Whoever I Am: On the Quality of Life
Abstract
:1. That This
I must interrupt to say that ‘X’ is what exists inside me. ‘X’—I bathe in that this [esse isto]. It’s unpronounceable. All I do not know is in ‘X’ … Always independent, but it only happens to whatever has a body. Though immaterial, it needs our body and the body of the thing.–Clarice Lispector, Agua Viva
The structure of the question is implicit in all experience.–Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method
Life is a series of experiences which need innumerable forms.–Meher Baba
2. Everyone First!
3. Is a Bone
4. Facing the Face
5. Who Am I?
6. Ellipsis
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
1 | (Sorokin 1956) Not that Sorokin was against quantification per se, which is unthinkable given that “ultimate reality is infinite quantitatively and qualitatively” (Sorokin 1954, p. 366). |
2 | See Quantified Self: Self Knowledge Through Numbers, https://quantifiedself.co (accessed on 5 June 2024)). On the self-tracking movement, see Lupton (2016). |
3 | “Governance by numbers, as a radical form of impersonal power (an impersonality to which the law already aspired), has thus paradoxically spawned a world of bonds of dependence. In it there can be no difference marked between countries and businesses, or public and private … The suppression of the Law’s heteronomy—legal rules treated as just another product competing on a market of norms—has generated a double movement of privatisation of public responsibilities and ‘publicisation’ of private ones” (Supiot 2017, p. 285). |
4 | Bouilloud and Deslandes (2020) and Ghislain Deslandes, “Life is Not a Quantity: Philosophical Fragments Concerning Governance by Numbers”, in (Bouilloud and Deslandes 2020, p. 100). |
5 | “The fundamental phenomenon which we should never lose sight of in determining the meaning of arithmos … is counting, or more exactly, the counting-off, of some number of things. These things, however different they may be, are taken as uniform when counted as ‘objects.’ Insofar as these things underlie the counting process they are understood as of the same kind. That word which is pronounced last in counting off or numbering, gives the ‘counting-number,’ the arithmos of the things involved … In the process of counting, in the actus exercitus (to use scholastic terminology), it is only the multiplicity of the counted things which is the object of attention. Only that can be ‘counted’ which is not one, which is before us in a certain number: neither an object of sense nor one ‘pure’ unit is a number of things or units. The ‘unit’ as such is no arithmos” (Klein 1968, vol. 46, pp. 48–49). |
6 | “The series is simultaneous unity and multiplicity, particular and general: true poles of all perception, which cannot exist without one another” (Proudhon 2023). “The ONE is one complete whole and simultaneously a series of ones within the ONE” (Baba 1963, p. 52). As a metaphysical principle, seriality is present for Aristotle both in the ordering of the categories and in the refuted, ‘bad tragedy’ view of nature as “a series of episodes” (Aristotle 1941, Metaphysics, 1090b20–1), though his argument for the priority of substance, by entertaining the serial view hypothetically, expresses a certain ambivalence, or play, in the totality of things: “The subject of our inquiry is substance; for the principles and the causes we are seeking are those of substances. For if the universe [to pan] is of the nature of a whole [holon], substance is its first part; and if it coheres merely by virtue of serial succession [ephexes], on this view also substance is first, and is succeeded by quality, and then by quantity” (Aristotle 1941, Metaphysics, 1069a19–22). Aquinas articulates such whole/serial ambivalence as a question of perspective, in considering the nature of angelic knowledge: “Now it happens that several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts of a continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered severally they are many: consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In another way they are taken as forming one in the whole; and so they are grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and by one operation; as long as the entire continuous whole is considered” (Thomas Aquinas (Aquinas n.d.), Summa Theologica, Ia.58.2, https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1058.htm (accessed on 5 June 2024)). So, for Proclus, seriality is a universal principle manifesting the neither-one-nor-many nature of the One: “A series [seirá] or order is a unity … but that which is cause of the series as a unity must be prior to them all … Thus there are henads consequent upon the primal One, intelligences consequent on the primal Intelligence, souls consequent on the primal Soul, and a plurality of natures consequent on the universal Nature” (Proclus 1963, p. 21). |
7 | (Hegel 2010, pp. 285, 302). On the sorites paradox, see (Paradox 2018). |
8 | Seriality is a deceptively simple idea and phenomenon with connections to various interrelated concepts like sequence, succession, repetition, consequentiality, implication, order, iteration, list, coincidence, enumeration, pattern, and so on. To think clearly about seriality requires understanding the distinctions between seriality’s proliferating possibilities while staying within sight of the principle of seriality in its simplicity. This is always somewhat difficult, because of the way seriality mirrors the movement of thinking as a passage from thought to thought, to the point that the being or existence of a series may appear indistinguishable from the thinking of it. Just as, in thinking, we pass from thought to thought in a manner that makes one focus on the thoughts and forget or elide their passing per se, so, in the perception of seriality there is a natural tendency to give attention to the elements of the series and their interrelationships and to disregard seriality as