1. Introduction
In recent years, in economically developed regions of China such as the Yangtze River Delta, Hangzhou Bay, and Pearl River Delta, with the continuous expansion of the scale of urban rail transit construction, underground engineering increasingly encounters complex strata and specific unfavorable geological bodies. During the investigation and construction of rail transit projects, a Quaternary shallow gas geological phenomenon (hereinafter referred to as “shallow gas”) characterized by shallow burial depth, wide distribution, small single-layer thickness, relatively limited reserves, and a methane-dominated composition has been successively discovered and encountered [
1,
2]. Numerous urban rail transit projects, including Wuhan Metro Line 2 and Line 8, Hangzhou Metro Line 1, Guangzhou Metro Line 6, and Shanghai Metro Line 2, have been affected to varying degrees by the adverse geological conditions of shallow gas during construction, presenting potential safety hazards such as blowouts, gas migration, accumulation, combustion/explosion, and secondary environmental disturbances within the project timeline [
3,
4,
5]. Scientifically identifying and evaluating the adverse impacts of shallow gas on urban rail transit construction, and accordingly proposing targeted prevention, control, and safety treatment measures, has become one of the important issues urgently requiring resolution in the construction of rail transit projects in shallow gas-developed areas.
Existing studies and engineering case histories indicate that the formation and evolution of shallow gas geological risks result from the coupling of multiple factors. Duan Xiaoyong, Kortekaas et al., and Roy et al. [
6,
7,
8] point out that the occurrence of shallow gas disasters is first closely related to the occurrence characteristics of the shallow gas itself, such as gas composition, gas pressure, reserve scale, and occurrence morphology; it is then controlled by regional geological environment conditions, such as stratigraphic structure, permeability, gas source conditions, reservoir conditions, and cap rock sealing properties. Further studies [
9,
10] add that human engineering activities are also important external factors inducing shallow gas disasters, including the choice of construction method, borehole exposure behavior, soil disturbance intensity, and ventilation and drainage conditions.
Current research on shallow gas is relatively insufficient in the quantitative assessment of its engineering hazard level, and a unified, mature risk assessment system suitable for the unconsolidated sedimentary geological conditions of onshore Quaternary shallow gas has not yet been established both domestically and internationally. In contrast, significant progress has been made in risk assessment for gas tunnels in bedrock-type geological conditions. For example, research on Line 7 of the Tehran Metro by Bakhshandeh Amnieh et al. [
11] indicates that a relatively mature geological risk identification framework has been established for urban tunnel construction. Ayhan et al. [
12] investigated a methane deflagration incident during the excavation of the Silvan Water Diversion Tunnel in Turkey and noted that failure to adequately consider the natural gas basin background and the possibility of gas presence during the engineering planning and construction method selection stages may lead to sudden gas disasters in TBM construction. Wang et al. [
13] used the gray relational analysis method to analyze the influencing factors of tunnel gas accidents in China, revealing the degree of influence of factors such as gas content in surrounding rock, stratigraphic lithology, and groundwater on gas accidents, providing empirical support for related risk management. Wang Zichao et al. [
14] and Yun Feng et al. [
15] used the AHP to construct a well-defined hierarchical risk assessment system, systematically evaluating gas tunnels to obtain scientifically reliable risk assessment conclusions and offer constructive suggestions tailored to engineering practice.
In general, scholars have amassed substantial research findings regarding the mechanisms of gas disasters, tunnel explosion prevention, ventilation monitoring, and data-driven risk assessment. Nevertheless, systematic research on the risks of Quaternary shallow gas within the shallow-buried, linear, and densely built environment of urban rail transit requires further in-depth exploration. Among these, the AHP is well-suited for the small sample data of Quaternary shallow gas, which demonstrate prominent hierarchical features, as it can quantify qualitative issues, systematically stratify intricate decision-making problems, and effectively integrate expert experience with objective data.
Therefore, taking the engineering investigation stage as the entry point, this paper constructs a hazard factor evaluation model for shallow gas geological risks using the AHP, systematically analyzes the importance of each influencing factor, and identifies the key hazard factors, thereby providing a reference for the risk assessment and prevention/control of urban rail transit projects in Quaternary shallow gas-developed areas.
Accordingly, this study constructs an AHP-based evaluation framework for disaster-inducing factors of Quaternary shallow gas in rail transit engineering and applies it to a representative metro tunnel case. The main scientific contributions are: (1) establishing a risk factor indicator system tailored to shallow gas in Quaternary unconsolidated strata; (2) making the indicator screening and expert consultation process explicit; (3) linking the ranking results to engineering investigation, hazard zoning, and controlled gas release measures. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 summarizes the main disaster forms of shallow gas across project stages and engineering types.
