The Self-Transcendence in Chapter “De Chong Fu 德充符” of the Zhuangzi—Starting from Kant’s Symbolic Relationship Between Beauty and Morality

Abstract

Judging a person’s appearance as beautiful or ugly is not a factual description but an aesthetic act. Kant believed that the human figure is the ideal of beauty, and at the same time, beauty can positively symbolize morality. However, regarding the correlation between aesthetics and morality, the Chapter “De Chong Fu 德充符” in the Zhuangzi offers us a strikingly insightful perspective that is transcendent and religious. The characters depicted in “De Chong Fu 德充符” have incomplete physical forms and ugly appearances, which seemingly do not qualify as symbols of morality in Kant’s sense. Yet, their behavior and demeanor precisely reflect their detachment from external physical forms and their inner virtue being full. This inner virtue embodies a religious ethic that transcends individual and subjective perspectives. This paper posits that there is a deeper and more thought-provoking connection between virtue and physical form in Zhuangzi’s philosophy. The aim of this paper is to explore the issue of self-transcendence in Zhuangzi’s philosophy from the perspective of religious ethics, using the relationship between the body, beauty, and virtue in Lao–Zhuang philosophy as a guiding thread. This paper will be divided into three main parts: the first part introduces the topic through the symbolic relationship between beauty and morality in Kant; the second part discusses the transcendence of aesthetics and physical form in Daoist philosophy and provides a section-by-section analysis of Chapter “De Chong Fu 德充符” of the Zhuangzi; and the third part summarizes the relationship between virtue and form in “De Chong Fu 德充符”. The paper argues that the transcendence of the physical form by virtue, as reflected in Chapter “De Chong Fu 德充符”, is an embodiment of religious ethics. In Lao–Zhuang philosophy, due to their deep understanding of the nature of beauty and the nature of the body, there is no necessary positive connection between beauty and form. Virtue does not necessarily need to rely on beauty as a symbol to be realized, and there can still be a positive connection between a defective physical form and virtue. In conclusions, the paper proposes the modern inspiration of self-transcendence reflected in Zhuangzi’s “De Chong Fu 德充符”.

1. Introduction

In the context of globalization, the possibility of dialogue between Chinese and Western cultures is increasingly enhanced. Daoist philosophy,1 especially Zhuangzi’s thought, is gaining attention in the Western academic community, with research from the perspective of religious ethics being particularly prominent. Despite some modern Western scholars’ claims that Zhuangzi does not discuss moral and ethical issues, and that his attitude of “wu wei 无为” (effortless action)2 might even lead to the possibility of condoning immoral behavior (Hansen 1992, p. 290),3 Eske Møllgaard’s research explores the potential for religious ethics in the Zhuangzi (Møllgaard 2003). He argues that the Zhuangzi should be understood beyond the aesthetic dimension, as the moral demand expressed in the Zhuangzi transcends the aesthetic level and reaches a transcendent, religious ethical realm (Møllgaard 2003, p. 364). He also claims that there are structural similarities between Zhuangzi’s religious ethics and Kant’s ethics (Møllgaard 2003, p. 364). His research prompts us to reexamine the issue of self-transcendence in Zhuangzi’s philosophy, as well as the fortuitous encounter between Zhuangzi’s and Kant’s philosophies.

Kant believed that beauty is the symbol of morality and that the ideal of beauty is the human figure (form), and only the human being can be the ideal of beauty. From this perspective, Kant places significant emphasis on the intellectual dimension of humanity while beauty in his philosophy serves as a symbolic function for morality. However, it seems we can raise these questions: Is the antithesis of beauty—namely, ugliness or imperfection—absolutely opposed to morality? Can physical imperfection have a positive connection with virtue? Interestingly, Chapter “De Chong Fu 德充符” (The Token of Virtue’s Fulfillment)4 of the Zhuangzi portrays characters who, despite their incomplete physical forms and ugly appearances, possess noble virtues. These characters and their stories have posed extremely strong challenges and questions to the aesthetic and ethical views of their time and subsequent eras. People with physical imperfections also exemplify virtue: they transcend their external forms and are filled with inner virtue, which is precisely a form of self-transcendence from a religious perspective. Their physical ugliness cannot serve as a symbol of morality, but their behavior and demeanor are precisely the embodiment of virtue. These reflections give rise to an urgent scholarly controversy: while Kant insists that beauty can symbolize morality, Zhuangzi demonstrates that imperfect bodies and ugly appearances can also carry the inner virtue. What possibilities for dialogue are contained in the fundamental differences between the two regarding the relationship between physical form and virtue?

This paper analyzes the self-transcendence in Zhuangzi’s philosophy, especially the transcendence of the physical form, by examining the relationship between the body, beauty, and virtue in Daoist philosophy. This paper will be divided into three parts: The first part introduces the topic through the symbolic relationship between beauty and morality in Kant; the second part discusses the transcendence of aesthetics and physical form in Daoist philosophy and provides a section-by-section analysis of Chapter “De Chong Fu 德充符”; the third part summarizes the relationship between virtue and form in “De Chong Fu 德充符”. The paper argues that in Laozi and Zhuangzi’s philosophy, due to their insight into the nature of beauty and the nature of the body, there is no necessary positive connection between beauty and form. Virtue does not necessarily need to rely on beauty as a symbol to be realized, and there can still be a positive connection between a defective physical form and virtue. Therefore, the modern inspiration of self-transcendence reflected in Chapter “De Chong Fu 德充符” of the Zhuangzi lies in the fact that the manifestation of virtue in individuals with unusual or defective physical forms requires overcoming greater material obstacles, and they should receive more social attention.

2. Kant’s Symbolic Relationship Between Beauty and Morality

The beauty of the human form has always held an important place in Western art. The expression of human physical beauty in artworks has undergone an evolution from the rationality and idealization of ancient Greece to the suppression and symbolism of the Middle Ages, and then to the secularization and humanism of the Renaissance. However, in Western aesthetics, the aesthetic appreciation of the physical form has always been transcendental: the beauty of the physical form presented in artworks serves to embody ideas or the spirit. Plato believed that beautiful things are beautiful because they partake in the Idea of Beauty, and the same applies to beautiful human beings. In Plato’s Symposium, the “ladder of love” theory posits that universal beauty of form is higher than individual beauty of form, and that “the beauty of souls is held in higher value than that of the body” (Plato, Symposium, 210b). The love of beauty is described as ascending in stages, from the pursuit of beautiful bodies to the pursuit of beautiful observances, to the pursuit of beautiful learning, and ultimately to the understanding of the essence of beauty (Plato, Symposium, 211c). The ladder of beauty illustrates that the desire for physical beauty can be sublimated into the pursuit of the beauty of knowledge (truth), and ultimately leads to the contemplation of the Idea of the Good. Thus, the ladder of beauty implies that, for Plato, beauty is a path to the Good.

