3.2. The Re-Emergence of the Nativist Movement and the Argument of Nationalist Love
As discussed at the beginning of this article, theorizing about the topographies of social love involves considering it as a framework that integrates cultural and political geography to analyze how communities map and enact solidarity, care, unity, and support for one another. This complex undertaking requires examining various elements that are not always clear-cut or well-defined concerning people’s networks and understandings of love. For instance, two critical elements in contemporary public discourse are patriotism and nationalism, along with nativism. Although these concepts are distinct, they are deeply interconnected; they can mutually reinforce one another.
Patriotism, nationalism, and nativism represent distinct yet interrelated ideologies regarding national identity and allegiance. Nativism is not merely an intensified form of patriotism or nationalism; rather, it occupies a distinctive analytical space in the realm of political ideologies. While patriotism and nationalism can encompass a broader range of sentiments and allegiances, nativism is specifically characterized by its construction of a clear-cut division between native and non-native individuals. This binary distinction serves as the foundation for nativist rhetoric, which often frames non-native individuals (aesthetics and ideas of diversity) as existential threats to the cultural, social, and political fabric of the nation.
In this regard, nativism fundamentally operates on fear and exclusion. It posits that the presence of non-native individuals undermines the integrity of the community, leading to perceived threats to economic stability, social cohesion, and national identity. This sense of vulnerability gives rise to exclusionary policies and practices, which seek to protect the interests and privileges of the so-called native population.
Moreover, nativism employs this construction of the native/non-native divide to justify a variety of social and political agendas, often rooted in historical narratives or cultural myths that glorify a homogeneous national identity. By portraying non-native individuals as inherently incompatible with the values and norms of the nation, nativism creates a climate of suspicion and animosity, further entrenching divisions within society.
Consequently, nativism transcends mere expressions of loyalty or cultural pride. It fundamentally reshapes the political landscape by advocating for policies that prioritize native interests while marginalizing those deemed non-native. This analytical distinction underscores the urgency of addressing nativist ideologies in contemporary discourse, as they can foster exclusionary practices that resonate deeply within national politics.
In his influential book
Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson defines a nation primarily as “an imagined political community [that is] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (
Anderson 1983, p. 6). He explains that its members develop a shared consciousness and identity that transcends personal acquaintance. In other words, we can argue that a nation’s cohesion is primarily sustained on an emotional level. For
Anderson (
1983), nationalism emerged from historical shifts, such as the decline of religious communities and the rise of print capitalism, which fostered a shared consciousness enabling individuals to feel part of a larger sovereign nation beyond the confines of their immediate kinship. Nationalism, as a political project, typically seeks to unify people around elements such as language, cuisine, music, and shared historical experiences, including catastrophes and wars. It can manifest in formal independence movements and, later, in discourses of national sovereignty, self-determination, or the promotion of national economic interests.
While nationalism often embodies an inclusive ethos, it inherently involves a discernment process regarding who belongs to, or is excluded from, the national project. Consequently, nationalism can give rise to exclusionary practices, particularly against those perceived as “dangerous” to the unity and cohesion of the nation’s imagined homogeneity, such as minorities and non-citizens. In this context, nationalism may evolve into practices that marginalize ethnic groups, promoting or reinforcing prejudices and stereotypes. As scholar
Higham (
1988) explains, this form of nationalism has been part of the history of the United States and has evolved over time both as an ideology and as a praxis. It embodies tendencies of exclusion and rejection that are explicitly nation-based.
This definition may work, particularly for the United States, but how about other Western contexts? In this regard,
Mudde (
2007) defines nativism as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally a threat to the nation-state” (p. 19). He reiterates the exclusionary nature of nativist movements and specifically analyzes the attacks against three groups, Muslims, Jews, and the Rom, who are constructed as enemies.
More recent work, such as that of sociologist Bart Bonikowski, expands our understanding of nationalism by elaborating on its connections to authoritarianism and populism. He recognizes the complexities of broader universalist definitions and emphasizes that people’s attitudes and approaches to the nation change over time, both between and within groups, parties, and even political campaigns (
Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). Nationalism is deeply influenced by the circumstances surrounding individuals, including, but not limited to, financial stress and vulnerability (
Bonikowski 2017). In other words, it is not static or homogeneous; rather, it is relational, evolving across different domains and spaces, and is activated in response to the circumstances that shape people’s belief systems. As Bonikowski explains, the politics of ethno-nationalism thrives on scapegoating and fearmongering, especially when combined with populist anti-elite arguments. The radical right has developed an effective formula that intertwines nationalism, populism, and authoritarianism, creating a synergy among these three ideologies. Populism criticizes elites while elevating the people, nationalism defines who “the people” are, and authoritarianism implements measures that benefit those in power, maintaining the dominance of radical supporters. This combination proves especially effective during times of structural change, cultural shocks, and rising status anxiety within dominant groups (
Bonikowski et al. 2022).
Moreover, in her foundational book,
The Cultural Politics of Emotion (
Ahmed 2004), argues that nations are formed not merely by geography, but through what she defines as “affective economies” in which shared emotions and feelings bind people together and define who belongs and who should be excluded, rejected, or contained. In other words, as she explains, these emotions and beliefs circulate, exchange and trade as a type of capital, beyond the private sphere and into the public as social practices. And it is via this circulation of emotions that a set of boundaries of affiliation and rejection are constructed, emphasizing “us” and “them.” This introduces another related concept for our discussion: nativism.
Higham (
1988) defines nativism as “an inflamed and nationalistic type of ethnocentrism” (p. 4). He explains that while ethnocentrism is a general prejudice against outsiders, nativism is a specific, intensified version of nationalism that links hate and rejection directly to national identity. In this context, nativism is not merely a dislike of the differences manifested by the ‘other’, but rather it is a radical effort to protect and shield a nation’s culture and institutions from the perceived threats posed by foreigners, migrants, “aliens” and those defined as undesirables. More importantly, national threat boundaries are not defined or limited by fixed physical borders, but rather by cultural, religious, or ethnic markers that differentiate ‘natives,’ ‘non-natives,’ and sovereign territories, beyond both real and imaginary.
As (
Bonikowski 2017;
Bonikowski et al. 2022) observes, nationalism and nativism are interconnected, and here populist discourse functions as a rhetorical and discursive method that provides the logic and tools to reproduce frames of fear. Here again, Ahmed’s arguments regarding the circulation of emotions prove particularly useful for understanding how, through the rhetoric of repetition employed by authoritarian populism, the bodies of the ‘other’ become, as she identifies, ‘sticky’ and infused with negative emotions such as fear, disgust, and suspicion (
Ahmed 2004). This highlights two important elements: (a) the contagious nature of hate and suspicion directed toward minoritized subjects, and (b) the manipulation of discourses of love to promote hostility, rejection, and fear.
Before discussing these two elements, it is essential to affirm that nativism extends beyond a mere political ideology or exchange of ideas; it is accompanied by actionable methods. Nativism is designed to favor the interests of the nation over those of other nations, prioritizing the rights of individuals perceived as the nation’s original inhabitants over immigrants and minorities, whom it considers non-normative. In this context, nativism aims to preserve the cultural, economic, and political dominance of the prevailing group. Consequently, it often promotes policies that restrict immigration and emphasize the necessity for cultural homogeneity. Furthermore, nativism relies on a fixed and linear conception of stable cultures, coupled with a nostalgic longing for the past, ultimately failing to recognize the permeable and evolving nature of cultures and nations (
Boym 2001).