such. We think and talk all the time about series of this or that without properly considering that we are dealing with seriality, no less objectively than subjectively. As many forms of relation and non-relation fall within the general idea of seriality, so do thoughts follow upon each other in all sorts of related and unrelated ways, such that the two are always becoming entangled. Whenever we are perceiving a series, however seemingly random or formally defined, there remains an unshakeable sense of its inseparability from the seriality of experience itself, as if the unity or individuality of one’s own being cannot but mark itself indexically across serially salient points of awareness, and, vice versa, as if our integrity, the unity of oneself, were somehow inseparable from this indicating of unities, one after another. Thus, in the case of the random or coincidental series, say a sequence of stars, there remains, despite the evident dependency upon seeing them as a series, the fact of their seriality being objectively or phenomenally there to notice. And in the case of the most irrefutable, observation-independent series, say, the set of natural numbers, there always remains, despite the awareness of their formal independence from one’s observing or counting them, the fact that one must imaginatively ‘fill them in’, projecting the integers to infinity, in order to grasp the set. The former, a presence of seriality where no regular series is there, pertains to the quantity of quality, in the positive sense of a ‘surplus’ magnitude of integrity, the intensive presence of much and of many qualities which make for more seriality than there are series. The latter, an inherent absence of seriality where a regular series is there, in the negative sense of a seriality’s lack of itself or auto-ellipsis, pertains to the quality of quantity, in the sense of a ‘deficient’ kind of integrity, the absence of the substantiality proper to its magnitude and number as abstractions which ‘never arrive’ or always fail to capture what they measure. Accordingly, we have, on the one hand, the putative ‘law of the series’, the theory put forth by Paul Kammerer, according to which reoccurring forms and events typically labelled as ‘coincidences’ are thought to be expressions of a deeper underlying force of attraction or affinity, “something like a transcendental precondition of all forms of regularity and coherence” (Wetters 2019). And on the other hand, we have Wittgenstein’s ‘rule-following paradox’, according to which all signs, however clearly they appear to demonstrate that something follows, are suspiciously in need of one’s following or deciding them (Wittgenstein 2009, §85). Whether we are dealing with a haphazard series of points connected ‘only’ by our connecting them or a series of unmistakable signs making ‘total’ sense, there remains the intriguing synthetic phenomenon of seriality, the being-serial of oneself and the thing, as if everything were held together by an endless spark leaping across the omnipresent gap between the two. Correlatively, we may say that between any two elements of a series, between this and that, there is not only nothing, but everything, just as in all perception, “Synaesthetic perception is the rule [la règle]” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p. 237). |
9 | Augustine (2006, X.33) translation modified to express literal sense of the verb. On the being-question, see (Marion 2005; Masciandaro 2011). |
10 | “There are realms of reality or—more exactly—of abstraction from reality in which the most complete detachment is the adequate cognitive approach. Everything which can be expressed in terms of quantitative measurement has this character. But it is most inadequate to apply the same approach to reality in its infinite concreteness. A self which has become a matter of calculation and management has ceased to be a self. It has become a thing. You must participate in a self in order to know what it is” (Tillich 2000). |
11 | “Dasein as such—being that is one with non-being—thus coincides completely with quality—non-being that is one with being; there is no sharp difference between them. Dasein, therefore, is not to be thought of as the ‘subject’ that ‘has’ qualities but is distinct from them; on the contrary, Dasein is one with—indeed, identical to—quality itself: as Hegel puts it in the Encyclopaedia Logic, “quality is, in general, the determinacy that is immediate, identical with being” (EL 146/195 [ § 90 A]). Being is determinate, therefore, insofar as it is qualitative; or, to put it another way, quality is what makes being determinate” (Houlgate 2022, p. 161). |
12 | Meister Eckhart, quoted in Sells (1994, p. 286). |
13 | Tillich, The Courage to Be, 124. |
14 | |
15 | As simultaneously one and many, the series is also logically neither one nor many, and thus the medium of Platonic individuality as the polycentrism of the One: “the ultimate source of reality is neither one nor many; individuality is not dissolved but established at the highest level; all things as individuals participate immediately in divinity, in a way that transcends the hierarchical levels of being” (Perl 2010). Cf. “When the soul comes out of the ego-shell and enters into the infinite life of God, its limited individuality is replaced by unlimited individuality. The soul knows that it is God-conscious and thus preserves its individuality. The important point is that individuality is not entirely extinguished, but it is retained in the spiritualised form” (Baba 1967, II.174–5). |
16 | |
