The Sustainable Supply Chain Network Competition Based on Non-Cooperative Equilibrium under Carbon Emission Permits
Abstract
:1. Introduction
1.1. Background
1.2. Practical Motivation
1.3. Research Question and Contributions
- (1)
- There is always a conflict between environmental protection goals and economic development goals. As for the government, how to properly enact policy or combine the advantage of different policies? Moreover, what are the differences between each kind of polices?
- (2)
- Carbon emission constraint incurs intense pressure on enterprises. They will face the choice of adjusting production planning passively or undertaking the social responsibility initiatively. Then, how should enterprises make operation decisions under different policies?
- (3)
- What is the benefit of reverse logistics? Does it affect enterprise strategy? What are the related parameters that influence supply chain performance such as consumers’ environmental awareness or recovery ratio?
- (1)
- We incorporate carbon trade regulations into the equilibrium model of a CLSCN to analyze the impacts of carbon trade behaviors of the two types of manufacturers on equilibrium decisions.
- (2)
- We first propose the carbon trade subnet and the product transaction subnet in the SCN and introduce the carbon trade center as a place for carbon trading.
- (3)
- By comparing three carbon reduction regulations, we illustrate the different laws of decision and profits and emission control and identify best practices for enterprises under different regulations.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Sustainable Supply Chain
2.2. Cap-and-Trade Regulations
2.3. Supply Chain Network Based on Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
2.4. Consumers’ Environmental Awareness
2.5. Research Gap
3. Notations and Assumptions
3.1. Notations
3.2. Assumptions
4. Model
4.1. Demand Market Decisions
4.2. Collection Centers’ Decisions
4.3. The Supply Chain Network under Cap-and-Trade (CT) Policy
4.3.1. Non-Ecological Manufacturers’ Decisions
4.3.2. Ecological Manufacturers’ Decisions
4.3.3. Carbon Trade Center’s Decisions
4.3.4. The Equilibrium Conditions of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network in the CT Model
4.4. The Supply Chain Network under Mandatory Cap Policy (MC)
4.4.1. Non-Ecological Manufacturers’ Decisions
4.4.2. Ecological Manufacturers’ Decisions
4.5. The Supply Chain Network under Cap-Sharing Scheme (CS)
Manufacturers’ Decisions
5. Discussion
5.1. Analyzing the Effects of Cap on Optimal Decisions and Profits
5.1.1. The Effects on Non-Ecological Manufacturer
5.1.2. The Effects on Ecological Manufacturer
5.1.3. The Effects on Supply Chain Performance
5.2. Analyzing Effects of and on Optimal Decisions and Profits
5.3. Analysis Effects of on Optimal Decisions and Profits
5.4. Managerial Insights
- Firstly, by comparing the three carbon emission policies, even though cap-and-trade regulations are more flexible than mandatory cap policy, it still loses a little efficiency than cap-sharing schemes. Both cap-and-trade regulations and cap-sharing schemes can encourage firms to adjust their production and pricing strategies. Governments should allocate caps properly and implement cap-sharing schemes in some pilot enterprises.
- Secondly, the proposed model proves that investment in green production technology helps ecological manufacturers gain lower carbon emissions and high profits. The technologies work both in forward and reverse channels. For wise enterprise leadership, correct decisions should be made on when and how to adopt cleaner production technology.
- Thirdly, the reverse supply chain should be valued at a strategic level because of its essential role in promoting a circular economy and sustainable development. Especially high-emission enterprises can complete green transformation and reduce emissions through recycling and remanufacturing processes.
- Finally, consumers are increasingly concerned about the impact of the production process on the environment. On the one hand, governments can reward manufacturers for producing more environmentally friendly products. On the other hand, the information or technology can be shared between enterprises.
6. Conclusions
- (1)
- Policy CS is effective in coordinating the relationship between economic development and environmental protection. In practice, the government may permit carbon cap sharing among enterprises, especially within a large enterprise to achieve a win-win situation. In other situations, CS policy may act as the ideal goal to measure the performance of MC and CT regulations.
- (2)
- Policy MC is easy to implement for governments, and the carbon reduction goal can be reached either. However, the carbon quotas cannot be converted to revenue, even if there are excess quotas for manufacturers.
- (3)
- Additionally, policy CT may lose a little efficiency compared with cap-sharing schemes, but it benefits government regulations. If governments can adjust cap transaction costs or relax carbon quotas, policy CT may show better performance. Moreover, policy CT can promote manufacturers adopting green technology to reduce carbon emissions, and the carbon emission rights have the nature of assets and create extra revenue.
- (4)
- It should be noted that in all scenarios, ecological manufacturers always show better performances, which means the green technology innovation can benefit firms both in sustainable development and economic development.