The idea of beauty transcends physical beauty and has a close and positive connection with moral goodness, a view that was more explicitly articulated by Kant: “the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good” (Kant et al. 2000, p. 227). Next, we will approach the topic from several aspects: What are the aesthetic objects in Kant’s philosophy? Where can we find the “ideal of beauty”? Why is human figure the only ideal of beauty? And why is beauty a symbol of morality?

Kant argues that the judgment of beauty and ugliness based on a person’s appearance is not a factual description, but rather an aesthetic act. Building upon Baumgarten’s foundation of aesthetics as an independent discipline, Kant posits in his Critique of Power of Judgment that aesthetic judgments have a distinct formation. For Kant, an aesthetic judgment is disinterested, meaning it does not involve considerations of utility (Interesse), concepts, or perfection (Vollkommenheit). When we regard a person as an aesthetic object and form an aesthetic judgment, this judgment is not a pure judgment of taste, because human beauty is tied to the concept of human perfection. Kant distinguishes between free (vague) beauty and dependent (on a concept) beauty. For example, he claims that the beauty of a horse is dependent beauty, contingent upon its utility to humans, and the beauty of a building relies on its functional purpose, whether for habitation or religious worship. Human beauty is also dependent, as it is tied to the purpose of being human. Among inanimate objects, animals, and humans, humans are clearly the highest form of existence. Human beauty is not free beauty because the essential definition of humanity is rationality, which is the essence of humanity as a species. In contrast, free beauty does not contain any concept of purpose. For instance, when we admire a flower not as a botanist but simply for its own sake, the flower represents free beauty. Based on this distinction, it appears that Kant highly values free beauty, because in aesthetic judgments, pleasure arises from the mere form of a purposive appearance, and free beauty is pure, unattached to concepts or perfection. Thus, it seems to be the free and therefore the most representative form of beauty in aesthetic judgments. However, Kant does not assert that free beauty is superior to dependent beauty. While he praises free beauty on one hand, he does not belittle dependent beauty on the other. Dependent beauty connects beauty with goodness, and in dependent beauty, taste and concept, form and content, mutually enrich each other. Moreover, dependent beauty becomes a standard in the art of genius. As a result, from this point on, Kantian aesthetics is no longer merely about pure form; it also becomes an aesthetic of expressionism, that is, the moral expression of ideas (De Rosales 2018, p. 82).

Based on the distinction between free beauty and dependent beauty, Kant contends that the “ideal of beauty” can only be found in human figure (Kant et al. 2000, p. 120), which is a form of dependent beauty. Kant differentiates between the Idea and the Ideal: “Idea signifies, strictly speaking, a concept of reason, and ideal the representation of an individual being as adequate to an idea.” (Kant et al. 2000, p. 117) Therefore, the ideal of beauty is a singular entity of beauty that can only arise from dependent beauty, “consequently it must not belong to the object of an entirely pure judgment of taste, but rather to one of a partly intellectualized judgment of taste.” (Kant et al. 2000, p. 117) That is, the ideal of beauty must encompass both sensuous and intellectual elements. Consequently, Kant maintains that the ideal of beauty “can be expected only in the human figure” (Kant et al. 2000, p. 117). Only humans, who have their purpose within themselves and can determine themselves through reason, can become the ideal of beauty: “This human being alone is capable of an ideal of beauty, just as the humanity in his person, as intelligence, is alone among all the objects in the world capable of the ideal of perfection.” (Kant et al. 2000, p. 117) Based on this more detailed explanation by Kant, we can understand that the term “human figure” does not only refer to the human physical form, but rather to the human being as a species.

It is worth noting that Kant does not hold the view that human being is the ideal of beauty because of its physical form. What’s more, even if a human figure conforms to perfect proportions and rules, it still cannot become the ideal of beauty for that reason alone. So, what kind of rational concept does the human figure, as the ideal of beauty, represent? Kant further distinguishes between the aesthetic “normal idea” (Normalidee) and the “idea of reason” (Vernunftidee). The normal idea is a standard model derived by the imagination through empirical induction. For example, by superimposing multiple images, the imagination arrives at an average, which serves as a common measure for all images. An average size of men derived by superimposing and comparing in the same manner is what Kant considers the stature for a beautiful man (a beautiful stature). It should be noted that this stature does not refer to the physical body itself, but to the external manifestation of the body. For instance, if a person’s height, weight, and proportions are exactly the average values for their culture and region, then their stature is considered beautiful. This normal idea is inevitably limited by culture and geography, as the standard physique varies from place to place and across different cultures. Therefore, the normal idea exists not only for the “species” (Gattung) in general but also for the species within different regions and cultures.

Then, does an aesthetic object that conforms to the normal idea necessarily lead to a judgment of beauty? Kant argues that this is not the case, because beauty that conforms to the normal idea merely does not violate the standard but is not beautiful in its own right. Kant even specifically notes in a footnote in §17 that a face that is perfectly regular usually reveals only a mediocre person (Kant et al. 2000, p. 119). Thus, it is evident that Kant does not claim that conformity to rules in human form is sufficient to establish the human being as the ideal of beauty.

Therefore, the ideal of beauty can only be based on the “idea of reason”. Kant argues, the ideal of beauty “can be expected only in the human figure. In the latter the ideal consists in the expression of the moral, without which the object would not please universally and moreover positively (not merely negatively in an academically correct presentation).” (Kant et al. 2000, p. 120) Here, the term “human figure” (menschliche Gestalt) encompasses the concept of “human stature” (menschliche Statur) mentioned earlier under the normal idea. The human figure is considered in relation to the “inner content” of human being, which is precisely human rationality or the expression of morality. Thus, the ideal of beauty exists in the human figure because only humans possess the ability of being moral, and the goodness of morality can be expressed through the symbolic significance of beauty.

Kant argues that while the concrete expression of moral ideals can only be derived from experience, if it is to reveal its connection with the highest purposive ideal in bodily manifestation—such as moral qualities like “goodness of soul”, “purity”, “strength” or “repose”—the evaluator must possess both the pure rational idea and a powerful imagination. Qualities like the goodness and purity of the soul are internal effects manifested externally, that is, in the body. This means that when a person performs moral actions, it seems as if we can see their good will and pure motives through their external appearance. However, the reverse is not true: we cannot infer moral motives from these moral qualities or virtues alone. Based on this premise, the ideal of beauty must meet the following standard: “no sensory charm is allowed to be mixed into the satisfaction in its object, while it nevertheless allows a great interest to be taken in it.” (Kant et al. 2000, p. 120) However, according to this standard, the aesthetic judgment of the beauty of the human figure cannot be a pure judgment of taste, because the beauty of a human is dependent beauty. When we judge the human figure as an aesthetic object, we cannot exclude the consideration that humans have purposes within themselves. Therefore, some scholars contend that, under Kant’s formulation, the human figure cannot be the symbol of morality, because “it expresses the moral, or else, it reveals the purposes of humanity ‘as their effect in appearance’” (Timár 2020, p. 83).