Section 3 describes indicator selection, expert consultation, and AHP weighting.
Section 4 interprets the ranking results and their engineering implications.
Section 5 presents a metro case for applicability verification, and
Section 6 discusses robustness, limitations, and future research directions.
2. Disaster Forms of Quaternary Shallow Gas in Rail Transit Engineering
The construction cycle of urban rail transit projects encompasses stages such as investigation, pre-construction preparation, design, construction, and operation. At different stages, factors including the burial depth of shallow gas, gas pressure, the relative position of the gas-bearing stratum with engineering structures and construction machinery, and the occurrence conditions of shallow gas will undergo dynamic changes. These changes will result in different disaster forms and extents of shallow gas at various construction stages. Below, the disaster forms of shallow gas are presented in accordance with the chronological sequence of urban rail transit project construction.
The core task of the investigation stage is to ascertain information such as the occurrence stratum, gas source type, pressure value, and distribution range of shallow gas. This necessitates guiding shallow gas from the underground gas-bearing layer to the surface via boreholes. In this process, high-pressure shallow gas is the primary cause of direct safety accidents (e.g., fire and explosion) and indirect geological hazards (e.g., stratum disturbance). Firstly, the main component of Quaternary shallow gas is methane, which can ignite when exposed to open flames and even explode at high concentrations, seriously endangering the safety of construction personnel and drilling machinery [
16]. Secondly, improper operation is highly likely to lead to the uncontrolled eruption of shallow gas. The high-pressure airflow generated by the eruption will directly damage drilling equipment and, in severe cases, even threaten the stability and safety of the drilling platform (or survey vessel) [
17]. Simultaneously, the ejected high-pressure airflow will also cause severe disturbance to the original stratum, altering its physical and mechanical properties and posing long-term risks to subsequent engineering construction [
18]. The representative shallow disasters, as shown in
Figure 1, are from the Hangzhou Metro Line 1 in China.
The main task of the pre-construction preparation stage is to carry out site leveling and construct temporary facilities to ensure that the project meets the requirements for formal commencement. To reduce the harm of shallow gas in subsequent construction during the pre-construction preparation stage, it is necessary to conduct pre-exhaust operations in the proven shallow gas areas. However, improper exhaust measures or uncontrolled exhaust are likely to cause severe blowouts and carry away a large amount of mud and sand, resulting in a large area of stratum subsidence. Meanwhile, it will cause large-scale and varying degrees of severe disturbance to the overlying, underlying, and surrounding strata [
19]. According to the degree of disturbance, Kong et al. classified the disturbed area into severely disturbed areas, seriously disturbed areas, slightly disturbed areas, and gas-bearing layer compaction areas [
18].
Figure 2 presents an on-site photo of ground collapse caused by the underground mud and sand being carried away due to uncontrolled gas release in a domestic metro project.
Urban rail transit engineering primarily encompasses supporting and load-bearing structures, traffic channel structures, and station hub structures, specifically covering projects such as bridge pile foundation engineering, foundation pit engineering, and tunnel engineering. The forms of shallow gas disasters vary across different projects. Therefore, it is necessary to describe the disaster risks of Quaternary shallow gas during the construction stage according to project categories.
Foundation pit engineering: During the process of foundation pit excavation, the sudden reduction of overlying soil pressure due to excavation unloading disrupts the original pressure equilibrium of the gas-bearing stratum, which is likely to trigger shallow gas outbursts or cause the gas to accumulate in the foundation pit. Once such gas outbursts occur, if the gas pressure is high, the reserves are large, the burial depth is shallow, and the excavation depth of the foundation pit is great, it will create extremely hazardous working conditions. The main problem which may occur is the heave of the foundation pit bottom plate. If the construction method and emergency measures are inappropriate, it may not only lead to extensive damage to the soil at the foundation pit bottom plate and a sharp decline in bearing capacity, but also cause damage to construction machinery and even result in personnel injuries. Shallow gas continuously seeps out along the weak parts of the foundation pit bottom plate or side wall and accumulates in low-lying or poorly ventilated areas of the foundation pit. If ventilation measures are not implemented, its concentration will rise rapidly. When the concentration reaches the explosion limit of 5–15%, it will explode violently upon exposure to open fire [
20].
Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a shallow gas outburst into the foundation pit induced by the sudden reduction of overlying soil pressure due to excavation unloading.
