Measuring Safety Culture Maturity in Indonesian Construction Projects Across Design and Construction Phases

Abstract

This study maps the maturity of construction safety culture in Indonesia across the design and construction phases and identifies priorities for improving the safety management system in construction. Building on a literature-derived framework of categories and subcategories, we conducted a two-round questionnaire-based expert elicitation (pilot and final rounds) and focus group discussions (FGDs) with a purposive panel of 12 experts representing key stakeholders (government/owners, contractors, consultants, and academia). Expert validation was used to assess alignment with field conditions and refine recommendations. The results show average maturity scores of 3.11 in the design phase and 3.36 in the construction phase, indicating a position between the compliant and proactive levels. Sub-category analysis indicates comparatively stronger performance in regulatory mechanisms and operational controls but persistent weaknesses in early-stage planning competence, time and resource allocation for safety, digitalization of safety management, and hazardous waste management. A cross-phase gap is evident: safety is more institutionalized during execution than it is embedded in upstream design decisions. The findings suggest that advancing beyond compliance requires an integrated approach that links national regulations with international project management guidance and construction-specific practices. We conclude by outlining how these frameworks’ integration can support a transition toward more proactive and ultimately resilient safety culture maturity in Indonesia’s construction sector.

1. Introduction

The construction industry remains one of the most hazardous sectors, where accidents often result in fatalities, material losses, and environmental harm [1,2]. Project planning and execution under constrained time and budget are among the characteristics that distinguish construction projects from those in other industries. These conditions contribute to hazardous environments and increase the risk of occupational accidents [3]. In addition, the development of a safety culture remains a major challenge within this industry, with most firms in Indonesia exhibiting only a reactive stage of safety culture maturity [4].

On the other hand, the implementation of various safety regulations in Indonesia remains fragmented, with partial distribution across sectoral authorities. As a result, Law No. 1/1970 and Government Regulation No. 50/2012 reinforce the perception that contractors solely take responsibility for safety in the construction industry [5]. Contrary to this contractor-centric perception, the responsibility for construction safety is collective—encompassing project owners, design and supervision consultants, contractors, and the wider supply chain [6]. Under Law No. 2 of 2017, construction actors including owners, consultants, and contractors, are mandated to apply standards of safety, security, health, and sustainability. Such standards include those related to materials, equipment, procedures, occupational health and safety, and environmental protection. The study by Endroyo et al. (2017) also revealed that the maturity of safety planning in the pre-construction stage is strongly correlated with safety resilience in the construction phase [7]. Projects marked by accidents involving casualties, property destruction, and environmental damage tend to reflect low levels of maturity in safety planning. Symbersky’s time–safety influence curve [8] further illustrates that the ability to influence safety is highest during conceptual and detailed design and declines sharply toward the construction phase (Figure 1).

Machfudiyanto et al. conceptualized construction safety as the condition in which potential hazards are controlled throughout the life cycle of a facility during execution, operation, maintenance, and partial or total demolition to prevent worker injuries, public harm, property damage, and environmental impacts [4]. This life-cycle view implies that safety culture must be mature not only in planning, but also during project execution, where the most acute risks materialize. Empirical studies in Indonesia show that, despite the existence of formal safety arrangements, on-site performance often deteriorates when workers have a low sense of control over their working conditions and face strong production pressures, revealing a gap between stated commitments and everyday practice during the construction phase [9,10]. Similar patterns are reported in other developing contexts, where construction organizations frequently operate at low safety culture maturity levels, safety is not treated as a core business risk, and written policies are weakly translated into routine site behaviors [11,12]. At the same time, international evidence confirms that poor safety management during execution directly leads to accidents, project delays, and financial losses, reinforcing the execution phase as a critical arena for safety culture performance [13]. Advancing beyond this reactive state requires robust institutional frameworks and coherent public policy that explicitly support safety management across the construction value chain [4]. Building on a structure–conduct–performance logic, Machfudiyanto et al. (2022) further argued that project organizational structures, behavioral dynamics, and performance incentives jointly shape safety management systems, and in turn, determine the maturity of safety culture and the level of safety performance achieved [2,14].

Ideally, a construction safety culture emerges from the aligned contributions of project owners, design consultants, supervising consultants, contractors, and the wider supply chain. However, whether the safety values, priorities, and practices of these actors are sufficiently integrated to support consistently high levels of safety performance across project phases is a central challenge. In Indonesia, the Construction Safety Management System (Sistem Manajemen Keselamatan Konstruksi, SMKK) mandated through Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing Regulation No. 10/2021 (Permen PUPR No. 10/2021) provides a technical framework for implementing safety, health, and sustainability standards. Yet, despite these regulatory developments, there is still no systematic evidence of the maturity of the safety culture in Indonesian building projects, nor of where the most critical gaps occur along the design–construction continuum. Without a phase-specific diagnosis of safety culture maturity, project owners, consultants, contractors, and regulators have limited guidance on where to prioritize their efforts, how to allocate resources, and how to monitor progress under the SMKK framework. This study seeks to provide an empirical baseline that can be used to target improvement actions, reinforce areas of relative strength, and ultimately contribute to reducing the persistently high burden of construction accidents in Indonesia by quantifying safety culture maturity separately for the design and construction phases and across key stakeholder groups.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Safety Culture in Construction

Safety culture is defined as the set of values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that shape organizational practices to safeguard workers, control risks, and minimize workplace accidents [15]. Hudson’s emphasized that it is manifested in an organization’s obligation to prevent incidents and its ability to anticipate hazards and implement preventive actions [16]. A positive safety culture is characterized by visible management commitment, transparent and effective communication, active worker engagement in safety initiatives, and continuous learning from experiences [3,17]. The construction sector requires a robust safety culture due to the elevated risk of accidents, such as those arising from working at height, using heavy equipment, or managing hazardous substances. A mature safety culture ensures that safety transcends administrative compliance and becomes a collective value upheld by every project participant.

2.2. Safety Culture Maturity Models

Hudson’s [18] Safety Culture Maturity Model enables the assessment of safety culture within construction projects by defining five maturity stages. Each stage illustrates the organization’s level of development in embedding safety within its operations, while also serving as a diagnostic tool for identifying gaps and opportunities to strengthen safety culture. These five stages of maturity level are shown in

Table 1. Maturity Level Scale [18].

Maturity Level	Description
Basic/Pathological	Workers perceive safety as a burden. The company prioritizes business operations and does not yet recognize safety as an integral part of the organization. This represents the lowest safety maturity level.
Reactive	At this level, the organization begins to take safety seriously but only responds after incidents occur. Actions are reactive rather than preventive.
Compliant/Planned	Safety is driven by management systems, often with extensive data collection. However, the primary focus on safety is still controlled by management decisions rather than being genuinely embraced by the workforce.
Proactive	Unexpected events are seen as opportunities to improve performance. Worker involvement increases, shifting behavioral initiatives from a top-down approach to a bottom-up approach, where employees actively contribute to safety improvements.
Resilient/Generative	Active participation exists at all organizational levels. Safety is regarded as a core business value. The organization demonstrates a chronic unease that prevents complacency and continuously drives improvement. This represents the highest level of safety maturity.

.

The safety maturity model has been analyzed by construction safety (K2) practitioners. The model, adapted from the UK Coal Journey framework, categorizes the maturity of safety culture implementation into five stages: Basic, Reactive, Compliant (Planned), Proactive, and Resilient [19]. Pashya identified eight critical factors in developing a total construction safety culture: (a) leadership, (b) competence, (c) commitment, (d) policy, (e) project scope, (f) resources, (g) supervision, and (h) training. Further data analysis revealed that the key determinants are (i) leadership, (ii) supervision, and (iii) training [20].

