The Blockchain Trust Paradox: Engineered Trust vs. Experienced Trust in Decentralized Systems

Abstract

Blockchain is described as a technology of trust. Its design relies on cryptography, decentralization, and immutability to ensure secure and transparent transactions. Yet users frequently report confusion, frustration, and skepticism when engaging with blockchain applications. This tension is the blockchain trust paradox: while trust is engineered into the technology, trust is not always experienced by its users. Our article examines the paradox through three theoretical perspectives. Socio-Technical Systems (STS) theory highlights how trust emerges from the interaction between technical features and social practices; Technology Acceptance models (TAM and UTAUT) emphasize how perceived usefulness and ease of use shape adoption. Ostrom’s commons governance theory explains how legitimacy and accountability affect trust in decentralized networks. Drawing on recent research in experience design, human–computer interaction, and decentralized governance, the article identifies the barriers that undermine user confidence. These include complex key management, unpredictable transaction costs, and unclear processes for decision-making and dispute resolution. The article offers an integrated framework that links engineered trust with experienced trust. Seven propositions are developed to guide future research and practice. The conclusion argues that blockchain technologies will gain traction if design and governance evolve alongside technical protocols to create systems that are both technically secure and trustworthy in experience.

1. Introduction

Blockchain has emerged over the past decade as one of the most influential and contested digital technologies. At its core, it promises to deliver secure, transparent, and tamper-resistant records through the combined properties of cryptography, decentralization, and immutability [1]. These features have positioned blockchain as a potential disruptor across industries, from finance and supply chain management to healthcare and digital identity [2,3]. Promoters describe blockchain as a “confidence machine” [4] because it embeds assurance into technical protocols. Yet despite these engineered guarantees, widespread user trust in blockchain systems has proven elusive. The gap between designed security and lived experience reflects a central tension: the blockchain trust paradox.

The paradox arises because technical integrity does not necessarily translate into human confidence. This paper advances the argument that this gap is rooted in a foundational conflict. Blockchain technology’s ideological pursuit of a “trustless” state clashes with the inherent human need for accountability, usability, and relational security. Recent empirical studies reveal a critical pattern. Despite the availability of decentralized, self-custodial systems, users consistently seek out and rely on centralized trust anchors, such as established exchanges and development teams [5]. This behavior is not an anomaly, but a rational response driven by the psychological need for accountability and a reluctance to bear the full responsibility that “trustless” systems demand. From a design perspective, blockchain’s architecture is secure by default. Records are immutable, distributed across many nodes, and validated through consensus mechanisms such as Proof of Work or Proof of Stake [6]. From a user perspective, however, these features are often opaque, difficult to navigate, and embedded in governance structures that appear uncertain or contested. For many individuals, the promise of decentralization collides with the reality of confusing interfaces, unpredictable transaction costs, and unclear accountability. Rather than fostering trust, these experiences can generate doubt and disengagement [7].

This paradox matters because blockchain adoption depends on more than technical design. Technology is more than instrumental; it is social and emergent [8,9]. Users bring expectations and institutional norms to their interactions with blockchain. When these expectations do not align with experience, trust falters [10].

In this article, we explore the blockchain trust paradox through three complementary theoretical perspectives. First, Socio-Technical Systems (STS) theory underscores that technologies are inseparable from the social contexts in which they operate [11,12]. Second, Technology Acceptance Models (TAM) and Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) highlight how perceptions of usefulness and ease of use shape willingness to adopt new technologies [13,14]. Third, Ostrom’s commons governance framework emphasizes the importance of transparent, accountable, and inclusive oversight for sustaining trust in decentralized systems [15].

The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, it examines the blockchain paradox of engineered security yet experienced distrust. Second, it introduces seven propositions that connect STS, TAM/UTAUT, and Ostrom’s governance principles to blockchain trust. These propositions highlight how trust can be strengthened by aligning technical assurances with human perceptions and governance legitimacy. Third, it develops an integrated framework that combines insights from experience design, human–computer interaction (HCI), and decentralized governance to guide future blockchain research and practice.

