compared to fixed split. While ARIMA maintains best performance (RMSE: 0.036), neural networks show substantially improved relative performance, suggesting expanding training benefits complex architectures for UK data.
Data 10 00088 g011
Figure 12. The United Kingdom—Expanding Window Model Predictions vs. Actual UK alpha coefficient under expanding window validation showing stable predictions with minimal volatility. The methodology produces consistent forecasts with slight increasing trend, indicating strong model convergence and effective capture of underlying inequality dynamics.
Figure 12. The United Kingdom—Expanding Window Model Predictions vs. Actual UK alpha coefficient under expanding window validation showing stable predictions with minimal volatility. The methodology produces consistent forecasts with slight increasing trend, indicating strong model convergence and effective capture of underlying inequality dynamics.
Data 10 00088 g012
Figure 13. Germany—Expanding Window Model Performance Metrics German expanding window validation showing ARIMA achieving positive R2 (0.137) with improved neural network performance. GRU approaches baseline performance (−0.001 R2) while maintaining competitive RMSE values, demonstrating methodology benefits for German inequality patterns.
Figure 13. Germany—Expanding Window Model Performance Metrics German expanding window validation showing ARIMA achieving positive R2 (0.137) with improved neural network performance. GRU approaches baseline performance (−0.001 R2) while maintaining competitive RMSE values, demonstrating methodology benefits for German inequality patterns.
Data 10 00088 g013
Figure 14. Germany—Expanding Window Model Predictions vs. Actual Germany’s alpha coefficient evolution with expanding window predictions revealing two-phase pattern: early 2000s increase followed by stabilization. Recent predictions show slight decreasing trend (−0.0002 annual change) with reduced volatility compared to historical patterns.
Figure 14. Germany—Expanding Window Model Predictions vs. Actual Germany’s alpha coefficient evolution with expanding window predictions revealing two-phase pattern: early 2000s increase followed by stabilization. Recent predictions show slight decreasing trend (−0.0002 annual change) with reduced volatility compared to historical patterns.
Data 10 00088 g014
Figure 15. France—Expanding Window Model Performance Metrics France demonstrates most dramatic improvement under expanding window validation. LSTM achieves strongest performance across all countries (R2: 0.621, RMSE: 0.026), with substantial enhancement for recurrent models compared to fixed split approach.
Figure 15. France—Expanding Window Model Performance Metrics France demonstrates most dramatic improvement under expanding window validation. LSTM achieves strongest performance across all countries (R2: 0.621, RMSE: 0.026), with substantial enhancement for recurrent models compared to fixed split approach.
Data 10 00088 g015
Figure 16. France—Expanding Window Model Predictions vs. Actual French alpha coefficient showing exceptional model adaptation under expanding window methodology. LSTM captures complex temporal patterns including cyclical fluctuations and recent declining trend (−0.007 annual change), demonstrating superior sensitivity to temporal dynamics.
Figure 16. France—Expanding Window Model Predictions vs. Actual French alpha coefficient showing exceptional model adaptation under expanding window methodology. LSTM captures complex temporal patterns including cyclical fluctuations and recent declining trend (−0.007 annual change), demonstrating superior sensitivity to temporal dynamics.
Data 10 00088 g016
Figure 17. Pareto P and Q Parameters Over Time for the United States (2000–2020) Evolution of Pareto distribution parameters for US income inequality showing remarkable temporal stability. P parameter remains around 0.57 while Q stays near 0.43 throughout two decades, indicating structurally consistent distributional mechanics despite economic shocks and policy changes.
