Superstition or Culture: Protestant Discourses on Halloween Following the 10.29 Itaewon Disaster

Abstract

The 10.29 Itaewon Disaster in Seoul, which claimed 159 lives during a Halloween celebration in 2022, has divided Korean Protestant discourse on Halloween into two opposing theological positions: one that interprets Halloween as inherently superstitious and satanic based on its historical origins, and another that embraces it as a contemporary youth cultural phenomenon worthy of protection under principles of cultural diversity. These theological frameworks are intertwined with questions of disaster accountability within the political–historical context of Korean Protestantism’s social engagement, with the former—corresponding to the conservative stream of Korean Protestantism—implicitly attributing responsibility to festival participants while absolving the government, whereas the latter—corresponding to the progressive stream—emphasizes institutional failures in crowd management and public safety protocols. Through comparative analysis with established American Protestant discourse on Halloween, this study examines how Korean Protestant theological interpretations of Halloween intersect with both the specific context of the 10.29 Itaewon disaster and political orientations within Korean Protestantism. The research draws on diverse primary sources, including articles, commentaries, official statements, social media discourse, and sermonic materials, to analyze the emergent Protestant narratives following the disaster.

1. Introduction

On 29 October 2022, a catastrophic crowd crush in Seoul’s Itaewon district resulted in 159 fatalities during Halloween festivities. The majority of victims were young people in their 20s and 30s, including 26 foreign nationals from various countries such as Iran, Russia, China, the United States, and Japan. The incident occurred when a dense concentration of celebrants converged in the narrow alleyways at the district’s entrance. This disaster, now known as the 10.29 Itaewon Disaster, ranks as the ninth most severe crowd-related disaster globally in the 21st century. Its occurrence in an urban center of South Korea’s capital, coupled with real-time witness accounts and documentation, precipitated profound social trauma and widespread public distress.

In the aftermath of the incident, public discourse centered on causation and accountability. The convergence of large crowds in Itaewon was anticipated, given that this was the first Halloween celebration following the complete lifting of COVID-19 social distancing measures. However, governmental authorities failed to implement adequate crowd control mechanisms. Subsequent investigations revealed significant deficiencies in police preparedness and emergency response protocols. Despite receiving multiple reports of imminent danger, police authorities’ failure to respond promptly, coupled with their inadequate handling of victims in the aftermath, exacerbated the casualty toll. These systemic failures led to widespread criticism and assertions of governmental culpability in the disaster.

In this context, the bereaved families, survivors, and citizens calling for a thorough investigation and legal accountability of those responsible for the tragedy have formally designated the incident as the ‘10.29 Itaewon Disaster.’ This nomenclature serves to preserve the temporal and spatial specificity of the tragedy while countering the South Korean government’s initial characterization of the event as an ‘accident’—a term that potentially diminishes both its societal implications and governmental accountability. The distinction between ‘accident’ and ‘disaster’ is significant: while an accident typically denotes an unexpected occurrence with individual attribution, a disaster encompasses catastrophic events of broader scale, implying state responsibility for response, investigation, and preventive measures. In South Korea, the concept of ‘social disaster’ has emerged as a theoretical framework to illuminate the structural and systemic nature of mass casualties (S.-E. Park 2023, pp. 86–89). This framework has been applied to analyze major incidents, including the 1994 Seongsu Bridge collapse, the 1995 Sampoong Department Store collapse, the 2003 Daegu Subway fire, the 2014 Sewol ferry sinking, and the 2022 Itaewon crowd crush. These events collectively exemplify the state’s fundamental responsibility in emergency response, rescue operations, and post-disaster recovery.

Immediately following the 10.29 Itaewon Disaster, the Protestant community in South Korea, irrespective of theological or political orientation, unanimously expressed profound condolences to the victims and their families. Major Protestant denominations, including the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Korea (GAPCK), the Korean Methodist Church (KMC), and the Assemblies of God of Korea (AGK), issued official statements conveying their grief (G. Kim 2023, pp. 33–34). Even the United Christian Churches of Korea (UCCK), a denominational coalition traditionally characterized by conservative leanings, expressed mourning and announced the provisional postponement of the Korea Parade—a large-scale street festival scheduled from Gwanghwamun to Seoul City Hall under the theme “W.A.L.K. With, All generation, Love, Korea” (CTS 2022; Yang 2022).

However, when the government subsequently established a national mourning period and installed an impersonal memorial altar at Seoul Plaza—one bearing neither names nor photographs—and when it was revealed that the government had circulated official directives to local authorities instructing them to classify the incident as an ‘accident’ rather than a ‘disaster’ and to refer to victims as ‘casualties’ rather than ‘sacrifices,’ bereaved families and numerous citizens responded with outrage and resistance, condemning governmental incompetence and evasion of accountability (Miryu 2023, pp. 180–81; S.-E. Park 2023, p. 86). This state-imposed forced and uniform mourning was perceived as an expedient attempt to attenuate the traumatic impact of the catastrophic event (S. Park 2025, pp. 166–208).

At this very moment, a parallel public discourse emerged that directed criticism toward Halloween celebrants themselves. Conservative Protestant groups emerged as prominent critics, characterizing Halloween as a problematic Western cultural import steeped in superstition, and attributing responsibility to the victims for their participation in such festivities. This sparked a contentious debate within Protestant circles about the fundamental nature of Halloween—whether it constituted legitimate youth culture or represented dangerous superstitious practices. The fact that substantive discussion of Halloween within Korean Protestantism was catalyzed specifically by intensifying civil society criticism of the government reveals that the superstition-versus-culture discourse surrounding Halloween emerged within a distinctly political context—one structured by whether groups supported or criticized the government’s response. While these conservative Protestant perspectives held limited sway in broader civil society, their voices suppressed the atmosphere of mourning within Protestant communities, proving particularly detrimental to bereaved Protestant families affected by the disaster.