17 | See De Anima, II.3. Fraser comments: “the serial entities [i.e., the various grades of soul] do not share any community of essence—they are not synonyms. What is common between the prior and the posterior entities is just their position relative to one another in the series; they cannot, therefore, be regarded as equal and co-ordinate species of a common genus” (Fraser 2003, p. 136). For Young, to embrace the “collective otherness of serialized existence”, in which “a person not only experiences others but also himself as an Other, that is, as an anonymous someone”, is crucial, as it “allows us to see women as a collective without identifying common attributes that all women have or implying that all women have a common identity” (Young 1994). While seriality in Sartre’s view seems to constitute a deficient and superficial form of sociality, its own serial relation to group formation reveals the fundamentality of the series as the process of “constant incarnations” governing the arising and dissolution of social forms: “groups are born of series and often end up by serializing themselves in turn … [what] matters to us is to display the transition from series to groups and from groups to series as constant incarnations of our practical multiplicity” (Sartre 2004, p. 65). Kathleen M. Gough (Gough 2024) emphasizes the open, relational, and educational dynamic of seriality: “Thinking in a series is always about thinking in multiples. You are never solo, never alone, you are always in relation” (p. 13). Seriality is thus the more authentically democratic form, that which saves individuality from the pressurized collective ego of the political group: “Once of the growth of the party becomes a criterion of goodness, it follows inevitably that the party will exert a collective pressure upon people’s minds … Political parties are organizations that are publicly and officially designed for the purpose of killing in all souls the sense of truth and justice” (Weil 2013, p. 13). Cf. “What the State cannot tolerate in any way, however, is that the singularities form a community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without any representable condition of belonging” (Agamben 1993c, p. 85). |
18 | I would like to thank the anonymous reader who suggested this avenue of clarification. |
19 | Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 30. |
20 | Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, 697A, in Complete Works, 73. |
21 | Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 86. |
22 | On how this happened, see Weeks (2020, p. 348). |
23 | Let us call it a self-destroying world of meaningless anthropocentric humanism. “In performing quantifying valuing, numbers effect an order of political economy that brings into being quantifiable and hence manageable nature” (Verran 2013, p. 35). “In truth, the very notion of the ‘aims’ of public policy is shaped in a deep way by the dictates of quantification. We don’t quantify because we are utilitarians. We are utilitarians because we quantify” (de Mesquita 2019). “The ‘in order to’ has become the content of the ‘for the sake of’; in other words, utility established as meaning generates meaninglessness” (Arendt 1958, p. 154). “The weakness of humanism’s claim consists in dogmatically imagining not only that man can hold himself up as his own measure and end (so that man is enough for man), but above all that he can do this because he comprehends what man is, when on the contrary nothing threatens man more than any such alleged comprehension of his humanity. For every de-finition imposes on the human being a finite essence, following from which it always becomes possible to delimit what deserves to remain human from what no longer does” (Marion, “Mihi magna quaestio factus sum”, 14). |
24 | (Blake 1988, p. 36). On individuation and/as stupidity, see (Masciandaro 2010; Ramey and Farris 2016). |
25 | “Many Romantics felt intuitively that all the negative characteristics of modern society—the religion of the god Money (Carlyle called it mammonism); the decline of all qualitative, social, and religious values; the death of the imagination and the novelistic spirit; the tedious uniformization of life; the purely utilitarian relations of human beings among themselves and with nature—stem from the same source of corruption: market quantification” (Löwy and Sayre 2001, p. 35). |
26 | (Goethe 1998, #1286). In other words, mathematics is haunted to infinity by its own indifference toward actual entities: “Mathematics, like dialectics, is an organ of the inner higher intelligence; in practice it is an art, like oratory. Nothing is of value to them both except form: content is a matter of indifference. Mathematics may be calculating pennies or guineas, rhetoric defending truth or falsehood, it’s all the same to both of them” (#605). Henri Bortoft (Bortoft 1996) explains how Goethe’s approach relates to the distinction between primary (quantifiable) and secondary (non-quantifiable) qualities: “Goethe gives attention to the phenomena … so that he begins to experience their belonging together … and thereby to see how they mutually explain each other. Such a holistic explanation is an intrinsic explanation, in contrast to the extrinsic explanation whereby phenomena are explained in terms of something other than themselves—which is conceived to be ‘beyond’ or ‘behind’ the phenomena, i.e., separate from the phenomena in some way. Extrinsic explanation is the mode of explanation typical of theory-based science. But through attention to the concrete, i.e., to the phenomena as such, we begin to encounter the qualities of the phenomena without any concern for their supposed ontological status as dictated by a theory (i.e., whether they are secondary qualities). Attention to the phenomena brings us into contact with quality, not quantity. The latter is in fact reached by abstracting from the phenomena, which entails standing back from the phenomena to produce a head-orientated science (to use Goethe’s phrase) instead of participating in the phenomena through the senses” (p. 214). |