We know that, in fact, Kant’s aim was not to consider whether the human figure could be an aesthetic object, but rather to connect beauty with morality. The connection he found is that beauty is the symbol of morality. Kant maintains that through the relationship of symbolism, “beauty” assumes a transition between sensuous charm and moral interest, and this transition is very natural, requiring no great leap on the part of the beholder (Kant et al. 2000, p. 228).

What, then, is a symbol? Kant explains, the relationship between the symbol and the symbolized is as follows: the symbolized is generally a non-sensible concept, while the symbol, as a sign, expresses this non-sensible concept in a sensible manner. There must be some similarity between the two that serves as an analogical relationship. For this reason, the symbol is an indirect expression of the concept. Thus, beauty is an indirect expression of morality. The fact that beauty symbolizes morality also indicates that beauty and morality are fundamentally different in nature. However, there are similarities between them. In § 59, Kant lists four similarities between them in terms of reflective rules. The most essential of these is that both aesthetic and moral judgments possess purposiveness without a purpose. The beauty that best serves as a symbol of morality is not the beauty of the human figure (because human being does possess a purpose) but natural beauty, for only natural beauty corresponds to the feature of purposefulness without a purpose inherent in beauty.5 Kant illustrates with an example of flower: a tulip is considered beautiful because, in our perception of it, we discover a certain purposiveness that is entirely unrelated to any specific purpose. It is in this respect that aesthetic and moral judgments are similar. The beauty of the human figure, however, is based on a specific purpose and does not conform to a pure judgment of taste. Therefore, the best embodiment of the symbol of morality is natural beauty, not human beauty.

To sum up, in Kant’s expression that “the ideal of beauty is the human figure”, the term “human figure” does not refer to the human physical form but rather more to the intellectual aspect of the concept of humanity. Kant maintains that the human figure cannot be an object of a pure judgment of taste, in other words, we cannot make an aesthetic judgment about the human figure. Even if the human physical form conforms to standard rules, it cannot thereby be called beautiful. Thus, the beauty of the human form is actually an issue that Kant avoids. Therefore, there is no necessary positive connection between beauty and the human form here.

Although Kant did not address the concept of ugliness6 neither, we can still pose the question here: Is ugliness or imperfection, the opposite of beauty, absolutely opposed to morality? When beauty is defined as harmonious proportion, is imperfection necessarily ugly? What, then, is the nature of beauty and ugliness? Physical imperfection or deformity is widespread in nature. So, can the human form with such imperfections have a positive connection with virtue? Reflecting on this perspective is precisely the inspiration we gain from Zhuangzi’s philosophy.

3. Self-Transcendence in Daoist Philosophy

Daoist philosophy holds that there is no necessary positive connection between beauty, physical form, and virtue; in fact, beauty and virtue may even exhibit a starkly oppositional relationship. This represents the transcendental nature of Daoist philosophy. Although Daoist philosophy does not directly address the issue of “self-transcendence”, it contains numerous expressions of negation and transcendence of the “self”, such as “abandoning the self”, “being selfless”, “losing the self”, “forgetting the self”, and “I lose myself” (Xu 2014). Jochim (1998) argues that while Zhuangzi contains these negative expressions of the “self”, it does not presuppose that Zhuangzi acknowledges the existence of an ontological self that needs to be eliminated. The state of “forgetting the self” does not mean the loss of the self but rather transcending the constraints of self-centeredness to achieve harmony with nature. It is evident that the negation of the self in Zhuangzi’s philosophy is based on transcendence. Thus, it can be summarized as the issue of “self-transcendence”. Studies that take self-transcendence as a clue in Zhuangzi’s Philosophy include Wang (2025) and Coles (2025). The concept of “I lose myself” in the Zhuangzi is the most intuitive expression of the issue of self-transcendence, and relevant studies include Hong (2007) and Hung (2019).

This part argues that the transcendence in Zhuangzi’s philosophy is first reflected in the Daoist transcendence of aesthetics. That is, the essential insight into beauty and ugliness allows Daoism to achieve a transcendence in aesthetics by canceling the absoluteness of values such as beauty and ugliness (Section 3.1). Secondly, the self-transcendence in Zhuangzi’s philosophy is also manifested in the transcendence of the self as a natural physical existence, namely the body, and this transcendence is expressed as a kind of “virtue” (Section 3.2). Subsequently, in the Section 3.3, this paper will conduct a detailed analysis of the relationship between virtue and form in “De Chong Fu 德充符”.

3.1. Transcendence of Aesthetics in Daoist Philosophy

Since Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–62), the West has established aesthetics as an independent discipline, while Daoist philosophy actually does not have a systematic or specialized set of aesthetic views (Ye 2014, p. 97). Laozi did not address specific aesthetic issues, but his transcendental understanding of the concepts of beauty and ugliness and his criticism of rituals and music can be seen as a transcendence of aesthetics. The aesthetic transcendence in Daoist philosophy is first reflected in the profound insight into the concepts of beauty and ugliness. Laozi proposed the relativity of beauty and ugliness in Chapter 2 of Daodejing: “As soon as everyone in the world knows that the beautiful are beautiful, there is already ugliness. As soon as everyone knows the able, there is ineptness” (Ames and Hall 2003, p. 80) (天下皆知美之为美，斯恶矣。皆知善之为善，斯不善矣). Through this perspective, Laozi essentially cancels the independence and validity of aesthetic judgment. Kant distinguished between determinative judgment and reflective judgment. Determinative judgment serves to determine, while reflective judgment does not determine but rather regulates our cognition. Aesthetic judgment of beauty, that is, judgment of taste, is reflective and regulative. Therefore, for Kant, aesthetic and cognitive judgments are inherently different in nature. Beauty and ugliness themselves belong to the category of values, which are not equivalent to facts. However, in Laozi’s philosophy, there is no explicit distinction between aesthetic and cognitive judgments. Laozi seems to hold a relativistic attitude toward all judgments. He treats beauty and ugliness as a dialectical opposition in terms of value, and all values are considered relative, including good and evil. Additionally, aesthetic value varies depending on the perceptual framework of the subject. Ye Lang7 clearly articulated this dialectical characteristic of value: “Once a thing that is beautiful and good becomes known to all, it embarks on the fate of being objectified, rigidified, and instrumentalized, and ultimately becomes not beautiful and not good” (Ye 2014, p. 118).8 Aesthetics is based on the senses, and Laozi opposed strong sensory stimulation, believing that “the five colors make one’s eyes blind五色令人目盲”. However, Ye Lang argues that he is not opposing aesthetics but rather safeguarding it, out of criticism of the collapse of rituals and music. Laozi’s criticism of “li 礼” (ritual) is primarily focused on Chapter 38 of the Daodejing: “As for ritual propriety, it is the thinnest veneer of doing one’s best and making good on one’s word, and it is the first sign of trouble” (Ames and Hall 2003, p. 136) (夫礼者，忠信之薄，而乱之首). “li 礼” (ritual) is an set of norms, forms, and ceremonies, all of which are external constraints on behavior, in contrast to “de 德” (virtue), which has intrinsic transcendence. Laozi argues that “li 礼” (ritual) is a sign of insufficient loyalty and good faith, and it marks the beginning of chaos. His criticism of “li 礼” (ritual) is not about the aesthetic form of rituals and music, but rather about their loss of educational function. The emphasis on ritual indicates that spontaneous and intrinsic moral sentiments have gradually faded, and morality has become increasingly instrumentalized. Thus, ritual represents “tinsel decorating the way, and is the first sign of ignorance” (Ames and Hall 2003, p. 136) (道之华，而愚之始). In fact, this stance already shows that Laozi is not concerned with the form of art, but with the Dao and “de 德” (virtue) that transcend aesthetics.

