1. Introduction
The Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that, on average, global temperature levels will increase by 1.5 to 4.5 degrees Celsius (with high confidence) relative to pre-industrial levels by the end of the 21st century [
1]. The IPCC also suggests that such profound changes in the climatic system during the 21st century will likely be felt hardest by households in developing countries, which strongly depend on agricultural production (IPCC, 2013, 2014). Significant empirical research has been undertaken examining the impact of negative climate shocks on key economic and social outcomes, such as economic growth, productivity, health, crime, and conflict, to name a few (see Dell, Jones [
2] and Carleton and Hsiang [
3] for detailed reviews). Very few studies have analyzed the impact of climate shocks on social network relationships. This paper, therefore, seeks to bridge this research gap, by assessing the impact of climate shocks on the social networks of households in rural India. Investments in social networks are important for mitigating the negative impacts of climate shocks [
4,
5,
6,
7,
8,
9]. Social capital and social networks have also been found to be positively associated with better environmental and natural resource management [
10]. However, to date, no research has been found examining the extent that investments in social networks may be an adaptive response by individuals to heightened climate risk. In general, investments in social networks are particularly useful for people living in rural and marginalized communities, where formal market-based and institutional solutions remain limited. Flora [
11], Fafchamps and Minten [
12], Bloch et al. [
13], and Bloch and Dutta [
14] have found a positive association between investments in social networks and information transfers, enforcement of social and contractual obligations, and the provision of social assistance, such as emergency credit, all of which become crucial in times of crisis. Unlike past studies, this paper aims to examine the extent to which climate shocks and other negative climate events may act as a trigger for a person to join social networks, as a risk-mitigation strategy, or to build resilience against future negative climate events. Alternatively, negative climate events can also erode social network relationships, either through forced migration, the destruction of homes and communities, and business failure, or as a result of the increasing prevalence of illness and death among families. It is hoped that this study can deepen our understanding of ways that negative climate events influence human decisions to invest in social network relationships, which, in some regions, become a key source of support in the face of negative climate events. Additionally, given the nature of the survey, I can also differentiate which social networks become most important in the face of heightened climate risks.
One of the challenges in assessing the impact of climate shocks is distinguishing between “direct” and “adaptive” impacts of changing climate patterns [
3,
15]. “Direct” impacts include instances where harmful climate events, such as droughts and high-temperature levels, result in the loss of assets, livestock, business failure, illness, or even death among households. Such events not only undermine a household’s social standing in a community but also negatively impact social network relationships. On the other hand, indirect or “adaptive” impacts are driven by expectations households develop, either in response to past climate patterns or based on information about future climate events [
15]. This distinction is key to understanding climate shock impacts on social network relationships. Indeed, in the case of the former, negative climate shocks can have a “corrosive” impact on social network relationships, while in the case of the latter, the experience of negative climate shocks during prior years can be “consensus building”, as persons work together either to mitigate the impacts of future climate threats or repair damage of past adverse climate events. In the latter case, individuals have an incentive to increase investments in social network relationships, as a means of mitigating the risks associated with possible future negative climate events [
12,
16].
