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Economies, Volume 2, Issue 4 (December 2014) – 2 articles , Pages 193-219

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Editorial
Urban Economy
Economies 2014, 2(4), 218-219; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies2040218 - 17 Dec 2014
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 3625
Abstract
In a call for papers, for the special issue to be devoted to “Urban Economy” late in 2015, that the Economies editors issued recently, I noted the increased attention that has been given to urban economies during the past quarter century. This is [...] Read more.
In a call for papers, for the special issue to be devoted to “Urban Economy” late in 2015, that the Economies editors issued recently, I noted the increased attention that has been given to urban economies during the past quarter century. This is concomitant with the increased importance and role in policy that cities have attained. This is, in part, due to the diminished capacity of national and sub-national governments to find the funds needed for urban projects and services, and in part to the understanding that cities are the key to the economies and societies of most if not all nations.[...] Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Urban Economy)
Article
Can Courts Make Federalism Work? A Game Theory Approach to Court-Induced Compliance and Defection in Federal Systems
Economies 2014, 2(4), 193-217; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies2040193 - 02 Dec 2014
Cited by 6 | Viewed by 4354
Abstract
Few studies on federalism analyze the role of courts as safeguards of the federal arrangement, and those that do tend to be too optimistic about what courts can do. This article analyzes the effect of judicial review on the interaction between the central [...] Read more.
Few studies on federalism analyze the role of courts as safeguards of the federal arrangement, and those that do tend to be too optimistic about what courts can do. This article analyzes the effect of judicial review on the interaction between the central and a regional government in a federation in order to understand the conditions under which courts may or may not enforce compliance with federalism. It argues that politicians of either level of government anticipate the likelihood of a judicial challenge and an eventual veto, and it finds distinct equilibria in the interaction between central and regional governments (imposition, auto-limitation, negotiation and litigation). Only under auto-limitation do courts effectively prevent transgressions to the federal arrangement. In all other scenarios, defection may take place despite the presence of courts. These findings show that as the court’s jurisprudence becomes more solid and defined, the chances for governments to successfully exceed their powers increase. Not only do transgressions take place despite the presence of the court, but because of it. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Political Economy)
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