This study examines the Protestant discourse surrounding Halloween in the aftermath of the 10.29 Itaewon disaster, analyzing how religious and cultural interpretations of the event intersect with questions of public accountability and social meaning. Methodologically, it employs a discourse-analytic approach informed by historical and sociopolitical perspectives to reveal how the labeling of Halloween as either “culture” or “superstition” within Korean Protestantism reflects not intrinsic properties but historically situated dynamics shaped by broader political and social contexts. More specifically, this study argues that the divergent Protestant discourses on Halloween in South Korea stem from political positions regarding responsibility for the 10.29 Itaewon disaster, and that these political positions are closely intertwined with the long-standing political–historical divisions within Korean Protestantism. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on Halloween and superstition discourse to situate this research and clarify its methodological approach. Section 3 briefly traces Halloween’s historical origins and examines its introduction into Korean society, while Section 4 conducts a comparative analysis of Halloween perceptions between Korean and American Protestant communities prior to the 10.29 Itaewon disaster. In Korea, prior to the disaster, a minority of Protestants criticized Halloween primarily on commercial rather than religious or spiritual grounds, while the majority remained indifferent to the observance. Section 5 provides a detailed analysis of the evolving Halloween discourse within Korean Protestant circles following the 10.29 Itaewon disaster. Conservative Protestant factions adopt a theological framework, condemning Halloween as theologically unsound and superstitious—a stance that correlates with victim-blaming narratives that attribute responsibility to those who participated in Halloween celebrations. Conversely, progressive and socially engaged Protestant groups approach Halloween through a cultural lens, interpreting it as an expression of youth identity and cultural diversity, a perspective that corresponds with their attribution of responsibility for the disaster to governmental authorities. This analysis reveals that Korean Protestant Halloween discourse is situated at the intersection of two critical contexts: the specific circumstances of the 10.29 Itaewon disaster and the varying political orientations of Protestant groups in relation to governmental authority.

2. Review of Existing Literature on Halloween and Superstition Discourse

Research on Halloween in South Korea can be broadly categorized into two streams: analyses of Halloween as a cultural festival and discussions that critically approach Halloween from a theological perspective. The former includes studies that approach Halloween as a cultural code and analyze public perceptions of it (C. Park 2011), cultural and aesthetic analyses of Halloween costumes themselves (C. H. Kim 2007; Lennon et al. 2016; Kim and Kim 2020; Yu 2012; Lee and Baik 2001), immanent analyses treating Halloween festivals as objects of cultural textual analysis (I. R. Kim 2022; Che 2001), and critical approaches to its commercialist characteristics (Jiwon Lee 2019; Yim 2006), among others. The latter consists primarily of either case studies presenting the adoption and adaptation of Halloween into Sunday school educational programs in Korean American churches (E. Park 2007) or non-academic columns criticizing Halloween as a festival that deviates from Protestant doctrine. These discussions share three notable characteristics: first, their limited volume prior to the 10.29 Itaewon disaster; second, the concentration of academic research papers primarily on Halloween as a cultural festival, particularly focusing on costumes; and third, the lack of an established scholarly framework for religious or theological approaches to Halloween. This paper attends to the explosive increase in Halloween discourse in South Korea following the Itaewon disaster, demonstrating that any meaningful analysis of this discourse must account for the disaster’s catalytic significance.

Meanwhile, the concept of superstition has been employed within the Korean religious landscape as a mechanism for othering specific targets, especially other religions (D. Kim 2012). Jingu Lee (1995) points out that prior to liberation, Korean Protestantism positioned itself as rational and civilized while utilizing the concept of superstition as a regulatory framework to exclude Buddhism, Confucianism, folk beliefs, and new religions from the domain of legitimate religion by emphasizing their dimensions of ancestor worship and idolatry. However, the concept of superstition is neither fixed nor stable; rather, it is arbitrary and fluid. For instance, Korean shamanism was stigmatized as superstition by the government for an extended period, yet when its sociality—its capacity to foster community cohesion—was emphasized, it was accepted as culture (Shinzato 2019, pp. 95–97). Shinzato thus proposes that by capturing the specific dimensions emphasized when particular phenomena are criticized as superstition, one can trace the historicity of the superstition concept. This study moves beyond analyzing the transformation of the superstition concept through the inherent properties of the objects themselves, demonstrating instead that the labeling of something as superstition is enabled by specific political–historical contexts. In other words, through the concrete case of the Itaewon disaster, this research seeks to reveal that political–historical contexts may contribute more profoundly than internal attributes to the criticism of something as superstition. This illuminates how, in the context catalyzed by the Itaewon disaster, Protestant discourse surrounding Halloween is deeply entangled with theological, cultural, political, and social dynamics.

3. The Origins of Halloween and Its Introduction to Korea

3.1. The Origins of Halloween

The historical antecedents of Halloween traditions and customs can be traced to the ancient Celtic festival of Samhain, celebrated in what is now modern-day Ireland. Samhain, whose etymology denotes the ‘end of summer’, was a millennia-old celebration deeply embedded in Celtic culture. The Celtic calendar marked 31 October as the year’s end, coinciding with the onset of winter and the harvest season. According to Celtic cosmology, this date held particular significance as it represented the temporal point at which the boundary between the mortal realm and the domain of the dead reached its most permeable state, facilitating potential communion between the living and the deceased (Lefkowitz 1993). Celtic belief systems held that during this period, supernatural entities—ghosts and demons—would traverse from the otherworld into the mortal plane, gaining the ability to interact with the physical realm of the living. These entities were believed to possess emotional capacities, harboring either benevolent or malevolent intentions toward the living world, with the potential to inflict harm upon both people and agricultural yields (Yousaf 2021, pp. 89–90). In response to these perceived supernatural threats, the Celts developed ritualistic practices of offering food and donning spectral disguises, operating under the belief that such a masquerade would deceive these entities into identifying them as fellow spirits, thus averting potential harm. These practices constituted the fundamental elements of the Samhain festival.

