On the Knowledge of My Existence: Towards My Existence as the Adverbial Transcendent/Immanent

Abstract

I exist in the universe in a unique manner. I seem to know this statement to be true. However, even if I did not exist, the human who happens to be me could be living and writing the same statement. Then, do I really know that the statement is true? Do I really have epistemic contact with my existence? The aim of paper is to clearly raise this question and to offer a positive answer. By drawing on the disjunctive theory of perception, I propose the account that my existence can be involved in experience. To consider how my existence can be involved in experience and can be known from within experience, I refer to Wittgenstein, Kuki Shūzō, and Nishida Kitarō, and present the panentheistic view that my actual existence can be a limit of experience, both transcendent of and immanent in experience. This view is made persuasive by understanding the transcendence and immanence of my existence as adverbial. My conclusion is that I do know with certainty that I exist in the universe in a unique manner, and that this knowledge lies beyond Cartesian certainty.

1. Introduction

For 13.8 billion years since the beginning of the universe, I had not existed in it. However, a few decades ago, I began to exist in the universe. Something unique that previously had never existed came into existence.

I came into existence as a human on Earth (hereafter ‘this human’). This human was born in accordance with the natural flow. The universe began, the planet called Earth was formed, and life thrived on that planet. The species known as humans emerged, and through their reproductive cycles, this human was born as a part of that species.

However, my existence does not follow such a natural flow. I suddenly came into existence for the first time in the history of the universe.

This human came into existence following the natural flow. But I, unrelated to that natural flow, suddenly came into existence. This human somehow happened to be me. In other words, this human’s existence is compatible with the possibility of his not being me. This human could have been born, lived, and died without being me. In that case, the universe would have continued to exist without anything existing in a unique manner, i.e., without anything existing as me.1

Stephen Priest writes as follows:

Uniqueness is not unique, because everything is unique. You are not only unique. You are uniquely unique; not in being unique but in your manner of being unique.

(Priest 2008, chp. 1)

I exist in the universe in a unique manner. This does not mean that this human is unique. Everything in the universe, including this human, is unique, having some unique property or position in the universe. In that sense, this human is one of the unique things in the universe. I, in contrast, am not one of the unique things. I am unique in the manner of my existence.

I exist in the universe in a unique manner. I seem to know this to be true. But do I really know it? Suppose that I did not exist in the universe. Even so, this human might have been born, lived, and might be writing this paper. He might be referring to himself as ‘I’, writing, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’. If there is such a possibility, my existence might be irrelevant to the statement, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’. Whether I exist or not, this human might be writing, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’. If so, do I really know that the statement is true?2

Let us consider a dream scenario to clearly raise the question. Suppose that I, while asleep, dream of the Prime Minister giving a speech. In the dream, I say, ‘The Prime Minister is giving a speech’. Later, upon waking up and turning on the television, I find a live broadcast of the Prime Minister giving a speech. In this scenario, my statement in the dream, ‘The Prime Minister is giving a speech’, happened to be true. However, I did not know in the dream that the Prime Minister was giving a speech. The statement, ‘The Prime Minister is giving a speech’, only happened to be true because, even if the Prime Minister was not giving a speech, I would have still uttered the same statement in the dream. The actual fact that the Prime Minister was giving a speech was irrelevant to my statement, ‘The Prime Minister is giving a speech’. If there is no relevance between the Prime Minister’s actually giving a speech and my statement, ‘The Prime Minister is giving a speech’, I cannot be said to have known in the dream that the Prime Minister was giving a speech.

Let us return to the question concerning the knowledge of my existence. Even if I did not exist, this human might be writing, ‘I exist in the universe as in a unique manner’, just as I, in the dream, would have said, ‘The Prime Minister is giving a speech’, even if the Prime Minister had not been giving a speech. So, when I exist and write, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’, my statement would only happen to be true. I could not be said to know it. If an analogy holds with the dream scenario, that would be the consequence.

Indeed, the consequence would be even more serious. When I exist and write, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’, I would not be able to say that the statement happens to be true. For me to be able to say that it happens to be true, I would have to know that it is true. If I do not know that the statement is true, I would not be able to say that it happens to be true.

In the dream scenario, the actual fact that the Prime Minister is giving a speech transcends my experience in the dream. When I wake up and see the speech on TV, I come to have epistemic contact with the actuality that transcended my experience in the dream. At that moment, I become able to say that my statement in the dream, ‘The Prime Minister is giving a speech’, happened to be true. By contrast, in the case of the statement about my existence, there could be no moment corresponding to my waking up to the actuality. There could be no moment of my coming to have epistemic contact with my existence—the epistemic contact which would allow me to say that statement, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’, happens to be true. My existence would remain transcendent of my experience. That is why I would not be able to know that the statement happens to be true.