Cultural theorist
Berlant (
1997) highlights that nativism’s governance and policy are emotionally driven, acting as a defense against collective anxiety and nostalgia. These sentiments create a narrative that helps people cope with social, economic, and demographic changes. As marginalized groups like people of color, women, and LGBTQ+ individuals demand equality, traditional power structures—primarily white, heterosexual, middle-class men—may experience displacement and pessimism about their future. This fear of change fuels nativism. Berlant describes these privileged groups as “unmarked,” viewed as the normative standard in society and idealized as full members with undeniable status. They possess cultural elements that reinforce their central role in national narratives, termed “national iconicity.” This concept encompasses symbols and events strategically used to create a cohesive narrative centered around “unmarked” citizens. Moreover, as
Ahmed (
2004) notes, narratives of exclusion and hate spread contagiously, targeting non-normative individuals and their cultures. Conversely, objects deemed ‘sacred’ for the nation-state also affirm national identity, as individuals connect with symbols like flags or anthems. Therefore, actions such as flag burning are perceived as desecrations, similar to the treatment of religious symbols.
Nativist groups often seek to homogenize the physical landscape to reflect only the dominant aesthetics of the “mainstream” identity. This includes national symbols such as flags and their colors, the national anthem, and even representative animals (e.g., the eagle), as well as architectural styles (e.g., grand monuments), typefaces (e.g., Times New Roman), and propaganda films. Additionally, practices such as censoring and destroying art and literature designated as “degenerate” (e.g., Alma López’s art of the Virgin of Guadalupe at the Santa Fe Museum of International Folk Art), along with the banning of certain authors (e.g., Arizona House Bill 2281, which banned Ethnic Studies and several books in the Tucson Unified School District), are employed to manipulate cultural production for the purposes of territorial control, exclusion, and the perceived cleanliness of the social body.
In 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio mandated that all U.S. diplomatic units use the Times New Roman typeface for official documents, reversing the Biden administration’s previous switch to Calibri, which aimed to enhance accessibility for readers with disabilities (
Lee 2025;
Barker 2026). Rubio labeled Calibri as “another wasteful DEIA program.” This change was viewed as part of a broader Trump policy promoting a unified approach to America’s foreign relations (
Treisman 2025). Politico (
Dallison 2025) characterized it as “U.S. wages war on woke fonts.” As a sans-serif font, Calibri lacks the “decorative tops and tails” found in serif fonts like Times New Roman, which some studies suggest makes serif fonts harder to read (
Treisman 2025). Times New Roman was viewed as more conservative, while Calibri was seen as too modern and “woke” (
The Guardian 2025). Historically, typefaces have been used by various social movements to project values like austerity and strength. Thus, font choice serves as a powerful tool for ideological expression and shapes cultural identity, highlighting how small details can influence societal perceptions and reinforce political narratives.
Let us also remember the case of Sébastien de la Cruz, a Mexican American boy who sang “The Star-Spangled Banner” at the 2013 NBA Finals in San Antonio, which underscores the intersectionality of rejection in contemporary society. Despite being born in Texas, de la Cruz faced a barrage of anti-immigrant comments, largely due to his traditional mariachi outfit (
Rodriguez 2013). One critic, a self-proclaimed NBA fan, questioned, “Why is a foreigner singing the national anthem?” while another provoked, “Who let this illegal alien sing our national anthem?” This reaction illustrates how de la Cruz’s mariachi attire transformed into an “iconic” object that undermined his American identity. At just 11 years old, his choice of clothing marked him as an outsider, despite his U.S. citizenship and a father who served in the military. The incident highlights how rejection operates through multiple dimensions—not only through language but also through aesthetics and public performance. It was not merely the outfit that sparked controversy; the performance of the anthem by a brown body at such a significant event amplified the exclusionary discourse.
In this context, the concepts of aesthetic plurality and the rights of communities to express themselves in accordance with their histories and traditions are rendered nonexistent unless they align with state interests (
Gaspar de Alba 1998). Moreover, narratives and myths regarding the origins of the nation are selectively promoted, resurfaced, emphasized, or recreated to create a façade of cohesive homogeneity within the dominant group’s core identity. This process diminishes genealogical conflict and ambiguity, effectively eliminating challenges to the naturalization of power (
Arendt 1951).
A question may arise: what distinguishes each of these examples as instances of nativism rather than nationalism, racialization, conservative cultural politics, anti-DEI initiatives, or censorship? Each example exemplifies nativism by emphasizing the native/non-native divide, which sets it apart from nationalism, traditional racialization, conservative cultural politics, anti-DEI initiatives, and general censorship. While issues of race, class, and gender contribute to the ethos and mechanisms of exclusion employed by nativist groups, these examples collectively underscore how nativism prioritizes and safeguards a perceived cultural homogeneity, viewing non-native narratives as existential threats.
The Times New Roman versus Calibri controversy, for instance, promotes traditional font choices that symbolize established cultural norms while rejecting contemporary designs. This preference reinforces the idea that adherence to longstanding customs is essential for cultural integrity, reflecting a desire to protect a ‘native’ cultural identity against perceived threats from newer or diverse expressions.
Similarly, Sébastien de la Cruz faced backlash for singing the national anthem in a mariachi style, illustrating how nativist perspectives equate a singular national identity with conformity to specific cultural norms. This reveals a strong bias against non-native expressions. Unlike nationalism, which may accommodate diverse cultural expressions within a broader patriotic framework, nativism seeks to uphold a singular, traditional vision of national identity, rejecting any form of cultural pluralism. Interestingly, de la Cruz’s family’s reference to his father’s veteran status emphasizes a patriotic narrative dismissed by nativism critics.
Moreover, the banning of ethnic-studies materials exemplifies nativism by attempting to erase perspectives that challenge the dominant cultural narrative. This action seeks to safeguard the interests of ‘native’ identities, framing alternative curricula as threats to national cohesion. As a form of cultural censorship, it aims to uphold a constructed notion of cultural homogeneity, actively marginalizing voices that diverge from traditional norms. Unlike broader anti-DEI efforts, which may resist change for ideological reasons, this specific ban embodies fear of non-native influences and a desire to maintain cultural homogeneity. This desire to preserve a ‘pure’ national culture reflects nativism’s goals, seeking to protect native interests and values. Such actions illustrate nativism’s efforts to sanitize the educational landscape, often justified by claims that alternative curricula threaten national unity.
Ultimately, these examples highlight how nativism seeks to preserve a singular cultural identity and frames non-native expressions as threats, clearly distinguishing it from nationalism and other related concepts.
3.2.1. The Manipulation of the Narratives of Love
Nativist movements present an inherent dilemma; they advocate for a model of unity and cohesion that can be fundamentally defined as a type of love, while simultaneously contradicting the interconnected and mobile nature of modern society. Many individuals involved in these movements may genuinely believe they are enacting a form of care for those who are close and similar to them, perceiving their actions as expressions of love for their families, nation, and religion. This raises critical questions: Does this framing render the concept of social love inoperative or obsolete if it can be posited as love even when it causes harm to others? How can we critically analyze nativism when it is defined as expressions of love? On one hand, individuals can perform acts of kindness and social love across various contexts. People are complex, often navigating conflicting and even contradictory positions on social issues, oscillating between their private and public lives. Ideological movements are rarely coherent or homogeneous. On the other hand, as Sara Ahmed argues, nationalist narratives within white supremacist groups frame their hatred and mistreatment of minorities—such as immigrants, LGBTQ+ individuals, feminists, and others—using a language of love for their own nation. I contend that this phenomenon reflects its deeply Christian character, both ideologically and theologically.