Zhuangzi further developed Laozi’s ideas in terms of aesthetics. Zhuangzi’s aesthetics can be summarized as the transcendence of right and wrong, and cognition (Ye 2014, p. 276). Consistent with Laozi, Zhuangzi believes that beauty and ugliness can transform into each other, and the relativity of beauty and ugliness is reflected in Chapter “Qiu Shui 秋水” (Autumn Waters). This chapter narrates the story of a fictional River God. During the autumn floods, when all the streams converge into the river, the River God believes that all the beauty in the world is concentrated within himself. However, upon arriving at the Northern Sea and witnessing a much grander spectacle, he realizes that his judgment of beauty has been limited by time and space. This story illustrates that beauty and ugliness are relative. And this is precisely the essence of aesthetic transcendence in Zhuangzi’s philosophy, that is, the dissolution of the absoluteness of the value of beauty and ugliness. There is no real standard for judging beauty and ugliness in the world; there is no “true color 正色”,9 “utmost happiness 至乐”.10 One should maintain a state of “wu qing 无情” (emotionless, detachment),11 avoiding the use of value judgments to fall into the rigidity of a particular viewpoint or the chaos of emotions. It is evident that Daoist philosophy deconstructs the absolute value of beauty and ugliness, and through the stories in Chapter “De Chong Fu 德充符” in the Zhuangzi, we can also see the deconstruction of the traditional understanding of the body in Daoist philosophy. In this chapter, Zhuangzi uses extremely exaggerated writing to describe the ugly and the deformed. By praising the virtues of the ugly and the deformed, he criticizes the absolute valorization of “beauty”. It is virtue that enables the transcendence of form, or rather, the transcendence of the body is manifested as virtue.

3.2. Transcendence of the Physical Form in Daoist Philosophy

The Daoist attitude of transcending the physical form is first reflected in the view that “the greatest trouble is the body” (大患若身). Chapter 13 of the Daodejing states: “The reason we have grave anxieties is because we are embodied persons. If we were not such persons, what anxieties would we have” (Ames and Hall 2003, p. 93) (吾所以有大患者，为吾有身，及吾无身，吾有何患). This sentence indicates that all troubles, worries, and distresses arise because we are embodied persons. The human body is perishable, and its existence is limited by time and space. In the Daodejing, the concept of “shen 身” (body) not only refers to the body, person, and self, but also signifies identity, status, and social position. This term is subtly related to the concept of “shen 申” (outward extension) and is connected to the walking radical in “de 德” (virtue), further emphasizing its significance beyond mere physicality. Thus, the attitude towards the “body” (身) is, in fact, the attitude towards individual life in its entirety, including one’s identity and social standing. This sentiment of sorrow caused by the finitude of the body and life is also reflected in the Chapter “Da Sheng 达生” (Fathoming Life) in the Zhuangzi: “Although nourishing the body requires external things, some fail to nourish their bodies even with more than enough things. Although the continuance of life requires that the body is not dismembered, some bodies lose the life in them even when still intact. When life comes it cannot be refused, and when it departs it cannot be detained. How sad it is that the people of the world think that nourishing the body is enough to preserve the life in them! But in the final analysis, a nourished body is not sufficient for the preservation of this life—so what in the world could be really worth doing? Though nothing is really worth doing, it is impossible not to do something or other, so our activity itself is simply one more thing that cannot be avoided.” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 149) This passage not only shows the insignificance of the individual in the infinite world, feeling an inescapable limitation, but also clarifies the deeper connection between the body and life: the nourishment of the body does not necessarily ensure the continuation of life. For life, the body is not essential. The existence and demise of the body are the gathering and dispersing of vital power (气). This means that the physical body is precisely what needs to be overcome and transcended.

Compared to the importance of the human form in Western aesthetics and art, in Daoist philosophy, the human form is placed in opposition to virtue. Can physical imperfection have a positive connection with virtue? What does “virtue” (德) mean in Daoist philosophy? Zheng (2009) understands “virtue” (德) as a core concept in the period of the Hundred Schools of Thought. It is both a manifestation of personal moral cultivation, such as the qualities of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, and the foundation for social behavior and political governance. It emphasizes governing the country through virtue, guiding social order with the moral example of rulers, and complements “li 礼” (ritual), reflecting the unity of morality and politics in early Confucian thought.

Kant’s notion that “beauty is the symbol of morality” refers to morality or moral goodness, which has a clear connotation of moral duty. In Kant’s philosophy, morality is based on the categorical imperative, which requires actions to follow universal principles. Virtue is the strength and ability of a person to act according to these moral principles, and it shows how moral ideas can be put into practice. However, the virtue discussed in Zhuangzi’s “De Chong Fu 德充符” is not moral duty but rather virtue as a kind of excellence or virtuous character,12 belonging to the basic good character traits and inner strength of a person. This kind of virtue is consistent with “arete” in Aristotelian ethics: a thing that has the potential to fully realize its function because of its essential characteristics is considered to have virtue (arete), and thus arete can also be applied to humans. In Zhuangzi’s “De Chong Fu 德充符”, the symbolic relationship between “virtue” and “form” is not only deliberately broken, but Zhuangzi also attempts to use the strong contrast between physical ugliness and virtuous character and behavior to provoke reflection on the mainstream societal views and subjective prejudices regarding physical completeness (Chen 2016, p. 169). The Chapter “Qi Wu Lun 齐物论” (Equalizing Assessments of Things) in the Zhuangzi already has a religious and transcendent understanding of “death” from the perspective of “equalizing assessments of things”, and the chapter “De Chong Fu 德充符” further demonstrates the main theme of “equalizing assessments of things” in its recognition of physical imperfection as a natural phenomenon in the physical world.

