Quantum Physics and the Existence of God
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Consciousness and Quantum Physics
- (1)
- The Copenhagen Interpretation (‘C’)
‘Complementarity’ (def.) F and G are complimentary iff, at any time, t, if x is measured to be F, x cannot not be measured to be G, and if x is measured to be G, x cannot not be measured to be F, but x may be measured to be F at t, and measured to be G at t1.
- Does C Presuppose Consciousness?
- [1]
- Something is something to someone or other.
- [2]
- Something is present to someone or other.
- [3]
- Someone is aware of something as something or other.
- Argument that C presupposes consciousness:
- (1)
- (ψ→Φi)
- (2)
- (ψ→Φi) → ∃(x) (Θ x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (4)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- (2)
- The Many Worlds Interpretation (MW)
- Does MW presuppose consciousness?
[…] every quantum transition taking place on every star, in every galaxy, in every remote corner of the universe is splitting our local world on earth into myriads of copies of itself.
- Argument that MW entails the existence of consciousness:
- (1)
- ∃(x) (Θ x, w1) & ∀(w) −(w = w1) → −(Θ x w)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (Θ x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (4)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- The Consistent Histories Interpretation (CH) (Griffiths 1984)
- Does CH entail the existence of consciousness?
- Argument from belief, that CH entails the existence of consciousness:
- (1)
- ∃(x) Bxp
- (2)
- ∃(x) Bxp → ∃(x) (© x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- Argument, from history, that CH entails the existence of consciousness:
- (1)
- ∃(x) Hx
- (2)
- ∃(x) Hx → ∃(x) (Θ x)
- (3)
- ∃(Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (4)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- (3)
- The Ensemble Interpretation (E)
- Does E presuppose consciousness?
- Intuitionist Argument that E Presupposes Consciousness:
- (1)
- ∃(x) (x = n)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (x = n) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- (4)
- The Branching Space–Time Interpretation
- Does BST Presuppose Consciousness?
- Argument that BST presupposes consciousness:
- (1)
- ∃(x) (Θ x, s − t1) & ∀(s − t) − (s − t = s − t1) → −(Θ x s − t)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (Θ x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (4)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- (5)
- The de Broglie–Bohm Interpretation (B-B)
- Does B-B Presuppose Consciousness?
- Argument that B-B presupposes consciousness:
- (1)
- Bx [(|ψ> →| Φ¡>)] & −(|ψ> →| Φ¡>)
- (2)
- Bx [(|ψ> →| Φ¡>)] → ∃(x) (Θ x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (Θ x)
- (4)
- ∃(x) (Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (5)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- Argument that Bohm’s interpretation presupposes consciousness:
- (1)
- ∃(x) (Φx) & ∃(y) (Dy) & Rxy
- (2)
- ∃(x) (Φx) & ∃(y) (Dy) & Rxy → ∃(z) (© z)
- (3)
- ∃(z) (© z)
- (6)
- Relativistic Quantum Physics (RQP)
- Does RQP presuppose consciousness?
- Argument that Relativistic Quantum Physics presupposes consciousness (I):
- (1)
- ∀(x) ((Φx & Fx) → ∃(y)(Θ y) & (Rxy)
- (2)
- ∃(x) ((Φx & Fx)
- (3)
- ∃(y)(Θ x)
- (4)
- ∃(y) (Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (5)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- Argument that Relativistic Quantum Physics presupposes consciousness (II):
- (1)
- ∀(p) p → ptº
- (2)
- ∃(p) p → ptº
- (3)
- ∃(p) p → ptº → ∃(y)(Θ x)
- (4)
- ∃(y) (Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (5)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- (7)
- The Quantum Information Interpretation (ontological) (QI(O))
- Does QI(O) presuppose consciousness?
- Argument that QI(O) presupposes consciousness (I):
- (1)
- ∃(x) (Θ x)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- [1]
- Information is information to someone or other.
- [2]
- Information is present to someone or other.
- [3]
- Someone is aware of information as something or other.
- Argument that QI(O) presupposes consciousness (II):
- (1)
- ∃(x) ∃(y) (Cxy) & (i x)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (i x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- (8)
- The Quantum Information Interpretation (Epistemological) (QI(E))
- Does QI(E) presuppose consciousness?
- Argument that QI(E) presupposes consciousness:
- (1)
- ∃(p) (Kxp)
- (2)
- ∃(p) (Kxp) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- (9)
- The von Neumann/Wigner Interpretation (N/W)
- Does N/W entail the existence of consciousness?