Thus, if we attempt to understand the knowledge of my existence through an analogy with the dream scenario, my existence would remain transcendent of my experience. Consequently, I would not know that I exist in the universe in a unique manner.

Is that really the case? I am still strongly inclined to say that I clearly know this statement to be true: I exist in the universe in a unique manner. In the dream scenario, my statement in the dream, ‘The Prime Minister is giving a speech’, only happened to be true, with the actuality transcending my experience. However, in the case of my existence, it seems to me that I must know the statement to be true. My existence does not seem to transcend my experience (which could be perceptual experience or thinking experience).

Do I know that I exist in the universe in a unique manner? This is the question of this paper.3 In the following sections, I will explore a way to answer this question positively. In Section 2, by drawing on the disjunctive theory of perception, I will propose the account that my existence can be involved in experience. In Section 3, I will refer to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and present the view that my existence can be involved in experience as the limit of experience. In Section 4, I will contemplate the Twin Earth skepticism and explain how experience can supply a reason for referring with certainty to myself as a particular. In Section 5, I will interpret Kuki Shūzō’s remarks on ‘disjunctive contingency’ and consider my existence, which is the limit of experience, to be epistemically encountered as actuality. In Section 6, to discuss how my actual existence can be involved in experience, I will refer to Nishida Kitarō’s panentheism in his essay, ‘The Logic of the Place of Nothingness and the Religious Worldview’, and present the view that my existence is transcendent of and immanent in my experience. In Section 7, by considering this transcendence and immanence as adverbial, I will clarify my panentheistic view and make it persuasive. In Section 8, I will draw the conclusion that I know the statement, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner,’ to be true. I will also explain that this knowledge with certainty lies beyond Cartesian certainty.

2. Causal Relationship, Transcendence, and Disjunctivism

I might utter a true statement in a dream. However, in a dream, I do not know the statement to be true. I could then suspect that I am dreaming now, doubting that I know any statement I utter on the ground of experience to be true. This skepticism presupposes that actuality transcends my experience whether I am dreaming or not. In this section, I will introduce the disjunctive theory of perception, which rejects such a presupposition and holds that an actual object can be involved in experience. I will then propose the account that my existence can be involved in experience, rejecting the thought that my existence transcends this human’s experience. On this account, I know the statement that I exist in the universe in a unique manner to be true, for my existence is involved in this human’s experience, which would be different in that it would not involve my existence if I did not exist. This human’s experience, involving my existence, does supply a reason for knowing the statement to be true.

In the dream scenario, there is no relevance between the actual fact that the Prime Minister is giving a speech and my statement in the dream that the Prime Minister is giving a speech. That is why I do not know that the Prime Minister is giving a speech while dreaming.

What is meant by relevance here? A plausible candidate is a causal relationship. When I am dreaming, there is no causal relationship between the actual fact that the Prime Minister is giving a speech and my statement in the dream. That is, the actual fact that the Prime Minister is giving a speech is not the cause of my saying in the dream that the Prime Minister is giving a speech. That can be said to be the reason why I do not know that the Prime Minister is giving a speech while dreaming.

When I wake up and turn on the television, the causal relationship obtains. The actual fact that the Prime Minister is giving a speech becomes the cause of my saying that the Prime Minister is giving a speech. I thus come to know that the Prime Minister is giving a speech, and that the same statement in the dream happened to be true.

In the above line of thought, the actual fact that the Prime Minister is giving a speech is a cause that transcends my experience in the dream. It is only upon waking up that I come to have a relationship with the cause that transcended my experience in the dream.

Then, I could engage in dream skepticism, doubting that there is a causal relationship between actuality and the experience I have now. I might be having a dream now. I see a computer in front of me, but on the ground of this experience, I cannot distinguish whether there is actually a computer in front of me or whether I am lying in bed dreaming about a computer in front of me. My experience can be the same regardless of whether there is actually a computer in front of me or not. On the ground of such experience, I cannot know that there is actually a computer in front of me. My experience fails to supply a reason for knowing that there is actually a computer in front of me.4

The assumption in the above inference is that actuality transcends experience. Whether there is a causal relationship between actuality and experience (i.e., whether I am not dreaming) or whether there is no causal relationship between them (i.e., whether I am dreaming), my experience could be the same. In this manner, actuality transcends experience. If so, I cannot know on the ground of experience that actuality is the cause of my experience. My experience fails to supply a reason for knowing that actuality is the cause of my experience.

