Reflecting on the Distinction between Philosophical Daoism and Religious Daoism Based on the Transmission and Transformation of the Concept of “Philosophy”

Abstract

The distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism is widely influential yet highly controversial. The current popular empirical methods often overlook the vicissitude of the concepts underlying the reception history of this distinction. Therefore, this article adopts the method of intellectual history, based on the transmission and transformation of the concept of philosophy, to examine the rationales of the establishment and reception of this Daoist distinction. Here, we present that, though the Confucian tradition of ranking Daoist figures provided soil for this Daoist distinction, the establishment of the dichotomy with terminological awareness should be attributed to the cooperation between Victorian Protestant intellectuals and their late Qing Confucian collaborators. The concept of philosophy that pursues eternal wisdom and truth and traces the origin of all things has played an essential role in the establishment of this distinction. The thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi was valued and preferred in mainland China because of its deemed congruence with this Western concept of philosophy, while other more religious branches of Daoism were belittled. However, the philosophies of anti-metaphysics engender a new paradigm of thinking. On the one hand, under the influence of logical positivism and its successors, natural science has become an excellent model for other studies. In light of empirical methods, the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism becomes an erroneous and inefficient metaphysical distinction. On the other hand, inspired by continental philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida, scholars gained a new perspective on understanding the thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi. Thus, a new consensus emerges: eternal truth based on concepts and logic distorts the real world of life. According to this, the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism is only an imaginary and conceptual distinction, which does not apply to the understanding of living Daoism.

1. Introduction

Norman J. Girardot once confirmed that the distinction between philosophical Daoism (daojia 道家) and religious Daoism (daojiao 道教) framed Western understanding of the Daoist tradition for much of the twentieth century (Girardot 1999). In Chinese academia, the Daoist distinction remains the basic dichotomy for writing Daoist history even to this day. However, when zooming in, a complex situation emerges: some scholars argue that the distinction between Daoist philosophy and Daoist religion originated in China, while others try to demonstrate that this distinction was established by Western intellectuals; some scholars criticize religious Daoism as superstitious and believe that it is not worth studying, while others focus on exploring religious Daoism through empirical methods; some scholars call for the integration of philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism, while others point out that the dichotomy is an imaginary distinction that does not conform to historical facts.

The complexity of the disputations indicates that the Daoist distinction is a very noteworthy issue. Given the profound significance of this distinction, it is necessary to clarify the following questions: When and where did the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism originate? What are the rationales for elevating Daoist philosophy and belittling Daoist religion? What are the reasons for endorsing and opposing the distinction? Why did people initially generally embrace this distinction, but later are there significant discrepancies in the reception of it?

The Daoist distinction is a sub-issue of the distinction between philosophy and religion. Therefore, revisiting this issue on the concept of philosophy and religion should be an appropriate approach. In this article, we focus on examining the Daoist distinction based on the concept of philosophy. There are two main reasons: first, philosophy and religion are closely paired, and when the concept of philosophy is clarified, the concept of religion is also illuminated to a certain extent. Second, from the perspective of intellectual history, the above-listed questions are closely related to the transmission and transformation of the concept of philosophy. Here, we would like to point out in advance that the relationship between this Daoist dichotomy and the concept of philosophy is the focus of this article.

The writing of this article relies mainly on the method of intellectual history.1 By investigating the transmission and transformation of the concept of “philosophy,” we can effectively and directly focus on our concerns. Readers well versed in philosophy may desire a more detailed philosophical analysis in this article. However, given the primary purpose and length constraints of this article, we have shelved our ambition for an exhaustive philosophical analysis.

The main body of this paper consists of four sections: the first section focuses on the establishment of the Daoist dichotomy. As shown in existing classics and literature, there was no apparent bifurcation between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism throughout history. There just appears to be a Confucian tradition of ranking Daoist figures, which, indeed, provides soil for the distinction. The Daoist distinction, in a terminological sense, can be safely traced back to the cooperation between Victorian Protestant intellectuals and their late Qing Confucian collaborators. The concept of philosophy has played an essential role in the establishment of this distinction.

The second section explores the reception history of this Daoist distinction and presents the various understandings and attitudes of both Eastern and Western scholars towards the dichotomy, which provides a factual basis for discussions in later sections.

The main purpose of the third section is to demonstrate the influence of traditional philosophy, namely, philosophy with metaphysics as its core, on the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism. Traditional Western philosophy pursues eternal wisdom and truth and traces the origin of all things. Comparatively, the thought of Laozi 老子 and Zhuangzi 莊子 has been regarded as the prominent representative of the Chinese philosophy because of its deemed congruence with the Western concept of philosophy. However, at the same time, other branches of Daoism were belittled, especially in mainland China, chiefly because they were interpreted as filled with superstitions and incompatible with modernity, so the research on these branches could not be fully carried out for a long time.2 Since the May Fourth Movement (Wusi Yundong 五四運動) in the late 1910s, Confucianism has also experienced intense criticism. Therefore, just raising that Laozi and Zhuangzi are more in line with the tastes of Confucian intellectuals cannot explain the popularity of the Daoist distinction in mainland China. The concept of philosophy plays a fundamental role in the reception history of the Daoist dichotomy.

The fourth section focuses on the influence of antitraditional philosophy on the Daoist distinction. Given that the concept of philosophy is fundamental to this distinction, the transformation of the concept of philosophy must lead to different understandings and treatments of this distinction. If the rationale for embracing this Daoist distinction is rooted in the belief that Daoist philosophy has genuine metaphysical concerns, then once the traditional metaphysics is overcome, the Daoist dichotomy loses its foundation accordingly. However, mainstream Chinese scholars will not fully accept Western postmodern thinking, and this Daoist distinction will still exist in the Chinese academic community, although it will greatly deviate from the meaning it held when it was established.

2. The Establishment of the Distinction between Philosophical Daoism and Religious Daoism

Before reflecting on the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism, it is necessary first to examine how this distinction was established.

Let us start with the term “Daoism.” “Daoism” has various meanings in English and limits its meanings neither to the field of philosophy nor to the field of religion (Bokenkamp 1997, p. 10). According to the existing research, the word “Daoism” is not a translation of a given Chinese term, but a word coined by Western scholars in the 1830s (Liu 2015, p. 472). If translating this word into modern Chinese, we are presented with at least two words: daojia and daojiao. According to their modern semantic stipulations, daojia is the philosophical Daoism referring to the Daoist schools; daojiao is the religious Daoism referring to the Daoist religion.

However, based on the analysis of the usage of these two words in traditional China, we can see that daojia, rather than daojiao, serves as a more suitable counterpart to the word “Daoism” coined in the 1830s. In other words, “Daoism” could be initially regarded as equivalent to daojia in the classical Chinese sense. Due to the widespread influence of the modern meanings of daojia and daojiao, it is necessary to review how the word daojia was employed in classical Chinese contexts and to figure out its relevant meanings.