To distinguish between possible “direct” and adaptive impacts on social network relationships, I leverage widely documented, fluctuating long-term rainfall patterns throughout India. Specifically, Parthasarathy et al. [
17] and Kripalani and Kulkarni [
18] have documented constantly shifting long-term rainfall patterns (movements between periods of heavy rainfall, followed by very dry rainfall patterns) over the last 100 years across the continent of India. In this case, I argue fluctuating long-term rainfall patterns create a degree of uncertainty in climate patterns among decision-makers and households. I hypothesize that past realized rainfall trends are indicative of future rainfall patterns and, as such, can shape a household’s expectations of future weather patterns, which ultimately influence a household’s decision to invest in social network relationships. In this way, this paper is most closely related to Taraz [
19], who links past fluctuating weather patterns in India to farmers’ decisions to adopt new irrigation technologies and select more climate-resistant crops. In this case, I examine the extent that which households adapt their portfolio of social network relationships in the face of heightened climate risks. I also assume households make a rational choice in terms of which types of social network relationships can better protect and support long-term consumption or production in the face of possible future negative climate events. I also follow Woolcock [
20], Adhikari [
21], Hawkins and Maurer [
22], and Poortinga [
23] by differentiating among three types of social network relationships: (1) family/caste-based (bonding); (2) non-family (bridging); and (3) vertical (linking). Finally, I examine the extent to which social networks are impacted by repeated climate events. This analysis is used to assess the extent to which social network relationships can also be eroded by negative climate events. Both approaches differ from other climate impact studies, which utilize year-to-year changes in climate variables to determine the impact on social and economic outcomes. While year-to-year variations in climate patterns can uncover shorter-term impacts on social and economic outcomes, such as crime and productivity, it overlooks a household’s adaptation and responsiveness to past climate shocks or longer-term climate trends [
2,
15].
Understanding the impact of climate shocks on social networks can be particularly relevant to poor and vulnerable communities since these communities tend to rely heavily on social network relationships for information, informal support, and collective action. Poorer communities also tend to have less diversified sources of income, own fewer productive assets, and are frequently located in areas that can be particularly vulnerable to sudden climate shocks, such as floods or droughts. This implies that negative climate events can have far-reaching consequences beyond the loss of assets, illness, or death. By impacting both physical and social assets, negative climate shocks have the potential to undermine the long-term resilience of already vulnerable communities, thereby pushing them into a vicious cycle of poverty and underdevelopment. By understanding how these social networks are impacted by negative climate events, it is hoped that policies can be developed to strengthen network relationships, to build greater resilience among climate-affected communities.
This paper is divided into four sections.
Section 2 provides details of the data and empirical strategy. The main results and discussions are presented in
Section 3, as are the robustness tests and extensions. Finally, concluding remarks and policy recommendations are outlined in
Section 4.
3. Results
Table 2 outlines the results of household fixed effects (FE) models. Firstly, I found a negative association between the average rainfall deviation patterns on measures of linking social capital (vertical network relationships) and the percentage of informal family-based networks (FamilyNet). Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the average rainfall levels above the long-term average was associated with lower investments in vertical (power-based) and informal family-based networks by approximately 0.14 and 0.17 standardized points. This suggests that households living in locations that experienced higher than average longer-term rainfall patterns recorded lower investments in vertical and family-based networks. I also found increases in the average rainfall deviations above the long-term average, associated with higher investments in non-family or bridging networks, approximately 0.08 standardized points more than the sample average. I was also able to distinguish the impact of positive and negative rainfall shocks on investments in social network relationships. Not surprisingly, I found a positive association between the average negative rainfall shocks on measures of linking social capital (vertical network relationships) and the percentage of the informal family/caste-based (FamilyNet) networks. Specifically, for each additional month, negative annual rainfall shocks were recorded (based on three-year averages) and investments in vertical (power-based) networks were found to be approximately 0.16 standard deviations higher than the sample average. We also find a one-month increase in the average negative rainfall shocks, associated with higher investments in informal family/caste-based networks, approximately 0.14 standardized points higher than the sample average. Interestingly, the converse is also true; that is, the occurrence of positive rainfall shocks over the long-term is associated with lower levels of investments in linked and family-based networks, as well as increasing investments in non-family (bridging) networks. These results point to greater investments in vertical (linked) and family/caste-based networks among households located in regions that experience negative rainfall shocks much more frequently (I also tested for the impact of long-term temperature shocks but found these shocks to have no significant impact on social network variables. This may be due to the fact that households may find it particularly difficult to adapt to temperature shocks through social network relationships).