Advocates of the disjunctive theory of perception (or disjunctivism) reject the assumption here. Michael Martin (2002), for example, would claim that if I am not dreaming, my experience involves the actual computer, whereas if I am dreaming, my experience does not involve the actual computer. Martin’s disjunctivism would thus draw a distinction between the two experiences. The two experiences are not the same, even though I, the subject of experience, cannot discern between them.

If it is possible for an actual object to be involved in experience, experience can supply a reason for knowing that there is an actual object. If I am not dreaming, my experience involves the actual computer. Then, I am in a position to know, on the ground of experience, that there is the actual computer in front of me. True, even if I am dreaming, and my experience does not involve the actual computer, I might still claim to know that there is the actual computer in front of me. However, this would not imply that experience supplies no reason for knowing the existence of the actual object.

Let us now return to the statement, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’. The human who happens to be me, is writing it. But, even if I did not exist and this human was not me, he might be writing the same statement. If so, is my actual existence irrelevant to the statement?

One might think that the relevance being questioned here is a causal relationship and conclude that there is no causal relationship between my existence and the statement. Whether I exist in the universe or not, this human might write, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’. One might infer from this that my existence is not the cause of the statement.

The presupposition here is that there is no causal relationship between my existence and this human’s experience. Even if I did not exist, this human’s experience might be the same, there being no causal relationship between my existence and this human’s experience. That is why, one might argue, this human might write the statement, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’, without my existence as its cause.

One who makes the above inference may admit that there is a causal relationship between this human’s experience and the statement in question. For example, it may be acknowledged that this human is writing that statement because he studies philosophy—i.e., that the experience of studying philosophy is the cause of the statement. This is not to admit that there is a causal relationship between my existence and this human’s experience. Whether or not I exist, it can be said, this human might study philosophy.

The inference can be summarized in the following way. There may be a causal relationship between this human’s experience and the statement, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’. However, there is no causal relationship between my existence and this human’s experience. Therefore, there is no causal relationship between my existence and the statement.

The account that there is no causal relationship between my existence and this human’s experience assumes that my existence is transcendent of this human’s experience. The implication is that this human’s experience could be the same whether I exist or not.

I would like to propose the account that my existence is not transcendent of this human’s experience. It is the account that my existence can be involved in this human’s experience. It denies that this human’s experience could be the same regardless of my existence. For, if I exist, this human’s experience involves my existence, whereas if I do not exist, this human’s experience does not involve my existence.

3. My Existence as a Limit of Experience

How can this human’s experience involve my existence? According to disjunctivism, experience can involve an actual object. If experience involves an actual computer, for example, the actual computer is the object of experience. However, my existence is not something that can appear in front of me like a computer. How can such a thing be involved in experience?

In this section, through understanding Wittgenstein’s line of thought, I would like to think that my existence is involved in this human’s experience as a limit that distinguishes this human’s experience from other experiences. My existence is not transcendent of this human’s experience such that I exist somewhere outside the experience. Nor is my existence inside this human’s experience (as a computer can be). Rather, I exist by limiting this human’s experience. Only this human’s experience is limited by my existence; all other experiences are not limited by my existence. My existence, thus, is a limit that distinguishes this human’s experience from other subjects’ experiences.

Furthermore, my existence is a limit that distinguishes this human’s experience from possible experiences, including the possible experience which would be had by this human if I did not exist. This human’s experience is limited by my existence because he happens to be me, but if I did not exist, his experience would not be limited by my existence.

In the above thought, this human’s experience is contrasted with other experiences, i.e., other subjects’ experiences and possible experiences. Plural experiences are juxtaposed, with one of the experiences demarcated and limited by my existence.

Wittgenstein contrasts my experience with possible experiences had by possible subjects. For him, I am a limit that demarcates my experience, distinguishing my experience from possible experiences.

Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus, ‘The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world’ (Wittgenstein 1974, §5.632, p. 57). According to Wittgenstein, I do not exist in the world, or I am not found in the world (Wittgenstein 1974, §5.633, p. 57). Instead, I am ‘a limit of the world’.

Maintaining that I am ‘a limit of the world’, Wittgenstein introduces an analogy with the visual field. I ‘do not see the eye’, and ‘nothing in the visual field’ allows me ‘to infer that it is seen by an eye’ (Wittgenstein 1974, §5.633, p. 57). The eye is not found in the visual field. Furthermore, things found in the visual field do not indicate the existence of an eye seeing the visual field. Analogously, I am not found in the world. Nor do things found in the world indicate the existence of me.