27 | (Guénon 2001, p. 20). He describes the relation between rationalism, materialism, and descent into uniformity as follows: “As soon as it has lost all effective communication with the supra-individual intellect, reason cannot but tend more and more toward the lowest level, toward the inferior pole of existence, plunging ever more deeply into ‘materiality’; as this tendency grows, it gradually loses hold of the very idea of truth, and arrives at the point of seeking no goal other than that of making things as easy as possible for its own limited comprehension, and in this it finds an immediate satisfaction in the very fact that its own downward tendency leads it in the direction of the simplification and uniformization of all things; it submits all the more readily and speedily to this tendency because the results of this submission conform to its desires, and its ever more rapid descent cannot fail to lead at last to what has been called the ‘reign of quantity’” (94–95). |
28 | (Kula 1986, p. 42) “Kula concludes that in the preindustrial world, the qualitative was always dominant over the quantitative. The regime of discretion and negotiation clearly favored local interests over central powers, as was universally recognized. The privileging of judgment over objectivity in measures was only the tip of the iceberg. Every region, sometimes every village, had its own measures” (Porter 1995, p. 25). |
29 | Julius Evola, quoted in Furlong (2011, p. 82). |
30 | Sandoval, Methodology of the Oppressed, 122. |
31 | Italics altered. |
32 | “Spirituality must make man more human. It is a positive attitude of releasing all that is good, noble and beautiful in man. It also contributes to all that is gracious and lovely in the environment” (Baba 1967, I.32). |
33 | Meher Baba, Discourses, I.171, italics altered. Taurek’s controversial answer to the trolley problem (give all individuals an equal chance at survival by flipping a coin), regardless of its practicality, exposes the truth of this paradox: “I cannot see how or why the mere addition of numbers should change anything … The numbers, in themselves, simply do not count for me. I think they should not count for any of us” (Taurek 1977). |
34 | “Although the sense of equality is made the basis of many social and political ideals, the real conditions of rich co-operative life are fulfilled only when the bare idea of equality is replaced by the realisation of the unity of all life” (Baba 1967, II.76). |
35 | I find our shared human sense that there is a world in the sense of a single total sum of all things to be an ironic shadow of homo numerans: “the postulated domain of unified total overall reality corresponds to the idea of unrestricted quantification” (Gabriel 2015, p. 7). The sense of this irony needs clarification. Given that everything as it appears to us is precisely not a totality, but more of an unbounded and open-ended experiential expanse involving endless individualized co-witnesses with no-less-weird inner and outer worlds, our sense of there being a world, a single totality, is absurd. Now irony, as explained by Kierkegaard, represents the negative, self-suspending freedom of a subject absolutely isolated or alienated from objective reality: “It is not this or that phenomenon but the totality of existence that it contemplates sub specie ironiae [under the aspect of irony]. To this extent we see the correctness of Hegel’s view of irony as infinite absolute negativity … In irony, the subject continually wants to get outside the object, and he achieves this by realizing at every moment that the object has no reality” (Kierkegaard 1989, pp. 254–57). Per Kierkegaard’s pun, irony is a kind of bad eternity, comparable to Hegel’s bad infinity, which never stops counting itself. So, irony contemplates negatively what unrestricted quantification contemplates positively (i.e., everything as a sum), exploding the additive mass of all things into an endlessly revisable space of possibilities: “In irony, the subject is negatively free … and as such is suspended, because there is nothing that holds him. But this very freedom, this suspension, gives the ironist a certain enthusiasm, because he becomes intoxicated, so to speak, in the infinity of possibilities, and if he needs any consolation for everything that is destroyed, he can have recourse to the enormous reserve fund of possibility” (Kierkegaard 1989, p. 262). Correlatively, unrestricted quantification, that which adds everything up into the totality of a world, may be grasped as a kind of anti-irony which produces for the subject not negative freedom but positive imprisonment, a pseudo-sense of being securely confined in a countable whole. I say ‘pseudo’ both because the whole is never really countable and because the aim of adding it all up is also a way of existing or standing outside the count, discounting the presence of the counter, being virtually beyond the totality, such that quantification’s anti-irony is also itself ironic, a type of negative (or even nihilistic) freedom—there is a world and I have counted it. Consider, for example, how, even at the physical level, the radically unknown is included in our calculation of a universe composed of 95% dark matter, as if we could actually, from some vantage point, see and tally the totality, the 100% beneath, above, and inside our feet. Of course, neither irony’s suspension nor quantification’s fixity suffices the infinite flow of a heart’s desire, which wants both the unlimited play of positive freedom and the absolute safety of negative imprisonment, the ‘prisonless prison’ of eternal security, in the sense of the absence of an outside, which music, neither inside nor outside the world, gives an experience of. What we want, then, is a kind of paradisical, neo-medieval irony, in the sense of a humble, unnihilistic, non-isolating self-suspension harmonizable with subjectivity/objectivity, recalling that “medieval irony stemmed from man’s recognition of his place in creation; it was not at all a challenge to God but rather an acceptance of man’s own inadequacy, bearing out Kenneth Burke’s point that ‘humility is the proper partner of irony’” (Reiss 1981). In other words, it would be some decent species of sincere irony, a homely double suspension of self and totality that unveils truth. For neither imposing our image upon nor forever hiding from reality are happy or actual options. |