Several peer-reviewed studies have applied Hudson’s safety culture maturity model (or similar frameworks) to the construction industry. These studies typically assess organizations on a five-level maturity ladder (e.g., from pathological to generative culture) and adapt it to local contexts. For example, Golabchi et al. (2025) proposed a safety maturity framework in Canada that integrates leading indicators to encourage proactive safety management, extending Hudson’s model toward prevention-oriented practices [21]. Chan (2023) applied the five-stage maturity framework to Hong Kong building projects, revealing gaps in maturity levels across clients, contractors, and subcontractors, and emphasizing the challenge of aligning safety culture across fragmented project stakeholders [22]. Trinh and Feng (2022), working in the Vietnamese construction context, enriched the maturity model by incorporating resilience dimensions such as anticipation, learning, and error management [23]. While these studies demonstrate the adaptability of Hudson’s framework, they generally treat safety culture as a unified organizational or project-level construct, with limited attention to how maturity may vary across the project lifecycle. In contrast, this study localizes the maturity framework to Indonesia’s construction sector and uniquely applies it in a phase-based assessment that distinguishes between the design and construction phases. This approach not only provides an empirical baseline of maturity for each phase but also identifies systematic gaps between them, thereby offering practical insight for targeted improvement under Indonesia’s evolving regulatory context (e.g., SMKK implementation).

In this study, we build on Hudson’s established five-level logic (from reactive to generative/proactive) and adapt it to the specific needs of construction projects by structuring the assessment around the two main project phases. Therefore, the proposed “phase-based safety culture maturity assessment” uses existing maturity levels but applies them separately to the design and construction phases and to a detailed set of safety-related subcategories. This disaggregated view enables the identification of phase-specific weaknesses that would remain hidden in a single, organization-wide maturity score.

2.3. Standards and Frameworks

Construction safety culture maturity cannot be separated from the regulatory and managerial frameworks that guide project implementation. In Indonesia, the SMKK, mandated under Law No. 2/2017 and further detailed in Permen PUPR No. 10/2021, provides the legal foundation for integrating safety management into all construction activities, although its implementation remains largely compliance-oriented [2]. At the international level, ISO 21500 offers general project management guidance, emphasizing the alignment of organizational objectives with project execution, including risk and safety considerations [24]. The PMBOK Construction Extension expands on the Project Management Institute’s framework by incorporating construction-specific practices such as safety planning, quality integration, and stakeholder coordination [25].

Together, these three frameworks form a critical reference for advancing safety culture maturity, as they provide complementary perspectives: SMKK ensures regulatory compliance, ISO 21500 emphasizes project governance and standardization, and the PMBOK Construction Extension integrates safety into practical project delivery. Integrating these standards offers a pathway to move beyond compliance-driven safety management toward a more proactive and resilient safety culture within Indonesia’s construction industry.

3. Methodology

The resilient safety culture maturity framework is structured around measurable components, such as criteria, sub-criteria, maturity levels, and rubrics, based on established maturity models [23]. Maturity models operate by delineating stages or levels that gauge organizational or process completeness across various multidimensional indicators [26]. Accordingly, this study operationalizes safety culture maturity as a phase-based matrix. Rather than assigning a single maturity level to each organization, the framework assesses each sub-category’s maturity within the design and construction phases. The maturity level descriptors are derived from existing maturity models, particularly Hudson’s five-level approach, and are localized and contextualized for the Indonesian construction sector, then applied separately to each phase–sub-category combination. This design allows us to pinpoint the weakest phase of safety culture maturity at the sector level. In this study, the maturity framework should be interpreted as a structured conceptual and policy analysis tool based on expert judgment; it has not yet undergone large-sample psychometric testing (e.g., reliability and construct validity) and therefore should not be treated as a validated measurement scale. Future applications of the framework with larger, stratified samples could further examine how gaps differ among owners, contractors, and consultants. The structure of the maturity model and the research methodology is illustrated in Figure 2.

The research was conducted in three stages. First, a literature review and initial FGDs were used to identify and refine categories and sub-categories relevant to safety culture maturity in Indonesia’s construction sector and to develop phase-based maturity rubrics. Second, data were collected through a structured questionnaire that operationalized these rubrics, complemented by follow-up FGDs. For each sub-category, experts selected the maturity level that best represents typical practice in Indonesian building projects (Basic/Pathological, Reactive, Compliant/Planned, Proactive, or Resilient).

Sampling was purposive and expert-based rather than statistically representative. The panel consisted of 12 experts selected to cover key stakeholder groups in Indonesian construction, including government/owners or regulators, state-owned and private contractors, consultants, and academia. Inclusion criteria were (i) at least 10 years of experience in medium- to large-scale construction projects; (ii) a senior role with responsibility for safety management, project delivery, or regulatory oversight; and (iii) familiarity with national safety regulations and internal safety management systems. The questionnaire was piloted with a subset of the panel to refine wording and ensure clarity (see Appendix A for the pilot instrument), then administered to the full panel, who completed it individually (see Appendix B for the final questionnaire) before participating in FGDs. The FGDs were used to discuss ratings, resolve major discrepancies where needed, and capture qualitative explanations of phase-specific maturity profiles. Participating state-owned contractors represented approximately 80% of the national state-owned construction sector, providing coverage of organizations involved in a substantial share of major projects.

Third, the consolidated findings were subjected to expert validation, in which the panel and additional senior academics reviewed the results for alignment with field conditions and refined the policy and practical recommendations.

4. Result

4.1. Categories and Sub-Categories

The initial stage of this research involved a systematic literature review followed by a focus group discussion to identify the critical dimensions of safety culture maturity within construction projects. Previous studies on safety management maturity [18,23,27,28] have highlighted that safety culture is a multidimensional construct that evolves through organizational learning, regulatory compliance, and stakeholder engagement. Building upon these insights, the review was extended to include Indonesian national and international standards, such as SMKK, ISO 21500 (Guidance on Project Management), and PMBOK Construction Extension, which emphasize the integration of safety into both the design and the execution phases of construction projects.

Structured set of categories and subcategories was developed to assess safety culture maturity. These dimensions were grouped into two major phases: (i) the Design Phase, where safety is embedded in planning and decision-making, and (ii) the Construction Phase, where safety management is operationalized in the field. Following the development of the category–sub-category framework for the design and construction phases, we engaged a purposive panel of experts to pilot the instrument, join the FGDs, and provide independent validation of the findings, as shown in

Table 2. Categories, Sub-Categories, and Safety Culture Maturity Descriptions in the Design Phase.