Wittgenstein then goes on to write, ‘This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is at the same time a priori’ (Wittgenstein 1974, §5.634, p. 58). ‘Whatever we see could be other than it is’ (Wittgenstein 1974, §5.634, p. 58). Just as the eye is not found in the visual field, I am not found in the experience. To think that I am the subject having the experience, I must contrast the experience with other possible experiences had by possible subjects. By contrasting the experience with possible experiences had by possible subjects, it becomes possible to think that I am the subject having the actual experience. When conceiving of this contrast, the actual experience is juxtaposed with possible experiences; the actual experience is considered what ‘could be other than it is’.

Thus, for Wittgenstein, the experience’s being mine coincides with its being actual. Just as I am not found in the experience, actuality is not found in it. It is through the contrast with possible experiences had by possible subjects that the experience is thought to be mine and to be actual. In other words, that the experience is mine and actual does not appear within the experience, but is thought through contrasting the experience with possible experiences had by possible subjects.

Wittgenstein develops his discussion in the following way:

Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

(Wittgenstein 1974, §5.64, p. 58.)

When having the solipsistic thought that the world is ‘my world’ (Wittgenstein 1974, §5.63, p. 57), the self that is not found in the world coincides with actuality that is not found in the world. In the solipsistic thought, I and actuality together become ‘a point without extension’, leaving the reality found in the world, i.e., in my actual world.

I and actuality as ‘a point without extension’ is ‘a limit of the world’. It is a limit that distinguishes my actual world from others’ possible worlds. I as a limit distinguish my world from others’ worlds, meaning that actuality as a limit distinguishes the actual world from possible worlds. This limit is conceived of when juxtaposing different worlds and thinking that one of them is mine and actual. Or, more precisely, because one of the juxtaposed different worlds is distinguished from other worlds by I and actuality as a limit, can be thought as mine and actual.

Now, let us proceed with our discussion. Although my existence is not found in this human’s experience, my existence is involved in this human’s experience. My existence is involved in this human’s experience as its limit. In other words, my existence is what limits this human’s experience.

Even if I did not exist, this human might be writing, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’. Let us compare this human’s experience in that possible case with the experience of this human who is now writing, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique way’. The latter experience is limited by my existence, and is distinguished from the former experience.5

When conceiving of such a comparison, the two experiences are juxtaposed in thought. Of these two juxtaposed experiences, one is limited by my existence and is distinguished from the other experience.

My existence, which limits this human’s experience, can be known from within the experience. If this was impossible, the thought to the effect that one of the two juxtaposed experiences is limited by my existence would also be impossible. This human can know my existence from within his experience. This knowledge makes it possible to think that one of the two juxtaposed experiences is limited by my existence and is distinguished from the other experience.

4. The Twin Earth Skepticism

My existence is involved in this human’s experience as its limit. This limit is known from within this human’s experience. In this section, I will discuss the Twin Earth skepticism based on P. F. Strawson’s argument. I will extend the skepticism further and argue that the existence of the particular ‘I’ is involved in experience, providing certainty for successfully referring to the particular ‘I’ when making the statement ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’. The implication is that the existence of the particular ‘I’ limits this human’s experience and is known from within his experience.

The following is Strawson’s argument:

Now one may be very well informed about a particular sector of the universe. One may know beyond any doubt that there is only one particular thing or person in that sector that answers to a general description. But this, it might be argued, does not guarantee that the description applies uniquely. For there might be another particular, answering to the same description, in another sector of the universe. Even if one enlarges the description so that it incorporates a description of the salient features of the sector of the universe concerned, one still lacks a guarantee that the description individuates. For the other sector might reproduce these features too. However, much one adds to the description of the sector one knows about its internal detail and its external relations—this possibility of massive reduplication remains open. No extension of one’s knowledge of the world can eliminate this possibility.

(Strawson 1959, p. 20)

For example, this human believes that he is ‘very well informed’ about himself. Suppose that this human provides a detailed general description of himself, detailed enough for him to ‘know beyond any doubt’ that it applies to only one particular thing on Earth. Now, somewhere in the universe, there may be Twin Earth, which is completely identical to Earth. On Twin Earth, there may be a Twin Earthian who is exactly identical to this human. If so, any detailed description of this human may also apply to the Twin Earthian, as long as the description only contains general terms. Because of such a possibility, there is always doubt that such a general description, however detailed, succeeds in referring to one particular thing.

Let us contemplate this doubt by considering the case of perceptual experience. According to Colin McGinn, perceptual experience only contains what can be specified by general descriptions (McGinn 1997, pp. 51–52). If he is right, this human could not say, by looking at his body, ‘this body’ solely on the ground of perceptual experience. For, according to McGinn, perceptual experience contains no element specifiable by the demonstrative term ‘this’; perceptual experience only contains elements specifiable by general terms, such as the color and shape of the body.