- Argument that N/W presupposes consciousness:
- (1)
- [(|ψ> →| Φ¡>)]
- (2)
- [(|ψ> →| Φ¡>)] → ∃(x) (© x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- Argument that the entire physical universe depends upon conscious observation:
- (1)
- ∃(x) (x = w) → (|ψ> →| Φ¡>)
- (2)
- (|ψ> →| Φ¡>) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (x = w)
- (4)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- (10)
- The Wheeler/Stapp Interpretation (W/S)
- Does W/S entail the existence of Consciousness?
- Argument that W/S entails consciousness:
- (1)
- ∃(x) (x = w) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (x = w)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- (11)
- The Many-Minds Interpretation (MM)
- Does MM Presuppose Consciousness?
- Argument that MM presupposes consciousness:
- (1)
- ∃(x) (Mx)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (Mx) → ∃(y) (© y)
- (3)
- ∃(y) (© y)
- (12)
- The Relational Interpretation (R)
- Does R presuppose consciousness?
- Argument that R presupposes consciousness (I):
- (1)
- ∀(p) Kxp → ∃(x) (perspective x)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (perspective x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- Argument that R presupposes consciousness (II):
- (1)
- ∀(p) Kxp → ∃(x) (perspective x)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (perspective x) → ∃(x) (Θ x)
- (3)
- (Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (4)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- Argument that R presupposes consciousness (III):
- (1)
- ∀(p) Kxp → ∃(x) (measurement x)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (measurement x) → ∃(x) (Θ x)
- (3)
- (Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (4)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- Argument that R presupposes consciousness (IV):
- (1)
- ∃(x) (actuality x)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (actuality x)→ ∃(x) (Θ x)
- (3)
- (Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (4)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- Argument that R presupposes consciousness (V):
- (1)
- ∃(x) (ix)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (ix) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- (13)
- The Time-Symmetric Interpretation (TS)
- Does TS presuppose consciousness?
- Argument that TS presupposes consciousness (I):
- (1)
- ∃(x) (Hx)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (Hx) → ∃(x) (Θ x)
- (3)
- (Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (4)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- Argument that TS presupposes consciousness (II):
- (1)
- ∃(x) (Kxp)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (Kxp) → ∃(x) (Θ x)
- (3)
- (Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (4)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- Argument that TS presupposes consciousness (III):
- (1)
- ∃(x) (ix)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (ix) → ∃(x) (Θ x)
- (3)
- (Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (4)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- (14)
- The Quantum Bayesian Interpretation (QB)
- Does QB presuppose consciousness?
- Argument that QB presupposes consciousness (I):
- (1)
- ∃(x) (Bxp)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (Bxp) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- Argument that QB presupposes consciousness (II):
- (1)
- ∃(x) (Kxp)
- (2)
- ∃(x) (Kxp) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (© x)
- Argument that QB presupposes consciousness (III):
- (1)
- Some systems are observed systems.
- (2)
- If anything is observed, then there is consciousness.
- (3)
- There is consciousness.
- (1)
- ∃(x) (Θ x)
- (2)
- (Θ x) → ∃(x) (© x)
- (3)
- ∃(x) (© x)
[PR] ‘prior’ (def.) a is prior to b iff if not a then not b;[F] ‘more fundamental than’ (def.) a is more fundamental than b iff if not a then not b but not if not b then not a;[AF] ‘absolutely fundamental’ (def.) a is absolutely fundamental iff if not a then there is not anything but nothing except a is necessary for a.
3. The Existence of God
‘God’ (def.) x is God iff x is the unique, infinitely powerful, infinitely knowing, infinitely benevolent, necessary, omnipresent, atemporal ground of everything, a person, and the Creator and sustainer of the universe: pure actuality.
- (a)
- Omnipresence
‘Omnipresent’ (def.) x is omnipresent iff x is, and there is not anywhere x is not.
- (b)
- Actus purus
‘Actus purus’ (def.) x is actus purus iff x is pure actuality.
- (c)
- Omniscience
‘Omniscient’ (def.) x is omniscient iff, for all p, x knows that p.
- (d)
- Creator
‘Creator’ (def.) x is the Creator iff only x makes what is be.
- (e)
- Sustainer
‘Sustains’ (def.) x sustains y iff y cannot continue (to be) without x.
- (f)
- One
One (def.) x is One iff x is but does not in principle admit of plurality.
- (g)
- Simplicity
‘Simple’ (def.) x is simple iff x has no parts.
- (h)
- Infinity
‘Infinite’ (def.) x is infinite iff, if x is F, there is no limit to the degree to which x is F.
- (i)
- Timelessness
‘Timeless’ (def.) x is timeless iff no temporal predicates apply to x.