No.	Category	Sub-Category		Description	Basic	Reactive	Compliant	Proactive	Resilient
1	Competence and Personnel of the Designers	D1	Knowledge, Experience, and Skills of Designers [29]	Designers possess technical knowledge, practical skills, and professional experience in integrating safety considerations during the design phase.	Designers possess very limited technical knowledge and skills; safety is seldom considered in design, and they lack relevant professional experience.	Designers seek safety knowledge and skills only after incidents or problems; experience is acquired reactively, not as a core competency.	Designers meet minimum standards and include safety to satisfy regulatory requirements, but not in a deep or innovative manner.	Designers proactively update and enhance safety knowledge, skills, and professional experience; safety is a primary consideration from the outset of design.	Designers exemplify mastery in safety-related knowledge, skills, and experience; safety is integrated into every design aspect, and knowledge is actively shared with the team.
		D2	Attitudes and Mindset of Designers [29]	Designers demonstrate commitment and a safety-oriented mindset, particularly in making design decisions.	No commitment to safety; focuses on technical output and cost while neglecting risk.	Commitment appears only when directed by superiors or after incidents; thinking remains problem-driven and reactive.	Mindset and commitment conform to existing standards/procedures, mainly to fulfill formal obligations.	Designers consistently prioritize safety, even without external pressure; safety impacts are always considered in design decisions.	The safety mindset and commitment are deeply embedded in the individual and team cultures, and safety is the top priority in all design decisions.
2	Regulatory Environment	D3	Regulations [30]	Existence of government and organizational regulations as the legal and operational foundation for safety implementation in the design phase.	There is no compliance with safety regulations; they are not understood or are ignored in the design.	Regulations receive attention only after incidents or external/legal demands; compliance is reactive.	Regulations are followed to the minimum required level as formality, with no effort to deepen or improve implementation.	Regulations serve as the primary reference in every design process; active efforts are made to understand, implement, and socialize them.	Regulations are internalized as organizational culture; best practices and innovations are adopted to exceed standards, with periodic evaluation to keep pace with new requirements.
		D4	Guidelines and Codes [31]	Availability of structured standards and industry codes of practice that guide design safety implementation.	No industry guidelines or codes are used; design proceeds without clear safety standards.	Guidelines/codes are consulted only when problems arise; application is sporadic and unstructured.	Guidelines and codes are applied to minimum standards but are not embedded in routine design practice.	All design processes refer to relevant guidelines/codes; the team routinely seeks the latest standards and ensures that their implementation is understood.	Guidelines/codes are a benchmark of work culture; the organization proactively helps develop new standards and benchmarks against best practices.
		D4’	Regulatory Requirements for Professional Engineer Accountability	The necessity of a professional licensing system for designers, supported by professional codes of ethics and binding sanction mechanisms, as a form of accountability for negligence in prioritizing safety during the design phase.	There is no clear licensing system or mechanism for professional accountability; codes of ethics and sanctions are not applied.	Licensing and codes of ethics receive attention only after violations have occurred; sanctions are applied only when cases arise.	Licensing, codes of ethics, and sanctions exist and are executed to meet legal/professional obligations, but they are not part of work culture.	Planners actively ensure professional licensure, an understanding of codes of ethics, and compliance with accountability mechanisms; routine socialization and training are provided.	Licensing, ethics, and sanctions are internalized as a professional culture; each engineer feels fully responsible for safety, and the organization helps advance professional standards nationally and internationally.
3	Tools and Resources	D5	Tools and Technology [32]	Availability of tools and technologies that support designers in identifying and reducing safety risks throughout the design process.	No dedicated tools/technology to support the identification and reduction in safety risks; processes are entirely manual.	Tools/technology are used only after incidents or in urgent cases and are not integrated into routine design.	Safety tools/technology exist and are used to minimum standards but are not optimally leveraged in all design processes.	Tools/technology are actively and integrally used from the outset to detect and reduce risks, with ongoing evaluation for improvement.	The organization pioneers the adoption of state-of-the-art safety tools/technology; upgrades are periodic and involve the entire design team.
		D6	Knowledge Transfer and Training [9]	Structured training programs and knowledge-sharing mechanisms to improve stakeholders’ awareness and competence in safety practices.	No training or knowledge sharing on safety; understanding is very low.	Training/knowledge-sharing occurs only after incidents or upon special request.	Safety training and knowledge sharing are routine per regulation but remain formalistic and shallow.	Programs are proactively designed and involve all stakeholders; effectiveness is evaluated periodically.	Training and knowledge transfer are part of organizational culture; members continuously and systematically share safety experience and knowledge.
4	Design for Safety Methods	D7	Risk Management [23]	Systematic assessment and risk mitigation during the design phase.	No formal risk assessment or mitigation; safety risks are ignored in the design.	Risk assessment/mitigation occurs only after problems/incidents; it is not systematic and reactive.	Risk assessment/mitigation follows standard procedures and regulations but is not proactive across all design stages.	Risk assessment/mitigation is comprehensive and planned from the outset, with periodic evaluation to anticipate emerging risks.	Risk management is part of organizational culture; innovations in risk identification and mitigation are continually developed and involve the entire design team.
		D8	Integration of Quality and Safety [33]	Integration of safety principles into quality management systems to ensure that safety objectives are considered at all stages of the design process.	No effort is made to integrate safety into the quality management system; quality and safety are run separately.	Integration is undertaken only upon client/regulatory request or after incidents.	Safety principles are integrated into quality management to achieve minimum standards/policies but not comprehensively.	Safety and quality are consistently integrated throughout the design process, with active monitoring and evaluation.	Safety is integral to the quality management system; continuous learning and innovation keep quality and safety at the highest level.
		D9	Environmental Management Planning [34]	Comprehensive environmental planning, including traffic management, to support safe and sustainable design implementation.	No environmental or traffic plan addressing design safety.	Plans are drafted only after problems/complaints have been resolved; implementation is temporary or partial.	Plans are prepared per requirements, but execution is suboptimal and largely for compliance.	Plans are comprehensive, anticipate risks from the outset, and are routinely evaluated for improvement.	Integrated traffic and environmental plans are standard best practices that are continually updated with new technology and stakeholder input.
		D9’	Evaluation and Audit Methods	Existence of evaluation or audit mechanisms that assess the completeness of safety documentation and its practical implementation.	No evaluation/audit of safety implementation; checks, if any, are purely documentary (or absent).	Evaluation/audits are triggered by problems and limited to document compliance, not field implementation.	Evaluations/audits are conducted periodically per regulation but focus on documentation rather than effectiveness.	Evaluations/audits focus on field effectiveness; results are used for continuous improvement.	Evaluation and audit are part of organizational culture; every audit yields learning and innovation for system-wide enhancement.
5	Contracts and Costs	D10	Contractual Aspects and Responsibilities [14]	The contractual provisions and responsibilities of all stakeholders to integrate safety into the design.	Contracts do not assign stakeholder responsibilities for safety in design; contract documents ignore safety.	Contract adjustments for safety only occur after incidents or external demands; responsibilities are set post-event.	Contract provisions exist to minimum standards, but their application is formalistic and not consistently followed by all stakeholders.	Contracts clearly assign each stakeholder’s responsibility for safety in design; provisions are socialized and jointly monitored.	All stakeholders understand, accept, and internalize safety responsibilities; there is strong collaboration in implementation and ongoing evaluation.
		D11	Financial Considerations [9]	Budget allocation for the implementation of design safety measures.	No dedicated budget for safety in design; safety is often sacrificed due to funding limits.	Safety funds are provided only after incidents or demands are met; they are not planned from project initiation.	Safety budgets are included to meet minimum regulatory/standard requirements but are not proportional to actual needs.	Safety budgets are prioritized and carefully planned, with periodic evaluation to ensure sufficiency at each design stage.	Safety budgeting is a top, sustained priority—adaptive, flexible, and fully supported by all stakeholders.
		D11’	Time Considerations	Adequate planning time allocation to ensure proper implementation of safety in design.	No time allocated for safety planning; processes are rushed without considering risk.	Additional time is granted only when obstacles arise during execution, not planned from the outset.	Time for safety is scheduled per standards but used ineffectively or only to meet formal requirements.	Time for safety is strategically and adequately allocated, with routine evaluation to ensure effective implementation at each design stage.	Time allocation for safety is part of the work culture; sufficient time for innovation and development is always available and adaptively accommodated to project needs.
		D11”	Competent Construction Safety Personnel	Designated safety-competent personnel from each stakeholder to review and ensure the implementation of safety in design.	No designated safety-competent personnel; safety reviews are never conducted by qualified experts.	Safety personnel are involved only after incidents or by external request; no routine scheduling is required.	Qualified safety personnel from key stakeholders are formally tasked to review, but involvement is largely administrative.	All stakeholders actively involve competent safety personnel in every review process, with good communication and coordination.	Cross-stakeholder collaboration with highly competent personnel is routine; safety personnel act as strategic partners in design innovation and evaluation.
6	Influence of Owners/Clients	D12	Client Commitment [35]	Project owners demonstrate commitment to safety by encouraging designers to adopt and implement safety principles from the outset of design.	The project owner shows no commitment to safety; no resources are provided for safety in design.	Commitment appears only under external pressure, incidents, or requests from others; resources are limited and incidental.	Owners provide resources to meet minimum standards, mainly to meet contractual/regulatory obligations.	Owners actively encourage safety from the outset of design, provide adequate resources, and are involved in oversight.	Safety commitment is embedded in all owner policies and actions; resources are consistently optimal with innovative and continuous efforts to raise standards.
		D13	Client Leadership [14,36]	Strong client leadership from clients fosters a project culture where safety becomes a core value.	The client shows no leadership on safety; it is not a decision-making priority.	Safety leadership appears only after problems/accidents or external demands; it is inconsistent and reactive.	The client states that safety is a project value, but actions remain at minimum standards and are not inspirational for the entire team.	The client consistently demonstrates leadership that fosters a safety culture, providing direction, recognition, and corrective action.	Client leadership sets a model for all stakeholders; safety culture is a core value that is maintained and elevated in every project aspect.
7	Stakeholder Involvement and Collaboration	D14	Collaboration [7]	Effective collaboration among stakeholders facilitates shared understanding and responsibility in implementing safety in design.	No stakeholder collaboration; each party works in isolation regarding safety.	Collaboration occurs only after problems occur; routine shared understanding and responsibility are absent.	Collaboration follows standard forums but is not integrated into day-to-day project work.	Collaboration is active and structured; stakeholders routinely share information, experience, and safety responsibility across all design stages.	Collaboration is part of organizational culture; all stakeholders actively implement and innovate in safety and sustain collective responsibility.
		D15	Communication [9]	Open and continuous communication ensures that safety issues are effectively identified and addressed.	No safety communication among parties; safety information is never discussed formally or informally.	Safety communication occurs only after problems/incidents occur; messages are one-way and limited.	Safety communication is scheduled (e.g., toolbox meetings) but remains formal and not fully open/responsive.	Communication is two-way, open, and routine; safety issues are quickly identified and resolved through effective information flow.	Safety communication is cultural; individuals feel comfortable and encouraged to continuously raise, discuss, and co-solve all safety issues.