It is true that perceptual experience enables detailed descriptions of the body. However, for McGinn, those descriptions are general. As long as they are general, they could also apply to a body that might exist on Twin Earth. Thus, perceptual experience does not supply a reason for referring to this particular body. For McGinn, when this human says ‘this body’ while looking at his body, he is relying not only on perceptual experience but on his beliefs (McGinn 1997, p. 51).

Tyler Burge (1991), unlike McGinn, thinks that perceptual experience contains demonstrative elements. If Burge is right, this human could say, by looking at his body, ‘this body’ solely on the ground of perceptual experience. This human would be able to refer to the particular body as ‘this body’ solely on the ground of perceptual experience. This ability stems from the fact that perceptual experience contains a demonstrative element specifiable by the demonstrative term ‘this’.

However, even if Burge is right, the following consequence arises: if there is a Twin Earthian identical to this human, this human’s perceptual experience and the Twin Earthian’s perceptual experience would be exactly the same. Even if perceptual experience contains demonstrative elements, those demonstrative elements would be exactly the same in both perceptual experiences. Then, when this human says ‘this body’ on the ground of the demonstrative element contained in his perceptual experience, the Twin Earthian would also be saying ‘this body’ on the ground of the same demonstrative element (See Burge 1991, p. 208). Would such a demonstrative element serve as a reason for referring to one particular thing?

Suppose that the light entering the Twin Earthian’s right eye comes to be instantly transferred to this human’s right eye. As a result, this human starts seeing the Twin Earthian’s body with his right eye. If perceptual experience contains a demonstrative element, the demonstrative element in this human’s perceptual experience delivered through his right eye would now refer to the Twin’s Earthian’s body, while the demonstrative element in his perceptual experience delivered through his left eye would continue to refer to this human’s body. Despite this change, the demonstrative element contained in this human’s perceptual experience would remain unchanged before and after the light transfer. For, before the light transfer, this human’s perceptual experience would have been exactly the same as the Twin Earthian’s perceptual experience, including the demonstrative element. The unchanging demonstrative element, which would have referred to this human’s body before the light transfer, would refer to this human’s body and the Twin Earthian’s body after the light transfer. Such a demonstrative element would not serve as a reason for referring to one particular body, because it could refer to either one body or two bodies without changing.

Martin offers an alternative to Burge’s view, denying that the same demonstrative element contained in two (or more) perceptual experiences can refer to different particulars (Martin 2002, pp. 192–95). According to Martin, perceptual experiences must be different if their objects are different particulars. This is because Martin thinks that a particular can be involved in perceptual experience.

Martin would explain that this human’s perceptual experience involves this human’s body, while the Twin Earthian’s perceptual experience involves the Twin Earthian’s body. Since the two perceptual experiences contain different particulars, they are not the same. In this human’s perceptual experience, this human’s body is involved. Thus, when this human says ‘this body’ on the ground of his perceptual experience, he is supplied with a reason for referring to his particular body (rather than the Twin Earthian’s body).

However, even if we adopt Martin’s account, this human could not be said to be supplied with the certainty of referring to one particular body. The uncertainty arises because this human could engage in the skepticism of instant light transfer from Twin Earth to one of his eyes, suspecting that his perceptual experience might involve two bodies. He could doubt that when he says ‘this body’ on the ground of perceptual experience, the reference to one particular body is successful. Even if his perceptual experience involves his particular body, the perceptual experience would not provide the certainty that that body is the only particular referent.

I would now like to present my account. This human can write, on the ground of experience, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’. At the same moment, a Twin Earthian identical to this human might be writing the same statement. Despite the possibility of such a doubt, this human can still write, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’, referring to one particular ‘I’. That is because the existence of that particular ‘I’ is involved in this human’s experience.6

When this human writes, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’, the word ‘I’ refers to one particular ‘I’. Such a reference is possible because that particular ‘I’ is involved in this human’s experience, serving as a reason for referring to the particular ‘I’.

Even if this human entertains the skepticism of instant light transfer from Twin Earth to one of his eyes, he can still say ‘this I’, being certain that he is referring to one particular ‘I’. True, he can doubt that only one body is involved in his perceptual experience. However, he cannot meaningfully doubt that the experience is had by this particular ‘I’.

Thus, the existence of the particular ‘I’, which is involved in this human’s experience, not only serves as a reason for referring to myself as a particular but provides certainty for the success of this reference. It is possible to doubt that, at this moment, this human has ceased to be me, and instead, the Twin Earthian identical to this human has become me. If that were to happen, the existence of the particular ‘I’, which was involved in this human’s experience, would now be involved in the Twin Earthian’s experience. However, even in that case, this creature, who is me, could still write, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’ on the ground of experience. I may not know whether I am on Earth or on Twin Earth. Nevertheless, in any case, I exist in the universe in a unique manner. That can be said with certainty. This certainty is provided by the existence of the particular ‘I’ involved in the experience of this creature, who is me now. That existence of the particular ‘I’ is known from within the experience.