36 | Meher Baba, speaking in Beyond Words, dir. Louis van Gasteren (1997), https://youtu.be/qOwi4MaLULI. (accessed on 5 June 2024). |
37 | See All That Breathes, dir. Shaunak Sen (2022), which explores interconnectedness in relation to the meaning of breath: “Life itself is kinship. We are all a community of air. One shouldn’t differentiate between all that breathes”. Cf., “The ordinary man never loses faith. He is as one who climbs up a mountain a certain distance and, experiencing cold and difficulty of breathing, returns to the foot of the mountain. But the scientific mind goes on up the mountain until its heart freezes and dies” (Meher Baba, Everything and the Nothing, 55–6, my emphasis). We may say that breath is literally symbolic of spirit, a confluence of air and life that always speaks to the openness of beings to each other via a shared embodiment belonging to the extra-materiality of nature, its causal non-closure: “Nature goes beyond the universe. It is that which we attempt to know through measurement, but whose complexity always makes it more than we think we know at any time” (Gabriel 2022, p. 232). Correlatively, Allen argues for the need to think breath in political ecology: “Attending to breath brings previously considered immaterialities (elements, lungs, dust, emotions, affects, atmospheres and breath itself) into sharp focus with implications for how environmental subjectivities and politics come into being and how embodiment figures through these encounters” (Allen 2020, p. 98). Similarly, Gaard argues for the critical importance of ‘airstories’ in the contemporary world: “In an era of anthropogenic climate change, extinctions, migrations, pandemics, refugees and smog, recuperating, and sharing airstories offers a timely approach toward illuminating the interbeing and intra-action of all vital matter, and the life that is continuous, coexistent, and present in every breath” (Gaard 2022, p. 315). To consider the spiritual and environmental nature of breath promises a path beyond the overheated “global civilization greenhouse” wherein human beings, haunted by the scientistic worldview of humankind as “towered above on all side by monstrous exteriorities that breathe on it with stellar coldness and extra-human complexity”, are “driven to limit themselves to small, malicious arithmetic units”, a way into a more livable, breathable sphere or “immune-systemically effective space” for “ecstatic beings that are operated upon by the outside” (Sloterdijk 2011, pp. 23–28). |
38 | Gabriel and Žižek, Mythology, Madness, Laughter, 77. |
39 | “For in all action what is principally intended by the agent, whether he acts by natural necessity or voluntarily, is the disclosure or manifestation of his own image. Whence it happens that every agent, insofar as he is such, takes delight. For, because everything that is desires its own being and in acting the being of an agent is in a certain way amplified, delight necessarily follows, since delight always attaches to something desired” (Alighieri 1965, 1.13.2–3). |
40 | (Aristotle 1984). As Aquinas explains, pleasure perfects operation both as end and as agent, as an as-it-were extra end, a supplementary good added to the good of the action, and as an as-it-were extra agent, an instrumental helper in the action’s completion—‘as-it-were’ because the distinction is essentially logical rather than actual. “Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an end: not indeed according as an end is that on ‘account of which a thing is’; but according as every good which is added to a thing and completes it, can be called its end. And in this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that ‘pleasure perfects operation … as some end added to it’: that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, which is operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, denoting the repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as agent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that ‘pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy, but as health does: but it does so indirectly; inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it, and carries it out with greater care. And in this sense it is said in Ethic. x, 5 that ‘pleasures increase their appropriate activities, and hinder those that are not appropriate” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-1.33.4, https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2033.htm#article4 (accessed on 5 June 2024)). The question of pleasure’s activity and activity’s pleasure is existential, connected to a deferrable ambivalence at the core of life’s movement, or, further, to the present moment as displacement of the ambivalent ordering of life and pleasure: “But whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life is a question we may dismiss for the present” (Aristotle, Ethics, 10.4). This is clarified by Coomaraswamy, drawing on Bonaventure, in relation to the beauty of the opportune: “What is true of factibilia [things to be made] is true in the same way of agibilia [actions to be done]; a man does not perform a particular good deed for the sake of its beauty, for any good deed will be beautiful in effect, but he does precisely that good deed which the occasion requires, in relation to which occasion some other good deed would be inappropriate (ineptum), and therefore awkward or ugly. In the same way the work of art is always occasional, and if not opportune, is superfluous” (Coomaraswamy 2007, p. 35). |
41 | Augustine defines music as “the science of moving well, such that the movement is desired for itself and because of this delights through itself alone [scientiam bene movendi; ita ut motus per se ipse appetatur, atque ob hoc per se ipse delectet]” (De Musica, I.2, http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/resources/augustine/De_musica.txt (accessed on 5 June 2024)). |