and

Table 3. Categories, Sub-Categories, and Safety Culture Maturity in the Construction Phase.

No.	Category	Sub-Category		Description	Basic	Reactive	Compliant	Proactive	Resilient
1	Safety Compliance and Standards	K1	K4 Standards [9,10,31]	Implementation of national occupational safety regulations (K4) as the legal basis and standard for applying workplace safety at construction sites.	National K4 occupational safety regulation is not applied; workers and management are unaware of or ignore K4 at construction site.	Standards are only applied when inspections occur or after an accident; compliance is temporary and inconsistent.	K4 standards are implemented to the minimum required level with standard reporting and documentation; however, field application is sometimes a mere formality.	K4 standards are not only met but integrated into all aspects of project execution; the entire team actively ensures routine compliance.	Adherence to K4 has become part of the work culture; continuous innovation and improvement aim to reach and exceed the prescribed standards.
		K2	Monitoring and Inspection Standards [23,37]	Regular monitoring and inspection of safety procedures to ensure compliance and detect deviations.	No routine monitoring or inspection; safety procedures are never checked or evaluated.	Monitoring and inspection occur only after accidents or complaints have occurred; corrective actions are temporary.	Monitoring and inspection are conducted routinely per regulation but focus more on administrative completeness than on field effectiveness.	Routine monitoring and inspection are comprehensive and target field effectiveness; findings are immediately acted upon for continuous improvement.	Monitoring and inspection are part of the organizational culture; all team members actively participate in evaluation and improvement and encourage learning from every finding.
2	Organizational Governance and Commitment	K3	Contract and Financing Review [14,31]	Existence of formal instruments that stipulate responsibilities, budget allocation, adequate resources, and control mechanisms to ensure safety throughout project execution.	No contract or financing review considers safety; responsibilities, costs, and resources for safety are ignored.	Safety-related contract and financing reviews occur only after incidents or external demands; implementation is inconsistent.	Formal review instruments exist per minimum standards, but implementation remains administrative or a formality.	Reviews are structured and involve all stakeholders, with routine safety resource allocation monitoring.	Reviews are embedded in organizational culture; ongoing evaluation and innovation optimize responsibilities, costs, and safety resources.
		K4	Accountability [6,24]	Clear role definition, fostering a culture of shared responsibility for safety, supported by organizational mechanisms that ensure that each individual effectively carries out their responsibilities.	Safety roles and responsibilities are not defined; the accountability culture is very weak or absent.	Safety roles and responsibilities are emphasized only after violations or incidents; mutual stewardship is still very limited.	Roles and responsibilities are formally defined per regulation, but implementation is suboptimal, and the culture of accountability is not strong.	Accountability is actively practiced at all levels, with periodic evaluation, supported by the organization and mutual reminders.	Accountability has become a core organizational value; mutual care and responsibility for safety are ingrained across individuals and groups.
		K5	Leadership and Commitment [10,14,36]	Active commitment and exemplary leadership from project leaders in prioritizing safety.	Project leaders demonstrate no commitment or leadership in safety; safety is not a management priority.	Leadership commitment appears only after problems or incidents occur; responses are sporadic.	Leaders demonstrate commitment to existing standards/procedures, largely to meet regulatory demands rather than internal motivation.	Project leaders actively model and direct safety prioritization and directly oversee implementation.	Leadership and commitment inspire the entire team; safety is consistently treated as a core value in all policies and actions.
		K5’	Reward and Punishment	Implementation of a reward system for positive safety behavior, and sanction mechanisms (including financial penalties) for individuals or parties failing to fulfill their safety responsibilities.	No reward or sanction system related to safety behavior; violations or achievements are neither recognized nor followed up.	Rewards and sanctions are provided only after significant (positive/negative) events and are typically incidental.	A formal reward-and-punishment system exists but is not yet effective in driving broad behavioral changes.	Transparent and consistent implementation of rewards and sanctions contributes to positive behavior change in safety.	The system is internalized as part of organizational culture; all members support and maintain its effectiveness to ensure safe and sustainable behavior.
3	Safety Information Management	K6	Safety Planning [7,38]	Comprehensive and holistic planning covering the identification and mitigation of potential risks as the foundation of safety implementation.	No safety planning; risks are not systematically identified or mitigated.	Safety planning occurs only because of external demands or after incidents; planning is not comprehensive.	Safety planning follows minimum standards/procedures but does not fully consider all potential risks.	Safety planning is structured and comprehensive, identifying and mitigating risks at every execution stage.	Safety planning is embedded in organizational culture, continuously updated through learning and innovation and serves as the foundation for all execution processes.
		K7	Safety Reporting [9]	To record all conditions, including analysis, documentation of safety incidents, and follow-up actions for continuous improvement, open and easily accessible safety reporting systems.	No safety reporting system; safety events or conditions are not documented.	Reports are prepared only when accidents/incidents occur; reporting is incidental.	A reporting system exists and follows procedures but does not yet enable openness, easy access, or in-depth analysis.	Reporting is open and easily accessible and is routinely used to record and analyze all safety aspects, thereby supporting rapid decision-making.	Reporting has become cultural; the whole team actively reports, analyzes, and follows up findings for continuous improvement.
		K8	Data Utilization [32]	Safety data analysis for trend identification, risk prediction, and decision-making process enhancement.	Safety data are neither collected nor analyzed and decisions are not data-driven.	Data are used after incidents to identify causes, but not routinely for prediction or improvement.	Safety data are routinely collected and analyzed per standards, yet they are not fully used for trend identification or strategic decision-making.	Comprehensive data analysis detects trends, predicts risks, and supports system improvement.	Safety data underpin all decisions; analytical innovation is continuously developed and learning from data is integrated into the safety management system.
		K9	Safety Audit [19,24]	Periodic evaluation of safety systems and practices to support continuous improvement.	No safety audits; implementation is never systematically evaluated.	Audits are conducted only after problems or external requests; follow-up is usually inconsistent.	Audits are conducted periodically per regulation, focusing more on administrative compliance than on field effectiveness.	Comprehensive and periodic audits are used to improve systems and field implementation.	Audits are a learning and innovation process; findings are always followed up for continuous improvement and systemic enhancement.
		K10	Accident Investigation [39]	Systematic investigation of workplace accidents as a basis for learning and future prevention.	No investigation of occupational accidents; incidents are ignored without follow-up.	Investigations are conducted only after major incidents; causal analysis is usually superficial and unsystematic.	Investigations follow standard procedures; however, learning and follow-up are often limited to administrative aspects.	In-depth and systematic investigations are conducted to identify root causes; results are used for tangible improvements in the field.	Investigation is part of organizational culture; lessons from every incident are disseminated and applied to prevent recurrences.
4	Operational Safety Management	K11	Document Control [24]	Safety document management to ensure availability, up-to-date information, and easy field access when needed.	Safety documents are unavailable, unmanaged, or difficult to access on-site when needed.	Safety documents are prepared only upon request during inspections, audits, or incidents; not managed routinely.	Although safety documents are available and managed per standards, updates and accessibility remain limited to certain situations.	Document control is proactive, continuously updated, and easily accessible to all parties in the field when needed.	Document control is an established work culture; documents are always up-to-date, accessible, and used effectively to support site safety.
		K12	Equipment Control [24,38]	Inspection, maintenance, and use of safe work equipment to prevent accidents.	Work equipment is never inspected or maintained, and its often use deviates from procedures, increasing the risk of accidents.	Inspection and maintenance are performed only after breakdowns or accidents; there is no routine maintenance schedule.	Inspection and maintenance follow a standard schedule; however, not all equipment types are covered or fully documented.	All equipment is routinely and systematically inspected, maintained, and used to ensure safety, with consistent reporting and follow-up.	Equipment control is embedded in the work culture; continuous innovation and improvement are pursued, and all parties actively help keep equipment safe.
		K13	Material Management [38]	Safe and efficient handling, storage, and distribution of construction materials.	Materials are handled and stored haphazardly, without regard for safety and efficiency.	Material management is corrected only after accidents, damage, or warnings; standard procedures are not yet in place.	Materials are managed according to standard procedures but not yet optimally; minor violations persist in practice.	Procedures for handling, storage, and distribution are well implemented and continually evaluated for improvement.	Material management is part of the organizational culture; the team is committed to safety and efficiency and continually innovates.
		K14	Worksite Conditions [9]	Arrangement of work areas, access, lighting, and overall physical environment to ensure workplace safety.	The work environment is disorganized, with poor access and lighting; physical conditions pose hazards to workers.	Site arrangement occurs only after accidents, warnings, or complaints; no routine monitoring is performed.	Site arrangement, access, and lighting meet minimum standards but are not consistently maintained.	Comprehensive and continuous site arrangement, with routine monitoring and immediate correction of deficiencies.	Safe and comfortable site conditions are the norm; any change is promptly addressed, and workers actively help maintain the work environment.
		K14’	Hazardous and Non-Hazardous Waste Management [33]	Hazardous (B3) and non-hazardous waste are managed in accordance with procedures to prevent occupational hazards, environmental contamination, and to support worker health at construction sites.	No waste management; hazardous (B3) and nonhazardous waste are disposed of carelessly without regard for safety and environmental impacts.	Waste handling is performed only after warnings, accidents, or environmental incidents; procedures are inconsistently applied.	Hazardous and non-hazardous waste are managed per standard procedures, but oversight and evaluation are suboptimal.	Waste management is systematic, with routine monitoring and reporting to prevent exposure and contamination.	Waste management is internalized as part of work culture; continuous innovation and system enhancement ensure maximal safety and environmental protection.
5	Safety Capacity Building and Innovation	K15	Safety Digitalization [32]	Digital technologies (software, dashboards, BIM, IoT) are utilized to plan, monitor, measure, and report safety conditions.	Digital technology is not used in safety processes; activities are entirely manual and conventional.	Digital technologies are used only after incidents or when external parties require them and are not integrated into daily work processes.	Digital tools are used for certain safety aspects (e.g., reporting or monitoring) but are not fully integrated or optimized.	Digital technologies are integrated with planning, training, monitoring, and reporting, with routine evaluation and development.	The organization pioneers safety digitalization; systems are fully integrated, and all workers actively use technology to sustain the safety culture.
		K16	Training [9,32]	Implementation of structured training and orientation programs to improve safety awareness, skills, and responsibility of all workers.	No safety training or orientation programs; workers have minimal safety knowledge and skills.	Training/orientation is conducted only after accidents or on special request; it is not continuous and remains unstructured.	Safety training and orientation are routinely delivered per standards, but more as a compliance activity than a comprehensive competency development.	Training and orientation are continuous, with regularly updated materials; all workers are encouraged to actively participate and apply lessons learned.	Training and orientation are cultural norms; workers share knowledge, skills, and experiences, and continuous innovation is pursued to strengthen competence.