3.1. Assessing the Impact of Repeated Climate Shocks
I also tested the impact of repeated negative climate shocks on household social network relationships. Specifically, after controlling for climate shocks in prior periods, I identified the districts that have been impacted by consecutive climate shocks (negative rainfall anomalies) over three years (
Table 3). I found investments in (non-family/caste) bridging networks to be lower in regions that have experienced repeated climate events (three years), approximately 0.02 standard deviations below the sample average. However, I continued to find higher investments in linked and family-based networks in regions repeatedly impacted by consecutive negative precipitation shocks. This indicates the continuing resilience of vertical and family-based networks in the face of repeated negative climate events. I found negative precipitation lags (one to three-year) to be positively associated with investments in Linking and FamilyNet.
3.2. Tracing Heterogeneous Impacts
I also examined the possible heterogeneous responses to climate shocks based on differences in community characteristics. Firstly, to explore the extent altruism can influence investments in social network relationships, I explored the impact among households where more than 50 percent of the same village members are of the same caste grouping, as per the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCSTs) and High Caste (HC) groupings, using the information on village characteristics extracted from the 2005 survey. SCSTs are considered the lowest of the caste groupings in India. I found households located in villages where SCSTs make up more than 50 percent of the village population in 2005 tend to have marginally lower investments in vertical networks in the face of negative climate shocks. Interestingly, I found similar results among villages dominated by High Caste groupings (
Appendix A Table A2).
I also find that households residing in rural communities with a higher average village-level income (I defined high-income villages as villages where the average income levels are 75 percent or more than the sample average) will invest approximately 0.206 standardized points more in Linked capital relative to households living in villages with lower levels of income (
Appendix A Table A3), suggesting that wealth rather than caste status is a significant determinant of access to vertical-based networks. I also found the converse is true, where for households residing in lower-income villages, investments in linked capital tend to be eroded first in the face of repeated negative rainfall shocks, further reinforcing wealth as a key influence in terms of the household’s access to linked capital (see
Appendix A Table A4).
3.3. Extensions and Robustness Tests
Understanding Possible Motives for Investments in Social Networks
An additional step will be to determine the possible motives for investing in social networks. Based on the literature, social networks can be particularly useful for securing emergency credit, social insurance, facilitating technology adoption, social cooperation, and resolving conflicts, all of which become critical in the face of negative climate events. Using survey-based responses, I estimated the impact of investments in key social network relationships on variables such as access and sources of credit, the number of businesses owned and managed by households, reported instances of cooperation among households, and access to private wells (
Table 4). Specifically, I found a positive association between investments in linking and bridging capitals and the log number of loans (Ln(#Loans)) received by households. Investments in bridging and linking networks increase the probability of obtaining an additional loan by about 5 and 8 percent, respectively. There is also a positive and significant relationship between investments in linked network capital and loans obtained from family members. Investments in linked capital are also positively related to the number of non-farm business households involved, indicating that vertical relationships are important contributors to having a more diversified portfolio of non-farm businesses. Investments in linking capital are also positively associated with reported collaboration among households. Finally, investments in informal family-based networks are positively associated with increasing access to private tubular wells.
For the robustness tests, I examined the impact of rainfall shocks based on five-year instead of three-year averages. Additionally, given the importance of agriculture to earnings among rural households, I focused on the average rainfall shocks occurring during India’s monsoon season. Once again, in both instances, I continued to find a positive and significant impact of rainfall shocks on increasing investments in family-based networks (see
Appendix A Table A5). I also tested the extent to which the baseline results are not driven by shocks occurring in one specific year. Therefore, I estimated the impacts of lagged climate shocks on social network relationships and found the significance of shocks up to seven years before the survey period (
Appendix A Table A1). Thirdly, given that I argue a household’s decision to join social networks is considered largely an adaptation strategy to mitigate higher climate risk, one robustness test can include instances where households have more stable income sources, such as salaried households. Indeed, salaried households, such as government workers, administrators, and office employees, may be less likely to be affected by climate shocks relative to other groups such as farmers and business owners. As expected, I found no significant relationship between past climate shocks and investment in social networks among households who earn income from salary-based sources (see
Appendix A Table A6).