42 | As Quinn states in summarizing the broadly perennialist/traditionalist view, “The enemy was for them rather the reduction—the reductio ad quantitatem—an apodictic denial of the reality of the intelligible realm, the specious and at times dangerous conclusions reached by those who held an exclusively quantitative worldview—for example, the proclivity to deracinate the process of intellectual intuition in metaphysics and the results thereby achieved from the ‘respectable and relevant’ academic milieu. Quantity, in the Traditional view, is a complement to quality, not an irreconcilable antithesis; under the right conditions the complexio oppositorum becomes a coincidentia oppositorum” (Quinn 1997, p. 46). |
43 | Italics altered. This ideal of positive freedom as infusion without curtailment is similar to what Sloterdijk more normatively identifies as the ‘floating’ nature of human life: “Humans have never lived in direct relationship with ‘nature,’ and their cultures have never set foot in the realm of what we call bare facts; their existence has always been exclusively in the breathed, divided, torn-open and restored space. They are life forms designed to be floating beings—if floating means depending on divided moods and shared assumptions” (Sloterdijk, Bubbles, 46). |
44 | “The condition of the world, the strife and uncertainty that is everywhere, the general dissatisfaction with and rebellion against any and every situation shows that the ideal of material perfection is an empty dream and proves the existence of an eternal Reality beyond materiality; for if this Reality did not exist, the increased material well-being of millions of people which science has brought about would have produced contentment and satisfaction, and the tremendous imagination science has projected into the general consciousness would have let loose happiness” (Baba 1963, p. 55). |
45 | Meher Baba, Discourses, III.55. |
46 | Meher Baba, Discourses, II.92. |
47 | I think it is fair to say that quantitative factualization tends to dualize knowledge, fashioning it as knowledge about an object, as we say, ‘to gather the facts about’ something. This occludes the appreciative dimension of knowing, as hermeneutic appreciation of the thing itself, attending to it with understanding as an inherent reality, a being saturated with its own necessity. As Nietzsche ways, “I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them—thus I will be one of those who make things beautiful” (Nietzsche 2001, p. 157). Fundamentally, this imperative is about insisting on a science which unites rather than separates subjects. Cf. “In non-duality there is … knowledge and appreciation of things as they are” (Baba 1967, I.169). |
48 | Here one might consider the connections between spectatorship and paralysis, as dramatized, for example, in Brian de Palma’s Body Double (1984), in which the paradox of acting inside the tomb of histrio-cinematic observation is investigated. Where the real is confounded with a screenic world-picture and oneself a character, there would seem to be no space for movement and no one who can know. |
49 | “[A]uch das Trennen ist noch ein Verbinden und Beziehen” (Heidegger 1970, p. 337). |
50 | “[M]odern science has its origins in an unprecedented mistrust of experience as it was traditionally understood” (Agamben 1993a, p. 19). |
51 | For a specific attempt at such science, see Civic Laboratory for Environmental Action Research (CLEAR), “a marine science lab dedicated to doing science recently by foregrounding anticolonial land relations” (Liboiron 2021, p. 6). As Liboiron explains, “the methodological question is: how do I get to a place where these relations are properly scientific, rather than questions that fall outside of science, the same way ethics sections are tacked on at the end of a science textbook? How do I, as a scientist, make alterlives and good Land relations integral to dominant scientific practice?” (20). |
52 | The quantification of life has a stronghold in the medical sphere, as instanced by the calculation of quality-adjusted life year (QALY) and the correlative general concept of the life span: “life is turned into a pilgrimage through check-ups and clinics back to the ward where it started. Life is thus reduced to a ‘span,’ to a statistical phenomenon which, for better or for worse, must be institutionally planned and shaped. This life-span is brought into existence with the prenatal check-up, when the doctor decides if and how the fetus shall be born, and it will end with a mark on a chart ordering resuscitation suspended” (Illich 1976, p. 79). |
53 | On the rise of this practice in the 14th and 15th centuries, see Gagné (2014). Gagné locates this development at the confluence of war and pandemic—specifically mustering and memorial practices—and the emergence of the modern fact, an epistemological unit the peculiar self-effacing emergence of which “was central to creating, then sustaining, the illusion that numbers are somehow epistemologically different from figurative language, that the former are somehow value-free whereas the excesses of the latter disqualify it from all but the most recreational or idealist knowledge-producing projects” (Poovey 1998, p. 6). Coupled with the rise of printed news bulletin and the addition of numbers to war monuments after 1500, “the meaning of numbers” was carried “beyond the instrumentality of quantification”, becoming, as Gagné states in an apt mercantile metaphor, “carriers of commemorative freight in extending a cult of memory” (794). |
54 | As Meher Baba says of the form of life which he followed from 1949 to 1952, “This New Life is endless, and even after my physical death it will be kept alive by those the life of complete renunciation of falsehood [etc.] … This New Life will live by itself eternally, even if there is not one to live it” (Purdom 1964). |