3.3. Section-by-Section Analyze of Relationship Between Virtue and Form in “De Chong Fu 德充符”

This part of the paper will analyze the relationship between “virtue” and “form” in Chapter “De Chong Fu 德充符” in the Zhuangzi section by section. First, expressions like “disfiguring the form” (支离其形) and “disfiguring virtue” (支离其德) already appear in the chapter “Ren Jian Shi 人间世” (In the Human World). Lin Xiyi13 argued, He who disfigures his form can still nourish his body and live out his natural lifespan. This is similar to the “usefulness of uselessness” (无用之大用) exemplified by the “unusable tree” (Chen 2016, p. 164). Through the depiction of “Zhi Li Shu” (支离疏) we see that disfiguring the form can achieve great use through uselessness, preserving life and nurturing one’s natural lifespan. Second, in the chapter “Da Zong Shi大宗师” (The Great Source as Teacher), the story of the four friends realizing the “unity of life, death, Being, and Non-Being” (死生存亡之一体) illustrates the Daoist attitude toward the body: using humor to dissolve the importance of the body to human essence, reflecting their detached and indifferent attitude toward external things after enlightenment. The character Zi Yu (子舆) in this chapter accepts his disfigured form with ease and indifference. He does not despise the transformations of nature but rather humorously imagines the changes of the body, viewing physical death as a form of “release” (悬解). Through the depiction of Zi Yu, we see that a person with complete virtue can regard physical disfigurement with equanimity, possessing virtue without being burdened by physical form.

The main chapter that embodies the relationship between “virtue” and “form” is “De Chong Fu 德充符”, whose theme is to break the notion of physical completeness, to value virtue, and to advocate forgetting the physical form while cultivating inner virtue. “De Chong Fu 德充符” consists of six sections. According to Lo (2024), the first three sections tell the stories of three mutilated individuals who have lost their feet due to punishment. The fourth section discusses an ugly person. The fifth and sixth sections use debates between real people and events to summarize the implicit meanings of the first four sections. He believes that the arrangement of these six sections is intentional on Zhuangzi’s part. The first four sections are fictional stories, while the last two are non-fictional, transitioning to the topic. The final section, a debate based on real people and events, summarizes the entire chapter’s meaning and its relevance to reality (Lo 2024). Therefore, this paper will analyze the relationship between “virtue” and “form” in each section according to the conventional order of the Zhuangzi.

 

Section 1: The Story of the Mutilated Wang Tai

The first section tells the story of Wang Tai, who, despite his physical disability, taught through actions rather than words and attracted many followers. This aroused the curiosity of Confucius’ students, who asked their teacher why people were drawn to Wang Tai. Confucius replied that Wang Tai could see things from other perspective: “Looked at from the point of view of their differences, even your own liver and gall bladder are as distant as Chu in the south and Yue in the north. But looked at from the point of view of their sameness, all things are one” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 46) (自其异者视之，肝胆楚越也；自其同者视之，万物皆一也). By focusing on the essential unity of all things, one can recognize their shared nature, thus perceiving the oneness of all things. Understanding this, one would become “free of all preconceptions about which particular objects might suit the eyes or the ears” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 46) and rather seek to wander in the harmony of virtue. By recognizing the higher commonality between a toe and a clod of earth, one can overlook physical deficiencies. Wang Tai did not regard a human toe as worthless as a clod of earth, to be casually discarded. The absence of a toe merely signifies a loss of physical integrity, which might to some extent impact a person’s psychology and behavior, but it does not fundamentally alter one’s virtue. This is because the manifestation of virtue transcends the limitations of the physical body. Wang Tai perceived that, on a higher level, there is a commonality between a toe and a clod of earth, and they are part of a unified whole. Therefore, the loss of a toe is not a true loss.

In this section, the physical body, represented by the ears and eyes, is contrasted with virtue, forming an opposition. When asked why people followed Wang Tai, Confucius said that such an individual, “who takes heaven and earth to be his own bodily organs and the ten thousand things to be his own guts—a man who is merely lodged for the moment in some particular limbs and trunk and head, a man who regards even his own eyes and ears as merely images perceived” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 46) (官天地，府万物，直寓六骸，象耳目), recognizes the body as a temporary dwelling and the senses as superficial, without the concept of death. People are drawn to such individuals because they are like still water, reflecting and inspiring others. Their virtue has a transcendent, religious significance, transcending the mundane, material existence of the body and its organs. This is why they are worthy of emulation.

 

Section 2: The Transcendence of Virtue over Form

The second section also illustrates the transcendence of virtue over physical form. It tells the story of Shen Tu Jia (申徒嘉), who studied with Zheng Zi Chan (郑子产) under the guidance of Bo Hun Wu Ren (伯昏无人). Zi Chan, due to Shen Tu Jia’s physical disability, looked down on him and demanded that he show deference because of his disability. However, Shen Tu Jia was not insulted. He believed that those with virtue could accept their fate with equanimity, “only a true virtuoso can understand what is unavoidable and find peace in it as his own fate” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 47) (惟有德者能安之若命) without feeling inferior because of it. In contrast, their teacher Bo Hun Wu Ren never perceived Shen Tu Jia as a disabled person, which is the true mark of a virtuous individual. Shen Tu Jia’s response highlighted the difference between having (有德) and lacking virtue (无德), making Zi Chan feel ashamed and humiliated. Zhuangzi intended to convey that physical disability is a matter of fate, beyond our control: some are punished with amputation for crimes, while many are born with disabilities without any fault. Only the virtuous can accept their fate and live with physical imperfections. Compared to Shen Tu Jia, Zi Chan, though physically intact, lacked inner virtue and had an incomplete mind, whereas Shen Tu Jia, despite his physical disability, had a full virtue and a complete mind, interacting with others based on virtue. Shen Tu Jia finally asked Zi Chan, “Here you and I have been wandering together on the inner side of the corporeal—is it not wrong of you to seek me on its outer side?” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 47) (今子与我游于形骸之内，而子索我于形骸之外，不亦过乎). This means that while they studied moral principles within the realm of physical form, Zi Chan judged people by their appearance and status, seeking them outside the realm of virtue. Here, “corporeal” or “physical form” (形骸) clearly becomes the boundary between the inner and outer, between form and virtue. To interact within the physical form means to engage with others based on virtue and sincerity, while seeking someone “outside” the physical form means to focus on superficial, material aspects, such as rigid social hierarchies, which may be a potential flaw in Confucian moral philosophy.

 

Section 3: The Body as a Temporary Dwelling

The third section compares the “physical form” to an inn, a temporary place of residence. The story involves Confucius, who, blinded by appearances, discriminated against Shu Shan, who had been punished and lost his feet (叔山无趾). However, Shu Shan believed that despite his physical disability, there was something more noble than feet. If even those with physical disabilities pursue higher and nobler things, how much more should those with intact bodies do so? Failing to recognize the “oneness of life and death” (死生同一) and focusing on physical imperfections is a form of mental bondage, an unbreakable punishment from heaven (天刑). This implies a critique of traditional Confucian views (Møllgaard 2003). Those punished and disabled may not be recognized by mainstream Confucianism, but they gain greater freedom because they realize that human judgments are not absolute. Traditional Confucianism, on the other hand, is obsessed with the human world, confining itself entirely within its own constructs, with no way out. Zhuangzi argues that when one ignores the other side of the “human” world, there is no power to break free from self-imposed shackles. This is then the heavenly punishment. Møllgaard (2003) believes that through the dialogue between Shu Shan and Confucius, this chapter shows Zhuangzi’s virtue transcending moralists and traditionalists like Confucians.