Our paper is set out as follows. First, we introduce our theoretical perspective integrating STS, TAM/UTAUT, and Ostrom’s governance approach. Second, we provide an overview of blockchain and use the STS lens to provide trust propositions. Third, we view blockchain from an experience design perspective using TAM and UTAUT to provide trust propositions. Fourth, we use Ostrom’s (1990) [15] commons governance framework to understand trust in bitcoin’s decentralized network. Fifth, we tie the three theories together to offer a final proposition. We conclude our paper by looking at implications for researchers, designers, and policymakers.

2. Theoretical Framework

Trust in technology cannot be reduced to mechanisms alone. While cryptographic assurance, decentralization, and immutability create conditions for engineered trust, adoption and engagement depend on how people experience these systems. To capture this tension, three complementary theoretical perspectives are applied: Socio-Technical Systems (STS) theory, Technology Acceptance Models (TAM and UTAUT), and Ostrom’s commons governance framework. Each contributes a different angle on how trust is produced, maintained, or eroded in decentralized blockchain ecosystems. However, first, we briefly explore the types of trust.

Trust in bitcoin tends to focus on the technical: cryptographic protocols and consensus mechanisms [16]. However, trust amongst people is more than technical. At the individual level, trust is generally defined as willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations; in interpersonal settings, this rests on cognitive trust (judgments of another’s competence/reliability) and affective trust (bonds of care and goodwill) [17]. When such orientations generalize beyond known others, they become social trust, a belief in the reliability, integrity, and competence of others within a society [18]. Governance trust extends the target from persons to institutions and officeholders; it relies on institutional trust created by structural assurances such as rules, standards, professionalization and on perceived procedural justice/legitimacy [19]. In short, cognitive/affective trust supplies the building blocks; their diffusion yields social trust; and institutional design, combined with legitimacy, translates them into durable governance trust.

2.1. Socio-Technical Systems (STS) Theory

STS theory emerged in organizational studies to explain how technology and social practices co-evolve [12]. Its central claim is that technology does not operate in isolation; rather, it becomes meaningful only through its interaction with people, institutions, and environments [11]. In the blockchain context, STS theory suggests that trust arises not only from protocols but also from how those protocols are embedded in use.

For example, a blockchain may offer strong technical guarantees through cryptographic consensus, but if user communities cannot understand wallet interfaces, or if they fear losing keys, the system will not be experienced as trustworthy. STS highlights that blockchain adoption requires alignment across both technical and social domains. A technically secure ledger that undermines social practices of accountability or usability will fail to generate trust.

2.2. Technology Acceptance Models (TAM and UTAUT)

While STS highlights the social, adoption models such as TAM and UTAUT focus on the psychological determinants of technology use. Davis (1989) [13] first proposed the Technology Acceptance Model, identifying perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use as the strongest predictors of adoption. Venkatesh et al. (2003) [14] later extended this work through the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT), which incorporated additional constructs such as social influence, facilitating conditions, and behavioral intention.

Applied to blockchain, these models explain why engineered trust often fails to translate into adoption. A decentralized ledger may be theoretically secure, but if potential users perceive it as difficult to navigate, lacking clear benefits, or unsupported by peers and institutions, adoption will remain limited. Recent studies confirm this point: concerns about usability, volatility, and complexity remain the strongest barriers to blockchain adoption across industries [20].

2.3. Ostrom’s Commons Governance Theory

The third theoretical anchor draws on Ostrom’s (1990) [15] work on governing the commons. Rather than accepting the “tragedy of the commons” perspective, which assumes that shared resources inevitably collapse under collective use, Ostrom demonstrated that communities are capable of creating durable institutions by establishing rules of participation, monitoring, accountability, and conflict resolution. Design principles of such communities include inclusivity, transparency, and legitimacy.