- (j)
- Good
‘Good’ (def.) x is good iff x is conducive to happiness or (vel) the elimination of suffering.
- (k)
- Necessary Being
therefore has that property ascribed to God by God in Exodus 3: 14: ‘I am that I am’.38
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Nomenclature
p, q, r | propositional variables |
& | conjunction |
- | negation |
→ | material implication |
≡ | biconditional |
x,y | name variables |
∃ (x) | existential quantifier |
∀ (x) | universal quantifier |
∃! | There exists at least and at most one … |
a, b, c | name letters |
F, G | predicate letters |
◊ | ‘It is possible that’ |
□ | ‘It is necessary that’ |
w | possible world |
∊ | ‘is a member of’ |
x | object variable |
Φ | particle |
p | momentum |
q | position |
t | time |
ψ | wave |
Ψ | wave function |
F | force |
C | ‘is a causally sufficient condition for’ |
IC | ‘is an initial condition for’ |
n | ‘number’ |
NC | ‘is a causally necessary condition for’ |
K | ‘It is known that’ |
B | ‘It is believed that’ |
Θ | ‘observes’ |
© | ‘is conscious’ |
i | information |
I | ‘is intelligent’ |
O | ‘occurs’ |
P/ | ‘the probability of’ |
P | projection operator on a Hilbert space |
H | history |
H | Hilbert space |
v | vector |
1 | Einstein et al. (1935). Einstein said: “Die Theorie liefert viel, aber dem Geheimnis des Alten bringt sie uns nicht näher. Jedenfalls bin ich überzeugt, daß der nicht würfelt. (The theory delivers much, but it brings us no nearer to the mystery of the Old One. I, at any rate, am convinced that He does not play dice.)” (Einstein [1926] 1971, p. 91). (Translation amended.) The theory is quantum mechanics. The Old One is God. Although the experimenters set out with the explicit aim of finding the classical determinants of quantum reality, Einstein had, in the end, to renounce this scepticism about quantum indeterminism. John Bell showed mathematically that there are no local hidden variables which would eliminate the intrinsically indeterminate and probabilistic nature of quantum entanglement, and its threat of action at a distance and even transmission of information faster than the speed of light. Bell’s refutation of Einstein is confirmed by the experimental work of the 2022 Nobel Prize winners, Alain Aspect, John F. Clauser, and Anton Zeilinger (See Bell 1964). |
2 | Allocate the value ‘consciousness’ to ‘a’, ‘quantum level’ to ‘b’, and ‘physical world’ to ‘c’, and read ‘if not x then not y’ as ‘x is a necessary condition for y’. If not a then not b, and if not b then not c, but not: if not c then not b, then not: if not b then not a. Otherwise: if not c then not b (because if not c then not a, and if not a then not b, then if not c then not b, by the transitivity of ‘if not’). But ‘If not c then not b’ is ruled out by Bell’s criticism of EPR. |
3 | It is sometimes put to me, by way of objection: “Some of the presuppositions you identify are not peculiar to quantum physics but are presuppositions of any theory, or even presuppositions of anything”. The observation is correct, but does not count as an objection to ‘Consciousness is a presupposition of quantum physics’. If p is a presupposition of any theory, or of anything, then p is a presupposition of quantum physics. |
4 | I therefore cannot endorse the central thesis of Dennett (2017), because, if consciousness is a product of evolution, then consciousness is an emergent property of the brain. But consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain, so consciousness is not a product of evolution. Nevertheless, if the thesis that quantum reality presupposes consciousness is correct, then consciousness is ‘already there’ if atoms exist and, given that extra premise, it is right after all that the existence of atoms is sufficient for the existence of consciousness. But then it would remain wrong to claim that consciousness is any kind of product of evolution. Consciousness exists anyway. |
5 | Bohr says ‘Far from containing any arbitrary renunciation of customary physical explanation, the notion of complementarity refers directly to our position as observers in a domain of experience where unambiguous application of the concepts used in the description of phenomena depends essentially on the conditions of observation’ (Bohr 1958, p. 99). |
6 | This claim requires more clarification and defence than it has received. For example: In MW, the logical possibility that MW is false is not realised, neither is the theoretical possibility that the Copenhagen interpretation is correct or the mathematical possibility that there exists only one universe. Moreover: suppose p is possible, and not p is possible, but both p and not p is impossible. Is p then realised? Or is not p then realised? In MW, there seems nothing to force this one way or the other. Perhaps God does play dice. |
7 | Here we may adduce all Sartre’s grounds for the past being ‘personal’, i.e., indexed to some present consciousness. (Priest 2001, 163 ff.) |
8 | Olley Pearson has argued, in rigorous detail, that a tensed account of time is (a) rationally unavoidable and (b) entails that the self is non-physical. See (Pearson 2018). |