 

Section 4: The Relationship between Form and Virtue

The fourth section illustrates the relationship between form and virtue through the contrast between physical appearance and spiritual essence, reflecting the relationship between phenomena and essence. The story is about Ai Tai Ta (哀骀它), who, despite his hideous appearance, was praised by Duke Ai of Lu for his virtue. Confucius used the metaphor of piglets and their mother to explain why Ai Tai Ta could positively influence others without drawing attention to himself. Piglets suckling on their dead mother leave when they realize she is unresponsive. They do not love the sow’s form but the spirit that animates it. The difference between form and spirit reflects the relationship between things and their essence. If the essence is lost, there is no need to cling to the form. A person who has lost a foot does not cherish their old shoes because the essence is gone. Those who serve as consorts of heaven and earth do not trim their nails or pierce their ears, not clinging to physical beauty. Even those with undamaged bodies do not pursue superficial appearances, let alone those with complete virtue. Confucius believed that Ai Tai Ta must be a person whose “intrinsic virtuosity [virtue] takes no definite external form” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 49) (才全而德不形), which means seeing through the transient changes in phenomena and maintaining inner peace. By keeping the mind in an extremely still state, one is not disturbed by external circumstances. Virtue is a state of perfect cultivation, where the virtuosity has no discriminatory mind, so virtue does not show itself but still influences others, making them want to stay close. This “virtue” is that which enables things to succeed and brings harmony to all (事得以成，物得以和) while “virtue takes no definite external form” (德不形) is an expression of “wu wei” (无为), nothing fails to succeed, nothing remains unharmonious (无事不成、无物不和). Things and humans are in a state of harmony and completeness because of virtue, making its expression natural and unobtrusive. Ai Tai Ta, being a person whose “intrinsic virtue takes no definite external form” shows that he has maintained seeing the essence of things and humans within himself, thus not being influenced by external things that could harm the essence. His virtue, cultivation, and effort are then unobtrusive.

 

Section 5: The Daoist Concept of “Forgetting”

The key Daoist concept in Section 5 is “forgetting” (忘). The story in this section involves two individuals, Zhi Li Wu Chun (支离无唇, means limping, hunchbacked, and lipless) and Weng Ang Da Ying (瓮盎大瘿, means with a goiter on the neck as large as a basin). By worldly standards, they are considered the epitome of ugliness. However, they are able to “forget their forms and build virtue” (忘形建德) (Guo 2013, p. 199), “embody the Dao and discuss the profound” (体道谈玄) (Guo 2013, p. 199), making others forget their physical imperfections and deformities. The concept of “forgetting” implies that in the present moment, one does not make aesthetic or value judgments, but rather engages in a pure, sensuous acceptance of things. The relationship between “virtue” and “form” is first manifested in them as: “He has the physical form of a human being but not the characteristic inclinations of a human being” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 50) (有人之形，无人之情). They possess human forms without the emotional concerns of right and wrong. By forgetting both themselves and the world around them, there is no right or wrong. They can forget their own physical imperfections and deformities, and they can also make others forget them. The second expression of the relationship is: “where the intrinsic virtuosities [virtue] excel, the physical form is forgotten” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 50) (德有所长，而形有所忘). Form and virtue are contrasted again: Guo Qingfan commented on this, saying: “Thus, virtue is something the world does not forget; form is something that reason does not preserve.” (故德者，世之所不忘也；形者，理之所不存也) (Guo 2013, p. 199). His words illustrate the distinction between the importance of virtue and the relative insignificance of physical form in Daoist philosophy. Regarding the two individuals mentioned earlier, Zhuangzi continues to comment on what constitutes “true forgetting”: “But people are unable to forget the forgettable, and instead forget the unforgettable—true forgetfulness!” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 50). It means, if one possesses inner virtue, physical imperfections will be forgotten by others. If people do not forget what they should forget—the physical form—and instead forget what they should not forget—virtue—this is “true forgetting”. Zhuangzi believes that the practice of virtue is not necessarily related to physical form, because virtue is not expressed through the physical form. This is the meaning of “virtue does not depend on form” (德不形). For the masses, forgetting the physical form and practicing virtue is difficult, yet it is far more valuable. However, “one should forget the physical form” does not mean denying the existence of form. Instead, it means forgetting the form in the present moment and suspending judgment. This means that in the moment of interacting based on virtue, one should not use common standards and value to make aesthetic judgments. Instead, one should perceive things with a contemplative and reflective attitude, forgetting the worldly value system and breaking traditional, common notions through philosophical thought.

Additionally, it should be noted that in the fifth section, the character “忘” (forgetting) carries a negative connotation. However, in other texts by Zhuangzi, the same character reflects the subject’s state of being and level of attainment and tends to have a positive connotation. In Chapter “Wai Wu 外物” (External Things), phrases like “De Yu Wang Quan得鱼忘筌” (When you get the fish, you forget the trap), “De Tu Wang Ti得兔忘蹄” (When you get the rabbit, you forget the snare) and “De Yi Wang Yan得意忘言” (When you get the intent, you forget the words) illustrate how the non-intentional act of “forgetting” elevates the essence of things above their outward form and materiality. In Chapter “Da Zong Shi大宗师” (The Great Source as Teacher), Zhuangzi dictum “a dropping away of my limbs and torso, a chasing off of my sensory acuity, dispersing my physical form and ousting my understanding until I am the same as the Transforming Openness. This is what I call just sitting and forgetting” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 62) (堕肢体，黜聪明，离形去知，同于大通，此谓坐忘) crystallizes his attitude toward the body and knowledge as objects of “forgetting”. Through “zuo wang 坐忘” (sit to forget), the subject relinquishes self-awareness of external physical forms, thereby liberating the mind to imaginatively coexist with other forms of consciousness. This is illustrated by the story of Zhuangzi dreaming of being a butterfly, where neither Zhuangzi nor the butterfly is confined by physical form, and their subjectivities exhibit a fluid and interactive state. Xu (2007, p. 54) elucidates that “dropping away of the limbs” and “dispersing the physical form” signify liberation from desires rooted in physiological impulses, while “chasing off of my sensory acuity” (黜聪明) and “ousting my understanding” (去知) denote transcending conventional intellectual activities. For Zhuangzi, detaching form does not negate desire per se but prevents desires from being amplified by conceptual knowledge beyond their natural limits (性分) (Xu 2007, p. 54). Desires within the bounds of one’s inherent nature are acknowledged as integral to that nature. Thus, within the practice of “zuo wang 坐忘” (sit to forget)”, “forgetting knowledge” becomes pivotal—a dissolution of analytical, conceptual thought. Li (1992) posits that sitting in forgetfulness achieves a state of selflessness (wuwo无我), radically diverging from subject–object dichotomies in conventional epistemology. In dualistic cognition, humans rely on sensory acuity and rational thinking to actively control the body, focus on objects, and pursue exhaustive understanding. True knowledge, however, emerges not from such purposive inquiry but through self-forgetting (wang wo 忘我) and selflessness (wu wo 无我). By relinquishing bodily, physical constraints, abandoning hyper-rationality, and merging with the totality of existence, one attains profound insight into the world’s essence—the only viable path to genuine wisdom (Li 1992).