Blockchain networks mirror commons in important ways. They are decentralized, rely on distributed participation, and lack centralized enforcement [21]. Without effective governance, blockchain networks risk fragmentation, concentration of power, or collapse in legitimacy. Ostrom’s principles therefore provide a lens for evaluating blockchain governance. They highlight the following questions: Who participates in decision-making? How are rules enforced? What mechanisms exist for resolving disputes or addressing misconduct? Trust depends not only on protocols but also on whether participants perceive governance as fair and accountable.

2.4. Toward an Integrated Perspective

Individually, these theories illuminate different aspects of the blockchain trust paradox. STS emphasizes the interplay of technical systems and social practices. TAM and UTAUT highlight perceptions of usefulness and ease of use as drivers of adoption. Ostrom’s theory stresses governance legitimacy as a foundation for sustained participation.

This sets the stage for the article’s propositions. At the conclusion of subsequent sections, we advance seven propositions that connect these frameworks to blockchain trust. Two propositions emerge from STS in the examination of blockchain foundations, two from TAM/UTAUT in the exploration of experienced design, two from Ostrom in the inspection of governance, and one from their integration in the discussion.

3. Understanding the Foundations of Blockchain

Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology that enables secure and tamper-resistant recordkeeping. Each block in a chain contains a set of transactions, a timestamp, and a cryptographic hash linking it to the previous block. The linkage ensures that once a transaction is recorded, it cannot be altered without invalidating the entire chain. This design embeds immutability into the protocol [1]. Combined with the transparency of all participants in a public blockchain being able to audit the ledger, this architecture is intended to replace reliance on centralized authorities with reliance on mathematics and distributed consensus [3].

Consensus mechanisms operationalize trust. In Proof of Work systems, participants compete to solve cryptographic puzzles, and the winning solution validates the next block. In Proof of Stake, validators are chosen based on the tokens they hold and commit as collateral. Both approaches reduce the risk of manipulation by requiring broad participation in verification [6,22].

At a systemic level, blockchain’s architecture reflects a deliberate attempt to shift trust from people and institutions to protocols and algorithms. This shift resonates with the concept of blockchain as a “confidence machine” [4]. By combining decentralization, immutability, and cryptographic assurance, blockchain aspires to create systems where verification is automatic and tampering is infeasible.

Yet technical guarantees alone do not ensure human adoption or confidence. Socio-Technical Systems (STS) theory explains why. Technologies function not as isolated artifacts but as systems that become meaningful only through their embedding in social practice [23]. A blockchain’s immutability may ensure record integrity, but if users cannot interpret transaction hashes, understand consensus, or manage keys, their experience will not match the engineered assurances [7].

The 2016 Ethereum DAO incident illustrates this tension [24]. When a vulnerability in a smart contract enabled the diversion of funds, the technical system functioned as designed. Yet the community interpreted the outcome as unacceptable and chose to intervene through a hard fork. This decision revealed that social legitimacy could override engineered guarantees [25]. The paradox emerges: while blockchain as code promises incorruptibility, blockchain as practice depends on human judgments about fairness, legitimacy, and usability.

STS theory also highlights how blockchain infrastructures are entangled with broader ecosystems. Governments debate regulatory frameworks for cryptocurrencies; firms design user-facing wallets; communities negotiate protocol changes. Each layer shapes how trust is perceived. A ledger may be cryptographically secure, but if regulators deem it noncompliant, or if businesses provide confusing interfaces, users may not trust it. Conversely, clear institutional support or transparent design can amplify trust beyond the code [9,20].

This analysis of blockchain’s foundations reveals the first dimension of the trust paradox. Engineered trust is necessary but not sufficient. A blockchain can be mathematically secure yet socially distrusted. Technical immutability can even conflict with human expectations of fairness, as when errors or fraud cannot be reversed. STS reminds us that blockchain systems must be evaluated not only by their protocols but also by their capacity to integrate with the practices and values of their users and communities.