55 | “The belief that the soul is doing anything is a false belief. For example, a man believes that he is sitting in the chair, but in fact it is the body which is sitting in the chair. The belief that the soul is sitting in the chair is due to identification with the physical body. In the same way a man believes that he is thinking, but in fact it is the mind which is thinking. The belief that the soul is thinking is due to identification with the mind. It is the mind which thinks and the body which sits. The soul is neither engaged in thinking nor in any other physical actions” (Baba 1967, III.146). This is equivalent to saying that the spontaneous, uncaused cause of action does not itself act, just the ceaseless present, as the standing now (nunc stans), does not move. Priest writes, “the soul is an initiator. It causes actions but is not caused to cause those actions. At the unconditioned level it is disclosed both that the soul is the cause of its own actions and that there is always the possibility of not acting, or acting otherwise, which is to say the soul has free will” (Priest 2012, p. 332). That one does not fully realize and enjoy this spontaneous freedom is due to the mind’s being conditioned by the impressions (sanskaras) of experience: “The mind is capable of genuine freedom and spontaneity of action only when it is completely free from sanskaric ties and interests” (Baba 1967, II.162). |
56 | Agamben, Coming Community, 14. |
57 | “[T]he singular experiences or observed particulars that natural philosophers began to value in the seventeenth century … were neither signifiers of anything nor self-evidently valuable; only when such particulars were interpreted as evidence did they seem valuable enough to collect, because only then did they acquire meaning or even … identity as facts” (Poovey 1998, p. 9). |
58 | Gabriel, Moral Progress, 189. |
59 | Markus Gabriel expresses this by underscoring the reality of circumstances: “moral statements deal with actually existing circumstances involving feeling and thinking living beings. These actually living existing circumstances are never maximally objective or maximally subjective but are located somewhere between these extremes. Their location depends on the concrete circumstances of our action situations” (Moral Progress, 94). |
60 | “Mind cannot tell you which things are worth having, it can only tell you how to achieve the ends accepted from non-intellectual sources. In most persons the mind accepts ends from the promptings of wants, but this means denial of the life of the spirit. Only when the mind accepts its ends and values from the deepest promptings of the heart does it contribute to the life of the spirit. Thus mind has to work in co-operation with the heart; factual knowledge has to be subordinated to intuitive perceptions; and heart has to be allowed full freedom in determining the ends of life without any interference from the mind. The mind has a place in practical life, but its role begins after the heart has had its say” (Baba 1967, I.140). Cf., “the natural sciences are unsuitable for ascertaining moral facts using measuring procedures or mathematical theorizing. This in no way means that there are no moral facts, simply that there is a great deal that cannot be scientifically explored or technologically controlled” (Gabriel 2022, p. 233). |
61 | For a defense of qualophilia against the demands of qualophobia, as the claim that one should admit to being a zombie (or the equivalent to) and not “a subject of genuine conscious experience”, see Levine (1994). Levine diagnoses qualophobia as fear of “disrespect for the authority and objectivity of science” and a “rush to solve the mind-body problem”, which causes qualophobes “to deny the undeniable” (125). Similarly, fear of either the face of reality or God may be seen as the simultaneous fear of seeing oneself, fear of seeing others, and fear of the faceless: “Each face, then, that can look upon Thy face beholdeth naught other or differing from itself, because it beholdeth its own true type … In like manner, if a lion were to attribute a face unto Thee, he would think of it as a lion’s; an ox, as an ox’s, and an eagle, as an eagle’s … In all faces is seen the Face of faces, veiled, and in a riddle; howbeit unveiled it is not seen until …“. (Nicholas of Cusa 2007, p. 24–6). |
62 | See note 31. |
63 | Cf., “Things are not outside of us, in measurable external space, like neutral objects (ob-jecta) of use and exchange; rather, they open to us the original place solely from which the experience of measurable external space becomes possible. They are therefore held and comprehended from the outset in the topos outopos (placeless place, no-place place) in which our experience of being-in-the-world is situated. The question ’where is the thing?’ is inseparable from the question ’where is the human?’” (Agamben 1993b, p. 59). |
64 | Gabriel, Moral Progress, 179. |
65 | Hilan Bensusan, Indexicalism, 86. |
66 | (Baba 1958, p. 8) Cf. “Every being questions. Just as we question every being, every being questions us. Every questioning is being questioned. In other words, nothing lies beyond questioning. The questioning of questioning is the questioning of all questioning. It is the mother of questioning. It is a generating process, the process of bring forth into the open, and at the same time a process of conserving the bringing forth into the open” (Murungi 2011, p. 357). On mysticism as “a pure science of the question, not irrational experience, but the superrational experience of experience, the conscious being of question itself, the question that one is”, see Masciandaro (2011). |
67 | On the spontaneous nature of the question, see Masciandaro (2018). |
68 | Even if one limits the question to animals, “the roots of the biological ability to evolve and perform playful acts go back over a billion years” (Burghardt 2005, p. 379). |