 

Section 6: Dialogue between Zhuangzi and Hui Shi

Section 6 is a dialogue between Zhuangzi and the sophist Hui Shi on having or not having “qing” (情), which means literally “emotion”, “attachment”, in the context “inner mental life”. Then “wu qing” (无情) means “being emotionless” or “without inner mental life” (无情). This section serves to discuss and summarize the implicit principles of the preceding sections. Zhuangzi argues that appearance is bestowed by the Dao, while the physical form is bestowed by Heaven. Since these are gifts of Heaven, humans ought to be “emotionless” (无情). Here, “emotion” refers to distinctions between right and wrong, self and other, preferences or aversions, love and hate. “Being emotionless” means abstaining from judgments of value or morality, avoiding emotional attachments to such dichotomies, and “doesn’t damage himself internally with likes and dislikes” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 51) (勿以好恶内伤其身). As mentioned in Part 3.1 of this paper above, for Zhuangzi, whether a body is deformed or abnormal is a factual statement, whereas judging such a body as beautiful or ugly constitutes an aesthetic judgment. Daoist philosophy, however, does not presuppose standards for aesthetic judgment. Daoist descriptions of beauty reject the notion that conventional beauty holds higher value. Laozi posits that beauty and ugliness are relative—conventional beauty often coexists with the emergence of ugliness, while true beauty transcends the convention as “vast beauty” (大美). Zhuangzi further states in Chapter “Zhi Bei You 知北游” (Knowinghood Journeyed North), “Heaven and earth possess vast beauties but speak no words” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 175) (天地有大美而不言). He believes natural beauty represents the highest form of beauty, which cannot be expressed through language but must be apprehended through the heart. These discussions of “beauty” are not merely about aesthetics or art but carry epistemological and ethical significance. The possibility of Daoist aesthetics lies in the alignment of “vast beauty” (大美) with “virtue” (德). When people follow nature and refrain from value judgments, they attain a state capable of perceiving the Great Beauty of Heaven and Earth. Daoism does not deliberately address aesthetic concerns, yet the contemplative, reflective, and playful state of aesthetic perception aligns perfectly with the Daoist ideal of embodying nature and realizing the Dao. What, then, is the opposite state? In this section, Hui Shi is taken as the counterexample. In Zhuangzi Jishi explains: “Hui Shi, still clinging to traps and snares, remains attached to distinctions of right and wrong” (惠子未忘筌蹄，执着于是非之分) (Guo 2013, p. 203). Huishi was exhausting his spirit, when singing, he leans against a tree, when sitting, he chatters incessantly, appearing listless, weary, and longing for sleep—“physically fatigued, mentally drained, utterly exhausted and drowsy” (形劳心倦，疲怠而暝者也) (Guo 2013, p. 203).

4. Summary of the Virtue-Form Relationship in “De Chong Fu 德充符”

Summarizing the above content, we can derive the transcendence of “virtue” over “form” from both negative and positive perspectives. First, Zhuangzi uses exaggerated stories of physically deformed characters to invert common sense and challenge Confucian traditional concepts. A disabled form is, after all, one of the many possible forms of the human body—an objective fact—while beauty and ugliness stem from our own discriminatory minds. We perceive physical disability as a deficiency and physical health as wholeness, but is this perception distorted? Is it their bodies that are deficient, or is it our cognition that is flawed? Zhuangzi seems to invert our understanding, telling us that physical disability is not truly a deficiency. We form such perceptions because we fail to see the whole and the fundamental. Meanwhile, things that appear outwardly whole may actually be pathological. True wholeness lies in complete virtue, not complete form. In other words, the other side of things may be the true reality. This is a significant challenge to traditional Confucian concepts. Traditional Confucianism is obsessed with the human world and completely confines itself within its own value judgment criteria. Daoism considers this an inescapable punishment from heaven (天刑). Sinologist Hans Georg-Moeller (2019, p. 153) believes that the characters in the Zhuangzi neither follow traditional morality nor accept the traditional definition of beauty. They reject the Confucian notion of preserving the body and opposing deformity. Therefore, the chapter “De Chong Fu 德充符” has a highly ironic function on philosophical, political, and social levels. It satirizes those who possess “complete form” but lack virtue, thus criticizing mainstream social and political values and expectations.

Second, the true transcendence of “virtue” over “form” lies in the manifestation of inner virtue in the external world (内德外于形), which leads people to focus more on virtue than on physical form. The “person of complete virtue” (全德之人) in Daoism is not about the completeness of physical form. The phrase “there can be ‘a Genuine Understanding’ only after there is such a thing as someone who is himself genuine even while being human—human yet genuine, genuine yet human: the Genuine-Human” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 53) (且有真人而后有真知) in Chapter “Da Zong Shi大宗师” (The Great Source as Teacher) implies that the acquisition of knowledge must be achieved when the seeker’s mind reaches a certain state to attain true and thorough insight. The transcendence of “virtue” over “form” offers us deeper reflections on life. Some people have experienced many inconveniences and hardships in life, accumulating a wealth of life experiences, and thus are particularly adept at understanding and grasping the philosophy of life. Although “Only with a Genuine-Human can there be a Genuine Understanding”, the ideal genuine person is one with a complete physical form, but in the real world, a genuine person may not necessarily have a complete physical form. In other words, it is possible that a genuine person is physically incomplete. Physical form does not affect the essence of being a true person. Therefore, a true person is not necessarily one with a complete physical form but one with complete virtue. A person with a physical disability can also be a person of complete virtue, although not necessarily so. Thus, the manifestation of virtue in people with deformed appearances or disabilities requires overcoming greater material obstacles, and their virtue has a more impactful influence on those around them. Once we are touched by their virtue, we involuntarily forget their physical deficiencies. This is the manifestation of “inner virtue externalized”. Virtue does not need “form” as a symbol, but it must be manifested and have an impact on the external world. According to Lo (2024), the true meaning of “De Chong Fu 德充符” is that inner virtue is externalized, not in the form of appearance, but in the unity with the external world. Inner virtue is reflected in how they respond to the external environment and even their influence on it. A person of virtue makes people around them feel no separation from the virtuous person under their influence. This is the true meaning of “De Chong Fu 德充符”.