As a test of the robustness of my channel analysis, I estimated the impacts of investments in social networks and simultaneously tested for the impact of long-term climate shocks on the key socio-economic outcomes (
Table A7). I found lagged average climate shocks to have no impact on the key channel outcomes such as access to credit, number of businesses, and access to private tubular wells. This result provides strong support for the directional effect of climate shocks. Climate shocks trigger investments in social network relationships, which bring with them positive socio-economic benefits to support recovery efforts or insulate against future negative climate events. Finally, I tested the robustness of the social capital measures to predict the key social outcomes, such as attendance at public meetings and measures of trust. I found a positive association between investments in Bridging, Linking, and FamilyNet, the probability that households will attend a public meeting, and a positive association between linking the capital and reported confidence/trust in key government institutions.
3.4. Discussion
Collectively, based on these results, I found households tend to be more reliant on family-based networks when faced with higher-than-average rainfall anomalies. I also found non-family (bridging) networks, such as membership in business associations and NGOs, to be eroded in the face of repeated negative climate events. Perhaps an interesting and new result to the literature is the growing importance of linked or power-based networks, such as contacts with local government officials or senior state employees, which tend to increase in the face of higher climate risk. This has significant implications in terms of delivery of support and types of technical support provided by key development organizations, which may have a greater impact and likelihood of success if they are channeled through family or kin-based networks or local government agencies rather than traditional non-profit organizations.
Another interesting finding is the importance of wealth rather than caste status as a key factor associated with greater investment in power-based networks. Households that are located in higher-income villages tend to register higher investments in linked networks, particularly in the face of higher-than-average negative precipitation shocks, giving further credence to the “pooled income” rather than “altruistic” motives for providing support in social networks.
Finally, when exploring the motives for investing in social networks, I found that investments in linked and family-based networks were associated with greater access to credit, also credit from family sources; increases in the number of businesses; increasing access to irrigation wells; and higher reported collaboration. Directional tests confirmed that households do not access these benefits in response to past negative climate events but, rather, increase investments in social networks that are associated with these benefits.
4. Conclusions
Using long-term averages in negative rainfall shocks, as well as lagged climate shocks, I found households that experience higher average negative rainfall shocks tend to have greater investments in vertical and family-caste-based networks. I found investments in linked networks to be marginally lower among villages dominated by SCSTs and also High Caste groups, while households that reside in villages with a high village income tend to have greater investments in linked networks. This result suggests wealth, rather than caste status, increases households’ ability to access linked networks when faced with higher-than-average negative rainfall shocks. Interestingly, I found little or no impact of negative precipitation shocks on investments in social network relationships among households that generate most of their income from salary and wage sources. Finally, I found investments in bridging (non-family networks) to be particularly sensitive to repeated negative precipitation anomalies. Collectively, these results highlight the importance of family/caste and linked network relationships in supporting households impacted by higher than average and repeated negative precipitation shocks. Not surprisingly, I found investments in vertical and family-based networks to be associated with greater access to credit (and sourced from family members), greater diversification into non-farm businesses, higher levels of reported collaboration, and increasing use of private irrigation technology, all of which are key to mitigating the impact of negative climate shocks.
From a policy perspective, these results highlight the importance of supporting family and vertical network arrangements through direct financial support, dissemination of drought-support programs, or improvements in governance structures and accountability frameworks within these communities. Such social support can extend the marginal social benefit of participating in these network relationships, extending spillover benefits to members, and also making these network relationships more resilient to repeated negative climate events. Further research is required to understand possible channels through which social networks are affected by climate shocks. This can be due to factors such as increasing migration, loss of income, and illness or death of household members. It will also be useful to trace possible outcomes of eroded social networks, in terms of increasing crime, higher poverty levels, or more instances of implementation of poor climate mitigation strategies, such as child marriages. Finally, I have also developed a theoretical risk sharing model which captures households’ decision to join social networks as adaptive response to increasing climate risk. The model also predicts household’s behavior in terms of continued network participation in the face of more frequent and intense climate risk. Indeed, while still preliminary, predictions of the theoretical model complement well the empirical results found in this paper (see
Supplementary Materials).