Ahmed emphasizes how nativist groups deploy narratives of love to justify hate and harm toward others. Initially part of her book
The Cultural Politics of Emotion (
Ahmed 2004), this idea was later reposted on her blog
feministkilljoys under the title “Fascism as Love” (
Ahmed 2016). Here, she explains that these groups position themselves as the true loving citizens, claiming victimhood against perceived threats to their rights. They justify their actions “out of love, seeking to defend the nation against others who threaten to steal it away” (
Ahmed 2016). This sentiment reflects an imaginary nostalgia for a time when their privileges were unquestioned, perpetuating a self-referential and exclusive type of love. Ahmed contends that because these groups see themselves as loving, they view hate not as harm but as necessary ‘tough love’ to protect their nation and loved ones. Their hardships are interpreted as sacrifices, unifying them through a “heroic patriotic sentiment.” This “love…reproduces the collective as ideal” (
Ahmed 2016), blurring the line between love and hate. They unify as defenders while excluding others perceived as traitors or intruders, projecting their love inwardly toward those embodying their national ideal: white, heterosexual, Christian, and economically stable individuals. Consequently, protecting the “foreigner” is framed as a threat to the nation’s purity.
On the other hand, as
Ahmed (
2016) also clarifies, the nation is perceived (and constructed) as the ultimate object of desire and love. When the nation’s promises of love are not fulfilled, these groups develop mechanisms “of defense against the loss of the object.” In their view, the lack of reciprocated love (in jobs, security, etc.) results from others claiming those benefits, prompting them to label migrants and minorities as criminals responsible for the nation’s plight. As she notes, “the nation as [a] loved object has been taken away,” and punishing minorities becomes a perceived act of love that further unifies them.
Nativism, as an ideology, is presented as inherently exclusionary and based on the normalized privileges and rights of one group over others; it relies on a linear narrative that positions its group above all others. This approach adopts an almost anti-historical stance, avoiding critical questioning and critique of its governance and social imperatives. Given its tendencies against migrants, Indigenous peoples, religious minorities, women, queer individuals, and even people with disabilities and divergent intellectual discourse, we can argue that nativist exclusion and rejection of differences in race, gender, and citizenship fundamentally undermine the principles of social love.
It is evident that for many disenfranchised groups, nativism generates pain, suffering, exclusion, fear, servitude, silence, exploitation, and discrimination. Ironically, nativism limits individuals’ potential and fundamentally prevents its members from transcending their in-group to care and love for those who are different to them or more vulnerable. By attempting to establish rigid, impenetrable borders to protect their constructed idea of community, nativism isolates groups from the broader global realities of cosmopolitanism and diversity. This isolation limits dialogue and collaboration between groups. This can be understood, in a broader sense, as an anti-social-love movement, concealed beneath a veneer of cohesion and deceptive unity; this can be seen as a simplistic and dismissive approach to the complexities of nativism and those enacting its ethos.
3.2.2. Ordo Amoris and the Dilemma of God as Love
In the previous section, we explained how nativist groups manipulate discourses of love to justify exclusion and oppression against minorities under the guise of loving and protecting the nation and its natural rights. Now, we will analyze how these supremacist narratives, rooted in the deeply Christian character of their members, utilize Christian discourse to establish hierarchies of care and love. They position themselves, and others like them, as the primary and sole beneficiaries of love, protection, and care.
We are not interested in engaging in a theological analysis, as it exceeds our expertise and focus. Instead, we aim to examine the gospels as social and cultural texts, deliberately avoiding discussions of divine revelation, doctrine, and the spiritual relationship between God and humanity. From a sociological perspective, we are particularly interested in the power dynamics they generate, especially in relation to Ordo Amoris. Ultimately, debates surrounding faith serve as conduits for analyzing how these discussions create hierarchies of care and justify discrimination under the guise of Christian love. In this work, we aim to examine how hierarchies of love are constructed within nativist narratives. We seek to understand how nativist groups deploy these political narratives and the responses that have emerged from the Roman Curia. Additionally, we explore how the concept of Ordo Amoris may be used to justify and validate social policy.
Nativist movements intriguingly employ a religious strategy that prioritizes affection for the ‘homeland’ and those who share similar identities over others. This approach weaponizes distinctions in care to foster vulnerability and justify the exclusion of migrants and marginalized groups. Consequently, a spatial divide emerges, treating the nation as a bounded, exclusive container of a singular culture—often imagined as homogeneous—while nurturing loyalty to the state and portraying immigrants as threats and deprived subjects of love. As a result, minorities and migrants are frequently encouraged or coerced into localized enclaves, revealing the tension between the rhetoric of inclusion and the physical reality of urban segregation. In this context, barrios, neighborhoods, and districts transform into spaces of exclusion defined by racial boundaries, exacerbated by poverty, disparities in social services, access to healthcare, government surveillance, and police brutality.
In this framework, the nation is divided into spaces of care and areas characterized by a deprivation of love, which can be termed ‘love deserts,’ as disparate policies are enacted in different locations. While many of these spaces are vibrant hubs of culture and diversity, they are often marginalized by public policies. It is within these intersections of discrimination, oppression, and resource inequality that we find significant disparities in life expectancy across regions.
For many in the West, the ‘problem’ is perceived to stem from the fact that many of these migrants are poor, non-white, non-Christians, and some identify as sexual minorities or LGBTQ+ individuals. What is particularly striking is that many policymakers who shape the lives—and deaths—of migrants and the impoverished identify as Christians. This faith is traditionally rooted in an ethos of care for the poor and vulnerable, framed within the concept of agape, a specific type of social love. More specifically, for Christians, God embodies love, and Jesus himself was a refugee, as his family fled persecution to seek refuge in Egypt.
One of the pinnacles of this dilemma, at least in the public eye, emerged between two global figures: U.S. President Donald Trump and Pope Francis (2013–2025), followed more recently by Vice President J.D. Vance and Pope Leo XIV (2025–present). The tension dates back to 18 February 2016, when Pope Francis responded to criticism from presidential candidate Donald Trump during his return to Rome after a pastoral visit to the U.S.–Mexico border. Trump had built his campaign on the promise of constructing a wall between the two nations. In response to a question about this, Pope Francis stated, “A person who thinks only about building walls, wherever they may be, and not building bridges, is not Christian. This is not in the Gospel” (
BBC 2016). This bold statement highlighted the Catholic Church’s position on social justice issues, including migration.
Pope Francis has consistently addressed migration and nativism, notably during the 2018 “World Conference on Xenophobia, Racism, and Populist Nationalism in the Context of Global Migration.” Organized by the Vatican’s Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development and the World Council of Churches, the conference convened religious leaders, human rights activists, and scholars globally (
Gomes 2019). In his message to the conference, Pope Francis criticized the political exploitation of fear and the challenges faced by vulnerable groups, stating that some politicians manipulate these fears for electoral gain (
Pope Francis 2018). This stance reflects the Roman Catholic Church’s commitment to advocating for the rights of migrants and countering nativist rhetoric, emphasizing compassion over division.
In his encyclical
Fratelli Tutti (
Pope Francis 2020), Pope Francis expanded on universal fraternity and love for migrants. Despite this, some conservative and nativist Catholics in the U.S. oppose his pro-immigrant stance, particularly regarding economic and migration issues (
Codina 2019). Many nativist and conservative Catholics in the United States have expressed opposition to his pro-immigrant stance, particularly his pastoral approach to economic, environmental, and migration-related issues. While this opposition is relatively small compared to the broader Catholic community, it is notable for its visibility and financial resources.
The rift within the Catholic community in the United States has persisted, particularly highlighted by J.D. Vance’s actions following his conversion to Catholicism in August 2019. He has faced criticism for invoking St. Augustine of Hippo’s concept of
Ordo Amoris to justify the Trump administration’s America-first policies and the mistreatment of migrants. Vance argues that this concept, also analyzed by
Aquinas (
[1271–1272] 2017), creates a hierarchy of love and establishes an order of priorities regarding how love should be enacted and “distributed” based on proximity to individuals. Referring to
Ordo Amoris, Vance suggests that,
As an American Citizen your compassion belongs first to your fellow citizens… There is this old school… a very Christian concept…That you love our family, and then you love your neighbor, and then you love your community, and then you love your fellow citizens in your own country, and then, after that, you can focus and prioritize the rest of the world. A lot of the far left has completely inverted that, they seem to hate the citizens of their own country, and care more about people outside their own borders. That is not [the] way to run a society.