Martin’s account could not explain the knowledge here. Martin could and would claim that this human’s experience and the Twin Earthian’s experience are different in that they involve different bodies. However, he could not explain the difference between the two experiences by saying that one of them involves the existence of the particular ‘I’. Thus, he could account neither for the possibility of the Twin Earthian’s becoming me, i.e., the possibility of his experience coming to involve the existence of the particular ‘I’, nor for this human’s (or the Twin Earthian’s if he becomes me) epistemic contact with the existence of the particular ‘I’.

On my account, by contrast, the difference between the two experiences is in that one of them involves the existence of the particular ‘I’. Therefore, I can explain the possibility of the Twin Earthian’s becoming me, with his experience coming to involve the existence of the particular ‘I’. Furthermore, on my account, whether I am his human or I am the Twin Earthian, there is epistemic contact with the existence of the particular ‘I’. This epistemic contact enables the knowledge of my existence with certainty, and also a reference to one particular ‘I’.7

5. The Contingency of My Life and the Knowledge of It

The existence of the particular ‘I’ limits this human’s experience and is known from within his experience. Then, how is it that this human knows the limit of his experience? The aim of this section is to construe Kuki’s view that one of the possible lives is ‘posited before the eyes as actuality’ and to claim that the limit encompassing the objects this human experiences is epistemically encountered as actuality.

It is contingent that I was born and am living as this human. While this human was born and is living, I could not have existed at all or could have been born as another creature. It is possible that I was not this human, and so it is contingent that I am this human. Kuki discusses such possibility and contingency when he writes,

In fact, we could have been American, French, Ethiopian, (…) or citizens of any other country. It is contingent that we are Japanese. We could have also been insects, birds, or beasts.

(Kuki 2012, p. 224, my translation)

Kuki writes with ‘we’ as the subject, but we should construe it as meaning ‘I’ for better understanding and for connecting his passage with our discussion. It is contingent that I was born and am living as this human being. I could have been born as an insect, bird or beast.

Kuki calls such contingency the ‘disjunctive contingency related to the lives as whole having an insect, bird, human, etc. as its disjuncts’ (Kuki 2012, p. 165, my translation). According to Kuki, the ‘lives as a whole’ is the disjunction of an insect’s life, bird’s life, human’s life, etc. My life as a human is part of that disjunction, or one of the disjuncts in the ‘lives as a whole’. My life is contingently a life as a human. That is, it is possible that my life was, say, an insect’s life, which is another disjunct (Kuki 2012, p. 225).

Regarding the disjunctive contingency, Kuki also writes as follows:

(…) this kind of contingency is the relation that, when one of the disjuncts in disjunctive possibilities is posited before the eyes as actuality, the actuality has to the possibilities as a whole, and therefore also to impossibility.

(Kuki 2012, p. 225, my translation)

In Kuki’s view, one of the disjuncts in the possibilities of life is ‘posited before the eyes as actuality’. Among the ‘lives as a whole’, which includes an insect’s life, bird’s life, human’s life, beast’s life, etc., my life as a human is ‘posited before the eyes as actuality’.

My life as a human is not before the eyes like a computer, which is one of the objects that are actually before the eyes. Rather, my life as a human is before the eyes as actuality itself. Actuality is not one of the objects I experience, but is, as it were, what encompasses the objects I experience. Actuality encompasses the objects I experience, and beyond this actuality are objects experienced by an insect, bird, beast, and so on.

Suppose again that there is a Twin Earthian exactly identical to this human. The Twin Earthian’s experience and this human’s experience might seem indistinguishable. However, in fact, they are not. For, I was actually born and am living as this human, not as the Twin Earthian, actually having this human’s experience. In that way, I distinguish this human’s experience as my actual experience. In other words, this human’s experience is distinguished from the Twin Earthian’s experience by the actuality of my having it. That actuality is known from within this human’s experience.

Thus, I would like to build on the discussion in the previous section and think as follows: my life as a human is limited by my existence and is distinguished from other possible lives (or from other disjuncts). This limit, encompassing the objects I experience, is epistemically encountered as actuality.

In this paper, I will not go as far as to claim that experiences other than this human’s experience are not actual. I would like to leave room for thinking that other creatures’ experiences are also actual. So, I refrain from fully equating actuality with my existence, or from considering actuality and my existence as coinciding. My existence is in contrast with the possibility of my non-existence or my existence as another creature. In that sense, ‘my existence’ refers to my actual existence, and is not synonymous with ‘actuality’. Then, there is room for saying that one of the plural actual experiences is limited by my actual existence. My actual existence, which limits this human’s experience, is known from within his experience. It is the actuality of my existence that is epistemically encountered as actuality.