The influence of a person with inner virtue on others and the environment is natural and is the external effect of a full inner virtue. The external form of a person with inner virtue is a direct obstacle, and overcoming this obstacle makes the power of virtue shine even brighter. The existence of these physically deficient individuals attempts to illustrate that physical appearance should not be a barrier to the pursuit of inner virtue. Physical disability is a factual description, but ugliness in appearance and ugliness caused by disability are aesthetic judgments based on subjective perspectives. Daoism denies such aesthetic standards based on social, external, and subjective criteria. On the one hand, beauty and ugliness are complementary concepts that belong to an evaluative system, which Daoism denies. It even advocates the “soft and weak” (柔弱) aspect. Therefore, Zhuangzi’s deliberate emphasis on deficiency and ugliness is consistent with the evaluative system of the Daodejing. On the other hand, “Heaven and earth possess vast beauties but speak no words” (Zhuangzi 2020, p. 175) (天地有大美而不言), beauty and ugliness exist in subjective evaluation. The next stage of physical appearance is illness and death. In Chapter “Da Zong Shi大宗师” (The Great Source as Teacher), the death of the character Mengsun Cai’s孟孙才 mother illustrates the Daoist view of life and death as “qi wu齐物” (equalizing assessments of things): only the body perishes and transforms, while the spirit and mind do not die. The body is perishable, but the spirit is immortal. Finally, Zhuangzi’s concept of “zuo wang坐忘” (sit to forget) epitomizes the relationship between the human body and the method of embodying the Dao. The objects of “zuo wang” are limbs, cleverness, form, and knowledge. Limbs are not only the physical body but also symbolize the sensuous desires and discriminatory mind brought by the limbs. Therefore, only by transcending the limitations of both the body and the mind can one truly grasp the Dao of the unity of all things.

5. Conclusions

In comparing Kant and Zhuangzi on the relationship between beauty, form, and virtue, we can clearly see their two points of agreement. First, neither of them places great emphasis on physical beauty. Although Kant believes that the human figure is the ideal of beauty, this view is emphasized based on human rationality. For Kant, mere proportional beauty of the body might also indicate an extremely mediocre inner self. Therefore, the emphasis on the human form is not about the beauty of the physical appearance but rather transcends physical beauty to highlight human rationality. Zhuangzi not only devalues physical beauty but also deeply deconstructs it. The chapter “De Chong Fu 德充符” not only dissolves the independence of beauty and ugliness but also reflects a profound insight into the perishable nature of the physical form. Secondly, both thinkers share a consistent attitude of contemplative observation towards aesthetic objects. In Kant’s view, a pure aesthetic judgment requires a disinterested aesthetic judgment on the part of the subject. Only when we do not entertain any purpose for the object does the aesthetic judgment remain pure, and our appreciation of it becomes contemplative, meditative, and playful, for instance, the appreciation of certain flowers according to Kant. This mode of engaging with objects strikingly aligns with the Daoist approach of judging things through “wu wei 无为” (effortless action). Zhuangzi relativizes and suspends aesthetic judgment itself, thereby achieving a contemplative and meditative state towards the object.

So, what are the different views that Kant and Zhuangzi hold regarding the relationship between beauty and virtue? Kant believes that only the human figure can embody the ideal of beauty, and natural beauty serves as a symbol of morality. This implies a positive and affirmative connection between beauty and virtue, but only natural beauty and virtue. Cultivating an aesthetic appreciation for natural beauty can positively guide the recognition and practice of virtue. In contrast, there is no positive connection between beauty and virtue in Daoist philosophy, and there are two reasons for this: First, Daoist philosophy deconstructs the relative nature of beauty and ugliness as secular values. The deconstruction of absolute standards for beauty and ugliness indicates that we cannot make independent aesthetic judgments. Thus, beauty and ugliness do not have a fixed criterion. Second, through the depiction of extreme ugliness and deformity in “De Chong Fu 德充符” Zhuangzi highlights the virtue of these ugly and deformed individuals. The purpose is to break the common social value standards and reveal the essence of values such as beauty and ugliness. In Daoist philosophy, virtue could be intuitively felt by others through its impact on the external world, without the need for symbolic representation. Chapter 2 of the Daodejing suggests that when the masses dissolve the independence of values, the sage can practice effortless action, and things will naturally succeed. “De Chong Fu 德充符” exemplifies individuals with virtue, who, regardless of their physical ugliness and deformity, can influence others with their virtue. People forget their physical appearance and are instead captivated by their virtue. In summary, while Kant still regards natural beauty as an appropriate symbol of virtue, Zhuangzi does not share this view. In fact, he seems to suggest that an attachment to fixed standards of natural beauty precludes self-transcendence, which should be considered an essential component of inner virtue.

Through the above comparison, we can find that Zhuangzi’s “De Chong Fu 德充符” and Kant’s views on the relationship between physical form and virtue do not essentially conflict with each other. Instead, they are complementary. The relationship between virtue and form in “De Chong Fu 德充符” breaks the necessity of beauty as a symbol of morality in Kantian aesthetics. We can draw the following inspiration from this: virtue may not necessarily need to rely on the ideal of beauty as a symbol to be realized. There can still be a positive connection between physical imperfection and virtue. This is because the body is the carrier of the subject, and the subject’s overcoming and transcendence of the mundane, material existence of the physical form, internal organs, and so on, is precisely the embodiment of freedom, which in turn can lead to morality.

Summarizing the three main parts of this paper, the first part investigates the relationship between human physical form and the ideal of beauty in Kantian aesthetics. According to Kant, when the aesthetic object is confined to perfect bodily proportions and merely conforms to the “normal idea” (Normalidee), it cannot present the ideal of beauty. The ideal of beauty should encompass intellectual and moral elements. Kant holds that only natural beauty can symbolize morality because the appreciation of natural beauty, which is purposeless and disinterested, more readily evokes moral feelings. Therefore, the statement that beauty is a symbol of morality should more precisely be understood as natural beauty is the best symbol of morality. The second part analyzes the theme of self-transcendence in Zhuangzi’s philosophy, especially the transcendence of aesthetics and the transcendence of physical form in “De Chong Fu 德充符”. Although Zhuangzi provides many detailed descriptions of physical form, he suspends almost all judgments, especially those concerning aesthetic notions of beauty and ugliness. Zhuangzi shows little interest in such aesthetic distinctions; no standard or rule can claim to be the definition of beauty, lacking the “normal idea” that Kant posits. Inner virtue is of paramount importance; even the most unattractive person could manifest this through their actions and demeanor. The self-transcendence of inner virtue renders all expressive and external aspects distinctly meaningful apart from aesthetics. The third part summarizes the transcendence of form by virtue in “De Chong Fu 德充符” and generalizes this self-transcendence as the manifestation of inner virtue. This part reminds us that individuals with unattractive appearances or physical disabilities may also possess a spiritually rich inner virtue. Moreover, since they need to overcome greater material obstacles, their virtue might be able to impart to us a powerful spiritual strength, and their living conditions also deserve more social attention.