Following the Roman conquest of Celtic territories, the Church adopted a strategy of cultural adaptation rather than prohibition regarding the deeply embedded Samhain festival. This process involved synchronizing the Celtic calendar’s observance of 31 October with its Gregorian counterpart and emphasizing the theological significance of All Saints’ Day. In 609 CE, the Church formally designated 1 November as ‘All Hallow Day’, a feast day commemorating all heavenly saints. Consequently, 31 October was designated as ‘All Hallow’s Eve’, from which the contemporary term ‘Halloween’ etymologically derives. This exemplifies the Church’s sophisticated approach to cultural assimilation, wherein indigenous practices were not suppressed but rather recontextualized to facilitate the transmission of Christian doctrine. Subsequently, Halloween, originating in Europe, was transmitted to the United States through Irish and Scottish immigration, eventually becoming a quintessential American tradition (Chamber 1997; Gu 2020; Seunghun Lee 2015).

3.2. The Introduction of Halloween to Korea

The first documented Halloween celebration in Korea was organized at a hotel in Itaewon in 1988. However, Halloween remained largely unfamiliar in Korean society until the late 1990s, being primarily perceived as a foreign Western cultural practice. The mainstreaming of Halloween in Korea from the late 1990s can be attributed to several factors: the increased penetration of foreign cultural content through various media channels—television dramas, cinema, and music—contributed significantly to the dissemination of Halloween culture, particularly among adolescents and young adults. During the 1990s, amid a growing emphasis on early English education, Halloween began to spread through English-language educational institutions in the Gangnam district, where private kindergartens and language academies adopted the celebration as part of their cultural curriculum. The 2000s witnessed its rapid expansion through commercial venues and entertainment facilities, while the 2010s marked an unprecedented acceleration in its popularity, driven by the emergence of the culturally expressive MZ generation and the proliferation of social media platforms. The Korean adaptation of American Halloween underwent a distinctive transformation, incorporating elements of street culture, cosplay, and nightlife entertainment. This localization process reconceptualized Halloween as a youth-centered performative cultural practice, characterized by public costume display and temporary escape from quotidian social norms. This cultural evolution catalyzed significant commercial developments, particularly in costume retail, decorative merchandise, and event-based entertainment sectors (J.-H. Ryu 2023).

Itaewon emerged as the focal point of Halloween celebrations in Korea during the post-2000 period. While modest Halloween events began appearing in the district in the early 2000s, the celebration expanded significantly around 2005 when the Itaewon Merchants Association initiated large-scale Halloween festivals. Although Halloween festivities subsequently proliferated across other regions, Itaewon maintained its position as the primary hub for Halloween celebrations in Korea.

Itaewon, an administrative district within Seoul’s Yongsan-gu, was designated as the city’s inaugural tourism special district in 1997, characterized by its multinational demographic composition with a foreign resident population exceeding 20,000. The district’s international character emerged in the post-Korean War period following the establishment of a major U.S. military installation in Yongsan-gu. This military presence catalyzed the development of a distinctive commercial and cultural ecosystem centered around American military personnel and their families. The district became notable for its informal economy of military surplus goods and PX merchandise, while simultaneously developing into a multicultural hub featuring diverse international retail and culinary establishments. The district’s established multicultural infrastructure and cosmopolitan atmosphere have historically attracted both expatriate residents and international visitors. Several factors facilitated this development: the widespread acceptance of international currencies, particularly the U.S. dollar and Japanese yen; multilingual commercial transactions conducted in English, Japanese, and Chinese; and the presence of diverse cultural institutions. These characteristics created an environment particularly conducive to the adoption and proliferation of Halloween celebrations.

The district’s Halloween celebrations attracted substantial crowds, with attendance exceeding 100,000 participants on peak days in the pre-pandemic period. This concentration of celebrants within the district’s limited spatial parameters—specifically, a 320 m commercial corridor lined with restaurants, retail establishments, and nightclubs—created significant population density during Halloween festivities.

4. Protestant Churches’ Perceptions of Halloween in the United States and South Korea Before the 10.29 Itaewon Disaster

While Halloween has become deeply embedded in American cultural traditions, its integration into South Korean society represents a relatively recent cultural adaptation driven by globalization and Western cultural diffusion. This distinct historical trajectory has fostered fundamentally different theological and cultural interpretations of Halloween between Protestant communities in these two nations.

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, American Protestant leadership mounted theological opposition to Halloween, characterizing it as a pagan and satanic ritual (Hislop 1858; Rogers 2003; Victor 1994). In response, they developed alternative Christian celebrations such as ‘Holy Day,’ ‘Holyween Day’ and ‘Hallelujah Festival’ (Phillips and Robie 1987). These events incorporated fundamental Christian practices, including worship, prayer, scriptural study, and communal activities, functioning as theological counterpoints designed to preserve Christian orthodoxy and religious identity. These adaptations within American Protestantism emerged from the necessity to navigate Halloween’s dual nature—its pagan origins and its established cultural significance. Protestant efforts to infuse the holiday with Christian elements, however, drew criticism in America’s pluralistic society for potentially undermining cultural diversity. The debate gradually subsided as Halloween gained broader social acceptance and cultural legitimacy as a secular celebration.