My actual existence is known from within this human’s experience. If the Twin Earthian exists, his experience might also be actual. However, his experience is not limited by my actual existence, which is known by this human when he writes, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’.

Indeed, the Twin Earthian can use the word ‘I’ on the ground of his experience to refer to himself, who is a particular. The referent of that ‘I’ is, of course, not my actual existence. The referent is a particular creature. Therefore, if the Twin Earthian is writing the statement, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’, the statement would be false, or it can mean at most that he exists in the universe as a unique creature.

6. Nishida Kitarō’s Panentheism and My Existence

My actual existence (hereafter simply ‘my existence’) is involved in this human’s experience as a limit encompassing the objects this human experiences, and thus is known from within the experience. Then, how precisely is my existence involved in this human’s experience?

Although my existence limits this human’s experience, the experience does not literally involve a limit that encompasses the objects he experiences; the experience does not literally involve its boundaries. At the same time, my existence is not involved in experience like a physical object.

How, then, is my existence involved in the experience? Nishida’s panentheism in ‘The Logic of the Place of Nothingness and the Religious Worldview’ would give us insights to answer that question. In this section, based on Nishida’s panentheism, I will put forward the view that my existence is both transcendent of and immanent in the experience. My existence transcends this human’s experience such that his experience, with all the objects in it being the same, could not be mine. At the same time, my existence is involved in his experience, being immanent and omnipresent in it.

Nishida presents his theological view in the following passage:

God is in this world thoroughly in self-negation. In this sense, God is thoroughly immanent. Therefore, God is nowhere and there is nowhere God is not in this world.

(Nishida 2004, p. 316, my translation)

God self-negates his transcendence and is immanent in this world. Consequently, God is nowhere and everywhere in this world; God is both absent and omnipresent in the world.

Nishida further explains his theological view and calls it ‘panentheism’ in this passage:

A God who is merely transcendent and self-sufficient would not be the true God. (…) A God who is thoroughly transcendent and thoroughly immanent, a God who is thoroughly immanent and thoroughly transcendent, would be a truly dialectical God, and can be called the true absolute. (…) What I am saying is not pantheistic; rather, it should be called panentheistic.

(Nishida 2004, p. 317, my translation)

Nishida also expresses his religious view in the following way:

Religion must be thoroughly immanently transcendent, and conversely, it must also be transcendently immanent. In the position of the absolute contradictory self-identity of immanence-being-transcendence and transcendence-being-immanence, there is religion.

(Nishida 2004, p. 363, my translation)

The transcendent is nowhere in the world because it transcends the world. However, the transcendent is not outside the world; it is immanent in the world. The transcendent is everywhere in the world because it is immanent in the world.

Let us consider, based on Nishida’s theological or religious view, the relationship between my existence and this human’s experience. I could not have existed even if there was this human’s experience. It is contingent that I exist while this human has experience. All the objects in this human’s experience could be the same without my existence. In that sense, my existence transcends this human’s experience, or all the objects in it.

Yet, I do not exist somewhere outside this human’s experience. I am immanent, and, indeed, omnipresent in this human’s experience. That is precisely why, even if this human doubts the possibility of there being a Twin Earthian identical to this human, this human can refer to one particular ‘I’ with certainty on the ground of his experience (even on the ground of his visual experience of simply seeing a computer).

Note that I am not equating the ‘I’ with the experience. The view that claims such equivalence is analogous to pantheism, on which God and the world are one and the same. Hume considers the self as ‘a bundle or collection of different perceptions’ (Hume 1896, p. 252). If we adopt Hume’s view, we would be able to say that I am immanent and omnipresent in the experience because I am the experience itself—just as, if we adopt pantheism, we would be able to say that God is immanent and omnipresent in the world because God is the world itself. However, in doing so, we would eliminate the possibility that I could not have existed while there was this human’s experience, thereby neglecting the transcendence of my existence to the experience.

My existence is involved in this human’s experience, being immanent and omnipresent in it. This does not mean that I am this human’s experience. My existence, being immanent and omnipresent in this human’s experience, transcends his experience. For this human’s experience can exist with all the objects in this human’s experience being the same, or with the ‘bundle or collection’ of the objects being the same, without my existence.

7. Adverbial Transcendence and Adverbial Immanence

My existence is both transcendent of and immanent in this human’s experience. This section aims to understand this transcendence and immanence in terms of adverbs. My account will be as follows: my existence is transcendent of this human’s experience in the sense that the linguistic description of his experience could be the same whether I exist or not, while my existence is immanent in this human’s experience in the sense that my existence is found in any part of his experience.