In other words, Vance asserts that there is a primary responsibility toward family and the nation, followed by a secondary responsibility toward foreigners. Moreover, he goes beyond merely describing a hierarchy of care. As previously explained regarding the narratives of nativist movements, he employs a binary rhetoric around love. In this framework, he and the President, along with their supporters, are portrayed as the only ones choosing to love the nation by electing a policy of ‘America First,’ while those on the far left are presented as neglecting the nation by caring more about people outside the country than about their own families and fellow citizens.
Vance’s interpretation of
Ordo Amoris seems to contradict a fundamental tenet of the Gospels, as reiterated by Pope Francis: the call to love everyone without distinction, reflecting Christians belief that God’s love encompasses all individuals. St. Thomas Aquinas, discussing St. Augustine’s concept of
Ordo Amoris, articulates this notion succinctly: “If any man [person] loves not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because his neighbor is more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand our love; and God is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness” (
Aquinas [1271–1272] 2017, II-II, q. 26, a. 2). Thus, one cannot authentically claim to love God without also loving their neighbor, which includes extending that love to individuals outside one’s family and nation, without distinction or priority. In essence,
Ordo Amoris as explained by St. Thomas Aquinas, works as an appeal and a reminder to prioritize love for God and to all people over material pursuits, recognition, fame, power, and self-interest.
This disconnect between defining God as love and the Christian imperative to love and care for others, regardless of shared values or cultural backgrounds, highlights a critical moment in contemporary discourse (
Pope Stephen 2025). It is important to note that this phenomenon does not signify a form of atheism that denies God’s existence; such a denial is implausible, considering Christianity’s role as a unifying element among many contemporary nativists in the United States. Moreover, this rift between the essence of God as love and the selective prioritization of whom to love can be interpreted as a political strategy, effectively providing a moral justification for inflicting harm and fostering hatred.
In this context, we may be witnessing a new form of nativist mercantilism that integrates the concept of God. Here, God becomes an object of affection (
Ahmed 2016), necessitating alignment with national love. The ideology behind Manifest Destiny posits that God had a divine plan for the United States to expand its territory and spread democracy and civilization. The nation-state is envisioned as a manifestation of God’s love for its rightful members. Manifest Destiny became ingrained in American national identity, merging religious beliefs with patriotic duty. This ideology often framed the U.S. as “a city upon a hill” or a “chosen nation,” tasked with a moral obligation to disseminate its values and beliefs globally. Thus, American expansion was frequently seen as a fulfillment of biblical prophecy—a God-given right granted to the U.S. and its citizens.
The promise of the nation’s love may also manifest similarly to the notion of love for God. However, a God that demands equal love for others complicates matters, as this principle conflicts with the reality of expansion, dominion, and control necessary to uphold the current system. From a sociological perspective, these shifts and contradictions raise profound questions about how Catholic nativist movements might be “rewriting” their understanding of divine love and its implications for human interactions, particularly concerning charity and care for those in need. Furthermore, deploying the concept of Ordo Amoris may serve multiple functions. By invoking this early theological document, proponents may argue for validation through proximity to a “pure” original source or a founding figure of Christianity.
On the other hand, this concept may function as a defensive mechanism, akin to what Ahmed describes. In this context, it validates the belief that proponents are merely adhering to God’s intended will regarding love among people. Consequently, those advocating for egalitarian and indiscriminate love are often portrayed as naive, wasteful (due to their “irrational” love), or as refusing to follow God’s order. The order established by Vance’s notion of Ordo Amoris serves not only to organize hierarchies but also to define the appropriate and just use of love.
Since the primary responsibility lies with family, neighbors, and the nation, it creates tension in relationships with those who are unfamiliar. The argument against choosing to love one’s family and loved ones over strangers is rationalized as unnatural, unpatriotic, and irrational. It is challenging to argue against people’s inclination to love those they know and are close to. In many ways, the premise of patriotism and national protection is anchored in this idea. The ‘tyranny’ (and contradiction) lies in the fact that Jesus commands his followers to love him more than one’s family. According to the Gospel, Jesus states, “If you come to me but will not leave your family, you cannot be my follower. You must love me more than your father, mother, wife, children, brothers, and sisters—even more than your own life!” (Luke 14:25–27).
As Joan Tronto delineates in her book
Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (
Tronto 1993), the issue of care is a deeply political matter that requires navigating the boundaries defined by power, inequality, and social justice. Care, as she explains, has historically been framed and understood through gender boundaries, often presented as a woman’s responsibility and part of her nature. This perspective is both historically inaccurate and perpetuates structures of harm and inequality, as care work is devalued, taken for granted, or delegated to others without questioning the responsibilities or assumptions of privileged groups that expect to be cared for by the state. In this context, J.D. Vance’s articulation of
Ordo Amoris performs as a shift (or justification for the shift) in the responsibility to care for those in need, moving it from the state (or those in power) to individuals themselves or, at best, to the responsibility of others (e.g., international agencies, charity organizations) rather than that of the state. Since the emphasis is placed on in-kind resources for caring for immigrants, the needs of foreigners and other nations are diminished or eliminated. Let us remember that one of the first policies implemented by the Trump-Vance during the first months of their administration in 2025 was the systematic dismantlement of the U.S. Agency for International Development, which resulted in the cancellation and closure of around 83% of its foreign aid programs and the firing of about 94% of its employees. The impact on healthcare access, education, and disease prevention affected many countries globally.
The implications of this rupture, within nativist movements, are particularly intriguing, as it permits parallel notions of the order of love to coexist. These movements often promote a self-referential approach, emphasizing love for one’s kin and nation. Grounded in familiarity and self-interest, this perspective limits the potential for meaningful encounters with those who are different and hinders the capacity to address privilege and injustice. It creates an exclusionary framework that not only justifies unfair treatment of others but also legitimizes an almost fetishistic expression of love and affection toward one’s own community and nation. As love becomes conditional and dictated by proximity or shared identity, the transformative power of genuine inclusivity and compassion is stifled. In this context, the moral imperative to love one’s neighbor, regardless of their background, is overshadowed by an ethos that prioritizes division over unity.
Beyond the debate over whose interpretation of Ordo Amoris may be correct, we can explore its function within nativist movements and how it is redefined and repurposed to strategically shape and justify political discourse and social policy. How does the term operate within nativist ideology beyond its initial meaning?
In this re-enactment, the concept of Ordo Amoris is strategically utilized to express nativist views on love, belonging, and community values. This rhetorical framework resonates with their emphasis on cultural identity, enabling discussions about a structured hierarchy of care, affiliation, and responsibility that prioritizes national or cultural allegiance. By using Ordo Amoris, these movements create a moral framework that endorses traditional values, suggesting that love should be guided by established social norms and cultural practices of proximity and affinity. This aligns with nativist sentiments, which stress the necessity of preserving existing social structures against perceived threats from globalization and multiculturalism. The argument asserts that such trends can weaken social cohesion, upsetting the natural order of love and community. By invoking a Christian concept articulated by two “founding fathers” of Catholic and Western thought, they gain legitimacy and a sense of genealogical tradition.
They effectively utilize the rhetoric of care inherent in Ordo Amoris, positioning their insistence on prioritizing certain loves, be they familial ties or national loyalty, as essential for societal well-being, unity and national survival. This narrative allows them to justify exclusionary practices regarding immigration and cultural integration while framing their positions as compassionate and concerned for the common good.