The expression of daojia possibly first appeared in Sima Tan’s 司馬談 (?–110B.C) “On Principles of Six Schools” (Lun Liujia Yaozhi 論六家要旨): “Daojia proclaims that humans should be attentive to form and spirit, take action conforming to formlessness, and leave all things be self-sufficient” (Sima 2010, p. 7636). According to Liu Xiaogan, daojia might refer to the Huang-Lao school, named after the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi 黃帝)3 and Laozi (Liu 2015, p. 473). The daojia here is short for Daodejia 道德家,4 which dialogues with other schools, such as Confucianism and Mohism.

Ge Hong 葛洪 (283–343) stated, in Baopuzi Waipian 抱樸子外篇: “The inner chapters focus on immortalization and medicine, spells and magics, bodily cultivation for longevity, warding off evils and disasters, which belong to daojia. The outer chapters talk about success and failure, rightness and wrongness in the human world, which belongs to rujia (儒家 Confucianism)” (Ge 2013, p. 1139). We can read from the quotation that Ge Hong employs the term daojia to distinguish between Daoism and Confucianism. However, according to the later established distinction, daojia, in Ge Hong’s sense, corresponds more to religious Daoism.

Liu Xie 劉勰 (ca. 465–532) wrote in the essay “Miehuo Lun” 滅惑論 that: “According to the writings of daojia, we can rank three levels: the highest level is Laozi’s thought, the second level is about immortalization, and the lowest level is Zhang Daoling’s ideas about practices” (You 2013, p. 549). Liu Xie clearly included both Laozi and Zhang Daoling 張道陵 (34–156)5 in what he called “daojia.” He made no distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism but merely ranked the famous figures of daojia (Daoism). It is worth mentioning Wang Bi here, who tried to justify Confucian politics and ethics using Daoist thought. This Daoist justification of Confucian politics and ethics greatly promotes the acceptance of Laozi by Confucian literati (Kern 1990, p. 78).

Ma Duanlin 馬端臨 (1254–1340) wrote, in the “Bibliography of Daoist Canon” (Daozang Shumu 道藏書目): “The arts and techniques of daojia are mixed and varied, which include cultivation of inner peace, alchemy and bodily cultivation, practices of taking medicine, spell and magic, as well as doctrinalism. The books of Huangdi, Laozi, Liezi 列子, and Zhuangzi focus on the cultivation of inner peace and non-action and involve a little about alchemy and bodily cultivation; however, the practices of taking medicine, spell and magic, and doctrinalism are never touched” (Ma 1986, p. 1810). It can be seen that Ma Duanlin’s “daojia” here includes both philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism. According to Ma Duanlin, Laozi and Zhuangzi do not involve practices of taking medicine, spells and magic, etc. From the point of view of later scholarship, taking medicine, Daoist spells and magic all belong to the Daoist religion. In this case, Ma Duanlin is a follower of Liu Xie and also makes classification and ranking lists within Daoism.

“Daojia” in Weishu Shilaozhi 魏書·釋老志, Jiutangshu Jingjizhi 舊唐書·經籍志, Mingshi Yiwenzhi 明史·藝文志 means both philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism.6 The collection of the Daoist Canon (Daozang 道藏) often uses daojia to refer to the whole of Daoism; that is, both philosophical and religious Daoism are included.

At the same time, by combining traditional and classical works, we can see that the word daojiao is not solely assigned to referring to Daoism, either. According to Ren Jiyu’s research, the expression daojiao first appears in The Xiang’er Commentary to the Laozi (Laozi Xiang’er Zhu 老子想爾註) (Ren 1990, p. 8): “When the true Dao is hidden away, deviant writings emerge. Those mortals who commonly practice false arts proclaim them as the daojiao (teachings of the Dao), but it is all fraud and may not be employed” (Bokenkamp 1997, p. 104).7 Obviously, daojiao here refers to the “teachings of the Dao,” and it is not a proprietary term referring to the Daoist religion. On the contrary, in traditional China, the word daojia was often used to refer to the Daoist religion in the modern sense.

From the above citation and analysis, it can be seen that Daoism did not split into philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism in traditional China; daojia, rather than daojiao, is a better counterpart of Daoism (in its modern English sense);8 however, as shown in the expressions of Liu Xie and Ma Duanlin, the ranking of Daoist figures and ideas can be seen as a precursor to distinguishing Daoist philosophy from Daoist religion.

Indeed, some scholars believe that Liu Xie is the initiator of this Daoist distinction (Xu 2017, p. xi). Given that there was no such clear bifurcation of Daoism in history, especially in the early period, we do not consider Liu Xie as the creator of this distinction. However, the ranking of Daoist figures does contribute to the formation and establishment of the distinction in the later period.

The traditional Confucian intellectuals, like Liu Xie and Ma Duanlin, had mixed feelings towards the miscellaneous and multifaceted Daoism. They spoke highly of Laozi and Zhuangzi’s thought while adopting a dismissive attitude to other Daoist branches, which take immortalization, spell drawing, and evil vanquishing as the primary practices.9 However, in any case, the traditional Confucian intellectuals’ embrace of Laozi and Zhuangzi’s thought in some ways, as well as their rejection of immortalization and evil vanquishing, cannot be interpreted to mean that they definitely distinguished philosophical Daoism from religious Daoism in the sense of terminology setting.

If the Daoist distinction was not established in traditional China, when was it established?

Girardot attributed the engenderment of the distinction to James Legge (1815–1897). According to Girardot’s historical retrospection, Legge, as a Protestant, resolutely opposed Catholicism and believed that the originally pure Christianity had suffered the material corruptions of Roman Catholicism. Taking this stand, Legge saw a “philosophical and morally pure” Daoism in the Daodejing 道德經, which he regarded as superior in value to “the dissolute tradition of ritualized Daoism with ‘Daoist popes’” (Girardot 1999). In other words, religious Daoism is full of superstition, while the Daodejing contains neither superstition nor ritualized religion.

Similar to Girardot, Russel Kirkland attempted to demonstrate that the distinction was actually created by Protestant intellectuals like James Legge and their Confucian informants. In the 19th century, Western sinologists and missionaries’ access to Chinese thought was very limited and mainly relied on the late Qing Confucian literati they had close contact with.10 These Confucian collaborators saw no value in the living Daoist religion of that time. As Kirkland’s argument shows, “the perspective of those Confucian informers toward Daoism was quite comparable to that of most nineteenth-century European intellectuals toward Catholicism” (Kirkland 1997a).11 In the eyes of the Protestant intellectuals of that time, Catholicism was a ritualized religion led by bishops and priests, catering to the fears and superstitions of ignorant and backward people and offering nothing to the enlightened intellectuals who were seeking truth. Similarly, in the eyes of those Confucians, the Daoist religion was rife with superstition, spells, and magic; it spread fear and contradicted the teachings of Confucian sages. On this account, the cooperation between Protestant intellectuals and Confucian literati led to the situation that, except for the thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi, other Daoist ideas and practices were either ignored or caricatured (Kirkland 1997a). Kirkland’s demonstration is persuasive. In addition, his explanation also shows why Confucian intellectuals at that time readily accepted the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism.