.

In the Design Phase (Table 2), seven categories were identified: Competence and Personnel of Designers (knowledge, skills, attitudes, and commitment to safety), Regulatory Environment (laws, codes, and professional accountability mechanisms), Tools and Resources (availability of technologies and training systems), Design for Safety Methods (risk management, integration of safety and quality, environmental considerations, and audit mechanisms), Contracts and Costs (allocation of responsibilities, time, budget, and safety-competent personnel), Influence of Owners/Clients (commitment and leadership), and Stakeholder Involvement and Collaboration (collaboration and communication mechanisms).

In the construction phase (Table 3), five categories were outlined: safety compliance and standards (compliance with K4 and inspection mechanisms), organizational governance and commitment (contractual arrangements, accountability, leadership, and incentive mechanisms), safety information management (planning, reporting, data utilization, audits, and accident investigation), operational safety management (document control, equipment and material management, worksite conditions, and waste management), and safety capacity building and innovation (digitalization of safety management and structured training programs).

Focus group discussions were conducted to further validate the subcategories within the design and construction phases. This process led to the identification of additional subcategories, namely, (D4’) Regulatory Requirements for Professional Engineer Accountability, (D9’) Evaluation and Audit Methods, (D11’) Time Considerations, (D11’’) Competent Construction Safety Personnel, (K5’) Reward and Punishment, and (K14’) Hazardous and Non-Hazardous Waste Management.

Together, these categories and subcategories represent a comprehensive maturity framework that integrates safety’s technical and organizational dimensions. They provide a systematic lens through which safety maturity can be measured across project phases while also serving as a reference point for identifying gaps between current practices and international standards.

4.2. Safety Culture Maturity Assessment

Following the pilot survey and first FGD, maturity levels for each sub-category were measured for both the design and construction phases in the next FGD phase. A panel of 12 domain experts was purposively chosen in this phase. The panel covered the principal actor groups in Indonesian projects: six from state-owned and large contractors, three from government/owner organizations, two from design consultancies, and one from academia. The cohort comprised experts occupying senior safety and project leadership roles; 6 reported >25 years of experience, 2 had 20–25 years, 2 had 15–20 years, and 2 had 10–15 years of experience. Educational attainment included 8 master’s, 2 doctoral, and 2 bachelor’s degrees. Further details can be found in

Table 4. Respondents Details.

No.	Experts/Respondents	Position/Job Title	Institution	Years of Experience	Education Background
1	E1	Senior Staff HSM	Adhi Karya Limited	15–20 years	Master’s degree
2	E2	Desainer Infrastructure	Stadia Limited	>25 years	Master’s degree
3	E3	VP HSSE	Hutama Karya (Persero) Limited	>25 years	Master’s degree
4	E4	SVP QHSE	PT Nindya Karya	>25 years	Bachelor’s degree
5	E5	Expert QHSSE	Hutama Karya (Persero) Limited	>25 years	Master’s degree
6	E6	Head of Road and Bridge Development Division	National Roads and Bridges Agency Jakarta-Banten/West Java	20–25 years	Master’s degree
7	E7	Road and Bridge Management Officer—Junior Expert	National Roads and Bridges Agency Jakarta-Banten/West Java	10–15 years	Master’s degree
8	E8	SVP Departemen QHSSE	Brantas Abipraya Limited	20–25 years	Master’s degree
9	E9	Lecturer	PLN Institute of Technology	>25 years	Doctoral degree
10	E10	HSE supervisor	Adhi Karya Limited	10–15 years	Master’s degree
11	E11	Intermediate Expert in Construction Services Supervision (Functional Position)	Ministry of Public Works	15–20 years	Doctoral degree
12	E12	Design Consultant	Virama Karya Limited	>25 years	Bachelor’s degree

.