Furthermore, engagement with religious values adds a significant layer to this narrative. Given the term’s origin and context, it serves as a bridge linking faith, social governance, and cultural order, providing religious coherence and a faith basis for their arguments. By connecting their political discourse to deeply held beliefs, they solidify support among demographics that feel their values are reflected in this idea of prioritized love, care for their families, and their nation.
In summary, through the lens of Ordo Amoris, they construct a coherent narrative that emphasizes identity, morality, and social order. This approach serves as a powerful rhetorical tool, enabling them to convey a vision of community that resonates with their supporters while advocating for a return to traditional values. They emphasize America-first policies that center, serve, and protect the interests of the United States (and those perceived as belonging there) above the interests of all other nations, cultures, or peoples. Furthermore, this is perceived as God’s intended mission for them and the nation-state.
Yet, what mechanisms of resistance or counter-discourses have emerged and been enacted in response to the logic of Ordo Amoris proposed by the Trump-Vance Administration? What examples illustrate how social love has influenced public discourse about migration in the United States? Some of them may include various grassroots movements (e.g., the “Dreamers”), advocacy campaigns, community solidarity initiatives (e.g., the Sanctuary Movement), as well as artistic expressions aimed at reframing narratives surrounding migration. We would like to analyze the recent protests against ICE (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) in Minneapolis. Are they expressions of social love, state disobedience, or perhaps both?
3.2.3. Exploring the ICE Protests in Minneapolis
On 23 January 2026, Minnesota experienced an unprecedented statewide general economic blackout and strike, coinciding with public protest events that drew tens of thousands of participants under the title “ICE Out of Minnesota: Day of Truth & Freedom” (
Griffith et al. 2026). This boycott was initiated by a broad coalition that included faith leaders, pro-immigrant groups, labor unions, community organizations, and various civil-society actors. ISAIAH, a grassroots network of faith-based organizations affiliated with the Faith in Action network, played a central role in organizing the event. Other participating organizations included the Minnesota AFL-CIO, CWA Local 7250, Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 26, UNITE HERE Local 17, and the Minnesota Nurses Association. This diverse coalition underscores the significance and relevance of the boycott.
It is particularly relevant that ISAIAH is a faith-based coalition, especially in light of our previous discussion on Ordo Amoris. Formed in 2000 through the merger of three community organizations: the Great River Interfaith Partnership (GRIP), Interfaith Action, and the St. Paul Ecumenical Alliance of Congregations (SPEAC). These groups initially served the larger Twin Cities metropolitan area and St. Cloud in Minnesota. Now, as ISAIAH, they have broadened their efforts into a statewide coalition.
As stated on their website, “Each group had a strong tradition of grassroots organizing and a shared belief that bold, unified action was needed to confront racial and economic injustice across Minnesota” (
ISAIAH 2000). Inspired by their faith, ISAIAH advocates for affordable healthcare for all Minnesota children, regardless of immigration status. Their efforts also encompass public transportation, job access, labor protection, affordable housing, domestic violence, environmental justice, education, and voter suppression prevention. Their participation in the ICE protest in Minneapolis reflects a deep commitment to social justice and a faith-based call to action, rather than a random event. Their work contrasts sharply with the nativist interpretation of
Ordo Amoris, which focuses on care within familiar relationships, while ISAIAH extends compassion to migrants and strangers.
Moreover, an analysis of Ordo Amoris in relation to ISAIAH should go beyond solely addressing proximity and affinity. ISAIAH’s understanding of caring for those in need—extending beyond familiar individuals—has broadened its social consciousness regarding systemic oppression and discrimination. In contrast, a nativist approach that solely prioritizes employed citizens who are upper/middle class, heterosexual, and English-speaking overlooks the challenges faced by individuals who do not fit these categories or who lack access to resources. This narrow perspective can also overlook the privileges held by those in power. Consequently, ISAIAH stresses the importance of tackling the broader societal structures that sustain racial and economic injustices, as well as systemic inequalities.
In essence, a nativist interpretation that emphasizes a traditional view of family and community tends to overlook the needs of those outside immediate kinship. This perspective primarily favors ties associated with heterosexual families, marginalizing queer families and other diverse structures. A hierarchy of care often emphasizes individual responsibility and self-reliance within the in-group, which can undermine collective efforts to support historically marginalized and subjugated groups. Consequently, migrants are frequently depicted as solely responsible for meeting their own needs. Unsurprisingly, this perspective aligns with the Trump administration’s policies that restrict welfare assistance to migrants seeking to legalize their status in the United States (
Greenberg 2026), particularly as outlined in the Public Charge Rule, set to take effect on 18 September 2026 (
DHS 2026).
In this context, the hierarchical interpretation of
Ordo Amoris reflects principles inherent in the controversial ‘Prosperity Gospel’ prevalent in the United States. This theory posits that financial success and physical well-being are signs of divine favor (
Bowler 2018;
Jones and Woodbridge 2010). It emphasizes individual responsibility, promoting material wealth achieved through self-reliance, meritocracy, and sacrifice, often at the expense of communal accountability and recognition of privilege. Furthermore, it tends to normalize poverty as a result of personal choices.
ISAIAH, as a faith-based organization committed to advocating for various social issues, asserts that faith must translate into actionable justice. This commitment stands in stark contrast to interpretations of
Ordo Amoris that prioritize personal piety over political engagement and societal change. ISAIAH embodies a mature sense of care, and a more expansive and socially engaged understanding of compassion and justice than what is typically found in hierarchical readings of
Ordo Amoris. The confrontation between grassroots groups, activists, and migrants and members of the Trump administration captured national attention, particularly as the situation escalated to violence in Democratic cities like Los Angeles (California) and Minneapolis (Minnesota) in the preceding months. This unrest was part of the Department of Homeland Security’s “Operation Metro Surge,” which commenced in December 2025. The operation significantly increased the number of immigration enforcement agents in Minnesota from 150 to more than 3000 in a city (
Chen 2026) that has just around 600 police officers for the entire metropolitan area (
Korecki 2026).
Local public outrage intensified due to the detention of active asylum seekers, lawful immigrants, U.S. citizens, and the broader mistreatment of individuals. During the violent confrontations, several schools were forced to transition to remote learning, and everyday commerce was severely disrupted by the overwhelming federal law enforcement presence. The organizers included members from diverse cultural, ethnic, and racial groups, with the majority being American citizens. The killing of two civilians by federal immigration agents, Renée Nicole Macklin Good, on 7 January, sixteen days before the march, and Alex Pretti on 24 January—both American citizens—intensified the ongoing crisis, especially as the government tried to misrepresent them as domestic terrorists, violent and radical.
The government employed rhetorical tactics designed to demonize Good and Pretti while portraying immigration agents as victims. Within hours of the killing of 37-year-old Renée Nicole Good by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deportation officer Jonathan Ross, former Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem implied that Good was responsible for her own death, labeling her actions as “domestic terrorism” (
Ramirez Uribe 2026). Vice President J.D. Vance called her “brainwashed” and a “part of a broader left-wing network to attack, to dox, to assault and to make it impossible for our ICE officers to do their job” (
Gomez 2026). He argued that Good was attempting to run over Ross with her car, asserting that he acted in self-defense. In the case of Pretti, an intensive care nurse with the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, the government claimed he was trying to kill the agents. Greg Bovino, a Border Patrol Commander and the leading official of the immigration operation in Minneapolis at that time, known as Operation Metro Surge, described Pretti as “an individual [who] wanted to do maximum damage and massacre law enforcement” (
Barnett 2026). Pretti was legally licensed to carry a handgun.