To sum up, the differentiation of philosophical Daoism from religious Daoism with terminological awareness should be attributed to early Western sinologists with the collaboration of Confucian literati. Of course, the Confucian ranking of Daoist figures provides fertile soil for this distinction. It is worth mentioning that scholars in traditional China were not good at distinguishing and creating systems based on concepts. Just as Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868–1940) said, “If we want to make a system, we have nothing to rely on in the writings of the traditional Chinese; we have to refer to the history of Western philosophy” (Hu 2013, p. 2).

3. The Reception of the Daoist Distinction

This Daoist distinction has great vitality. Once established, it gained widespread popularity. As Girardot confirmed, the distinction between daojia (an early philosophically and morally pure Daoism) and daojiao (a later ritualistic and magical Daoism) set the context for the Western understanding of the Daoist tradition for much of the twentieth century (Girardot 1999). The following section concisely depicts the reception history of the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism.

As presented above, religious Daoism and philosophical Daoism are fabricated due to the preunderstanding of belittling the ritualistic and magical (even corrupt) Daoism and appreciating the thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi. Logically, at the beginning of the establishment of this distinction, Western scholars usually belittled religious Daoism and favored philosophical Daoism.

The French orientalist Léon de Rosny (1837–1914) followed the distinction and repeatedly proposed to use the French word “taoïsme” to refer to philosophical Daoism and “taosséisme” to designate religious Daoism. In de Rosny’s view, philosophical Daoism has great philosophical value, while religious Daoism “makes the people stupid” and “is a religion of little value” (Zhang 2022).

However, this Daoist dichotomy soon encountered critiques and challenges in the Western sinological sphere. The French sinologist Henri Maspéro (1883–1945) interpreted the early Daoist philosophy as a form of mysticism and emphasized that there is no distinct gap between philosophical Daoism and the later Daoist religion (Maspéro 1981, p. xx). In other words, by considering philosophical Daoism as mystical, Maspéro weakened the philosophical color of early Daoist scriptures, thus bridging so-called daojia and daojiao as a continuous development.

Maxime Kaltenmark (1910–2002), a disciple of Maspéro, also followed his tutor and stressed that philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism are very closely related to each other and from the same very ancient religious roots; though there are indeed significant differences between them, these differences are not sufficient enough for demonstrating that they represent two distinct undercurrents of thought (Kaltenmark 1983, pp. 193–194).

The French Daoist historian Anna Seidel (1938–1991) absolutely rejected such a distinction. She criticized that Chinese, Japanese, and Western sinological scholars generally make a strict distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism; however, this distinction does not correspond to historical facts (Seidel 2002, p. 5).

Russell Kirkland even claimed that, by the 1990s, “most scholars around the world who specialize in Daoist studies no longer see the fundamental historical issue as being a differentiation between ‘daojia’ and ‘daojiao’ or between ‘philosophical Daoism’ and ‘religious Daoism’” (Kirkland 1997b).12 His colleague Norman Girardot also held the same judgment and even affirmed that the distinction is an “old dichotomy between a pure philosophical-mystical Daoism and a corrupt religious-ritualistic Daoism” (Girardot 1999). Livia Kohn also followed and agreed that the Daoist division was established by nineteenth-century Protestant missionaries, such as James Legge. She stated that this dichotomy “has since been discarded as both erroneous and inefficient, replaced by a tripartite division into literati, communal, and self-cultivation” (Kohn 2019, p. 4). Interestingly, Kohn’s tripartite division strongly reminds us of Liu Xie’s ranking of Daoist figures.

In brief, most Western scholars nowadays have abandoned the Daoist dichotomy because, in their view, this dichotomy is either erroneous or inefficient.13

Unlike the situation in the Western sinological sphere, the dichotomy of philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism has become increasingly popular in the historical writings of Daoism in China since the early 20th century. Such a distinction, if not consciously stressed by Chinese scholars, is de facto utilized in the structure of their writings. However, their attitude and evaluation of Daoist philosophy and Daoist religion manifested in the history writings are not the same, making their views fall into three categories: first, some scholars consider that philosophical Daoism is of higher value than religious Daoism. Second, some scholars hold a more positive evaluation of the Daoist religion, though they also admit that philosophical Daoism is more valuable than religious Daoism. Third, other scholars emphasize the “binary whole” relationship between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism. They remind us that the key ideas in philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism are entangled, making the paired terms difficult to separate. The view of the third type comes very close to that of Maspéro and Kaltenmark.

Many representative scholars keep the stance of the first category. In the significant work History of Daoism (Daojiaoshi 道教史), Xu Dishan 許地山 (1893–1941) wrote that:

The content of Dao is extremely complex; either the noble thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi or the Daoist sexual practices (fangzhong shu 房中術) can be assigned to the name of Dao. Generally speaking, the Dao can be divided into philosophical Dao and religious Dao. Nowadays, people name the philosophical Dao as daojia and the religious Dao as daojiao. […] The ancient and primary daojia focuses on reasoning and reflection, while later formed daojiao clings to superstition.

(Xu 2017, pp. ix–xv)

This statement shows that Xu Dishan respected Daoist philosophy but devalued Daoist religion, although he conceded that it is very difficult to distinguish them completely (Xu 2017, p. ix).14

Fung Yu-Lan 馮友蘭 (1895–1990) also expressed explicitly in A Short History of Chinese Philosophy:

As to Daoism, there is a distinction between Daoism as a philosophy, which is called the Daoist school (daojia), and the Daoist religion (daojiao). Their teachings are not only different; they are even contradictory. Daoism as a philosophy teaches the doctrine of following nature, while Daoism as a religion teaches the doctrine of working against nature.

(Fung 1976, p. 3)15

Li Shen 李申 also distinguished philosophical Daoism from religious Daoism, and with the help of Xuan Zang’s 玄奘 (602–664) view,16 he argued that the religious reading of the Daodejing on its bodily cultivation is a degeneration (Li 1996, p. 134).

Though differentiating between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism, scholars of the second category hold a more positive evaluation of the Daoist religion. Ren Jiyu 任繼愈 (1916–2009) put forward two sources of the Daoist religion: one is the ancient divine religion (shendao 神道), and the other is the utterance of the Dao in the Laozi (Ren 1990, pp. 6–7). Therefore, the Daoist religion inherits from the Daoist philosophy. Meanwhile, Ren Jiyu evaluated Daoist religion under the view of Marxism and stressed that Daoist religion does have lots of negative and superstitious parts,17 but he advocates a dialectical perspective in studying Daoist religion (Ren 1990, p. 739). Tang Yijie 湯一介 (1927–2014) followed the opinion that Daoist religion inherits from Daoist philosophy. He further highlighted that religion does not equal superstition, and superstition should be eliminated, whereas religion plays an indispensable role in human life (Tang 2014, pp. 1–2).18

Qing Xitai 卿希泰 (1928–2017) also affirmed the terminological distinction: “Daojia in the pre-Qin period is a philosophical school represented by thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi, while daojiao is a religion formed in Eastern Han (25–220). These two are not the same thing” (Qing 1994). However, he underlined the association between them; namely, the Daoist religion regards Daodejing as the core scripture and reveres Laozi as the religious sage or deity. Although Qing Xitai did not acknowledge the value of Daoist superstition, he pointed out that Daoist religion promotes the influence of the Daoist school due to the role the religion played in history (Qing 1994).

Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇 agreed with the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism. He pointed out that the origins of the Daoist religion are complex. In addition to Daoist philosophy, ancient folklore, the thought of the yin-yang school (yin-yang jia 陰陽家) of the pre-Qin period, immortalization and recipes (shenxian fangshu 神仙方術) since the Warring States period, Confucian Mingjiao 名教,19 and the Buddhist idea of samsara are all involved in the formation of Daoist religion. Accordingly, it can be seen that the Daoist religion has such a complex origin that it cannot be simply devalued. He even stated that the Daoist religion has not only promoted the spread of Daoist philosophical ideas but also made significant contributions to science, technology, and plastic arts in traditional China (Guo 2006, p. 194).

Another important scholar who deserves mentioning here is Fu Qinjia 傅勤家 (active in the Republic of China 中華民國, birth and death are unknown). A History of Daoism in China (Zhongguo Daojiaoshi 中國道教史) was written by Fu, which is regarded as the first general history of Daoism completed by a Chinese scholar. Fu Qinjia also received the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism and believed that the latter originated from the former. However, Fu’s work showed no disparagement of the Daoist religion but expressed worries about the development of Daoist religion in modern times (Fu 2011, pp. 10–11). Unlike Daoist histories focusing mainly on native Chinese resources narrated by other Chinese scholars, Fu Qinjia’s History of Daoism in China drew on the achievements of many Japanese scholars.20

As mentioned above, scholars in the third category pay more attention to the dualistic unity of this Daoist distinction. Xiao Jiefu 蕭萐父 (1924–2008) concluded that: “To study the religious Daoism, one must trace its theoretical origin, in which the thought of Laozi, Zhuangzi, Liezi, and Wenzi 文子 will naturally be involved. In exploring philosophical Daoism, we must examine its historical development and admit that its descendants gradually converge with religious Daoism. So, the philosophical and religious facets can be united and studied when discussing Daoism” (Xiao and Luo 1991, p. 1).

Mou Zhongjian 牟鍾鑒 shares a similar view with Xiao Jiefu. He believes that “the dualistic Daoist philosophy and religion, together as one, pose one of the three pillars of traditional Chinese culture, and present a binary whole relationship within Daoism, that is, a combination of philosophy and religion” (Mou 1991, p. 6). Though acknowledging that modern scholars’ strict distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism is a step forward in cognition, Mou criticized that the distinction is far too simplistic and further pointed out that “the relationship between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism in history is a complex dynamic with separation and union, the coexistence of similarities and differences, and tangled development” (Mou 1991, p. 4). Hu Fuchen 胡孚琛 stressed that “philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism both take Dao as their theoretical foundation; Daoist philosophy is the philosophical underpinning of Daoist religion, and Daoist religion is the religious form of Daoist philosophy” (Hu 2001, p. 83).

The views of the scholars above manifest that the Daoist distinction is highly recognized in modern Chinese academic circles, although different scholars hold different evaluations and understandings of this distinction. However, it is rare for Chinese scholars to reject such a distinction completely.

4. Pure Philosophy and Its Influence on the Daoist Distinction

Through examining the establishment and reception of the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism, it is not difficult to find that the concept of philosophy has always played a very important role in the Daoist dichotomy.

When sinologists like Legge established this distinction, they presented such a dichotomy in their thought: a philosophically and morally pure Daoism vs. a ritualized Daoist religion rife with superstition. For the purpose of this article, we do not examine the phrase “morally pure”21 but instead focus on the phrase “philosophically pure.”

What does “philosophically pure” mean? What is “pure philosophy?” A philosophy should have concerns that transcend the secular world if it is pure. It is non-utilitarian and not directly useful. Such a pure philosophy should be at least second order, which means it is not directly knowledge or wisdom about the universe and life. It is a reflection on knowledge and wisdom and their foundations and possible conditions. Therefore, such philosophy has metaphysical or metaethical aspects. In the West, “pure philosophy,” as a term, is not commonly received or employed. However, in China, scholars have terminologized “pure philosophy.” Wang Guowei expressed the idea of “pure philosophy” (chuncui zhi zhexue 純粹之哲學) as early as 1904. He delineated this idea through the concept of metaphysics (Wang 2020, p. 8). Ye Xiushan 葉秀山 clearly proposed the concept of “pure philosophy” and strongly advocated this concept (Ye 2019, “Preface,” pp. 1–24). From the perspective of intellectual history, pure philosophy cannot be maintained as a concept with clear connotations, and it is also transformed in its dissemination. Chinese scholars have had numerous discussions about pure philosophy (Zhao 2019). When talking about pure philosophy in mainland China, people first think of philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and Hegel (Zhao 2019). Therefore, pure philosophy always takes traditional Western philosophy as its model. In this case, based on its kinship with metaphysics, we do not directly define “pure philosophy” but present it under the lens of Western traditional philosophy.

Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) once pointed out that it is safe to regard traditional Western philosophy as a series of footnotes of Plato (Whitehead 1978, p. 39). The distinct features of Plato’s philosophy are the pursuit of immutable truth (idea) and the inquiry into the ultimate cause of all things (Cooper and Hutchinson 1997, p. 451). If we understand metaphysics as a science that studies supersensible and abstract things that lay the foundation for obvious and sensible things, Plato’s philosophy is typically metaphysical. According to Aristotle, the first philosophy studies “substance that is without change”; it is a “universal science” (Aristotle 1998, p. 156). Obviously, Aristotle’s first philosophy is also metaphysical. During the Hellenistic period (from around the third to sixth century), under the influence of Christianity, philosophy preferred the exegetic or scholastic method, attempting to unify Plato and Aristotle, setting its goal in a mystical “oneness” that should transcend time, space, and spirit (Ritter and Gründer 1989, p. 597).

Of course, the concept of philosophy has also suffered a lot of criticism in Western history,22 and its focal point has undergone many changes. However, the essential feature of philosophy, namely, the love for wisdom and the pursuit of eternal truth, has not been truly shaken until modern times. Augustine of Hippo (354–430) understood philosophy as “love” (amor) and “the study of wisdom or truth” (studium sapientiae) (Ritter and Gründer 1989, p. 630). Descartes (1596–1650) also viewed philosophy as a pursuit of wisdom. Leibniz (1646–1716) followed his predecessors and affirmed that philosophy is the study of wisdom or truth (Ritter and Gründer 1989, p. 695). From the perspective of the fundamental thinking paradigm, they are not far from Plato and Aristotle.