This composition ensured that the instrument and subsequent interpretations were grounded in field realities across both phases, and it underpins the maturity results presented in

Table 5. FGD Results Analysis for Design Phase.

Sub-Category	Basic	Reactive	Compliant	Proactive	Resilient
Knowledge, Experience, and Skills of Planners	8.3%	25.0%	50.0%	16.7%	-
Attitudes and Mindsets of Planners	16.7%	16.7%	33.3%	33.3%	-
Regulations	8.3%	8.3%	16.7%	66.7%	-
Guidelines and Codes of Practice	-	8.3%	66.7%	25.0%	-
Regulatory Requirements for Professional Engineer Accountability	-	16.7%	33.3%	41.7%	8.3%
Tools and Technology	16.7%	8.3%	33.3%	41.7%	-
Knowledge Transfer and Training	8.3%	16.7%	33.3%	33.3%	8.3%
Risk Management	16.7%	8.3%	41.7%	25.0%	8.3%
Integration of Quality and Safety	8.3%	16.7%	33.3%	41.7%	-
Environmental Management Planning	8.3%	16.7%	25.0%	50.0%	-
Evaluation Methods and Audit Implementation	8.3%	25.0%	25.0%	41.7%	-
Contractual and Liability	8.3%	16.7%	50.0%	25.0%	-
Financial Considerations	8.3%	8.3%	41.7%	41.7%	-
Time Considerations	16.7%	8.3%	50.0%	16.7%	8.3%
Competency of Construction Safety Personnel	8.3%	8.3%	50.0%	33.3%	-
Client Commitment	-	25.0%	25.0%	41.7%	8.3%
Client Leadership	8.3%	8.3%	41.7%	25.0%	16.7%
Collaboration	-	25.0%	41.7%	33.3%	-
Communication	-	25.0%	41.7%	25.0%	8.3%

and

Table 6. Analysis of FGD Results for the Construction Phase.

Sub-Category	Basic	Reactive	Compliant	Proactive	Resilient
Occupational Safety Standards	-	8.3%	50.0%	33.3%	8.3%
Monitoring and Inspection Standards	-	8.3%	50.0%	33.3%	8.3%
Contract and Financial Review	-	16.7%	41.7%	33.3%	8.3%
Accountability	8.3%	16.7%	41.7%	25.0%	8.3%
Leadership and Commitment	-	16.7%	25.0%	50.0%	8.3%
Reward and Punishment Mechanisms	-	33.3%	25.0%	33.3%	8.3%
Safety Planning	-	16.7%	33.3%	41.7%	8.3%
Safety Reporting	-	8.3%	41.7%	16.7%	33.3%
Data Utilization	8.3%	8.3%	41.7%	25.0%	16.7%
Safety Audits	-	16.7%	8.3%	50.0%	25.0%
Accident Investigation	-	16.7%	16.7%	58.3%	8.3%
Document Control	-	8.3%	33.3%	50.0%	8.3%
Equipment Control	-	16.7%	25.0%	50.0%	8.3%
Material Management	-	16.7%	41.7%	33.3%	8.3%
Workplace Conditions	-	16.7%	50.0%	33.3%	-
Hazardous and Non-Hazardous Waste Management	-	33.3%	33.3%	33.3%	-
Safety Digitalization	16.7%	8.3%	41.7%	33.3%	-
Training	8.3%	16.7%	41.7%	25.0%	8.3%

below.

The FGD results provide a nuanced picture of how experts perceive safety culture maturity across both phases. In the design phase (Table 5), most subcategories are concentrated between the compliant and proactive levels, with very few judgment at the basic or resilient ends of the spectrum. Regulatory aspects are seen as comparatively stronger: Regulations (D3) and Regulatory Requirements for Professional Engineer Accountability (D4’) each have two-thirds or more of experts placing them at proactive or higher (66.7% and 50.0% including the resilient share, respectively), indicating that formal frameworks are perceived as reasonably mature. Similarly, Environmental Management Planning (D9) and Guidelines and Codes of Practice (D4) show a strong tilt towards compliant and proactive assessments. In contrast, more structural and capability-related dimensions such as Knowledge, Experience, and Skills of Planners (D1), Contractual and Liability (D10), and Time Considerations (D11’) display substantial shares in the basic and reactive levels (up to 25.0% in some cases), signaling persistent difficulties in embedding safety expertise, contractual leverage, and dedicated planning time within design teams. Client-side dimensions (D12–D15) are generally perceived as compliant to proactive but, with non-trivial reactive shares, suggesting that owner commitment, leadership, collaboration, and communication are present but not consistently generative across projects.

The distribution shifts upward in the construction phase (Table 6), with experts more frequently classifying subcategories as compliant, proactive, or even resilient. Operational and monitoring functions are particularly strong: Safety Audits (K9) combines 50.0% proactive and 25.0% resilient assessments, while Accident Investigation (K10) and Document Control (K11) also show dominant proactive ratings (58.3% and 50.0%, respectively). Safety Reporting (K7) stands out with one-third of experts (33.3%) placing it at the resilient level, indicating that reporting mechanisms on many projects are relatively advanced. Leadership-oriented variables—Leadership and Commitment (K5) and Training (K16)—cluster around compliant to proactive, pointing to generally positive but still uneven stakeholder engagement in safety during execution. Conversely, Reward and Punishment Mechanisms (K5’), Hazardous and Non-Hazardous Waste Management (K14’), and Safety Digitalization (K15) retain higher shares in the reactive or low compliant bands, highlighting that behavioral incentives, environmental waste control, and technology adoption lag behind more traditional operational controls. Overall, the FGD confirms that while construction-phase practices are perceived to be more mature than design-phase practices, both phases still exhibit clear gaps in the strategic, behavioral, and innovation-related dimensions of safety culture.

To move from qualitative expert judgments to numerical maturity scores, each expert’s allocation of a sub-category to one of the five maturity levels (Basic/Pathological, Reactive, Compliant/Planned, Proactive, Resilient) was coded from 1 to 5, respectively. For each sub-category in Table 2 and Table 3, we first calculated the mean score across the 12 experts. The phase-based averages of 3.11 (design) and 3.36 (construction) were then obtained by taking the arithmetic mean of all sub-category scores within each phase.

Table 7. Value of Safety Culture Maturity in the Design Phase.

Sub-Category		Measured Value
D1	Knowledge, Experience, and Skills of Planners	2.75
D2	Attitudes and Mindsets of Planners	2.83
D3	Regulations	3.42
D4	Guidelines and Codes of Practice	3.17
D4’	Regulatory Requirements for Professional Engineer Accountability	3.42
D5	Tools and Technology	3.00
D6	Knowledge Transfer and Training	3.17
D7	Risk Management	3.00
D8	Integration of Quality and Safety	3.08
D9	Environmental Management Planning	3.17
D9’	Evaluation Methods and Audit Implementation	3.00
D10	Contractual and Liability	2.92
D11	Financial Considerations	3.17
D11’	Time Considerations	2.92
D11’’	Competency of Construction Safety Personnel	3.08
D12	Client Commitment	3.33
D13	Client Leadership	3.33
D14	Collaboration	3.08
D15	Communication	3.17

and

Table 8. Value of Safety Culture Maturity in the Construction Phase.