Furthermore, in verified video footage from several news outlets, Pretti is shown not to be holding his gun at the time he was shot, as it had been taken away by an agent prior to the incident (
Vinick et al. 2026). He was, however, holding a cellphone. The fact that the government portrayed him as a terrorist simply because he was carrying a legally permitted firearm elicited public criticism from conservative gun rights groups, such as the National Rifle Association (NRA) and the Gun Owners of America (GOA), who consistently reinforced the protections granted by the Second Amendment, which allows individuals to carry weapons.
In many ways, what unfolded in Minneapolis was a massive mobilization of people expressing an aspect of social love. The activists sought to create a different world, contrasting with J.D. Vance’s concept of Ordo Amoris. While we do not imply that all actions by the activists were expressions of social love, many individuals willingly put their lives and safety at risk to help and support people who were likely not related to them as family, not citizens of their nation, and, in many cases, from different cultures, religions, and possibly non-normative sexual orientations. They sought to improve the lives of strangers—people unable to repay them or even know their names.
The collective actions and steadfast commitment to justice by the protesters, along with the killing of civilians and the erosion of political norms resulting from these events, created significant pressure on the Trump administration to change direction—at least publicly—in response to the widespread national backlash they encountered.
“Operation Metro Surge” ultimately became a public relations disaster (
Lavietes 2026). On 26 January, just two days after Pretti’s death, the Trump administration demoted Greg Bovino from his post in Minneapolis and transferred operations oversight to Tom Homan. This marked the beginning of a gradual reduction in federal presence in the city.
On 12 February 2026, Tom Homan announced the dismantling of “Operation Metro Surge.” On the same day, Jacob Frey, the Democratic Mayor of Minneapolis, addressed the recent weeks’ events on X, stating, “They thought they could break us, but a love for our neighbors and a resolve to endure can outlast an occupation” (
Frey 2026). This statement echoed the sentiments of many who rallied against the oppressive measures and highlighted the community’s resilience.
He emphasized an ethos of care and love for others, adding, “These patriots of Minneapolis are showing that it’s not just about resistance—standing with our neighbors is deeply American” (
Frey 2026). This statement directly addressed the notion that their actions were not anti-patriotic or an attack on the nation-state; rather, they should be interpreted as foundational and constitutive of maintaining a nation built on the contributions and experiences of migrants.
A few days earlier, on 28 January, the editors of
The Nation publicly nominated Minneapolis and its people for the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize, stating, “The moral leadership of the people and city of Minneapolis has set an example for those struggling against fascism everywhere on the face of a troubled planet” (
The Editors of The Nation 2026). Their nomination recognized the city’s mobilization in support of vulnerable individuals, the acts of peaceful resistance, and the importance of the demonstrations that emerged in response to the violence inflicted by federal immigration enforcement during that time.
3.3. Beyond Affiliation: From Nativism to Relationality
As previously explained, no nation, culture, religion, or political group can claim exclusive ownership of social love or its domains. In fact, the task of defining or quantifying its boundaries presents significant challenges (
Miller 2008). Beyond the universal social behaviors necessary for human survival, such as refraining from violence and respecting individual freedom, achieving consensus on a universal narrative framework for what constitutes love remains elusive. This complexity arises because love is deeply contextual and cultural, requiring mutual understanding between parties within their specific social realities.
Moreover, while it is crucial to acknowledge that individuals’ consciousness and dignity must never be infringed upon or compromised, the reality is far more intricate. Social consciousness itself can be manipulated. The narratives of love employed by nativist movements illustrate that not all actions perceived as just or well-intentioned truly embody social love. Furthermore, what was deemed acceptable in the past may no longer align with contemporary moral, legal, or social standards. Nativist exclusionary movements may frame their actions as righteous, yet their treatment of Indigenous communities, women, and minorities exemplifies how consciousness can be corrupted or distorted through ideology, fear, and misinformation.
In this context, love serves as a complicating factor—and potentially a “scandal”—for states and nativist movements, as it transcends the boundaries and definitions imposed by nations. It challenges the legitimacy of policies that stand in opposition to the ideals of social love. As
Hooks (
2000) articulates, “If all public policy was created in the spirit of love, we would not have to worry about unemployment, homelessness, schools failing to teach children or addiction” (p. 98). This perspective encourages a reevaluation of public institutions, viewing them not merely as bureaucratic entities but as reflections—or failures—of our collective capacity for care. When policies neglect the principle of love, they become susceptible to criticism for their inadequacies in fostering an inclusive and supportive society. Thus, understanding love as a vital component of social policy underscores the need for systemic change rooted in empathy and communal well-being.
In this context, love and care can be utilized to identify and quantify certain aspects of a nation’s tendencies toward compassion, as demonstrated by initiatives like the World Love Index project (
Cataldi and Iorio 2026). Additionally, we can evaluate political institutions based on the extent (and manner) to which they incorporate practices of care, solidarity, and responsibility toward their members (
Tronto 2013;
Kittay 1999). However, as previously discussed, love is inherently cultural and socially specific, making its quantification nearly impossible at times. The essential principles of unselfishness, care for others, self-awareness of privilege, and the dignity of individuals remain crucial for assessing a nation’s character.
Furthermore, comparisons between nations may not always yield useful or valid insights, highlighting the necessity to safeguard individual consciousness and freedom. Within this framework, we observe diverse forms of citizen resistance and mobilization aimed at justice, care, and equality—each an expression of love. These actions encompass a variety of non-violent strategies, including boycotts, strikes, marches, sit-ins, and acts of civil disobedience, such as factory workers slowing production or engaging in fasting. Each of these acts, whether collective or individual, aspires to promote transformative change within society. Remarkably, such changes can also be inspired by creative expressions, including art, performances, and legal advocacy. Ultimately, love manifests in multiple forms, underscoring its capacity to inspire action and foster collective well-being. This multitude of expressions reflects both the diversity of human experience and the potential for solidarity in pursuit of a more just and equitable world.
In this section, we want to explore a contrasting trend: a relational perspective in which we recognize the interdependence among individuals and between individuals and their environment. Love is not exclusive to the private sphere, nor merely a feeling. It is an action that combines “care, affection, recognition, respect, commitment, trust (…)” (
Hooks 2000, p. 12). In this case, we shall explore a form of care for others and for the world. As
Pulcini (
2009) notes, caring is a practice that transcends charitable or sacrificial logic, in which the individual recognizes themself as incomplete and vulnerable. This need for care challenges the idea of autonomy and self-sufficiency (
Tronto 1993) and leads to a relationality capable of assuming responsibility for the common good and “caring for the world” (
Pulcini 2009).
In this sense, social love rejects exclusive forms of love—those that define who belongs and who is left out—and, conversely, embraces those that expand the boundaries of community, thereby shaping the concept of ‘we.’ Here, we will consider social love as a mode of relationality that pertains not only to caring for present humans but also for future generations and the natural world. Thus, in this section, we present a perspective on love that transcends an anthropocentric view by including all existing beings. To achieve this, we will draw on the cosmological perspectives of the Indigenous Peoples of Latin America.
As a resource for our argument, we will outline the commonalities among the Indigenous Peoples of Latin America, in a somewhat binary opposition to “Western modernity”—as the “myth of modernity” conceptualized by
Dussel (
1994). The issue, of course, is more complex, especially when we consider the cultural hybridization that characterizes Latin America, which encompasses diverse “modernities” and “traditions” (
García Canclini 1990;
Escobar 2007). That said, among the wide variety of Indigenous perspectives, many challenge the Western modern distinction between nature and culture, as well as the idea that only human beings fully participate in social life. This leads to a questioning of anthropocentrism and, conversely, to the inclusion of nature as a living being (
Martins 2023). Rather than denying the differences between beings, these perspectives challenge the hierarchies and asymmetries that have historically been established between the various terms of Western dualism (
Lugones 2010): “man/woman, nature/culture, civilized/barbarian, modern/traditional” (
Svampa 2019, p. 45).