It is worth pointing out that from ancient to modern times, the contents of wisdom and truth have witnessed many different interpretations. Based on these interpretations, God, human nature, the origin and structure of the world, and even knowledge and methods, as well as a correct attitude towards life, have become the objects of philosophy. After long-term development and evolution, philosophy has long been a discipline. As Kant pointed out, according to the school concept (Schulbegriff) of philosophy, philosophy is defined as a system of rational knowledge based on concepts (Ritter and Gründer 1989, pp. 714–715).

In any case, due to the paradigm of metaphysical thinking that genuine wisdom and truth must be thorough wisdom and truth linked to the ultimate cause and purpose, traditional philosophy always exhibits a strong metaphysical feature, especially when people view truth and wisdom as eternal and unchanging and place them outside of time and space accordingly.

Based on this understanding of philosophy, the character Dao in the Daodejing can easily be interpreted metaphysically as ratio in Latin (the Greek counterpart “logos” and the Christian counterpart “God”). For example, the Jesuitic sinologist Martino Martini (1614–1661) interpreted the first sentence of the Daodejing as “Dao, or the great reason, has no name” (Tao, sive magna ratio non habet nomen) (Von Collani 2015, p. 42). François Noël (1669–1740) rendered the sentence as “The reason that can be understood by reasoning is not an eternal reason” (Ratio quae potest ratiocinando comprehendi, non est Aeterna Ratio) (Von Collani 2015, p. 73). Wilhelm Schott (1802–1889) interpreted the Dao in the Daodejing as “something purely spiritual” (rein geistiges Wesen), “absolute reason” (absolute Vernunft), and “primordial ground of all existence” (Urgrund alles Daseins) (Schott 1854, p. 24). It can be seen that the Dao in their reading is not the common reason but the great, eternal, and absolute reason; it is the primordial ground of all existence. In other words, the Dao is interpreted philosophically—to be precise, metaphysically.

Such translation and interpretation of the Dao in the Daodejing contributed much to the later establishment of the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism. Similarly, the introduction of the concept of philosophy to China has greatly promoted the acceptance of this Daoist distinction by Chinese scholars. It can be safely said that without introducing the Western concept of philosophy, the Confucian ranking of Daoist figures alone cannot engender the widespread embrace of the Daoist distinction since the turn of the twentieth century in China. Now, we examine in more detail the impact of pure philosophy on the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism.

Ever since the introduction of Western learning to the East (xixue dongjian 西學東漸), the idea of “pure philosophy” or metaphysics23 has gradually been received and appreciated by Chinese scholars. As early as 1904, Wang Guowei pointed out that the purpose of philosophy is to pursue eternal truth rather than to cater to the interests of one country and one time (Wang 2020, p. 7). Xie Wuliang 謝無量 (1884–1964), the author of the first History of Chinese Philosophy, defined metaphysics as follows: “Metaphysics explains the fundamental principles of the universe and the origin of all things” (Xie 2018, p. 232). Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962) also stated that: “The study, focusing on the essential issues of life, thinking from the root and seeking an ultimate solution, is called philosophy” (Hu 2013, p. 8).

Since then, an increasing number of Chinese scholars have appreciated the pure philosophical view, which pursues the first cause and eternal truth (wisdom). However, among the many traditional Chinese ideas and thoughts, one can find either the ruling arts for the king or the instruction manuals for immortalization, but not pure philosophy without any utilitarian purpose. Wang Guowei once lamented that China did not have such a pure philosophy but had developed a complete moral and political philosophy only for practical and utilitarian purposes. The metaphysics developed from the Zhou 周 and Qin 秦 dynasties to the Song 宋 dynasty only served to reinforce the foundation of moral philosophy and did not care about pure metaphysics (Wang 2020, pp. 8–9).

The lack of pure philosophy in traditional Chinese thought brings unease to modern scholars, presented by different philosophical anxieties at the beginning of the twentieth century. They either learn from the West to criticize Chinese learning or excavate features that conform to pure philosophy in classical Chinese texts. Fung Yulan once stated clearly that “the so-called Chinese philosophy refers to a certain kind of Chinese learning or part of a certain kind of learning that can be named after the stipulation of the Western philosophy” (Fung 2011, p. 8).24

After comparative research, some scholars found that traditional China is not without merit in pure philosophy; Laozi and Zhuangzi’s thought is excellent representative of pure philosophy.25 For instance, Wang Guowei commented that: “No word in the Analects of Confucius deals with metaphysics; Mozi’s 墨子 ‘celestial will’ (tianzhi 天志) aims at reinforcing moral politics; whereas the genuine philosophy of China begins with the Laozi” (Wang 2020, pp. 76–77). Though Xie Wuliang never criticized traditional Chinese thought from the perspective of Western philosophy, he still pointed out that Confucius rarely talked about the great Dao; the ontological cosmology became clear and precise in the thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi (Xie 2018, p. 107). Chen Guying 陳鼓應 also strongly argued that Laozi is the founder of Chinese philosophy (Chen 2015b, pp. 3–4).

In A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, Fung Yulan defined philosophy as “systematic, reflective thinking on life,” “the theory of life, the theory of the universe, and the theory of knowledge all emerge from this type of thinking.” Conversely, religion is “a philosophy with a certain amount of superstructure, which consists of superstitions, dogmas, rituals, and institutions” (Fung 1976, p. 3). In other words, Fung Yulan divided philosophy into pure philosophy and applied philosophy. Based on this distinction, he rationalized and decontextualized the Daoist distinction and decisively elevated the thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi. Fung’s writing implies that the distinction between philosophical and religious Daoism is not accidental or deeply culturally dependent but arises from the stipulation of genuine philosophy itself and the essential differences between philosophy and religion.

It is worth mentioning that Kirkland held a different opinion from that of Fung Yu-lan. Kirkland argued that it is accidental that the Daoist dichotomy became an important frame in writing the history of Daoism in the twentieth century. He expressed explicitly that: “Had early Western sinologues been guided by Chinese literati from a Daoist background, or at least knew the real history of Daoism, nearly everything said about ‘Daoism’ in the twentieth century would have been very different” (Kirkland 2004, p. 214).26

Philosophical reflection, in Fung’s sense, must be critical and thus contain elements of skepticism. Therefore, pure philosophy is, in principle, against superstition and cannot end up with any dogma. However, religion, even if it has a certain philosophy as its core, must rigidify the philosophy and turn it into a philosophy kidnapped by dogma and ritual. In other words, religion has no genuine metaphysical concerns; instead, it merely instrumentalizes philosophy.

Following Fung Yulan’s stream of thinking, people can easily figure out why the thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi is promoted and revered while other Daoist ideas and practices are disparaged in the history of Daoism. The dialectical and thorough idea in the Daodejing and the idea of the equality of all things (qiwu 齊物) in the Zhuangzi both show relatively pure and thorough thinking on life and the world, whereas later Daoist religion seems only to make use of these thoughts.