Propositions from STS

P1 The level of trust in blockchain systems will depend not only on cryptographic and consensus-based assurances but also on the alignment between these technical features and existing social practices.

P2 Perceptions of blockchain trustworthiness will increase when governance, user interfaces, and institutional norms co-evolve with protocol-level guarantees to form a coherent socio-technical system.

4. Experience Design

While blockchain protocols are designed to be mathematically secure and transparent, many users do not experience them that way. Instead, they encounter complexity, opacity, and friction that undermine confidence. Experience design and the field of Human–Computer Interaction (HCI) provide useful lenses for understanding this gap. These perspectives focus on how people interact with systems, the barriers that reduce usability, and the design strategies that can improve trust.

4.1. Usability Barriers

One of the most prominent challenges is digital key management. Blockchain relies on public–private key pairs to authenticate transactions and secure assets. While cryptographically robust, these mechanisms place a heavy burden on users. Losing a private key often means permanent loss of access to funds or data. Solutions such as seed phrases or hardware wallets may protect against theft but are intimidating for novices and unforgiving of error [7]. Instead of instilling confidence, key management frequently generates anxiety and reluctance to adopt blockchain-based applications.

A second barrier is transaction complexity. On networks such as Ethereum, users must pay “gas fees” to execute transactions. These fees fluctuate based on network demand and can be difficult to predict. To the average user, the logic of variable fees is opaque, creating confusion about fairness and frustration with unpredictability [26]. If transaction costs appear arbitrary, the perception of transparency that blockchain seeks to foster is undermined.

Third, decentralized applications (dApps) often lack design conventions. Interfaces vary widely, documentation may be sparse, and workflows are unfamiliar. Unlike mature web applications that benefit from standard patterns, dApps frequently present inconsistent metaphors and unclear prompts [27]. Users must learn idiosyncratic conventions, which increases cognitive load and contributes to distrust. Similarly, the technical nature of smart contracts, code that executes agreements on-chain, remains inaccessible to most participants, leaving them reliant on abstract assurances of correctness.

4.2. The Role of Experience Design

Experience design builds on HCI by focusing not just on usability but also on the overall quality of interactions. It emphasizes clarity, transparency, and emotional resonance in user journeys [28]. For blockchain, this means designing systems that are not only secure but also legible and reassuring.

Research demonstrates that well-designed onboarding can mitigate initial anxiety. Interactive tutorials, contextual explanations, and progressive disclosure of complexity help users form accurate mental models of blockchain processes [20]. Visual representations of consensus or transaction status can provide tangible reassurance. For example, showing the number of confirmations or illustrating validator participation makes abstract mechanisms more concrete.

Simplifying security practices is equally important. Biometric authentication and multi-factor verification can protect accounts while reducing dependence on complex seed phrases. Clear warnings and explanations can guide users toward safe behavior without introducing excessive friction. These design strategies demonstrate that security and usability need not be in conflict [29]. Instead, they can reinforce one another by making safety practices accessible and intuitive. Design can also address transparency concerns [30]. Interfaces that explain gas fees, offer estimates, and show how fees are calculated can improve perceptions of fairness. Likewise, dashboards that translate smart contract activity into plain language foster understanding.

4.3. Technology Acceptance Models

The importance of experience design becomes clearer when viewed through the lens of the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT). TAM identifies perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use as the primary determinants of adoption [13]. UTAUT expands this framework to include social influence, facilitating conditions, and behavioral intention [14].

Applied to blockchain, these models explain why adoption lags despite strong technical design. If managing keys is seen as complex and error-prone, perceived ease of use declines. If transaction fees appear arbitrary, perceived usefulness decreases. If social networks and institutions have not normalized blockchain use, social influence is weak. Conversely, improvements in interface design, onboarding, and institutional support can strengthen these perceptions and thereby increase adoption [20].