Tunnel engineering: When a slurry balance shield machine is used for tunnel driving, passing through a gas-bearing stratum is likely to cause the mixing of gas and liquid phases in the slurry cabin, resulting in pressure fluctuations and the failure of the mud film, which seriously threatens the stability of the excavation face. When an earth pressure balance shield penetrates a shallow gas-bearing sand layer, on the one hand, due to the high friction of the high-pressure shallow gas sand, rapid excavation will lead to a sharp increase and frequent fluctuations in the cutter head friction resistance and jack thrust, which is likely to cause excessive soil disturbance and ground settlement. On the other hand, the gas-bearing sand layer has poor fluidity because of its low water content and gas interfacial tension between particles. This not only increases the torque of the cutter head and the main bearing and slows down the excavation speed, but also easily induces “dry cake” or “sand cake” formations due to gas–soil separation in the screw conveyor. This destroys the uniformity and pressure balance of the soil in the sealed cabin, leading to the instability of the working face and difficulty in shield direction control [
21]. As is shown in
Figure 4,
Figure 4a is a schematic diagram of the pressure fluctuations caused by the mixing of gas and liquid phases in the slurry cabin during the driving of the slurry shield machine, which threatens the stability of the excavation face.
Figure 4b is a schematic diagram of disasters such as sand agglomeration and dry agglomeration caused by the action of shallow gas and torque overload caused by the action of shallow gas during the driving of the earth pressure balance shield machine.
Bridge pile foundation engineering: The pile side frictional resistance is the main component of the pile foundation bearing capacity. However, when the soil around the pile moves downward relative to the pile body due to the release of shallow gas, the frictional resistance will transform into negative frictional resistance, resulting in an increase in pile foundation settlement and a decrease in the effective bearing capacity. During the hole-forming process, the airflow released by shallow gas will erode the hole wall and damage the stability of the mud cake, which is highly likely to cause hole collapse [
19]. Simultaneously, the fine particles carried upward by the gas and the collapse materials caused by the instability of the hole wall accumulate at the bottom of the hole, which may lead to local “necking” or even blockage of the borehole, jamming the drilling tool or casing in the hole and causing drill-sticking accidents, which can seriously affect construction safety and progress [
22]. During the pile-pouring process, if the shallow gas cannot be effectively discharged or isolated, the gas will intrude into the concrete along the inner wall of the casing, resulting in continuous bubbling of the pile body. This in turn affects the bonding between the concrete, the hole wall, and the steel bars, and forms a large number of air holes and local grooves inside the pile body, causing serious honeycomb and pockmark defects, affecting the quality of pile formation [
22,
23]. The failure mode is shown in
Figure 5.
In the event of shallow gas leakage in the metro tunnel during the operation phase, the leaked gas will continuously accumulate in enclosed spaces such as tunnels and stations, resulting in a gradual decrease in the oxygen content in local areas, which may cause suffocation among personnel. Meanwhile, the primary component of the leaked gas is methane, a flammable gas. When its concentration reaches the explosion limit (5–15%), it is highly likely to trigger severe fires or even explosion accidents upon contact with ignition sources, such as electrical sparks and overheated equipment in the tunnel. This not only seriously endangers the lives of passengers and staff but may also lead to damage to the tunnel structure, equipment impairment, and long-term disruption of line operation [
21].
4. Results and Engineering Implications
Based on the AHP, the comprehensive weight ranking of hazardous factors for shallow gas geohazards in river- and lake-crossing rail transit projects is as follows: shallow gas pressure > methane content per ton of soil > occurrence morphology of shallow gas > cap rock thickness > eruption duration > actual gas layer thickness > source layer thickness > cap rock permeability coefficient > orifice flow rate > fault development > orifice methane concentration > reservoir burial depth > displacement pressure > confined water pressure > effective porosity of the reservoir. Among these, shallow gas pressure, methane content per ton of soil, and occurrence morphology of shallow gas rank as the top three risk factors. This indicates that these key factors should be prioritized during the investigation and design of such engineering projects to mitigate the risk of shallow gas geohazards.
Research reveals that the geohazard risk of shallow gas in river- and lake-crossing rail transit projects is not the result of a single geological condition, but rather the combined effect of gas source conditions, dynamic conditions, and sealing conditions. The AHP results demonstrate that the dynamic characteristics of shallow gas have the highest weight (0.4917), significantly higher than source layer conditions, cap rock conditions, and reservoir conditions. This is in line with the view that the key to determining the occurrence and impact of geohazards lies not only in the presence of shallow gas, but more importantly in its activity and release dynamics. Therefore, incorporating dynamic characteristics into the risk identification framework is more consistent with the formation and evolution patterns of shallow gas hazards, compared to evaluation methods that rely solely on static stratigraphic parameters.