- (5)
- Consumers’ environmental protection awareness has a positive effect on ecological manufacturers but hurts non-eco manufacturers, especially in cap-sharing schemes. Moreover, when the recycling rate is at a relatively high level, it effectively helps eco manufacturers to use more reusable materials and reduce carbon emissions, whereas when it exceeds a certain value, the change has almost no influence on equilibrium results.
- (1)
- Information sharing can be considered, especially the production cost for different manufacturers.
- (2)
- The model can include irrational behavior factors of decision-makers, such as free-riding behavior.
- (3)
- The online transaction fashion can be incorporated into the model, especially in the post-COVID-19 era.
- (4)
- Some practical constraints, such as financial constraints and capacity constraints, can be considered in the model in future research.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
- The equilibrium conditions of the closed-loop supply chain network in the MC model
Appendix B
- The equilibrium conditions of closed-loop supply chain network in CS model
Appendix C
- Qualitative Properties
Appendix D
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Literature | Consumer’s Green Awareness | Low-Carbon Policy | Supply Chain Structure | Research Method | |||
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Carbon Tax | Cap-and-Trade | SC | Network | Empirical Analysis | Modeling Analysis | ||
1. [1] | √ | ||||||
2. [2] | √ | √ | √ | √ | |||
3. [3] | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | ||
4. [4] | √ | √ | √ | √ | |||
5. [5] | √ | √ | √ | √ | |||
6. [7] | √ | √ | √ | ||||
7. [17] | √ | √ | √ | √ | |||
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10. [28] | √ | √ | √ | ||||
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14. [39] | √ | √ | |||||
15. [48] | √ | √ | √ | ||||
16. [49] | √ | √ | √ | √ | |||
This paper | √ | Cap-and-trade, mandatory cap, cap sharing | √ | √ |
Parameters | Definition |
---|---|
. | |
. | |
. | |
. | |
Unit carbon trading commission charged by carbon trading center. | |
Unit carbon trading price between non-eco manufacturers and eco manufacturers. | |
. | |
The proportion of reusable materials extracted from recycled products when collection centers dispose EOL products from demand markets. | |
denotes the reusable material conversion ratio. | |
Consumer environmental awareness level. | |
. | |
. | |
Carbon emission factor of a truck. | |
. | |
denotes the number of trucks between eco manufacturers and collection centers. | |
The total transport costs of unit product. |
Decision Variables | Notations |
---|---|
. | |
. | |
The amount of products that a non-ecological manufacturer j sells and transfers to demand market k, . | |
The amount of reusable material from collection center h to non-ecological manufacturer j, . | |
The amount of product that ecological manufacturer i sells and transfers to demand market k, . | |
The amount of reusable material from collection center h to ecological manufacturer i, . | |
The amount of recycling EOL (end of life) product from demand market k to collection center h, . | |
The carbon cap amount of non-ecological manufacturer j buying from carbon trade center, . | |
The carbon cap amount of ecological manufacturer i selling to carbon trade center, . | |
The price consumers paid for non-ecological products in demand market k, and . | |
The price consumers paid for ecological products in demand market k, and . |
Endogenous Variables | Notations |
---|---|
The product price between manufacturers and demand market k, . | |
The EOL product recycling price paid by collection center h to consumers in demand market k. | |
The reusable material price paid by non-ecological manufacturer j to collection center h. | |
The reusable material price paid by ecological manufacturer i to collection center h. |
Functions | Notations |
---|---|
. | |
. | |
. | |
The transportation cost burden assumed by consumers to obtain the product. | |
. | |
. | |
The disposal cost function of collection center h. | |
The transaction cost from demand market k to collection center h. | |
Disutility to consumers due to collection of EOL product. | |
The demand function of ecological product. | |
The demand function of non-ecological product. |
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Cheng, P.; Zhang, G.; Sun, H. The Sustainable Supply Chain Network Competition Based on Non-Cooperative Equilibrium under Carbon Emission Permits. Mathematics 2022, 10, 1364. https://doi.org/10.3390/math10091364
Cheng P, Zhang G, Sun H. The Sustainable Supply Chain Network Competition Based on Non-Cooperative Equilibrium under Carbon Emission Permits. Mathematics. 2022; 10(9):1364. https://doi.org/10.3390/math10091364
Chicago/Turabian StyleCheng, Peiyue, Guitao Zhang, and Hao Sun. 2022. "The Sustainable Supply Chain Network Competition Based on Non-Cooperative Equilibrium under Carbon Emission Permits" Mathematics 10, no. 9: 1364. https://doi.org/10.3390/math10091364
APA StyleCheng, P., Zhang, G., & Sun, H. (2022). The Sustainable Supply Chain Network Competition Based on Non-Cooperative Equilibrium under Carbon Emission Permits. Mathematics, 10(9), 1364. https://doi.org/10.3390/math10091364