69 | Question as spark is comparable to synderesis: “Just as the spark is that part of fire which is purer and hovers above the whole fire, so synderesis is that which is supreme in the judgment of conscience. And it is according to this metaphor that synderesis is called a spark of conscience” (Aquinas 1994, p. 325). As conscience stands above the judgment of others, questioning stands apart from opinion: “Plato shows in an unforgettable way where the difficulty lies in knowing what one does not know. It is the power of opinion against which it is so hard to obtain an admission of ignorance. It is opinion that suppresses questions. Opinion has a curious tendency to propagate itself. It would always like to be the general opinion, just as the word that the Greeks have for opinion, doxa, also means the decision made by the majority in the council assembly” (Gadamer 1989, p. 366). |
70 | |
71 | “I like villains, heroes, angels, devils—anyone who acts their parts perfectly!” (Meher Baba, quoted in Lord Meher, 2133). |
72 | Fiumara, Spontaneity, 25. |
73 | “For as the Etruscans are said often to torture captives by chaining dead bodies face to face with the living, fitting part to part, so the soul seems to be extended throughout and affixed to all the sensitive members of the body” (Aristotle 1984, B107). |
74 | Meher Baba, Discourses, I.57. |
75 | “The connection which determinateness now has with being is one of the immediate unity of the two [being and non-being], so that as yet no differentiation between the two is posited. Determinateness thus isolated by itself, as existent determinateness, is quality—something totally simple, immediate. Determinateness in general is the more universal which, further determined, can be something quantitative as well. On account of this simplicity, there is nothing further to say about quality as such” (Hegel 2010, p. 85). |
76 | Meher Baba, Discourses, II.192. |
77 | (Han 2022a). For an attempt to think how digital networks might be better tuned to the nature of learning, see Johnson et al. (2022, pp. 39–58). Given that “something is clearly wrong in the technical world that we have built for ourselves” and that “our abstractions have increased the gap between the way nature works and the way people think” (39), the authors argue for the possibility of improving digital networks by restoring network theory to “the micro-foundations of networks in cellular dynamics” (40). While they do not consider the place of questioning in life process as such, the argument does hinge on bio-hermeneutic analogies between cell function and learning, specifically the way cells develop via anticipatory self-modelling and how holes or zero totalities operate in biological processes, both of which are definitive of the nature of questioning (47). |
78 | “Perhaps someone might say, But surely, Socrates, after you have left us you can spend the rest of your life in quietly minding your own business. This is the hardest thing of all to make some of you understand. If I say that this would be disobedience to God, and that is why I cannot ‘mind my own business,’ you will not believe that I am serious. If on the other hand I tell you that to let no day pass without discussing goodness and all the other subjects about which you hear me talking and examining both myself and others is really the very best thing that a man can do, and that life without this sort of examination is not worth living, you will be even less inclined to believe me. Nevertheless, that is how it is” (Plato 1963, p. 23). |
79 | “And just as the dialectical negativity of experience culminates in the idea of being perfectly experienced—i.e., being aware of our finitude and limitedness—so also the logical form of the question and the negativity that is part of it culminate in a radical negativity: the knowledge of not knowing” (Gadamer 1989, p. 362). |
80 | Meher Baba, Discourses, I.169–70. |
81 | Fiumara, Spontaneity, 20, my italics. |
82 | Meher Baba, Discourses, I.35. |
83 | Meher Baba, Discourses, I.171. |
84 | Translation modified. Cf., “The coming being is whatever being” (Agamben 1993c, p. 1). See also Elisabeth Roudinesco’s critique of identity politics which proposes “a possible world in which everyone can adhere to the principle according to which ‘I am myself, that’s all there is to it,’ without denying the diversity of human communities or essentializing either universality or difference. ‘Neither too close nor too far apart,’ as Claude Lévi-Strauss was wont to say” (Roudinesco 2022, xi). The connection between totality and the affective or heart-centric core of thinking (and therefore authentic identity) is articulated by Han in contradistinction to so-called artificial intelligence: “Thinking sets out from a totality that precedes concepts, ideas and information. It moves in a ‘field of experience’ before it turns toward the individual objects and facts in that field. Being in its totality, which is the concern of thinking, is disclosed first of all in an affective medium … the world as a totality is pre-reflexively disclosed to humans … Artificial intelligence may compute very quickly, but it lacks spirit … Artificial intelligence is without heart. Heartfelt thinking measures and feels spaces before it works on concepts” (Han 2022b, pp. 37–40). |
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Masciandaro, N. Whoever I Am: On the Quality of Life. Religions 2024, 15, 735. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15060735
Masciandaro N. Whoever I Am: On the Quality of Life. Religions. 2024; 15(6):735. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15060735
Chicago/Turabian StyleMasciandaro, Nicola. 2024. "Whoever I Am: On the Quality of Life" Religions 15, no. 6: 735. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15060735
APA StyleMasciandaro, N. (2024). Whoever I Am: On the Quality of Life. Religions, 15(6), 735. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15060735