Regarding the comprehensive weights of the secondary indicators, the shallow gas pressure and the methane production per ton of soil rank first and second respectively, succeeded by the occurrence form of shallow gas in third, with comprehensive weights of 0.2735, 0.2319, and 0.1113, respectively. Collectively, these three indicators account for more than 0.60. This is because the gas pressure directly determines the potential for gas outbursts in the stratum and acts as the direct driving force for disasters such as gushing and gas emission under construction disturbance. The methane production per ton of soil reflects the capacity of organic matter decomposition and gas generation in the stratum, serving as an important material foundation for the formation and continuous replenishment of shallow gas. The occurrence form of shallow gas determines its distribution pattern within the soil. Research indicates that shallow gas in Quaternary deposits mainly occurs in forms such as scattered single pores, columnar or pinnate shapes, and chimney-like shapes. Naturally, there are also thick-layered, lumpy, and cystic forms, which have been observed in regions like Hangzhou and Guangzhou [
24,
25]. In comparison with the former, the latter types are characterized by higher shallow gas pressure, larger gas storage capacity, greater potential hazard, and a higher degree of development of gas-generating layers. Among these, free gas is more likely to be suddenly released under engineering disturbance, resulting in the concentration of construction risks. The occurrence of shallow gas disasters generally follows the evolutionary process of “continuous gas supply–local accumulation–disturbance-induced release,” where an adequate gas source and pressure accumulation are prerequisites for engineering risk.
Certainly, the rationale for the relatively low weight assigned to the occurrence form of shallow gas is grounded in practical engineering considerations. The exploration of Quaternary shallow gas adheres to the principle of “conducting geophysical reconnaissance initially, followed by verification through drilling and cone penetration testing, and quantification via in situ tests and laboratory experiments”. Owing to substantial interference from electromagnetic fields, vibrations, and other factors, the accuracy of geophysical detection is relatively limited. This phenomenon was manifested in a special investigation for a subway project in Guangzhou (
Figure 6): although acoustic blank zones (Q3 and Q8) were identified in the geophysical survey outcomes, no shallow gas was detected during the subsequent verification by drilling and cone penetration testing. As a result, its weight is ranked lower than that of the methane content per ton of soil.
Overall, this study clarifies the relative primary and secondary relationships among various factors in risk formation through AHP, highlighting the priority of gas pressure and gas generation capacity in river- and lake-crossing rail transit projects. Risk assessment should focus not only on “whether gas storage conditions exist” but also on “whether high-pressure release conditions and sustained gas supply capacity exist”. Risk management should shift from general shallow gas identification to a high-risk shallow gas system identification oriented toward construction safety, and from static stratigraphic description to a comprehensive evaluation model emphasizing dynamic response, process control, and graded prevention.
5. Engineering Case Validation
5.1. Engineering Geological Setting
To validate the practical applicability of the proposed framework, a metro tunnel section in Guangdong Province (YEDK57 + 480.000 to YEDK58 + 470.000) was selected as the dependent engineering case. The target area is located beneath a river channel. The riverbed is covered by mud of approximately 10–15 m thickness; beneath it is muddy soil and consolidated muddy silty clay of approximately 3–11 m thickness. These are underlain by medium-coarse sand, fine sand, and gravel strata, with moderately weathered migmatitic granite as the base.
5.2. Investigation Results
In the investigation region, a total of 64 boreholes were arranged, and all 64 boreholes were successfully completed. Gas blowout or gas emission was observed in 29 boreholes, accounting for 45.31% of the total number of boreholes. The maximum height of the gas jet exceeded the casing opening by approximately 11 m, and in certain boreholes, the duration of the gas eruption reached 1.6 h. Based on drilling site testing and static cone penetration test results, the depth of the upper boundary of the gas-bearing intervals in the blowout boreholes ranged from 19.00 m to 36.60 m. The shallow gas with engineering significance primarily occurred in muddy soil, particularly in the fine sand and medium sand interlayers within the muddy soil. The gas samples were predominantly composed of methane4, with a content ranging from 91.38% to 93.55% and an average of 92.36%, indicating a typical biogenic dry gas.
In the subsequent detailed investigation phase, the three key indicators identified through this research are applied to conduct a comprehensive and meticulous survey of the target area. Firstly, geophysical survey methods are utilized to explore the area and delineate acoustic blank zones, which are recognized as suspected shallow gas accumulation zones (
Figure 7).
