Correction: Chen et al. Dynamic Risk Evolution and Adaptive Synchronization Control for Human–Machine–Environment Coupled Nuclear Emergency System: Based on Comprehensive On-Site Emergency Drills of Nuclear Power Plants. Appl. Sci. 2026, 16, 3265

In the original publication [1], there were mistakes in Tables 1 and 3 as published.

In Table 1 (Summary of system parameter corrections), in the fourth row under the column “Mapping to Context”, the symbol of equipment failure “x₂” should be changed to “y”, the symbol of environmental deterioration “x₂” should be changed to “z”. In the ninth row under the column “Mapping to Context”, the symbol “x₁x₂” should be changed to “xy”.

In Table 3 (Control scheme), in the second row of the fourth column (under “Actual Gain K × γ”), the value “33.13” should be changed to “3.13”.

The corrected

Table 1. Summary of system parameter corrections.

The Given Equation	Term	Physical/Management Interpretation	Mapping to Context	Theoretical Basis
The Evolution of Human Subsystems $\dot{x}$	$-ax$	Organizational Dissipation	Emergency organizations implement standardized procedures, regular training, and psychological interventions to ensure that initial human errors and psychological panic gradually subside over time.	Organizational Resilience
	$+y$	Stress Transmission	Critical equipment failures (for M01) directly increase operational workload and decision-making pressure, thereby leading to Emergency decision-making suffering from a lack of basis, errors, or delays (H36) and operational errors.	Cognitive Load Theory
	$+cyz$	Nonlinear Amplification	When equipment failure (y) and environmental deterioration (z) occur simultaneously, they cause a nonlinear, dramatic increase in human error rates (e.g., communication disruption compounded by extreme weather leading to command paralysis).	Synergetics
The evolution of machine systems ($\dot{y}$)	$-y$	System Self-recovery	The device’s inherent redundancy design, automatic switching logic, or fault isolation measures enable the risk to revert to a stable state.	Reliability Engineering
	$+bx$	Intervention Gain	The effectiveness of command decisions directly influences the accuracy of operations. Positive human interventions, such as correct emergency repairs, can stabilize equipment status; conversely, non-compliant operations or actions (H66) tend to exacerbate equipment failures.	HFE
	$-xz$	Environmental Inhibition	Harsh environments (such as high radiation, Noise E10) impair personnel’s ability to control equipment, resulting in diminished “positive human intervention on machinery”, and manifesting as negative feedback	Situation Awareness
Evolution of environmental subsystems ($\dot{z}$)	$-{\displaystyle \frac{1}{2}}z$	Environmental Decay	The physical attenuation of the disaster itself (such as the fire burning out or the flood receding) and the environment’s inherent capacity for recovery	Environmental Risk Assessment
	$+xy$	Secondary disasters caused by human–machine mismatch	Typical secondary disaster mechanism: Equipment failure compounded by improper personnel response ($+xy$), directly triggering severe environmental consequences such as radioactive release or explosion.	Cascading failure mode
	$-{\displaystyle \frac{1}{2}}y$	The isolation effect of engineering barriers	The intact equipment condition (e.g., Containment rupture M09) provides physical shielding against environmental consequences, directly suppressing the spread of environmental risks.	Principle of defense in depth

and

Table 3. Control scheme.

Control Plan	Preset k Value	Resource Allocation Ratio (H:M:E)	Actual Gain K × γ
Human-dominated	[60, 25, 15]	60%:25%:15%	[7.5, 3.13, 1.88]
Machine-dominated	[25, 60, 15]	25%:60%:15%	[3.13, 7.5, 1.88]
Environment-dominated	[25, 15, 60]	25%:15%:60%	[3.13, 1.88, 7.5]

are shown below.

There was an error in the original publication. A correction has been made to Section 2.2 (Development of a Kinetic Model for Nuclear Emergency Risk Evolution), in the second paragraph below Equation (9).

The corrected sentence is shown below.

“For example, M01 and M02 substantially increase decision-making workload and on-site operational complexity, thereby increasing the risks of H36, H67, and reduced H81.”

The authors state that the scientific conclusions are unaffected. This correction was approved by the Academic Editor. The original publication has also been updated.