Sub-Category		Measured Value
K1	Occupational Safety Standards	3.42
K2	Monitoring and Inspection Standards	3.42
K3	Contract and Financial Review	3.33
K4	Accountability	3.08
K5	Leadership and Commitment	3.50
K5’	Reward and Punishment Mechanisms	3.17
K6	Safety Planning	3.42
K7	Safety Reporting	3.75
K8	Data Utilization	3.33
K9	Safety Audits	3.83
K10	Accident Investigation	3.58
K11	Document Control	3.58
K12	Equipment Control	3.50
K13	Material Management	3.33
K14	Workplace Conditions	3.17
K14’	Hazardous and Non-Hazardous Waste Management	3.00
K15	Safety Digitalization	2.92
K16	Training	3.08

report the resulting sub-category-level scores, while the radar charts in Figure 3 and Figure 4 visualize the same data to highlight relative strengths and weaknesses within and across phases.

In the Design Phase, the average maturity score across all subcategories was 3.11, as shown in the radar chart below (Figure 3). The radar charts are used to pinpoint which criteria exhibit the lowest and highest maturity levels in each phase, thereby indicating where targeted interventions are most needed to improve overall safety culture maturity in both the design and construction phases. The radar chart in Figure 3 indicates that safety culture maturity is positioned between the compliant and proactive levels for the design phase.

Several subcategories, such as Regulations (3.42) and Regulatory Requirements for Professional Engineer Accountability (3.42), achieved relatively higher scores, suggesting that regulatory frameworks are sufficiently established. In contrast, aspects such as Knowledge and Skills of Planners (2.75) and Time Considerations (2.92) received lower scores, highlighting the challenges in embedding safety knowledge within planning teams and allocating sufficient time for safety integration.

In the construction phase, the overall maturity level was slightly higher (Figure 4), with an average score of 3.36. This reflects a stronger emphasis on operational safety practices compared with the design phase.

Sub-categories with the highest maturity in the construction phase include Safety Audits (3.83), Safety Reporting (3.75), and Accident Investigation (3.58), indicating that monitoring, auditing, and reporting mechanisms are relatively more developed. Leadership also received a strong rating (3.50), reflecting positive stakeholder engagement in safety prioritization. However, subcategories such as Safety Digitalization (2.92) and Hazardous Waste Management (3.00) scored lower, suggesting that technological adoption and environmental safety management remain underdeveloped compared with international best practices.

The construction phase generally demonstrates higher maturity values than the design phase, particularly in operational aspects such as auditing, reporting, and accident investigation. Nonetheless, both phases remain clustered around the compliant level, indicating that Indonesia’s construction sector has not yet progressed to proactive or resilient maturity. The results point to a systemic gap in safety culture maturity: while formal regulations and operational monitoring mechanisms are relatively established, early-stage planning, time allocation for safety, workforce competence, and the integration of digital innovations remain weak. This pattern was reinforced during the FGD, where experts observed that compliance-driven practices dominated, with only limited evidence of proactive or generative safety culture emerging on projects. The maturity assessment was subsequently used as a basis to formulate a set of targeted, multi-stakeholder action plans aimed at lifting the maturity level of the most critical subcategories in both the design and construction phases.

The maturity assessment results were subsequently translated into a set of targeted action plans to guide stakeholders in improving the lowest-performing subcategories. For each sub-category with scores below the “managed” level (e.g., D1–Knowledge, Experience, and Skills of Planners; D2–Attitudes and Mindsets of Planners; D10–Contractual and Liability; D11’–Time Considerations; K15–Safety Digitalization), the expert panel first identified the underlying institutional and project-level causes of immaturity, drawing on their experience and on the quantitative maturity profiles. These preliminary diagnoses were then cross-checked through a desk study of project documents from multiple building projects, which confirmed recurring gaps such as limited integration of safety into design deliverables, weak contractual leverage for safety, insufficient dedicated time for safety planning, and fragmented or non-existent digital safety data systems. On this basis, the experts co-formulated concrete improvement actions for each sub-category, specifying not only the required change, but also measurable outcome indicators and clearly assigned responsible parties. The resulting action plan (

Table 9. Action Plan for the Improvement of the Safety Culture Maturity Level.

Sub-Category	Improvement Needs	Actions	Outcome Indicators	Responsible Party
Knowledge, Experience, and Skills of Planners (D1)	Development of structured competency-based training for safety-by-design, hazard anticipation, and risk integration for planners. Inclusion of mandatory OHS modules aligned, with international standards (e.g., ISO 45001 [40]) within professional licensing and certification frameworks.	Mandatory design-phase safety integration workshops tied to real project case studies. Development of simulation-based learning (e.g., BIM hazard detection and design-for-safety modeling). Establishment of a mentorship program linking junior planners with experienced safety professionals. Embedding safety performance as a requirement for planning accreditation.	Percentage increase in design submission incorporating safety aspects (risk assessment to planned cost) Increase in planners with safety certification Systematic integration of risk mitigation measures and safety cost planning into project budgets in accordance with Permen PUPR No.10/2021	Government, employers, and professional certification bodies
Attitudes and Mindsets of Planners (D2)	Institutionalization of regulatory enforcement mechanisms that embed safety commitment as a nonnegotiable requirement for planning consultants. Establishment of safety culture maturity assessment as a mandatory criterion in the selection of design consultants, grounded in sustainable development and ethical leadership principles.	Revision of procurement and licensing regulations to explicitly require a demonstrable safety culture maturity and commitment from planning consultants. Implementation of standardized safety culture maturity assessments (e.g., Hudson’s model) during consultant prequalification and tendering processes.	Appointment percentage of planning consultants that meet predefined safety culture maturity thresholds. Integration of safety culture considerations in consultant selection and procurement decisions.	Government, employers, and professional associations
Contractual and Liability (D10)	Introduction of a contractual demerit point system tied to safety performance metrics in consultant/contractor requirements. Mandating the submission and verification of SMKK documentation (as per Permen PUPR No. 10/2021) as a prerequisite for award and contract execution.	Insert a safety demerit clause in consultant and contractor contracts, defining point thresholds, penalties (fines, contract termination, withholding payments), and remediation pathways. Proof of SMKK compliance (audited documentation, certificates) is required as a mandatory contractual deliverable. Explicitly cite applicable regulations and safety standards (e.g., Permen PUPR No. 10/2021, ISO 45001) within contracts and stipulate liability consequences for violation.	Percentage of awarded projects whose planning consultants meet predefined demerit score thresholds. Number of contract breaches or penalties issued for safety non-compliance tied to demerit system. Frequency of audit verifications confirming the authenticity and adequacy of submitted SMKK documents.	Government, employers, legal, and professional associations
Time Considerations (D11’)	Allocation of structured schedule buffers to allow planners sufficient time for detailed safety design and cost estimation. Recognition of safety planning as a non-negotiable component of design, requiring inclusion in the baseline schedule.	Mandate minimum safety design lead time (e.g., specific percentage of total design schedule) in project procurement documents. Require that tender submissions include safety design work breakdown and time estimates, with penalties or adjustments if insufficient time is allocated. Introduce monitoring checkpoints during design phases to ensure safety planning is not compressed (e.g., mid-design safety review gate).	Average number of safety design work hours per project (versus baseline). Percentage of design deliverables containing fully developed safety plans (e.g., with quantified risk mitigation). Ratio of safety cost implementation (actual) to safety cost estimate in contract and trend of accident/incidence rates in projects.	Employers/ owners, design consultants, and professional associations
Safety Digitalization (K15)	Establishment of a centralized digital safety data infrastructure to collect, store, and analyze accident and near-miss data across projects. Introduction of incentive mechanisms (financial or reputational) to encourage contractors and planners to share accurate and timely safety data. The adoption of advanced digital technologies (e.g., machine learning for risk prediction, computer vision for hazard detection, robotics for inspection, and NLP for safety reporting) should be promoted to enhance proactive safety management.	Develop and implement a national or sector-wide construction safety data platform with clear data governance policies, standardized reporting templates, and open-access analytics dashboards. Incorporating data transparency and innovation performance as evaluation criteria in contractor prequalification and tendering processes. Establish incentive and recognition programs (e.g., safety innovation awards and digital safety certification) to reward companies that demonstrate technological excellence and data transparency.	Increase in the proportion of projects contributing safety data to the national platform. Growth in the number of contractors utilizing AI, automation, or digital analytics tools for safety management. Demonstrated correlation between technology adoption and reductions in recorded safety incidents or near misses.	Government, safety committee, employers, contractors and educational institutions

) operationalizes the maturity assessment by linking diagnosed weaknesses to multi-stakeholder interventions and monitoring metrics that can be used to track progress over time and systematically elevate safety culture maturity across both the design and construction phases.