9 | Einstein says: ‘The attempt to conceive the quantum-theoretical description as the complete description of the individual systems leads to unnatural theoretical interpretations, which become immediately unnecessary if one accepts the interpretation that the description refers to ensembles of systems and not to individual systems’ Einstein, in (Schlipp 1970, pp. 671–72). |
10 | |
11 | Maudlin points out that: ‘Bohm’s theory is deeply congenial to an ontology which maintains that all that exists exists now, i.e., at a point of time classically conceived’ (Maudlin 2002, p. 124). |
12 | Paul Davies claims: ‘It is not a wave of any substance or physical stuff, but a wave of knowledge or information. It is a wave that tells us what can be known about the atom, not a wave of the atom itself. Nobody is suggesting that an atom can ever spread itself around like an undulation. But what can spread itself around is what an observer can know about the atom’ (Davies 1983, p. 107). |
13 | If this is right, does matter exist? Feynman says: ‘You can’t say A is made of B or vice versa. All mass is interaction’. Richard Feynman Note (c. 1948), quoted in (Gleick 1992, pp. 5, 283). |
14 | Rovelli says ‘If I observe an electron at a certain position, I cannot conclude that the electron is there: I can only conclude that the electron as seen by me is there’ (Rovelli 2005, p. 116). |
15 | Rovelli thinks ‘the “observer system” O in quantum mechanics need not be human or have any other property beside the possibility of interacting with the “observed” system S’ (Rovelli 2005, p. 120). But, as we have seen, any chain of non-conscious observers has to be arrested in a conscious observer or there are no observers. |
16 | One might object that a camera (for example) has a perspective but is not conscious. But it is only right that a camera (or similar) has a perspective if someone could, in principle look through it (or, perhaps, through some camera or other). Consciousness is, therefore, presupposed. This holds even if a given camera can be triggered automatically or with no-one looking through it. |
17 | Rovelli gives ‘The Reason for the Apparent Paradoxes’. He says ‘The incorrect notion that generates the uneasiness with quantum mechanics is the notion of observer-independent state of a system, or observer independent values of physical quantities’ (Rovelli 2005, p. 120). |
18 | See Note 14 above. |
19 | Rovelli draws a distinction between ‘the measured system S and the measuring system O’ (116) and says ‘[…] the central tenet of relational quantum mechanics is that there is no meaning in saying that a certain variable of the system S takes the value q: rather, there is meaning in saying that this variable takes the value q for O, or with respect to O’ (Rovelli 2005, p. 116). |
20 | For example, Rovelli discusses ‘this relativisation of actuality’ (Rovelli 2005, p. 116). |
21 | Rovelli endorses ‘Shannon’s definition of information’ and says ‘According to this definition, the statement that O has information about S actually means that we shall observe O and S in a subset of the set formed by the Cartesian product [‘OF’chECK] the possible states of O and the possible states of S’ (Rovelli 2005, p. 120). |
22 | Rovelli says ‘I reformulate the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics as the problem of deriving the formalism from a set of simple physical postulates. I consider a reformulation of quantum mechanics in terms of information theory. All systems are assumed to be equivalent, there is no observer–observed distinction, and the theory describes only the information that systems have about each other; nevertheless, the theory is complete’ (Rovelli 2005, p. 119). |
23 | The Bayesian interpretation was developed by Christopher Fuchs, Carlton Caves, and Rüdiger Schack. |
24 | I argued that classical science cannot explain the scientist presupposed by its practice, in a talk given in Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1988. I thank Mike Brearley, Adrian Moore, and John Wisdom for comments. It was written up as Priest, “Scientist”. (Priest 1993). |
25 | All and only those logical inferences with Fundamental Ontological import are ontological. |
26 | Penrose says ‘It seems to me that consciousness is something global’ (Penrose 1997, p. 133). Penrose says ‘I share the discomfort of many others that the “Wigner view” seems to imply a markedly different physical behaviour in our own small corner of the universe from that which would be taking place almost everywhere else, in the absence of local conscious observers to keep things under control’ (Penrose 1987, p. 110). |
27 | ‘Pure act’ is not a perspicacious translation, because it implies that God exists in time. But the immanence of God is the Eternal Now, the unchanging present, the nunc stans. The nunc fluens is Creation. |
28 | Shimony says: ‘I share Roger [Penrose]’s scepticism about all attempts to interpret away this mystery, for example, by many worlds interpretations, decoherence, hidden variables, etc. At some stage or another in a measurement process the unitary evolution of the quantum state breaks down and an actualization occurs. But at what stage? There are many possibilities’ (Shimony 1997, pp. 156–57). |