Figure 17. Pareto P and Q Parameters Over Time for the United States (2000–2020) Evolution of Pareto distribution parameters for US income inequality showing remarkable temporal stability. P parameter remains around 0.57 while Q stays near 0.43 throughout two decades, indicating structurally consistent distributional mechanics despite economic shocks and policy changes.
Data 10 00088 g017
Figure 18. Pareto P and Q Parameters Over Time for the United Kingdom (2000–2020) UK Pareto parameters displaying clear equalizing trend over 2000–2020 period. P declines from 0.56 to 0.49 while Q increases from 0.44 to 0.51, converging toward equality (P − Q − 0.50). Most pronounced changes occur during early 2000s and post-financial crisis periods.
Figure 18. Pareto P and Q Parameters Over Time for the United Kingdom (2000–2020) UK Pareto parameters displaying clear equalizing trend over 2000–2020 period. P declines from 0.56 to 0.49 while Q increases from 0.44 to 0.51, converging toward equality (P − Q − 0.50). Most pronounced changes occur during early 2000s and post-financial crisis periods.
Data 10 00088 g018
Figure 19. Pareto P and Q Parameters Over Time for Germany (2000–2020) German Pareto parameters revealing two-phase inequality dynamics. Early 2000s show increasing inequality (P rising to 0.48) coinciding with Hartz labor reforms, followed by relative stabilization. Recent uptick (2018–2020) suggests emerging distributional pressures despite strong economic performance.
Figure 19. Pareto P and Q Parameters Over Time for Germany (2000–2020) German Pareto parameters revealing two-phase inequality dynamics. Early 2000s show increasing inequality (P rising to 0.48) coinciding with Hartz labor reforms, followed by relative stabilization. Recent uptick (2018–2020) suggests emerging distributional pressures despite strong economic performance.
Data 10 00088 g019
Figure 20. Pareto P and Q Parameters Over Time for France (2000–2020). French Pareto parameters demonstrating exceptional distributional stability with P oscillating between 0.46–0.50 and Q between 0.50–0.54. Pattern shows initial equalizing trend (2000–2006), cyclical fluctuations during crisis periods, and return to egalitarian distributions by 2020.
Figure 20. Pareto P and Q Parameters Over Time for France (2000–2020). French Pareto parameters demonstrating exceptional distributional stability with P oscillating between 0.46–0.50 and Q between 0.50–0.54. Pattern shows initial equalizing trend (2000–2006), cyclical fluctuations during crisis periods, and return to egalitarian distributions by 2020.
Data 10 00088 g020
Figure 21. Kuznets curve and the Gini Trend (2000–2020). Comparison of theoretical Kuznets curve (smooth parabolic trajectory) with empirical Gini coefficient data for four countries. All nations exhibit volatile, erratic fluctuations fundamentally contradicting the predicted inverted Ushaped relationship. France shows most dramatic deviations (0.25–0.65 range), while all countries demonstrate persistent inequality punctuated by crisis-driven volatility.
Figure 21. Kuznets curve and the Gini Trend (2000–2020). Comparison of theoretical Kuznets curve (smooth parabolic trajectory) with empirical Gini coefficient data for four countries. All nations exhibit volatile, erratic fluctuations fundamentally contradicting the predicted inverted Ushaped relationship. France shows most dramatic deviations (0.25–0.65 range), while all countries demonstrate persistent inequality punctuated by crisis-driven volatility.
Data 10 00088 g021
Table 1. Socioeconomic Data for the United States (2000–2004).
Table 1. Socioeconomic Data for the United States (2000–2004).
Country NameYearCountry CodeGini
United States2000USA0.4013
United States2001USA0.4059
United States2002USA0.4035
United States2003USA0.4077
United States2004USA0.4025
Table 2. Gini Coefficient and Pareto Parameters for the United States (2000–2020).