5. Discussions

The results indicate an intermediate maturity level (between compliant and proactive), with the design phase lagging behind the construction phase. This confirms that safety practices are institutionalized to a certain extent, particularly in the construction phase, but remain largely compliance-driven rather than rooted in proactive organizational learning. Higher scores in the construction phase reflects stronger operational mechanisms, such as reporting, auditing, and accident investigation, whereas lower score in the design phase underscores persistent limitations in embedding safety knowledge, allocating adequate planning time, and fostering professional accountability [7].

Several strengths are evident. The presence of formal regulatory frameworks and mechanisms of accountability in the design stage align with national requirements such as Law No. 2/2017 and Permen PUPR No. 10/2021, which provide legal bases for construction safety management. The relatively high auditing and reporting scores in the construction phase indicate that Indonesian projects have begun to adopt systematic monitoring processes consistent with international safety management principles [38]. These developments are consistent with earlier findings that the formalization of safety processes is often the first critical step toward building a stronger safety culture [27].

At the same time, the study highlights notable weaknesses. Regardless of higher maturity scores in some design phase subcategories, such as Regulations and Regulatory Requirements for Professional Engineer Accountability (both 3.42), subcategories such as Knowledge and Skills of Planners (2.75) and Time Considerations (2.92) remain low. This asymmetry points to a safety culture in which design teams recognize the formal importance of safety but still tend to treat it as a compliance requirement or as the contractor’s responsibility, rather than as an integral design criterion. Limited exposure to construction safety in professional education, the absence of dedicated safety roles within design organizations, and fee structures that constrain the time available for safety integration all contribute to the tendency to prioritize technical deliverables and schedule over systematic design-for-safety reviews. This result also suggests that safety is still treated as secondary to cost and time efficiency [2].

By contrast, the construction-phase profile reflects a more operationally focused and compliance-driven safety culture. Sub-categories such as Safety Audits (3.83), Safety Reporting (3.75), Accident Investigation (3.58), and Leadership (3.50) achieve relatively high maturity, suggesting that regulatory enforcement and client requirements have strengthened on-site monitoring, incident documentation, and managerial attention to safety. However, Safety Digitalization (2.92) and Hazardous Waste Management (3.00) lag behind, indicating insufficient adoption of innovations such as BIM, IoT, and digital dashboards that are increasingly integrated into safety management in more advanced contexts [32,41]. This aligns with critiques that Indonesia’s construction safety management remains predominantly reactive, with limited systemic adoption of proactive and resilient practices [42]. The lower maturity of design phase subcategories related to planner competence and time allocation, compared with the relatively higher maturity of construction-phase auditing and reporting practices, thus reflect deeper institutional patterns. Responsibility for safety is still largely institutionalized around the construction site and the contractor’s obligations, whereas design organizations operate under weaker safety accountability, limited feedback from incident data and commercial pressures that compress the time available for safety-oriented design iteration. These structural and cultural features explain why safety culture maturity remains low in the design phase even within organizations that display comparatively stronger safety practices during construction.

A cross phase analysis further reveals a disconnect between the regulatory intent at the design stage and the actual implementation on site. While regulatory compliance characterizes design maturity, construction maturity reflects more robust operational practices. However, the lack of integration between these two phases means that safety considerations identified at the design level are not always translated effectively into field practice. This gap mirrors the findings of previous Indonesian studies that institutional fragmentation and weak inter-actor coordination hinder the evolution of a cohesive safety culture [4].

The implications for policy and practice are significant. For the government and regulators, the priority lies in strengthening the enforcement of SMKK and aligning national regulations with international frameworks such as ISO 21500 and the PMBOK Construction Extension [24,25,31]. Investment in structured training, technology-enabled safety monitoring, and bottom-up worker participation are necessary for contractors to accelerate the transition to proactive safety culture. For consultants and designers, it is crucial to embed safety-for-design principles, including risk management, quality-safety integration, and environmental planning, earlier in planning [7]. Cross-cutting efforts should emphasize the integration of digital tools as enablers of continuous improvement, echoing international evidence that integrated management systems can enhance both safety and productivity [43]. Overall, the phase gap suggests that future improvements should prioritize upstream design accountability and better cross phase coordination.

6. Conclusions

This study mapped the maturity of safety culture in Indonesia’s construction projects by assessing the design and construction phases using a purposive panel of 12 experts (questionnaire-based ratings, FGDs, and expert validation). The findings indicate that safety culture maturity remains at an intermediate level, with the design phase averaging 3.11 and the construction phase 3.36, positioned between compliant and proactive maturity. While notable strengths were identified, such as the existence of regulatory frameworks and relatively strong auditing and reporting practices, persistent weaknesses in early-stage planning, professional competence, resource allocation, digitalization, and environmental safety management were identified. These results demonstrate that Indonesia’s construction safety culture is still driven largely by compliance rather than proactive organizational learning, underscoring the need for systemic improvement.

Theoretically, this study contributes by demonstrating the importance of a phase-based maturity assessment, revealing asymmetries between design and implementation that are often overlooked in existing maturity models. It highlights that bridging the regulatory–operational gap requires more than compliance: it demands integrated action across stakeholders. Moving forward, the next critical step is to develop an integrated construction safety management framework that combines national regulations (SMKK), international project management standards (ISO 21500), and global best practices in project execution (PMBOK Construction Extension). This integrated approach can improve implementation efficiency and strengthen safety and environmental performance while supporting compliance and organizational learning [33,34,43,44,45,46]. These insights provide a roadmap for policymakers and industry stakeholders seeking to shift from compliance-driven to proactive and resilient safety culture.

Despite these contributions, this study has several limitations. First, the maturity assessment relies on a purposive panel of 12 experts, which represents a relatively small and non-random sample and may be subject to subjective evaluation bias, although it covers the main actor groups and approximately 80% of state-owned construction companies. Accordingly, the findings should be interpreted as an expert-assessed industry landscape rather than a statistically representative survey. In addition, the maturity scale was not subjected to formal statistical reliability and validity tests (e.g., internal consistency or construct validation) because the design focused on expert consensus within a small purposive panel. Second, the analysis is confined to Indonesian construction projects and reflects the specific regulatory and institutional context; therefore, the findings should be cautiously generalized to other countries or project types. Third, the study provides a cross-sectional snapshot based on expert judgments rather than longitudinal data or objective performance indicators such as multi-project accident statistics or audit scores. These limitations open up several directions for future research. Comparative studies across countries and organizational cultures could test the transferability of the safety culture maturity framework, whereas longitudinal studies could examine how maturity levels evolve as new regulations and safety initiatives are implemented. Studies that apply the instrument to larger samples of organizations and respondents should incorporate psychometric analyses to strengthen the framework’s measurement properties. Further work could also investigate how digital tools, such as BIM-based planning, integrated safety management systems, and data-driven monitoring platforms, interact with regulatory frameworks (e.g., SMKK and ISO-based standards) to accelerate the transition from compliant to proactive and resilient safety cultures.