Recent discourse has proposed a reframing of Protestant engagement with Halloween, suggesting potential theological and social benefits. These perspectives emphasize Halloween’s utility for strengthening communal bonds and its parallel themes with fundamental Christian doctrines—specifically, the theological concepts of death and resurrection, eternal life, and the cosmic battle between good and evil (Dominguez 2021; Grove 2020; Oh 2020; Smith 2012). Contemporary perspectives advocate examining Halloween through a cultural lens, recognizing its evolution into mainstream American tradition with diminished religious significance. This view emphasizes Halloween’s transformation from pagan origins to contemporary celebration, noting its gradual integration into American Protestant cultural practices (Bannatyne 1998; Kim and McCune 2004; Rogers 2003). These interpretations converge on recognizing Halloween as a distinctly American cultural phenomenon.

In contrast to the complex historical negotiations between American Protestantism and Halloween traditions, the holiday’s emergence in Korea since the 2000s has followed a distinctly different trajectory. The holiday’s Korean adoption has manifested primarily as a youth-centered cultural phenomenon, detached from its historical and religious significance. Halloween celebrations have proliferated among Korean youth, particularly in Seoul’s Itaewon district, generating minimal Protestant opposition. While some Protestant groups echoed early American concerns about Halloween’s pagan and satanic associations (Daniel Lee 2022), these objections remained peripheral within Protestant communities. Notably, substantive theological critique of Halloween, particularly regarding its Samhain connections, has emerged predominantly from Korean Protestant clergy serving in U.S. churches and scholars with extensive U.S. residence (E. Park 2007), whose perspectives have been distinctly shaped by direct engagement with American Protestant theological discourse. Prior to the 10.29 Itaewon Disaster, religious critiques of Halloween maintained little significance within South Korean Protestant circles.

Prior to the 10.29 Itaewon Disaster, Korean conservative Protestant critique of Halloween focused primarily on its commercialization rather than its religious origins. Their criticism centered on how major corporations had transformed the holiday into a profit-driven enterprise. This commercialization manifested through various corporate-sponsored events: Theme parks and amusement parks offered elaborate Halloween parades and horror experiences, while luxury hotels hosted themed parties with premium pricing. Major entertainment companies organized exclusive celebrity Halloween parties with fan participation opportunities, and restaurants developed special holiday menus. This extensive commercialization required significant financial investment from young participants seeking to engage with Halloween culture. Korean conservative Protestants interpreted this phenomenon as emblematic of capitalist exploitation rather than meaningful cultural celebration. They viewed Halloween in Korea not as an ideological or religious concern, but as an example of corporate-driven consumerism divorced from authentic cultural value (Jeong 2004). The perception of Halloween as a manifestation of American commercialism has contributed to broader cultural resistance. Critics have expressed concern about the increasing engagement of youth with Western cultural practices at the expense of Korean traditional values, characterizing Halloween celebrations as emblematic of cultural imperialism and problematic westernization (Roh 2019).

Nevertheless, prior to the 10.29 Itaewon disaster in 2022, Protestant criticism of Halloween in South Korea was minimal, encompassing both religious and commercial objections, while the majority of Korean Protestant communities remained largely indifferent to the observance. The holiday remained largely absent from South Korean social consciousness until the 1990s, with its cultural presence remaining notably limited even throughout the 2000s. Despite widespread recognition of Halloween as a Western cultural phenomenon, public engagement was negligible (M. Lee 2022). This pattern of cultural detachment extended to religious communities as well. From a theological perspective, Halloween was perceived as an alien cultural practice, while from a capitalist viewpoint, it was categorized merely as one among numerous American consumerist cultural imports, thus failing to generate significant attention from Korean conservative Protestant circles. While Halloween had undergone substantial cultural transformation and integration in Western societies, particularly in the United States, its significance in the Korean cultural context remained peripheral until the 2000s. During this period, younger generations began engaging with the holiday in a distinctly casual manner, characterized by limited understanding of its historical origins or cultural significance, approaching it primarily as a form of recreational activity (M. Lee 2022).

Considering that, since the 2000s, a certain fraction within conservative Protestants who have been vocal on social issues have actively articulated a politics of hate and exclusion in the public sphere against LGBTQ+ individuals, refugees, Muslims, and other marginalized groups through the framework of ‘culture wars,’ their lack of engagement with Halloween during this period warrants attention. As cultural politics surrounding gender, sexuality, Islam, and multiculturalism gained prominence in the early and mid-2010s, conservative Protestant groups recognized the emergence of new ideological opponents in the cultural arena (Suh 2021, p. 105). In their pursuit of cultural hegemony through confrontational strategies, these groups have systematically opposed the Comprehensive Anti-Discrimination legislation, deliberately adopting ‘yangseong-pyeongdeung’ (equality between the two sexes) rather than the more inclusive ‘seong-pyeongdeung’ (gender equality)—thereby reinforcing a binary gender framework that linguistically delegitimizes sexual minorities—and actively resisted the acceptance of Muslim refugees. The absence of organized opposition to Halloween, despite its significant religious implications, thus serves as a compelling indicator of their historical indifference toward this cultural phenomenon.