As we have seen above, the Confucian ranking of Daoist figures contributed to establishing the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism. However, the entire Confucian ideology, as the dominant ideology in traditional China, has been severely criticized in China since the 1910s. The large-scale and fierce criticism of Confucianism did not stop in mainland China until the late 1970s. Today, certain criticism of Confucianism still exists (Deng 2000, p. 17). As David A. Palmer concluded:

For almost a century, the May Fourth paradigm of secularization and antitraditionalism has been the mainstream ideology of China’s intellectual and political elite, shared in its broad outlines by both the Kuomintang (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and even upheld by Chinese elites in colonial and postcolonial entities such as Hong Kong and Singapore.

(Palmer 2012, p. 173)

Therefore, it is not the Confucian ranking of Daoist figures but the acceptance of the Western concept of philosophy that leads to the widespread embrace of the Daoist distinction in China. Many Chinese scholars regard pure philosophy as “the science of sciences”27 and endow it with high value and status. In this sense, Daoist philosophy is compatible with modernity. On the contrary, Daoist religion is interpreted to be filled with superstitious ideas and thus incompatible with advanced civilization. Therefore, the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism actually gains symbolic significance because the distinction means not only the difference between philosophy and religion but also between civilization and barbarism, science and superstition, as well as advanced modernity and backward tradition. Such an understanding of the Daoist distinction also demonstrates that, though many Western scholars strongly criticize the Daoist dichotomy, most Chinese scholars still insist on it and consider it inherent to China (Gu 2013).

In the historical context of secularization and anti-traditionalism, as David A. Palmer described, the Daoist distinction once allowed Chinese scholars more room to retain the study of Laozi and Zhuangzi because the Daodejing and Zhuangzi were regarded as philosophical. However, the study of Daoist religion was suppressed, and the study of Laozi and Zhuangzi itself was, to some extent, limited to the paradigm of Western philosophy. Therefore, many important Daoist issues have not been fully discussed for a long time. For example, is the Dao of Laozi and Zhuangzi really metaphysical? Is the Dao beyond time and space or this-worldly? Is the thinking paradigm of the Daodejing reflective or intuitive? Is the philosophical pathway the appropriate access to Laozi and Zhuangzi? Additionally, in such a context, Daozang and many Daoist-related remnants left behind in the folk have been overlooked to a certain extent.

If we follow the school concept of Western philosophy (a system of rational knowledge based on concepts), we cannot even say that Laozi and Zhuangzi are philosophical. Both the Daodejing and Zhuangzi are not systematic and do not use logic and concepts for definition and argumentation. So, Chinese intellectuals had to dwell in such a situation for a long time: on the one hand, they were satisfied with having discovered genuine philosophy in the Laozi and Zhuangzi because both pursue thorough wisdom and truth; however, on the other hand, they lamented the lack of conceptual and logical thinking in Chinese classics.

Since the 1980s, intellectuals in mainland China have also been seeking more suitable methods to deal with Chinese classics (including the Laozi and Zhuangzi). At that time, they did have more room for rethinking their cultural tradition because modern Western philosophical ideas were extensively introduced to China.

5. Critique of Western Traditional Philosophy and Its Influence on the Daoist Distinction

In this section, we first examine the philosophies that oppose traditional philosophy. We do not conduct a comprehensive review of these philosophies but are satisfied with pointing out their opposition (or relation) to traditional metaphysics. Then, on this basis, we further investigate the impact of these philosophies on the Daoist distinction.

If traditional metaphysics is interpreted as the pursuit of eternal truth beyond time and space, it has been systematically criticized by Kant. Kant was not satisfied with Plato’s metaphysical world of ideas. He distinguished between understanding (Verstand) and reason (Vernunft), arguing that ideas beyond time and space (the objects of pure reason) cannot constitute knowledge. One fundamental demand of Kant’s transcendental philosophy is to demarcate pure reason. However, though Kant is regarded as the philosopher who criticized traditional philosophy of ignoring possible experience and speculating in the transcendent domain, he and Plato were quite consistent in the pursuit of the universal validity of reason (Kant 1956, A VII–A XII). In other words, Kant still pursued some constitutive pure forms of reason (including intuition and understanding). The pure forms themselves are unchangeable and thus have metaphysical features in the traditional sense.

German idealists after Kant (such as Fichte, Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel) always attempted to break through Kant’s division of phaenomena and noumena. In Platonic terms, it is safe to say that they wanted to unite the physical world with the ideal world and thus turn transcendental philosophy into absolute philosophy. For absolute philosophy, the ultimate idea is achievable, whether through aesthetic education (Schiller 1954) or through the dialectical movement of ideas (things) themselves (Hegel 1998, p. 16). Therefore, they align with traditional metaphysics in pursuing eternal (absolute) truth. It is worth noting that absolute truth already contains its own realization and is not always beyond time and space.

If the main efforts of German idealists, including Kant, can be reduced to constructing systems based on concepts, Nietzsche’s life philosophy completely abandons this philosophical paradigm with metaphysical remnants. Nietzsche harshly criticized rationalism that began with Socrates and Plato (Nietzsche 1889, p. 13). He accused traditional philosophy of making and using “mummified concepts” (Begriffs-Mumien). He sharply criticized that: “For thousands of years, philosophers have been using only mummified concepts; nothing real makes it through their hands alive” (Nietzsche 2005, p. 167).28 Nietzsche opposed entrusting all things related to truth, wisdom, and happiness to the imaginary world beyond time and space. He called for a this-worldly life full of intoxication (Rausch) because the essence of intoxication is the rise of power and the feeling of fullness (Nietzsche 1889, pp. 61–62).

Nietzsche’s criticism of traditional Western philosophy is not without consequences. Since the twentieth century, many continental philosophers have been influenced directly or indirectly by Nietzsche. Woodward wrote: “Many of the great thinkers of the twentieth century have felt the need to produce an interpretation of Nietzsche, to orient themselves in relation to the great event of his thought” (Woodward 2011, p. 2). Whether Nietzsche is liked or disliked, he “has thoroughly ‘haunted’ the history of twentieth-century Western philosophy, and he continues to do so into the beginning of the twenty first” (Moeller 2004). Heidegger even regarded Nietzsche as the one “in whose light or shadow every contemporary thinks and poetizes in being ‘for him’ or ‘against him’” (Heidegger 1998, p. 321). Nietzsche’s critical insights and his perspectivism, along with phenomenology and hermeneutics, have become important intellectual resources in continental philosophy today.

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), the founder of phenomenology, distinguished between “the dogmatic and the phenomenological attitude” and held that “the natural attitude is subordinate to the dogmatic attitude as a particularity” (Husserl 1983, p. 143). Husserl proposed to alter the natural attitude radically (Husserl 1983, p. 57). According to Husserl’s phenomenological epoché (ἐποχή), “the general positing which belongs to the essence of the natural attitude” shall be “put out of action;” “everything which that positing encompasses with respect to being” shall be “parenthesized” (Husserl 1983, p. 61). “All theories […] which relate to this world, no matter how well they may be grounded positivistically or otherwise, shall be parenthesized” (Husserl 1983, p. 62). “Consequently, all natural sciences and cultural sciences, with their total stock of cognition, undergo exclusion precisely as sciences which require the natural attitude” (Husserl 1983, pp. 131–32). From Husserl’s perspective, the metaphysical beliefs hidden in the natural attitude should also be excluded. In this sense, phenomenology and dogmatic metaphysics are fundamentally different; Husserl’s phenomenon is converted into self-manifestation. However, Husserl’s phenomenology is still traditional in a sense. He did not oppose concepts and logic; on the contrary, his phenomenology clarified them. Husserl wrote: “The exclusion of Nature was for us the methodic means for initially making possible the turning of regard to transcendentally pure consciousness” (Husserl 1983, p. 131).