We refer to relational ontologies as all those that allow us to conceive community beyond humanity. They enable us to consider the “different ways of making worlds” (
Lazzari 2018, p. 5) that result from the relationships between beings, among which natural entities may possess social and spiritual attributes (
Descola 2012). For instance, this is a topic explored by
Viveiros de Castro (
2000,
2019) in his works on the Indigenous Peoples of the Amazonian lowlands. From this Amerindian Perspectivism, animals are conceived as former humans who have lost the attributes that humans have retained (
Viveiros de Castro 2000, p. 20). This allows us to challenge, once again, the idea of humanity as a sphere completely distinct from the rest of existence and to understand the relationships between different beings in terms of continuity, interdependence, and reciprocity. In other words, beings do not exist as autonomous or isolated entities, but are constituted in and through the relationships they maintain with other human and non-human beings. For this reason, the community—which must be cared for—is not defined solely by membership in the human species, but by the network of relationships that makes life possible (
Flores 2020).
These complex and ancient perspectives give rise to the pluriverse, composed of partially connected worlds intersected by power relations and ontological conflicts—disputes over ways of conceiving life, territory, and community (
Escobar 2012). Understanding community through this lens of relationality means questioning the universalist claims of modern ontology, which are closely tied to an extractivist and utilitarian view of nature that reduces it to a mere commodity, thus separating it from social life. Furthermore, if humans and non-humans are part of the same community, then care, reciprocity, and responsibility extend beyond relationships among people to include all beings and everything that exists. Social love can therefore be conceived as a practice of “world care”—a form of care that is not confined to intersubjective relationships among humans but also encompasses the natural world (
Campello 2023). By challenging the dominant anthropocentric and extractivist logic, nature ceases to be viewed as an external entity open to appropriation; instead, it becomes a constitutive part of an expanded community, the “we,” and, as such, an object of care and love expressed in concrete ways.
Relationality on Guaraní ñande reko
After the conquest and colonization of the Americas, the newly independent nation-state has played a central role in framing Indigenous Peoples as ‘the others’ within the national community. The State, through its institutions and power to define identity, has historically determined who is considered a legitimate part of the nation and under what conditions (
Segato 2007). As noted, this has resulted in the systematic subordination of Indigenous Peoples (
Quijano 2014). The construction of these ‘others’ can therefore only be understood in relation to the formation of a dominant ‘us’ (
Casimiro Córdoba 2019), suggesting that otherness is not a natural given but a historical and relational construct. These classification systems continue to operate today. Unilaterally constructed stereotypes have solidified images of the ‘cultural other’ that transcend the contexts in which they arose, continuing to shape contemporary interethnic relations (
Casimiro Córdoba 2019). As
Segato (
2007) warns, even individuals who do not identify as members of Indigenous Peoples or as persons of African descent may experience exclusion simply by bearing the ‘mark of the Indian’—the ‘trace of their historical subordination.’ Such individuals effectively ‘still constitute the vast masses of the dispossessed population’ (p. 156).
The dispossession of Indigenous Peoples was not limited to the symbolic realm— the erasure of ethnicity and history. The appropriation and concentration of land, territorial dispossession, and subordinate integration into regional labor markets also constituted fundamental mechanisms for the reproduction of inequalities (
Segato 2007). In recent decades, the expansion of extractivism, the intensive exploitation of natural common goods, and the implementation of megaprojects have deepened territorial conflicts and evictions, often without consultation or consent from the affected communities (
Svampa 2019;
Farris 2021).
This does not imply that Indigenous peoples have been passive subjects. On the contrary, from the colonial period onwards, they have developed multiple forms of resistance. In the early decades of the 20th century, these struggles were often linked to peasant and agrarian movements (
Velasco Cruz 2003). However, beginning in the 1980s, a contemporary Indigenous movement began to take shape, reclaiming ethnic identity as the foundation for political action (
Bello 2004). This process, which
Bengoa (
2000) refers to as ‘Indigenous emergence,’ involved the proliferation of local, national, and continental Indigenous organizations, the articulation of common agendas, and the building of solidarity networks among diverse peoples. The assertion of Indigenous identity was particularly prominent on the eve of the 500th anniversary of European arrival in the Americas, leading to demands for land restitution, recognition of collective rights, political participation, autonomy, and self-determination. Indigenous movements succeeded in bringing their demands to the international stage, capitalizing on the expansion of human rights discourse and the creation of new legal instruments. Notably, this includes ILO Convention No. 169 and, later, the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In recent years, we have also seen a significant increase in laws protecting Indigenous peoples across the Americas, including the incorporation of the concept of Buen Vivir into the constitutional frameworks of Ecuador and Bolivia.
In recent decades, Indigenous demands have been linked to critiques of dominant development paradigms and to the defense of the commons against the advance of extractivism and neoliberal globalization (
Bello 2004). Their struggles are no longer limited solely to the defense of particular interests but instead challenge hegemonic ways of relating to nature, models of citizenship, and traditional conceptions of the State (
Svampa and Viale 2014;
Bello 2004).
“Contemporary Indigenous demands can, therefore, be understood as practices of resistance against the narratives that historically constructed them as subordinate ‘others.’ This remains true even when, not without tensions, they must negotiate and adapt to the logic of the market and the State, among other influences (
Frere Affanni 2023). Through these demands, many communities are fighting not only for the recognition of specific rights but also for the possibility of existing differently, reclaiming their ancestral identities. For this reason, the defense of alternative ways of relating to nature also entails an expansion of democracy, advocating for collective decision-making and the right of communities to reject projects they consider harmful to their present and future living conditions (
Svampa and Viale 2014). Beyond debates over production models, these struggles challenge the hegemonic ideas of ‘development’, ‘consumption’, and ‘quality of life’ that Western modernity has sought to universalize (
Svampa and Viale 2014). These are genuine ‘ontological conflicts’, in which not only are resources and territories contested but also differing ways of understanding the relationship between nature and society. They challenge the dualisms that underpin coloniality (
Escobar 2012) and confront hegemonic ways of life (
Svampa and Viale 2014), as well as the ways in which the modern Western ‘universe’ has permeated populations across much of the world.
While acknowledging the commonalities that allow us to speak of relational ontologies, it is essential to recognize the diversity within them and, therefore, to work with their specific characteristics. Let us, then, examine the Guaraní world, focusing specifically on the Chiriguano/Ava-Guaraní. There, love is not limited to a private feeling or to the most immediate family ties but is expressed in a way of life based on reciprocity and care for all forms of existence. This is embodied in the ñande reko—“our culture” or “our way of being”—which constitutes the ethical and relational framework through which relationships between people, the community, and nature are organized. Living well (
tekove kavi) means living in accordance with these Guaraní customs passed down from generation to generation (
Casimiro Córdoba 2019).
The ñande reko can be understood as a concrete, context-specific kind of social love—a form of care for the world and for others—grounded in the recognition of the interdependence among individuals and between individuals and their environment. It is not an idealization of the past, but rather a vision for the future. It is not limited to the Guaraní people but extends to the community in the broadest sense, encompassing both humans and non-humans. Individual life cannot be understood in isolation from collective life because each person—as in relational ontologies—exists in relation to others: among people, with future generations, with the territory they inhabit, and with all of nature. In other words, the ñande reko expresses an expanded conception of community that transcends the boundaries of the strictly human; a “symbiotic understanding of life,” where humans, animals, plants, the forest, water, and spirits are all part of the same relational web (
Medina 2002, p. 174).