Let us consider the sentence, ‘My mother is talking cheerfully’. The word ‘cheerfully’ is an adverb. This adverb can be said to transcend the sentence. For while the sentence, ‘My mother is talking’, is already a complete sentence sufficient for describing a fact, the adverb ‘cheerfully’ is added as a surplus. In other words, both the sentences, ‘My mother is talking’, and, ‘My mother is talking cheerfully’, can describe one and the same fact, with the adverb ‘cheerfully’ being a surplus in the latter sentence. In the sentence, ‘My mother is talking cheerfully’, the adverb ‘cheerfully’ occupies the position of a surplus added to the already complete sentence. From that transcendent position, the adverb ‘cheerfully’ modifies the verb (or predicate) ‘is speaking’.

The immanence of adverbs becomes evident when we observe the facts described by sentences. For example, when we observe the fact described by the sentence, ‘My mother is talking cheerfully’, my mother is talking cheerfully. In this fact, what corresponds to the noun (or subject) ‘my mother’ exists as a physical body, and what corresponds to the verb (or predicate) ‘is talking’ exists as a voice. By contrast, what corresponds to the adverb ‘cheerfully’ does not exist as anything specific in the fact. What corresponds to the adverb ‘cheerfully’ pervades the entire fact that my mother is talking (as my mother’s facial expressions, gestures, tone of voice, and so on). What is adverbial is thus immanent and omnipresent in the fact described by a sentence.

In sum, the adverbial occupies a transcendent position in a sentence, while it is immanent in the fact described by the sentence. Put another way, it is transcendent of a complete, sufficient linguistic description, and is immanent in the described fact.

My existence is transcendent of this human’s experience. This transcendence is adverbial. If this human linguistically describes the objects found in his experience, my existence transcends the description. For whether I exist or not, the description could be precisely the same. My existence adds nothing to the description. True, it is possible for this human to linguistically describe the experience itself by saying that this human’s experience is mine. However, this description, too, could be made whether I exist or not. (If I did not exist, this description would say something naturally correct). My existence thus transcends the linguistic descriptions both of the objects found in the experience and of the experience itself, being a surplus to the linguistic descriptions.

At the same time, my existence is adverbially immanent in experience. My existence permeates throughout the entirety of this human’s experience. Any part of this human’s experience is my experience. In this manner, my existence is immanent and omnipresent in this human’s experience.8

My existence is transcendent of and immanent in this human’s experience. The transcendence is adverbial, and the immanence is also adverbial. As it were, my existence adverbially modifies this human’s experience.9

8. Conclusions

This human is writing, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’. He knows this statement to be true, because his experience involves my existence as its limit. Despite the possibility that this human’s experience was not limited by my existence, on the ground of the experience’s being actually limited by my existence, this human is writing, ‘I exist in the universe in a unique manner’.

My existence as the limit of this human’s experience is adverbially transcendent of and adverbially immanent in his experience. While my existence is transcendent of the linguistic description of this human’s experience, it is immanent and omnipresent in his experience. Just as ‘cheerfully’ is found in the entire fact that my mother is talking cheerfully, my existence is found throughout the entirety of this human’s experience. My existence manifests itself and is known by this human in such a way.10

The knowledge here is knowledge with certainty. Descartes, on the ground of thinking experience, claims my existence to be known with certainty (Descartes 2008, pp. 17–24; Descartes 2006, pp. 28–29). For Descartes, I exist as the subject (or noun) of the predicate (or verb) ‘think’. Then, however, he would not be able to explain the possibility of thinking experience without my existence. For, if Descartes is right, thinking experience must have ‘I’ as the subject. However, it is possible for thinking experience to exist even if I did not exist. For example, this human could follow Descartes’ thoughts and say, ‘I think’, even if I did not exist and this human was not me. Nevertheless, if I do exist and say, ‘I think’, I know my existence with certainty. This knowledge is possible because my existence here is adverbial. My existence modifies the thinking experience of this human when he says, ‘I think’, for example. This is not the knowledge of the existence of ‘I’ as the subject, but is the knowledge of the existence of ‘I’ as the adverb. The thinking experience expressed by the sentence, ‘I think’, is actually modified by my existence, while the thinking experience expressed by the same sentence, ‘I think’, would not be modified by my existence if I did not exist and this human was not me. Thus, the knowledge of my existence as the adverbial lies beyond Cartesian certainty of the existence of the ‘I’ as the subject (or noun). It is the level of this knowledge that this paper has revealed.11