5. Analysis of Protestant Church Discourse on Halloween in Korea After the 10.29 Itaewon Disaster

Before examining the conservative and progressive Protestant discourses on Halloween following the 10.29 Itaewon disaster in detail, it is necessary at this juncture to briefly survey the historical, political, and practical differences between conservative and progressive Protestantism. Within Korean Protestantism exists a diverse theological spectrum. However, this paper adopts a broad categorization of conservative and progressive Protestantism along the lines of political–social attitudes—specifically, their history of political–social engagement in Korea. This analytic distinction follows established scholarship on Korean Protestantism that understands theological orientations in close relation to churches’ political and social engagement, highlighting how theological spectra are reorganized through their actual practices in the public sphere (D.-y. Ryu 2009; NCCK 2013; M. B. Kim 2009; Chang 2006, 2018; Kim et al. 2024). This approach is warranted because Protestant positions on Halloween are more deeply correlated with their political–social stances, and more specifically, their positions toward the government, than with their theological differences.

Following liberation from Japanese colonial rule, Korean Protestantism maintained close relations with the Syngman Rhee government—Rhee himself being a Presbyterian elder—which granted special privileges to Protestantism, and actively supported the regime (Chang 2006, pp. 122–25; J. G. Lee 2018). This close relationship was formed in part through the influence of American military governance and U.S. Protestant missionary networks, and, within the context of relations with North Korea during the Cold War, contributed to embedding anti-communist ideology deeply within Korean Protestant institutions. However, the April 19 Revolution of 1960 catalyzed an awakening of democratic consciousness among certain Protestant groups, and from the 1960s onward, these groups began to participate in social movements (CISJD 1983, p. 10). Grounded in Minjung theology—which is Korea’s indigenous liberation theology interpreting the “minjung” (a Korean term meaning oppressed people) as historical agents—they advocated for the realization of human rights and equality, stood in solidarity with laborers, farmers, and the poor in their struggles for decent and healthy lives, and actively engaged in political movements resisting military dictatorship to achieve democracy. Even after democratization in 1987, they have continued active social engagement for justice, human rights, ecology, health, peace, and equality (M. Kim 2021). Politically, they have supported the so-called progressive administrations of Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in, all of whom came from backgrounds as activists in the democratization and human rights movements.

In contrast, conservative Protestant groups sharing pro-American anti-communism supported the Syngman Rhee administration and subsequent military dictatorships. After democratization, however, they assumed critical positions toward the government when so-called progressive administrations came to power. In the 2000s, some with more extreme positions within the conservative spectrum launched active social campaigns under banners of anti-North Korea, anti-feminism, anti-homosexuality, and anti-Islam sentiments (Suh 2021). This shift emerged within the broader context of Korea’s “culture wars,” in which debates on gender, sexuality, multiculturalism, and national security became entangled with moral-religious discourse, prompting conservative Protestant groups to increasingly express their identity through more extreme forms of activism. In particular, the COVID-19 restrictions on religious gatherings created a perception among conservative Protestants that the progressive Moon Jae-in administration was suppressing their community, which ultimately served to consolidate and strengthen far-right Protestant alignment. To be sure, many Korean Protestants—indeed, the majority—maintain reservations about voicing faith-infused positions on political–social issues, advocating instead for the separation of church and state. However, since the 2000s, many moderate Protestants have been gravitating toward conservatism through their sympathy with opposition to feminism and homosexuality, and by the time of the 10.29 Itaewon disaster in 2022, there was a strengthened tendency to attribute responsibility for the tragedy to festival participants rather than to the government within a discursive framework linking Halloween-Itaewon-homosexuality. Underlying this phenomenon are several factors: theologically, Korean Protestant churches across denominational lines have maintained close relationships with fundamentalism, which has shaped the theological and cultural identity of twentieth-century Korean Protestantism (Bae 2008), while politically, pro-American anti-communism constitutes a shared characteristic across Korean Protestantism as a whole (D.-y. Ryu 2004).

The Korean government at the time of the disaster was the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, perceived as conservative, and conservative Protestant attitudes toward this administration were favorable (N. Kim 2021; Jeongmin Lee 2022b). This convergence stemmed from shared agendas such as anti-feminism, anti-LGBTQ+, and anti-Islam stances; the defense of social order and national security; and opposition to so-called democratic administrations, on which conservative Protestant groups had already established extensive mobilization networks. Setting aside extreme far-right Protestant leader Jeon Kwang-hoon, who argued that the Itaewon disaster was a North Korean conspiracy to impeach President Yoon Suk-yeol (B. Shin 2022), conservative Protestant media outlets and denominational leaders delivered theologically critical messages regarding Halloween and advocated that responses to the disaster should remain confined to consolation and mourning rather than evolve into demands for truth-finding investigations or condemnation of the government (PCK Goodnews 2022; Song 2022; Sinsil Lee 2022; Y. Jang 2022; Choi 2022; J. Jang 2022; G. Kim 2023). In contrast, progressive Protestant circles—critical of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration from its outset—condemned the government’s inadequate response to the Itaewon disaster, highlighting its administrative incompetence and evasion of responsibility.

5.1. Conservative Protestant Discourse on Halloween: Religious Approaches and Victim Blaming

In the aftermath of the 10.29 Itaewon Disaster, conservative Protestant groups—aligned with Korea’s long-standing conservative Protestant stream—shifted more explicitly toward a critique of Halloween, primarily focusing on its purported pagan and Satanic religious elements. This criticism has been manifested through various channels, including columns, commentaries, and organizational statements that specifically target Halloween’s religious characteristics. Korean conservative Protestant communities have acknowledged that while substantive theological critiques and analyses of Halloween have long existed in Western contexts, particularly in the United States—where Halloween celebrations are most prominent—and among Korean-American churches, the Korean Protestant establishment had maintained a position of indifference until recently. The Itaewon disaster has markedly shifted this stance of detachment (Christian Today 2023; Hyosang Lee 2023b).