Recent studies affirm that blockchain adoption depends heavily on user perceptions. In organizational settings, employees report reluctance to adopt blockchain tools when they perceive them as overly technical or disconnected from daily workflows [31]. In consumer contexts, adoption is highest when platforms offer clear utility, intuitive interfaces, and strong community support [32]. These findings align with TAM and UTAUT predictions: adoption follows from perceived usefulness, ease of use, and supportive conditions, not simply from cryptographic assurances.

4.4. Propositions from TAM/UTAUT

P3 Perceived usefulness and ease of use will mediate the relationship between blockchain’s engineered trust features and user adoption.

P4 The adoption of blockchain applications will increase when experience design strategies enhance clarity, simplify security practices, and integrate institutional support, thereby improving users’ perceptions of usefulness and ease of use.

5. Governance Challenges and Trust Beyond the Technology

While usability barriers explain why blockchain systems often fail to generate user confidence, governance challenges are equally central to the trust paradox. Unlike traditional systems that rely on centralized authorities to establish and enforce rules, blockchains distribute authority across networks of participants. In principle, decentralization reduces the risk of corruption and monopolistic control. In practice, however, it creates new difficulties around decision-making, accountability, and dispute resolution. Ostrom’s (1990) commons governance framework provides a useful perspective on these challenges.

5.1. Governance in Decentralized Networks

In centralized systems, governance is clear. A bank enforces compliance, a government agency issues regulations, or a platform provider dictates terms of service. By contrast, blockchain networks lack a single point of authority. Decision-making is distributed across developers, miners or validators, token holders, and end-users. Each group has distinct interests, and conflicts can arise. For example, protocol upgrades require coordination across stakeholders, yet disagreements can lead to forks that fragment communities and undermine stability [33]. The split between Ethereum and Ethereum Classic following the 2016 DAO hack illustrates this dilemma: the absence of clear dispute-resolution mechanisms forced the community to choose between immutability and intervention [25].

Governance in decentralized networks often depends on “rough consensus” and social norms rather than formal institutions [34]. This flexibility allows rapid innovation but can erode user confidence when processes appear opaque or dominated by insiders [35]. For non-expert users, the lack of visible governance can translate into uncertainty about accountability.

5.2. Concentration of Power

Although decentralization is designed to distribute authority, power frequently re-concentrates. In Proof of Work systems, large mining pools can control significant shares of computational power, raising concerns about collusion and “51 percent attacks” [36]. In Proof of Stake systems, token wealth translates directly into governance influence. Individuals or entities holding large stakes can disproportionately shape protocol decisions, undermining the principle of egalitarian participation [37]. This concentration of influence mirrors challenges in commons governance where powerful actors can exploit resources at the expense of others. Ostrom (1990) emphasizes that successful commons are marked by equitable participation and safeguards against domination.

A primary example of this is seen in the on-chain governance models of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), particularly those using Delegated Voting (DV). In an attempt to address voter apathy, many DAOs allow token holders to delegate their voting power to trusted representatives. However, empirical research reveals that DV frequently exacerbates power concentration, creating “delegation monopolies” where a small number of highly capitalized delegates control governance outcomes [38,39]. Furthermore, the lack of robust accountability mechanisms has led to documented instances of collusive behavior, vote-selling, and “governance extraction,” where delegates manipulate protocol rules for personal financial benefit [40]. This demonstrates that simply encoding rules on a blockchain does not eliminate the fundamental political dynamics of collective decision-making.

5.3. Dispute Resolution and Accountability

Another challenge lies in dispute resolution. Smart contracts execute code deterministically, yet errors, vulnerabilities, and fraud still occur. Unlike traditional systems with courts or regulators, decentralized networks lack universally recognized adjudicators. Some projects experiment with arbitration services or decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) that vote on disputes. Others rely on off-chain agreements or centralized interventions when necessary. The absence of consistent mechanisms leaves many users uncertain about how conflicts will be handled, reducing trust [41].