Heidegger was deeply influenced by hermeneutics, so his phenomenology attached importance to pregiven things and thus added boundaries and limitations to self-manifestation in Husserl’s sense. Heidegger opposed the traditional Western philosophy because it reduces being (Sein) to beings (Seiendes) and leads to the oblivion of being. According to Heidegger, being is indefinable. Being, by definition, cannot be derived from higher concepts or represented by lower ones.29 Traditional logic can define beings within a certain limit but cannot be applied to being. Logic cannot provide much help for the elucidation of ontology. On the contrary, formal logic is rooted in ancient Greek ontology (Heidegger 1967, p. 4).30 It can be seen that if concepts and logic are the cornerstone of the old metaphysics, this metaphysics is still not thorough and profound enough for Heidegger.

Logical positivism has launched an attack on traditional Western philosophy from another perspective. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is a guiding manual for logical positivism. In this book, Wittgenstein claimed that all that can be said is “propositions of natural science;” natural science “has nothing to do with philosophy;” metaphysical propositions always contain certain meaningless signs (Wittgenstein [1922] 1960, p. 189). Later, Wittgenstein firmly objected to essentialism in traditional philosophy. He adopted “language games” and “family resemblance” to overcome the rigid thinking paradigm in the old philosophy (Wittgenstein 2009, pp. 8, 36). In Wittgenstein’s view, the entire philosophical enterprise should be therapeutic, treating traditional philosophy through language analysis. He said: “A whole cloud of philosophy condenses into a drop of grammar” (Wittgenstein 2009, p. 233).

Modern French philosophers not only receive influence from Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger but also enjoy learning from Saussure and Freud.31 With the help of these resources, French philosophy appears particularly deconstructive and postmodern. For instance, Derrida’s “différance” shakes all possible certainty and eternity and aims at subverting all metaphysical constructions of meaning. Derrida stated sharply: “Not only is there no kingdom of différance, but différance instigates the subversion of every kingdom” (Derrida 1982, p. 22).

The above criticism of traditional metaphysics since Nietzsche has had a continuous impact on intellectual history and academic circles. In the intellectual exchanges between the East and the West, modern Western scholars have discovered something worth cherishing from Chinese thought, while Chinese scholars have gained new perspectives on their own traditional culture.

On the one hand, under the influence of logical positivism and its successors, natural science has become an excellent model for other studies. Empirical methods have become paramount. Metaphysics is something that scientific research should avoid because metaphysical propositions employ meaningless signs. Therefore, in the study of Daoism, the same change occurs. Researchers no longer study solely based on the written texts but instead focus on archaeological excavations, historical sites, and field investigations. The research methods of anthropology, sociology, folklore, and archaeology, which place greater emphasis on empirical evidence, have become popular in Daoist research. These research fields and methods make the study of the Daoist religion flourish. Therefore, due to the preference for empirical evidence, the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism becomes a meaningless metaphysical distinction.

On the other hand, inspired by continental philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida, scholars gain a new perspective on understanding ancient texts (including not only pre-Socratic but also pre-Qin texts). They find something in the Laozi and Zhuangzi that modern Western philosophy advocates, namely, breaking the shackles of rigid reason and suspending arbitrary assumptions about the metaphysical essence of the world. A large number of studies today indicate that the Daodejing and Zhaungzi are not systematic; Laozi and Zhuangzi do not argue and reflect based on concepts and logic. The Daoist Dao is not an eternal truth beyond time and space. That is, it is not metaphysical; it is formless (floating) but this-worldly (phenomenological) and functions everywhere (Chen 2017; Wang 2000; Michael 2022, pp. 65–116; Tan and Bao 2022; Wang 2022). Similarly, under the illumination of modern Western philosophy, cosmology and ethics no longer have clear boundaries. It is from this perspective that Karyn Lai combined ziran 自然 and wuwei 無為 to provide a new philosophical interpretation of the Daodejing (Lai 2007).32

It is worth mentioning that within less than a decade after Nietzsche’s death, his ideas had already spread among Chinese scholars and thinkers. Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929) mentioned Nietzsche in 1902; Wang Guowei published “Schopenhauer and Nietzsche” in 1904, and Lu Xun 魯迅 (1881–1936) called on Chinese people to learn Nietzsche’s philosophy in 1907. Chen Guying, who offered many insights into the study of Daoism with the approach of comparative philosophy, never concealed his embrace of Nietzsche’s thought (Chen 2015a, “Preface II,” pp. 4–12).

Similarly, the Daodejing and Zhuangzi have indeed attracted the attention of modern continental philosophers. For example, Heidegger attempted to translate the Daodejing into German but did not complete it. In any case, he was familiar with Laozi’s idea and quoted the Daodejing in his works (Heidegger 2000a, p. 43; 2000b, p. 618).

In mainland China, there has been an increasing amount of research on the abovementioned anti-metaphysical philosophers almost since the 1980s. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and other antitraditional philosophers are often key figures in philosophy courses at Chinese universities. Their importance is also increasingly recognized by Chinese scholars.

Under this circumstance, Chinese scholars pay more attention to these Western philosophers’ direct utterances of Chinese culture. Heidegger once said in an interview with Spiegel: “And who of us would be in a position to decide whether or not one day in Russia or China very old traditions of ‘thought’ may awaken that will help make possible for man a free relationship to the technical world?” (Heidegger 1981, p. 61). In a conversation with Chinese scholar Wang Yuanhua 王元化 (1920–2008), Derrida also affirmed that “China has no philosophy, only thought” (Wang 2002). Derrida did not mean to belittle Chinese culture but to point out that Chinese culture has no rigid metaphysics.

In such an intellectual interaction between the East and the West, a distinct value reversal has emerged: the pursuit of metaphysical eternal truth becomes meaningless because metaphysical and immutable truth is merely imaginary. In this case, such a pursuit and the corresponding technological approach to metaphysical ideas are harmful because they conceal the self-manifestation of things and make things one-dimensional. The abovementioned modern continental philosophers and their Chinese followers call for a return to the pretheoretical, non-metaphysical (even anti-metaphysical) world of life. According to this “return” current, the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism is only an imaginary and conceptual distinction that distorts the real Daoism and does not apply to the understanding of living Daoism.

Under the influence of the transmission and the transformation of the concept of philosophy, the Daoist distinction undergoes corresponding changes in reception. It can be seen that even in mainland China, the rationality of this Daoist distinction confronts more questions.