Conservative Protestant groups have articulated strong theological opposition to Halloween’s religious and superstitious elements. Their critiques encompass several key arguments: that Halloween “instills false worldviews and erroneous doctrines,” “facilitates the propagation of unbelief, leading to spiritual alienation from God,” and that “Halloween’s customs represent pagan cultural artifacts incompatible with biblical worldviews.” They further assert that “spirits of the deceased are nonexistent” and that “pagan festivals dominate contemporary consciousness through the appropriation of traditional customs, manifested in grotesque costumery, contributing to Christianity’s decline while fostering interest in malevolent practices” (J. Kim 2023). This religious opposition reached an unprecedented level when a pastor, during a public sermon, explicitly referred to the victims of the Itaewon disaster as “young people sacrificed to spirits at a ghost festival [gwisin chukje-e gaseo gwisindeurege huisaengdanghan jeolmeunideul]” (Choi 2022; Y. Jang 2022; J. Park 2022).

While some contend that contemporary Halloween celebrations have evolved toward commercialization and recreational activities rather than maintaining their supernatural elements, conservative Protestant groups reject this secular interpretation. They argue that “the diminution of pagan ritualistic elements and their religious significance does not constitute a legitimate basis for the practice.” Furthermore, they assert that “the day remains significant for Satanists and practitioners of black magic as an occasion for supernatural communion, often manifesting in various disturbing practices.” Through such arguments, they explicitly establish a direct link between Halloween observance and Satanic practices (Christian Today 2023).

The sociocultural significance of Itaewon as a nexus of LGBTQ+ community formation has generated tension with religious institutions, particularly regarding their criticism of the district’s Halloween festivities and their perceived association with homosexuality. Since the 1990s, Itaewon has emerged as a crucial site for the development and articulation of gay cultural identity and community solidarity (Heo 2005, pp. 38–40, 46–48). At that time in South Korea, LGBTQ+ identities were treated as non-normative sexuality and pathologized as a disease of American culture, yet Itaewon began to be recognized as a space where openness toward sexuality—taboo in Korean society—was permitted and where distinctive entertainment could be enjoyed (Haesu Lee 2023a, p. 94). Of particular significance is the area known as “Gay Hill,” which functions as a social and cultural hub primarily for gay men, embodying Itaewon’s broader characteristic as a space that fosters diversity and social inclusion. This spatial configuration demonstrates how marginalized communities can create and maintain distinct cultural territories within urban landscapes.

The Halloween festival exemplifies Victor Turner’s concept of liminality, wherein participants occupy an ambiguous state that transcends conventional social boundaries. As liminal entities, festival participants exist in an interstitial space “betwixt and between the positions assigned and arranged by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial” (Turner 1969, p. 95). This liminal condition engenders what Turner terms “anti-structure”—a temporary liberation from normative social constraints—and facilitates the emergence of “communitas,” a distinctive form of social bonding. Significantly, communitas does not dissolve individual identities into a homogeneous mass but rather “safeguards their uniqueness in the very act of realizing their commonness.” It does not merge identities. It liberates them from conformity to general norms (Turner 1974, p. 274). Within this theoretical framework, the Halloween festival serves as a crucial vehicle for South Korean LGBTQ+ individuals to navigate and contest their marginalization through performative expressions of identity via costumes, decorations, and makeup. This manifestation of liminality and anti-structure has provoked opposition from conservative Protestant leadership in South Korea, whose Biblical interpretation of homosexuality as transgressive has led to their critique of Halloween as a space of non-normative expression and liminal identity formation.

Conservative Protestant leaders proposed alternative Christian celebrations to counteract Halloween’s perceived anti-Christian elements, paralleling similar initiatives in the United States. These religious authorities advocated for the establishment of “true spiritual events” to supplant Halloween’s cultural prominence, introducing concepts such as the “Holy Win Festival”—semantically constructed to represent a “Festival of Holy Victory”—and “Hallelujah Night” as theological alternatives. Some conservative Protestant leaders advocated for the creation of exclusive Protestant gatherings during Halloween, even without formal denominational branding (Choi 2022; Jaewook Lee 2022a). Additionally, these conservative religious authorities proposed reinforcing existing Christian observances coinciding with Halloween’s temporal proximity, specifically emphasizing enhanced adherence to Advent, Reformation Day, and Thanksgiving Day celebrations as strategic alternatives to Halloween participation (Roh 2019; Daewoong Lee 2023).

The 10.29 Itaewon disaster emerged as a critical turning point in conservative Protestant discourse surrounding Halloween in South Korea. The unprecedented scale of casualties in an urban center not only traumatized the broader Korean society but also heightened conservative Protestant awareness of Halloween’s substantial cultural integration into contemporary Korean life. Significantly, this tragedy catalyzed a marked shift in the rhetorical framework of Protestant criticism, transforming from predominantly secular concerns about commercialization to explicitly religious condemnations. In the aftermath of the disaster, conservative Protestant leaders, who had previously maintained relative indifference toward Halloween celebrations, began to deploy intensified religious narratives that emphasized Satanic and pagan elements.