Subsequently, drilling and cone penetration testing techniques are employed to verify these suspected zones, and relevant indicators such as shallow gas pressure and methane content per ton of soil are obtained. Among them, the shallow gas pressure is taken as the maximum pressure from exploration boreholes within the delineated area, and the methane content per ton of soil is taken as the average value within the delineated area. The obtained data are shown in
Table 8.
5.3. Case-Based Validation of the AHP Ranking
The engineering case was further used to examine whether the AHP ranking corresponds to observed investigation outcomes. The two highest weight quantitative indicators available in the case, shallow gas pressure and methane content per ton of soil, were normalized by their maximum observed values in the delineated zones. A composite verification index was calculated as I = 0.2735(P/Pmax) + 0.2319(M/Mmax), where P is shallow gas pressure and M is methane content per ton of soil. This index was not used to recalibrate the AHP weights; it was used only to test whether the AHP-prioritized factors are consistent with field phenomena.
The calculated verification index was highest in Q6, where the measured gas pressure reached 0.12 MPa and methane content reached 0.521 m3/t. This zone also showed the strongest field indication among the listed zones and was therefore classified as the priority section for controlled pressure relief. Q7 ranked second, with a gas pressure of 0.08 MPa and a methane content of 0.348 m3/t, corresponding to a medium-risk section requiring strengthened verification and local pressure-reduction measures. Q1, Q2, and Q9 had lower but non-zero pressure and methane content, and were treated as low-to-medium-risk verification zones. Q3 and Q8 had no measured gas pressure despite being acoustic blank zones in the geophysical survey; these zones were therefore downgraded after drilling and cone penetration verification.
This comparison demonstrates the practical value of the ranking. If only the geophysical acoustic blank zones were considered, Q3 and Q8 could have been overestimated. After incorporating the AHP-prioritized indicators, the decision focus shifted to Q6 and Q7, where pressure and gas-generation capacity were both more significant. The observed correspondence between high ranked-factor values, borehole gas release behavior, and the need for pressure relief supports the applicability of the AHP results for section-based hazard discrimination.
This case illustrates an enhancement in decision-making performance during the investigation phase. The ranked indicators facilitated the transformation of a descriptive suspected zone map into a graded treatment scheme. High-priority zones necessitated pressure relief and continuous monitoring; medium-risk zones required supplementary drilling and methane testing. Geophysical anomalies without pressure confirmation were set aside for observation instead of immediate intensive treatment.
Simultaneously, this case should be regarded as a verification of the applicability of the AHP framework, rather than as comprehensive statistical validation. The comparison of results from Q6, Q7, Q3, and Q8 reveals that the framework aids in differentiating confirmed high-risk zones from unconfirmed geophysical anomalies and supports graded engineering decision-making.
Nonetheless, prior to the framework being employed as a predictive model, validation across multiple projects using independent construction outcomes remains requisite.
5.4. Engineering Prevention and Control Measures
To reduce the hazard of high-pressure shallow gas to subsequent construction, different response measures should be adopted for sections with different engineering hazard levels when metro tunnels pass through Quaternary ultra-shallow gas-enriched areas.
First, exploration and construction personnel should receive dedicated safety training to understand the hazard mechanisms of ultra-shallow gas. During investigation, special attention should be paid to shallow gas pressure at borehole openings so that personnel can be evacuated in time when abnormal release is detected.
Secondly, for shallow high-pressure gas zones with significant or relatively high risks, to alleviate the hazards of high-pressure shallow gas to subsequent construction, pre-construction gas emission work should be conducted approximately 3 to 6 months in advance. This involves pre-designing advanced gas release wells to guide the slow and safe release of shallow gas in a controlled fashion, thus effectively reducing formation gas pressure and geological risks before construction. The fundamental principle is to avoid disturbing the formation structure and prevent the leakage of sand-laden gas. Generally, a wellhead pressure below 0.05 MPa can be used as the termination criterion to ensure a stable and controllable pressure reduction process. The layout of pressure relief wells should be based on detailed preliminary investigation results, integrating key risk factor data such as shallow gas pressure, methane content per ton of soil, and occurrence patterns, to scientifically determine well locations, depths, spacing, and release rates, thereby establishing a systematic and efficient pressure relief network. This technology has proven its effectiveness in the risk prevention and control practices in the Ningming Basin [
19].
A pre-construction controlled gas release network was established 3 to 6 months prior to the project, which decreased the borehole pressure to below 0.05 MPa, thereby effectively alleviating the risk of gas outbursts during the subsequent excavation process.