Kirkland once summarized that “twentieth-century scholarship developed two divergent frameworks: (1) that of ‘mainstream’ scholars, trained to understand Daoism in terms of the deeply distorted Victorian/Confucian construct; and (2) that of scholars who accepted the importance of Daozang” (Kohn 2000, p. xv). To some extent, these two frameworks function well. However, if there is no examination of the transmission and transformation of the concept of philosophy, the changes in Daoist studies in mainland China will be difficult to understand.

In fact, there are also many Western scholars who do not study Daoism in the two frameworks proposed by Kirkland. Their research approaches are better explained through the transmission and transformation of the concept of philosophy. For instance, Moeller does not follow the Daozang framework. He disagrees that the Daodejing “is religious in nature” (Moeller 2006, p. ix). On the contrary, he insists that the Daodejing “contains a distinct and coherent philosophical ‘teaching’” (Moeller 2006, p. x). However, the Daodejing “did not attempt to be generally accessible” (Moeller 2006, p. x). Accordingly, philosophy can be esoteric and vague, and commonality and clarity are not necessary conditions for philosophy. Obviously, philosophy, in a broad sense, has always played a very important role in Moeller’s interpretation of Daoism. Through this philosophical pathway, Moeller highlighted the Daoist non-anthropocentrism, the Daoist “acosmotic” notion of ziran 自然, and the Daoist “zero-perspective” (Moeller 2015). The “genuine pretending” reading of the Zhuangzi is already a “New Daoist Philosophy” because the so-interpreted Zhuangzi “intertwines an existential mode of ‘rambling without destination’ with a thoroughly humorous approach to meaning and language” (Moeller and D’Ambrosio 2017, p. 185). Accordingly, Moeller does not think and write in the Victorian/Confucian framework either.

Like Moeller, Brook Ziporyn also holds a broad comparative philosophical perspective in Daoist research. His understanding of philosophy goes far beyond traditional Western philosophy, and he is adept at modern Western philosophy. His research on Daoism actually presents a “New Daoist Philosophy.” According to Ziporyn, “Daoism really doesn’t fit neatly into any preexisting philosophical or cultural category” (Ziporyn 2003, p. 3). Through the interpretation of the Guo Xiang commentary to the Zhuangzi, Ziporyn clearly presents the similarities and differences between Guo Xiang and German idealists such as Kant, Fichte, Schopenhauer, and Hegel. Comparative philosophy is indispensable in Ziporyn’s Daoist study. He pointed out that the difference between Guo Xiang and Hegel and Guo’s relation to the other Western thinkers on freedom and determinism “is well worth pondering when considering the characteristic habits and values of philosophers East and West” (Ziporyn 2003, p. 160). In addition, the metaphor of the “wild card” fully demonstrates his familiarity with postmodern ways of thinking (Ziporyn 2015), which cannot be included in either of Kirkland’s two frameworks.

Thomas Michael also provided his own inspiring philosophical framework for Daoist research. He differentiated two main versions of the Daodejing: the Laozi Daodejing and the Huang-Lao Daodejing. The Dao in the first version is a phenomenological Dao, namely, the pristine Dao, and the Dao in the second version is a metaphysical Dao, namely, the cosmic Dao (Michael 2022, p. 10). Given that the Laozi Daodejing is more original and focuses on bodily cultivation rather than metaphysics, distinguishing the Daoist philosophy from the Daoist religion becomes less important. Michael’s distinction between the different versions of the Daodejing not only unites various fragmentations within early Daoism but also can stimulate readers to divert their attention from the controversial differences between philosophical and religious Daoism to the activities of interpretation, acceptance, and practice under respective versions (Tan and Bao 2023).

Additionally, there is a phenomenon that deserves the reader’s attention. In mainland China, scholars increasingly emphasize cultural self-confidence and cultural self-reliance. Guo Qiyong opposed taking European philosophy as the stand-alone paradigm, and accordingly, he criticized the philosophical view of Hu Shi, Jin Yuelin 金岳霖 (1895–1884), and some other Chinese modern scholars. He held that there are different types of philosophy in the world and called for the autonomy of Chinese philosophy. Meanwhile, he rejected using Western philosophical terms and paradigms to “dress up” Chinese historical texts. However, Guo Qiyong admitted that people can hardly write and talk about philosophy if concepts and paradigms of Western philosophy are refused completely (Guo 2006, p. 194). Other scholars have even argued that the future of human philosophy can only be represented by Chinese philosophy, and Western philosophy is returning to Chinese thought; though the word “returning” may seem to be too assertive, the postmodern turn of Western philosophy can at least be seen as indirect while robust evidence of the tenacious vitality inherent in the Chinese traditional philosophy (Li 1999).

The shift in academic attitude among many Chinese scholars is linked to the value reversal brought about by Western anti-metaphysical philosophy. It is worth noting that, compared with those of Western philosophers, modern Chinese philosophers have different targets. They are not satisfied with postmodern philosophy. In other words, Western anti-traditional philosophy is just taken as a ladder for them, and in the end, this ladder (postmodern ideas) should also be removed (rejected). Chinese philosophers often have dreams similar to those of German idealists; namely, they want to establish an absolute philosophy with Chinese characteristics. In light of the sinicization of Marxism and the elevated status of Chinese traditional culture,33 the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism will still be upheld in China, though the status of Daoist religion is no longer as degraded as before.

6. Conclusions

From an empirical point of view, there are two possibilities to deal with the Daoist distinction. First, if there is no factual bifurcation of philosophical and religious Daoism in history, the problem of the Daoist dichotomy becomes a pseudo-problem. It is tantamount to declaring that it is of little significance to study the reception history of this Daoist distinction. All we have to do is correct this misunderstanding. Second, if this Daoist distinction is a fact, we have to confront the questions of when and from where this distinction originated. As is known, it is impossible to solve any genesis problem empirically because the origin of one thing must extend beyond these empirical materials employed to determine its origin.

However, the significance of the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism is deservedly highlighted from the perspective of intellectual history. By adopting the method of intellectual history, our focal point is shifted from the origin of the Daoist distinction to the establishment of the distinction. The establishment of the Daoist distinction in the terminological sense has far-reaching implications, which not only endows the study of the reception history with great academic significance but also intrigues regarding the interests and challenges in exploring the rationales behind the embrace and negation of the Daoist distinction.

From the perspective of intellectual history, this article presents the influence of the dissemination and vicissitude of the concept of philosophy upon the Daoist distinction and its reception in the writings of Daoist history. Here, we also expect colleagues interested in this problem to further illuminate this Daoist distinction from different research perspectives.

It is worth noting that in recent years, due to the emphasis on the autonomy of Chinese culture, the Western ideas of anti-metaphysics and anti-Eurocentrism have been faced squarely and well received in China. Many Chinese scholars have started reexamining the distinction between philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism from these postmodern perspectives and attempting to establish a Chinese philosophy that can provide direction for the future of human philosophy.