The religious critique of Halloween was closely associated with casting the disaster victims as transgressors against Christian morality for their participation in a wrongful festival. Conservative Protestant discourse, manifested through sermons, official statements, and social media communications, attributed culpability to the victims by emphasizing their participation in what was characterized as Western satanic practices. The proliferation of religious condemnation in the disaster’s immediate aftermath effectively reframed the victims’ presence at the event as morally transgressive. This theological framing had particularly severe implications for Christian families among the bereaved. A particularly illustrative case involves a deaconess who lost her son in the disaster. Despite her three-decade membership in her church community, she encountered ostracism rather than the anticipated pastoral support and communal empathy. Her account reveals how church members stigmatized the Halloween gathering as a “ghost festival [gwisin chukje],” questioning the propriety of a Christian’s presence at such an event. Notably, she reported that church leadership had never once visited the civic memorial altar erected in Seoul City Hall Plaza to commemorate her deceased son or to console her as a bereaved family member, further exemplifying the institutional distancing from the tragedy. Her expressed desire for the church to cease treating both her son and herself as sinners underscores the profound impact of this religious stigmatization on the bereaved (Na 2023).

The scapegoating of victims by conservative Protestant groups demonstrates notable parallels with governmental responses to the disaster. From the disaster’s onset, government officials engaged in systematic responsibility deflection while implicitly attributing culpability to the victims. The Minister of the Interior and Safety’s declaration that “there is no one to blame because there is no organizer” exemplified this strategy, simultaneously absolving institutional responsibility while implicitly shifting the burden of safety onto individuals who voluntarily attended the festivities (Huh 2022). The government’s investigative priorities further reinforced this pattern: their Special Investigation Headquarters’ immediate focus on analyzing CCTV footage and social media content from survivors and witnesses suggested an intent to scrutinize victim behavior rather than examine systemic failures (Statement 2022). This pattern of victim-focused investigation culminated in the controversial decision to conduct unauthorized narcotics testing on the victims’ corpses and personal belongings, without familial consent. These investigative priorities and methodologies revealed a systematic attempt to locate fault within the victims themselves, rather than addressing institutional and structural failures that contributed to the disaster.

A segment of civil society organizations and institutions participated in victim-blaming narratives through their coverage and responses. Media outlets exhibited problematic reporting practices, including the publication of unredacted photographs that sensationally displayed victims in provocative costumes lying on the street and the circulation of unsubstantiated claims attributing responsibility to specific festival participants. This stance by certain media outlets appears to have stemmed from their political position seeking to exclude the government from responsibility for the disaster (K. Park 2025). The media’s misrepresentation extended to their interpretation of international coverage. For instance, in their 29 October 2022 article “At Least 151 Killed in Crowd Crush at Seoul Halloween Celebration,” published on the day of the disaster, The Wall Street Journal provided a cultural context, noting that “In South Korea, Halloween is not widely celebrated as a candy-grabbing holiday for children. Twenty-somethings and other partygoers in recent years have made Halloween into a major clubbing event, with many decked out in costumes” (Martin and Sohn 2022). While this observation merely highlighted the generational and cultural distinctions between American and Korean Halloween celebrations—the former being an all-ages tradition incorporating trick-or-treating, and the latter predominantly a youth-oriented nightlife event—Korean media outlets mischaracterized this descriptive analysis as criticism. They employed phrases such as “Halloween culture has been perverted in Korea” and “WSJ criticized Korean Halloween culture,” misrepresenting The Wall Street Journal’s neutral cultural observation as condemnation. In fact, given that Halloween in the United States also encompasses elements of youth culture, cosplay, and club culture, Korean Halloween can be understood not as a perversion of American Halloween but rather as a selective adaptation of it. This deliberate misinterpretation generated immediate consequences, manifesting in public commentary that further perpetuated victim-blaming narratives (J. Park 2022).

In the aftermath of the disaster, amid widespread victim-blaming narratives, bereaved families found themselves compelled to construct and emphasize specific virtuous identities for their deceased loved ones to legitimize their status as victims worthy of public mourning. Parents felt pressured to demonstrate their children’s moral character through testimonials emphasizing studious, obedient, and restrained behaviors: “he was an introvert and did not like to play outside,” “she sat in study cafes all day studying,” “he promised to come back and study after just one play date,” or “she was the daughter who never spoiled her parents” (PSPD 2023). This compulsion to prove their deceased children’s moral worth created a secondary form of trauma for the bereaved, who had to simultaneously contend with the criminalization of their loved ones while demonstrating that these victims merited society’s grief and sympathy.

The conservative Protestant characterization of Halloween as a satanic ritual, whether intentionally or not, resonated with governmental responses and certain segments of civil society, contributing to a broader pattern of victim demonization. This convergence of religious and institutional stigmatization effectively marginalized commemorative voices within Protestant communities, suppressing efforts to memorialize and mourn the disaster victims within church spaces.

5.2. Progressive Protestant Discourse on Halloween: Cultural Approaches and Government Accountability

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, bereaved families and survivors mobilized to demand a thorough investigation and governmental accountability. This grassroots movement garnered significant civic support, manifesting in organized campaigns for the enactment of the Itaewon Special Law, the establishment of civic memorial altars, and collective commemorative practices. Progressive Protestant communities emerged as significant counterforces to the dominant victim-blaming narratives, explicitly challenging these discourses while emphasizing institutional culpability for inadequate safety protocols. These religious actors demonstrated active solidarity with bereaved families and survivors through their participation in social movements demanding thorough investigations, accountability from responsible parties, and appropriate judicial consequences (Statement 2022).

Progressive Protestant communities—aligned with Korea’s long-standing progressive Protestant stream—diverged from their conservative counterparts by adopting a cultural rather than religious framework in their approach to Halloween. They conceptualized Halloween as an expression of youth culture, arguing that its rejection represented a failure to acknowledge cultural diversity (News M 2022). This perspective aligns with Ruth Benedict’s theoretical framework of cultural pluralism. According to Benedict, pluralism is an inherent characteristic of all cultures. Each society comprises multiple institutions pursuing diverse objectives through mutual interaction, demonstrating that cultural systems are intrinsically complex and multidimensional. Benedict contends that there exists no universal set of values applicable across all temporal and spatial contexts, noting that “the course of life and the pressure of environment provide an incredible number of possible leads, all of which, it appears, may serve a society to live by” (Benedict 1934, p. 34; E. Shin 2006, pp. 215–26).