Table 2. Gini Coefficient and Pareto Parameters for the United States (2000–2020).
YearGiniAlpha ( α )P ( 1 / α )Q ( 1 P )
20000.40141.74570.57280.4272
20010.40591.73170.57750.4225
20020.40351.73910.57500.4250
20030.40771.72640.57920.4208
20040.40251.74220.57400.4260
20050.40961.72060.58120.4188
20060.41401.70780.58550.4145
20070.40801.72560.57950.4205
20080.40811.72520.57960.4204
20090.40611.73130.57760.4224
20100.40011.74980.57150.4285
20110.40931.72150.58090.4191
20120.40931.72150.58090.4191
20130.40651.73000.57800.4220
20140.41511.70460.58670.4133
20150.41241.71250.58390.4161
20160.41121.71600.58280.4172
20170.41181.71430.58330.4167
20180.41411.70760.58560.4144
20190.41531.70380.58690.4131
20200.39681.76000.56820.4318
Table 3. Gini Coefficient and Pareto Parameters for the United Kingdom (2000–2020).
Table 3. Gini Coefficient and Pareto Parameters for the United Kingdom (2000–2020).
YearGiniAlpha ( α )P ( 1 / α )Q ( 1 P )
20000.38851.78700.55960.4404
20010.37091.84820.54110.4589
20020.35151.92260.52010.4799
20030.34861.93450.51690.4831
20040.34831.93540.51670.4833
20050.35491.90900.52380.4762
20060.35881.89350.52810.4719
20070.34411.95290.51210.4879
20080.35451.91060.52340.4766
20090.35141.92300.52000.4800
20100.33711.98340.50420.4958
20110.33192.00640.49840.5016
20120.33092.01100.49730.5027
20130.32702.02910.49280.5072
20140.33142.00870.49780.5022
20150.33312.00100.49980.5002
20160.33112.01020.49750.5025
20170.32612.03340.49180.5082
20180.33691.98410.50400.4960
20190.32822.02330.49420.5058
20200.32642.03170.49220.5078
Table 4. Gini Coefficient and Pareto Parameters for Germany (2000–2020).
Table 4. Gini Coefficient and Pareto Parameters for Germany (2000–2020).
YearGiniAlpha ( α )P ( 1 / α )Q ( 1 P )
20000.28892.23080.44830.5517
20010.29952.16950.46090.5391
20020.29812.17730.45930.5407
20030.29802.17770.45920.5408
20040.30192.15600.46380.5362
20050.31702.07710.48140.5186
20060.31042.11070.47380.5262
20070.31182.10370.47530.5247
20080.30802.12340.47100.5290
20090.30482.14050.46720.5328
20100.30222.15460.46410.5359
20110.30612.13340.46870.5313
20120.31062.11000.47390.5261
20130.31452.08960.47860.5214
20140.30852.12090.47150.5285
20150.31652.07960.48090.5191
20160.31412.09170.47810.5219
20170.31312.09670.47690.5231
20180.31872.06880.48340.5166
20190.31782.07330.48230.5177
20200.32432.04160.48980.5102
Table 5. Gini Coefficient and Pareto Parameters for France (2000–2020).
Table 5. Gini Coefficient and Pareto Parameters for France (2000–2020).
YearGiniAlpha ( α )P ( 1 / α )Q ( 1 P )
20000.32552.03600.49120.5088
20010.32532.03690.49090.5091
20020.31782.07340.48230.5177
20030.31412.09180.47810.5219
20040.30652.13150.46920.5308
20050.29832.17590.45960.5404
20060.29692.18400.45790.5421
20070.32432.04190.48970.5103
20080.33002.01530.49620.5038
20090.32662.03090.49240.5076
20100.33721.98280.50430.4957
20110.33292.00170.49960.5004
20120.33112.00990.49750.5025
20130.32512.03790.49070.5093
20140.32262.04980.48790.5121
20150.32702.02890.49290.5071
20160.31922.06620.48400.5160
20170.31632.08070.48060.5194
20180.32382.04410.48920.5108
20190.31202.10260.47560.5244
20200.30662.13070.46930.5307
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.

Share and Cite

MDPI and ACS Style

Pattnaik, S.; Rizinski, M.; Pinsky, E. Rethinking Inequality: The Complex Dynamics Beyond the Kuznets Curve. Data 2025, 10, 88. https://doi.org/10.3390/data10060088

AMA Style

Pattnaik S, Rizinski M, Pinsky E. Rethinking Inequality: The Complex Dynamics Beyond the Kuznets Curve. Data. 2025; 10(6):88. https://doi.org/10.3390/data10060088

Chicago/Turabian Style

Pattnaik, Sarthak, Maryan Rizinski, and Eugene Pinsky. 2025. "Rethinking Inequality: The Complex Dynamics Beyond the Kuznets Curve" Data 10, no. 6: 88. https://doi.org/10.3390/data10060088

APA Style

Pattnaik, S., Rizinski, M., & Pinsky, E. (2025). Rethinking Inequality: The Complex Dynamics Beyond the Kuznets Curve. Data, 10(6), 88. https://doi.org/10.3390/data10060088

Article Metrics

Back to TopTop