Let us examine specific aspects that facilitate a discussion of the relational framework known as ñande reko, using
Melià’s (
1988) classic descriptions as a foundational guide, while also incorporating contemporary elements and reinterpretations. The elements that constitute the Guaraní way of being are not static relics of the past; rather, they are fluid and adaptable to changing contexts (
De la Cadena and Starn 2009).
One aspect of the
ñande reko relates to the organization of space, which reflects this relational logic. The Guaraní way of life is learned through space, conceived as four concentric circles that express the social and spiritual values inherent to the Guaraní way of good living, such as reciprocity and
motirô (community work or
minga) (
Casimiro Córdoba 2019). In each of the circles, which correspond to a dimension of life, there are elements related to sharing and relational living. The
oka (courtyard) is the basic unit of social organization, the place where family life unfolds (where people play, eat together, etc.). Within the
koo (fence), agriculture takes place, which is linked to
motirô and the principles of “solidarity and reciprocity” (
Casimiro Córdoba 2019, p. 86). The
kaa (“
monte”/forest) represents the “vital space of nature and the supernatural” (
Casimiro Córdoba 2019, p. 86). Finally, the last circle is the
ivoka, the “world beyond the human” (
Flores 2023, p. 10), a space within the
monte accessible only to spiritual leaders, who use it to communicate with the supernatural world (
Casimiro Córdoba 2019).
The Guaraní conception of the
monte (forest) reveals that nature is alive, has its own spirits, interacts with the community, and makes itself understood (
Yariguarenda Community 2020). The
monte is a sacred space with various ritual sites. It is also the home of the forest’s “owners” (
ija) and the animals. Whenever they punish humans, it is a punishment for those who do not respect the rules of reciprocity (
Castelnuovo Biraben 2015, p. 87). Therefore, the issue of territory highlights an intertwining of the human and nature—which are inseparable—where reciprocity and balance with the non-human are part of ancestral knowledge, and whose violation is punished not only by humans but also by other spirits such as the
Ija.
Referring to the forest, therefore, necessarily implies discussing the bond of balance and mutual respect between human beings, nature, and its spirits. Living and non-living beings—and even the supernatural—are not separate entities but rather part of social relationships (
Escobar 2003), and an integral part of the same “socioeconomic community” (
Descola 1996). As a Guaraní community publicly stated in response to a territorial conflict: “Our culture (…) has as ancestral values respect for all expressions of life (…). We live in connection with the earth (…) we coexist in harmony with nature, which shelters and embraces us and represents a great spiritual value to us” (
Radio La Voz Indígena 2024b). Nature is not seen as an object of appropriation; rather, it is a reality of which we are an integral part, coexisting with it. This perspective fosters a sense of responsibility and stewardship toward the environment, emphasizing the importance of harmonious relationships with all beings and entities.
This conception is also reflected in the Guaraní economy, which is based on a “mode of production (…) closely linked to the social relations of consumption and reciprocity” (
Melià 1988, p. 39). Land is not conceived as a commodity and therefore cannot be used as an object of commerce, any more than air or water can (
Melià 1988). The territory exists, on the contrary, to guarantee life and collective subsistence, not for individual accumulation; for this reason, ownership is typically communal. Since the land was created for everyone’s use, its fruits are comparable to children. Therefore, buying and selling land can be likened to buying a human being (
Melià 1997). This is something that, far from being limited to classical ethnographic studies, continues to emerge during the (frequent) territorial conflicts that communities face. On social media, a young Guaraní man states that the lands “are not for sale, nor are they for purchase, because we (…) defend the lands our ancestors left us so that we can live with them” (
Radio La Voz Indígena 2024c). Reciprocity plays a central role in this way of life, which is expressed through the
minga or
motirõ: work carried out collectively in a festive atmosphere, culminating in the sharing of food and drink. The logic behind it is neither that of commercial exchange nor that of debt. The gift is given freely (there is no obligation of reciprocity, which, moreover, does not necessarily pertain to material things) and is aimed at maintaining equality and solidarity within the community: “It is not that everything belongs to everyone, but rather that everyone receives a gift from everyone” (
Melià 1988, p. 48). One receives when needed and gives when the other is in need. That is why it is not an exchange but a gift, because one cannot make demands of the other party when that person is in a situation of need (
Temple 1995).
If redistribution is necessary to establish reciprocal relationships (
Temple 1995), then there must be production, which for the Guaraní people is fundamentally linked to agriculture. To achieve this, it is necessary to work the land, clear areas in the forest, and tend to the trees to protect the soil from the sun or rain. This translates into a relationship of respect and care for “the places, the resources, and the spirits that inhabit our territory” (
Yariguarenda Community 2020, p. 22). From the land will come the produce that will be shared at the feasts and celebrations that “foster peace and friendship” (
Medina 2002, p. 69). For the same reason, festivals are also part of the
ñande reko: they are a “form of resistance” and an “affirmation of their own identity” (
Melià 1997, p. 119). Their purpose is not to distribute economic surpluses equitably, nor is communal consumption their goal: the festival itself is not limited to consuming and distributing resources, but rather “produces” them (
Medina 2002, p. 140). Reciprocity is, consequently, a characteristic of the relationship with nature and of the daily practices of Guaraní communities, in which children are also taught values that are interconnected: “Only with love (
mboroau) the joy of working together (
yayerovia kavi) develops on reciprocal terms (
yoparareko) within families and communities” (
Flores 2023, p. 13).
For all these reasons, the diversity of practices rooted in ñande reko that Guaraní communities continue to enact—especially when conflicts arise in their territories—can be seen as a means of recreating their “world” and advocating for a “pluriverse” where different worlds and plural forms of being coexist. In this sense, the various territorial and socio-environmental conflicts that Indigenous Peoples engage in can be understood as “political-ontological practices of the territory.” These practices allow them to resist while also re-exist, reinventing their identities and histories, and conceiving of multiple ways of being, existing, and inhabiting (
Flores and Serapio 2019, p. 208). For the Guaraní and other Indigenous Peoples, this mode of inhabiting pertains to their relationships with both other fellow human beings and nature (
Leff 2006).
Therefore, the
ñande reko can be understood as a concrete expression of Buen Vivir, a vision that, although rooted in specific Indigenous experiences, has a universal—or rather, pluriversal—aspiration: “a new model of life (as opposed to the Western conception) but one that goes beyond Indigenous Peoples and applies to the entire planet (…) ultimately meaning happiness for Indigenous Peoples and all other human groups” (
Houtart 2011, p. 2). Precisely because they advocate for harmony between humans and nature, they not only restore the dignity of Indigenous Peoples—who have been systematically oppressed—but also highlight the importance of their contributions to the global environmental crisis. This is how some communities specifically view the resolution of a territorial conflict in favor of one of them: as something positive “not only for the members of the community, but also for the entire area, because it protects a territory rich in biodiversity” (
Radio La Voz Indígena 2024a).
In the context of the symbolic and material violence of extractivism—which disrupts the fabric of communal life—Indigenous Peoples choose to re-exist: not solely through defensive resistance, but by affirming a way of life that embraces emotions, memories, and aspirational futures. This commitment is linked to numerous experiences and communities promoting agroecological practices, actively opposing the large corporations that have ravaged territories and their inhabitants for decades (
Svampa 2019). In this struggle, the defense of land is inherently a defense of life (
Seoane 2006).
Thus, the ñande reko is not merely a construct of the past or a call to refrain from manipulating the commons. Instead, it embodies the principle that reciprocity, respect, and care for nature must underpin all productive practices. Consequently, it serves as a contemporary contribution to the pursuit of more solidarity-based, sustainable, and just ways of inhabiting and caring for the world.