Progressive Protestant engagement with Halloween as a cultural phenomenon reflects their broader commitment to fostering coexistence and harmony among diverse cultural practices. They critiqued religiously motivated rejection of specific cultural expressions as manifestations of bias and dogmatism that undermined social cohesion. Their position emphasized that cultural diversity and flexible religious–cultural relationships are prerequisites for social solidarity, thereby providing a theoretical defense for Halloween celebrations. Furthermore, they interpreted Halloween as a celebration of diversity and intercultural exchange, viewing it as an opportunity for cultural experimentation and enjoyment. This framework of cultural freedom and creativity ultimately informed their positive embrace of Halloween practices.

Progressive Protestant communities articulated a dual critique of conservative Protestant responses to the disaster: they challenged both the religious exclusivity in Halloween interpretations and the rhetorical displacement of disaster responsibility onto victims. They argued that such victim-blaming narratives obscured the structural causes of the disaster while impeding the development of preventative social systems for future disasters. Rejecting conservative Protestant characterizations of Halloween as a superstitious practice and their criticism of victims, progressive Protestant groups not only issued public apologies for the actions of those who sought to halt social mourning by urging the public to “stop grieving” or who condemned the victims for attending a “ghost festival” (G. Kim 2023, p. 38), but also rebuked preachers who described the tragedy as divine retribution for participating in a “festival of Satan” (News M 2022). At the same time, they actively engaged in multi-faceted advocacy through campaigns, protests, liturgical practices, public statements, and social media engagement to express commemoration of the victims and solidarity with bereaved families.

Civil society mobilized significant criticism of governmental and institutional actors for their negligence and administrative failures. Citizens engaged in collective memory-making and solidarity efforts, organizing grassroots campaigns to support the Itaewon Special Law, which demanded thorough investigation and accountability for responsible parties. The legislative petition for this special law garnered 50,000 signatures within 11 days, successfully advancing the bill to the National Assembly. The National Human Rights Commission of the Republic of Korea intervened with an official statement condemning victim-blaming narratives surrounding the disaster (NHRCRK 2022). Bereaved family members challenged religious interpretations of Halloween, emphasizing that participants, including the victims, approached the festival without significant awareness of or interest in its religious origins or supernatural elements (Na 2023). This testimony underscores that festival participation was primarily motivated by its role as a contemporary youth cultural practice rather than any religious or spiritual significance.

In the aftermath of the 10.29 Itaewon Disaster, progressive Protestant groups reframed the discourse surrounding Halloween, rejecting religious interpretations in favor of cultural analysis that positioned it within contemporary youth practices. This perspective emerged through their collaborative engagement with bereaved families and progressive civil society organizations. Through this framework, they simultaneously challenged religious parochialism and public stigmatization of victims while advocating for governmental accountability in the disaster.

6. Conclusions

The analysis of Korean Protestant discourse surrounding Halloween reveals the following key patterns:

First, prior to the 10.29 Itaewon Disaster, Halloween generated minimal theological debate within Korean Protestant communities, with existing critiques primarily focused on its commercialization rather than religious implications.

Second, in the aftermath of the 10.29 Itaewon Disaster, conservative Protestant circles witnessed a dramatic surge in discourse emphasizing Halloween’s pagan and superstitious origins. This led to proposals for alternative Christian celebrations, including “Holy Win Day,” “Holyween Day,” “Hallelujah Day,” or traditional observances such as Thanksgiving Day, Reformation Day, and Advent.

Third, the conservative Protestant framing of Halloween as a satanic practice implicitly attributed culpability to disaster victims through their participation in these festivities. By aligning themselves with pro-government narratives, conservative Protestant groups sought to deflect responsibility away from government authorities, which in turn fostered victim isolation and stigmatization, prompting concerns about victim scapegoating within civil society.

Fourth, progressive Protestant communities advanced an alternative framework that recognized Halloween as a contemporary youth cultural phenomenon deserving acknowledgment and respect within Korea’s diverse cultural landscape. They argued that analyzing the festival’s ancient origins was irrelevant to its current practice, as participants engaged with Halloween as a secular celebration devoid of religious significance.

Fifth, this cultural interpretation of Halloween facilitated a shift from victim-blaming narratives toward emphasizing governmental accountability for public safety failures. This perspective garnered support from civil society organizations advocating for improved crowd management systems and institutional responsibility.

In the wake of the 10.29 Itaewon Disaster, the theological debate over Halloween’s nature as superstition or cultural practice is closely associated with the fundamental question of disaster accountability. This debate over whether Halloween constitutes superstition or culture is not formed solely on theological grounds; that is, it cannot be explained merely by whether one emphasizes Halloween’s pagan religious origins or by the theological divide between conservative theology—which tends to understand sin as an individual moral failing—and progressive theology—which tends to understand sin as a structural problem. Rather, this debate can be comprehensively understood through its connections with the political–historical context in which conservative and progressive Korean Protestantism has been formed and has exerted social influence, as well as their attitudes toward the government at the time of the disaster. The contrasting interpretations of Halloween illuminate how religious and cultural frameworks intersect with broader questions of social responsibility and institutional culpability. A comprehensive analysis of these competing narratives in post-disaster South Korea necessitates examining two crucial contexts: the specific circumstances of the 10.29 Itaewon Disaster and the political dynamics within Korean Protestantism.