Accountability is also contested. Developers often disclaim liability for code outcomes, validators focus on protocol compliance, and platforms distribute responsibility ambiguously. This fragmentation can erode trust because users cannot easily identify who is responsible when problems arise [42]. Ostrom’s framework suggests that clearly defined roles, monitoring, and graduated sanctions are needed to ensure accountability.

5.4. Ostrom’s Principles Applied to Blockchain

Ostrom (1990) identified eight design principles for governing shared resources: clearly defined boundaries, congruence between rules and local conditions, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, recognition of rights to organize, and nested enterprises for large systems. Empirical studies show that projects implementing participatory governance and transparent decision-making foster higher trust among users and investors [35,43]. Conversely, networks that lack accountability or concentrate decision-making in a few hands often suffer from user disengagement and reputational decline.

5.5. Propositions from Ostrom’s Theory

P5 The perceived trustworthiness of blockchain systems will increase when governance mechanisms align with Ostrom’s design principles, including inclusivity, transparency, and accountability.

P6 Concentration of decision-making power among a small number of stakeholders will reduce user trust in blockchain systems, even when technical protocols remain decentralized.

6. Discussion

The preceding sections reveal that blockchain trust is more complex than its technical design implies. Protocols engineer trust through cryptography, consensus, and immutability. Yet these assurances do not automatically translate into adoption or confidence. Users experience blockchain through interfaces, institutions, and governance arrangements that shape perceptions of fairness, usability, and accountability. This tension, the blockchain trust paradox, can be better understood by integrating insights from Socio-Technical Systems (STS) theory, Technology Acceptance Models (TAM/UTAUT), and Ostrom’s commons governance framework.

Adopting a socio-technical security framework allows for a more granular analysis by deconstructing the system into three interconnected layers [44]:

• The Software Layer (Code and Applications): This is the traditional domain of blockchain security. However, usability failures in wallets and dApps are not just design flaws but security vulnerabilities at the human–software interface that directly undermine trust.
• The Social Layer (People and Processes): This is where the failures of the techno-deterministic model are most glaring. The user preference for centralized exchanges and the political dynamics within DAOs are social phenomena that demonstrate the human need for accountability and support that protocols alone fail to provide.
• The Infrastructure Layer: The ideal of pure decentralization is complicated by dependencies on centralized infrastructure, including mining pool concentration and reliance on API providers like Infura, which introduce points of control that challenge the “trustless” narrative.

This leads to a critical re-evaluation of the term “trustless.” The term is a profound misnomer that has arguably hindered mainstream adoption. Blockchain does not eliminate trust; it relocates it. Users are asked to shift their trust from known, regulated institutions to anonymous developers, unaudited code, and volatile on-chain political processes [45]. Traditional institutions have spent centuries building social and legal frameworks to make themselves trustworthy. A more productive framing would be to move away from the ideal of being “trustless” and toward the goal of being “demonstrably trustworthy,” leveraging blockchain’s transparency to create systems that are more auditable and fair than their traditional counterparts.

STS theory emphasizes that technologies are inseparable from the social practices in which they are embedded. TAM and UTAUT extend this insight by identifying the cognitive and perceptual factors that influence adoption. Ostrom’s governance framework adds a collective dimension. It shows that trust in decentralized systems depends on legitimacy and accountability.

Taken together, these perspectives suggest that blockchain’s trust paradox is a function of misalignment between engineered trust and experienced trust. At the protocol level, blockchain may appear incorruptible. At the user level, it may feel inaccessible, unpredictable, or unfair. The paradox is most visible in moments of crisis, such as the 2016 DAO hack, when the guarantees of immutability clash with the community’s sense of justice. It is also evident in everyday practices, where complex key management and inconsistent dApp interfaces deter adoption despite the reliability of consensus mechanisms.