29 | Schrödinger says ‘Mind […] I venture to call it indestructible since it has a peculiar timetable, namely mind is always now. There is really no before or after for mind. There is only a now that includes memories and expectations. But I grant that our language is not quite adequate to express this, and I also grant, should anyone wish to state it, that I am now talking religion, not science’ Schrödinger (QQ: 87) |
30 | Interestingly, it follows that consciousness is not a product of evolution. Consciousness does not evolve. |
31 | Davies says ‘Science, which by definition deals only with the physical universe, might successfully explain one thing in terms of another, and that in terms of another and so on, but the totality of physical things requires an explanation from without’ (Davies 1983, p. 47). |
32 | Omnès says ‘In his [Heidegger’s] opinion, one cannot reach [the] Being by experiment, because [the] “Being withdraws itself as soon as it is disclosed in the instant”. Whatever the meaning of this poetic sentence, it strangely looks when reading it in its context like a transmutation from potentiality to actuality that is not so foreign to physics’ (Omnès 1994, pp. 519–20). |
33 | Rees says ‘It is indeed remarkable that the external world displays so many patterns that our minds can interpret in mathematical “language”—especially when these are so remote from the everyday experiences and phenomena that our brains have evolved to cope with’ (Rees 1997, p. 160). |
34 | Planck says ‘All matter originates and exists only by virtue of a force which brings the particle of an atom to vibration and holds this most minute solar system of the atom together. We must assume behind this force the existence of a conscious and intelligent mind. This mind is the matrix of all matter’ (Planck 1944, Abt. Va, Rep. 11, Nr. 1797). |
35 | Heisenberg says ‘If we wish to approach the “one” in terms of a precise scientific language, we must turn our attention to that center of science described by Plato, in which the fundamental mathematical symmetries are to be found. In the concepts of this language we must be content with the statement that “God is a mathematician”; for we have freely chosen to confine our vision to that realm of being which can be understood in the mathematical sense of the word “understanding”, which can be described in rational terms’ (Werner Heisenberg 1985, p. 54). |
36 | It has been argued persuasively by the Canadian philosopher John Leslie, in a rather Neo-Platonic way, that the reason why there is a universe is that it is better that there should be a universe rather than no universe. See (Leslie 1979). |
37 | Here ‘Being’ does not mean ‘the totality of what is’ (or similar). ‘Being’ is understood as ‘Pure Being’. Being is the Being of Parmenides and sharply ontologically distinct from any or all beings. |
38 | It follows that the Thomist thesis that God is his own existence is correct. (Aquinas 1953, VII. II; 1993, 202 & ff.) “Oportet ergo quod hoc quod est esse, sit substantia vel natura Dei”, “Therefore that which is Being, must be the essence or nature of God” (translation amended.) VII. II. 11. |
39 | Roger Penrose comes close to expressing this doctrine and (no doubt unknowingly) engages in quasi-Hegelian dialectic, in (Penrose 1997, pp. 137–39). He uses the image of a triangle (138) to describe the relations between three ‘worlds’ (96) and three ‘mysteries’. [1] Platonic; [2] Mental; [3] Physical. Penrose argues that each ‘emerges’ from the other. Penrose says ‘There is something distinctly mysterious about the way that these three worlds interrelate with one another—where each seems almost to “emerge” from a small part of its predecessor’ (Penrose 1997, p. 139). |
40 | Einstein notoriously resisted the more counter-intuitive implications of quantum physics for years. Nevertheless, Einstein understands, better than most, that serious science presupposes consciousness. Einstein says ‘[…] everyone who is seriously involved in the pursuit of science becomes convinced that a spirit is manifest in the laws of the universe—a spirit vastly superior to that of man, and one in the face of which we with our modest powers must feel humble’ (Einstein [1926] 1971, p. 33). |
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Priest, S. Quantum Physics and the Existence of God. Religions 2024, 15, 78. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15010078
Priest S. Quantum Physics and the Existence of God. Religions. 2024; 15(1):78. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15010078
Chicago/Turabian StylePriest, Stephen. 2024. "Quantum Physics and the Existence of God" Religions 15, no. 1: 78. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15010078
APA StylePriest, S. (2024). Quantum Physics and the Existence of God. Religions, 15(1), 78. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15010078