This paradox underscores the limits of technology alone solutions. Blockchain cannot succeed as a trust solution through code alone. Its adoption requires co-evolution of technical systems, human-centered design, and participatory governance. Trust must be earned not only through cryptographic proofs but also through clear experiences, fair rules, and accountable processes.

Proposition from the Integrated Framework

P7 Blockchain trust will be maximized when socio-technical assurances, user perceptions, and governance mechanisms are aligned, creating coherence between engineered trust and experienced trust.

7. Conclusions

Our article has examined the blockchain trust paradox: the tension between trust engineered into protocols through cryptography, decentralization, and immutability, and the trust experienced by users through usability, governance, and perception. The analysis demonstrates that while blockchain architectures embed strong technical assurances, they do not guarantee user confidence. Trust is not produced by code alone but emerges through socio-technical interactions, cognitive perceptions, and collective governance arrangements.

Drawing on Socio-Technical Systems (STS) theory, the article highlighted that blockchain must be understood as a system where technical features, institutions, and user practices co-evolve. Engineered immutability and transparency are insufficient when social expectations and norms demand interpretability, fairness, or reversibility. The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) emphasized that adoption depends on perceived usefulness and ease of use. Blockchain adoption is hindered when key management is intimidating, transaction fees appear arbitrary, or dApp interfaces lack clarity. The application of Ostrom’s commons governance framework further revealed that legitimacy and accountability are crucial for sustaining trust. Without inclusive participation and transparent decision-making, decentralized networks risk power concentration and diminished credibility. Our argument is summarized in Figure 1.

The article also introduced seven propositions that advance theoretical understanding and guide empirical research. These propositions argue that blockchain trust emerges when technical protocols align with social practices (STS), when experience design improves perceptions of usefulness and ease of use (TAM/UTAUT), and when governance arrangements embody inclusivity and accountability (Ostrom). The final proposition from the integrated framework suggests that sustainable trust requires alignment across all three dimensions.

The theoretical contribution of this article lies in reframing blockchain trust as a socio-technical achievement rather than a purely technical feature. By integrating STS, TAM/UTAUT, and Ostrom, the analysis provides a holistic framework that explains why engineered trust may not translate into experienced trust, and under what conditions the gap can be closed. This framework can inform future scholarship on digital governance and technology adoption, extending debates about blockchain beyond questions of efficiency or security to questions of legitimacy, usability, and participation.

The practical implications are equally significant. For designers, the findings underscore the importance of simplifying interfaces, clarifying costs, and providing reassuring experiences. For developers, they point to the need to embed governance as part of protocol design, not as an external afterthought. For policymakers, they highlight opportunities to support blockchain ecosystems by encouraging standards for usability and accountability while preserving the benefits of decentralization.

Blockchain’s long-term potential will depend on resolving the trust paradox. If engineered trust and experienced trust remain misaligned, adoption will stall, and systems will fragment. If, however, technical assurances are coupled with human-centered design and participatory governance, blockchain can become not only a secure infrastructure but also a trusted medium for digital interaction. Realizing this vision requires acknowledging that trust is not only built into code but also lived through people, communities, and institutions.

To this end, this paper proposes a forward-looking, interdisciplinary research agenda focused on the following key areas:

• Designing and Testing Hybrid Trust Models: Research is needed to explore novel architectures that combine on-chain logic with off-chain support systems, such as legally accountable entities for dispute resolution.
• Developing User-Centered Governance Interfaces: The focus of governance research must shift from purely algorithmic mechanisms to the HCI of participation, including creating intuitive visual interfaces for voting and deliberation.
• Conducting Longitudinal Studies of Trust and Social Norms: There is a critical need for ethnographic research that examines how trust and cooperation evolve within decentralized communities over time.
• Creating Standardized Metrics for Trustworthiness: The industry and academia should collaborate to develop heuristics and metrics for evaluating the usability, security, and overall trustworthiness of blockchain systems to empower users and drive human-centric design.