Public–Private Partnerships in Urban Regeneration: Comparative Insights and Lessons from Brazil, Italy, and the UK

Abstract

Urban regeneration practices have gained prominence in urban planning in different contexts. Among the different areas subject to urban regeneration, waterfronts stand out as privileged areas of the city and are, therefore, very attractive for new uses. Public–Private Partnership (PPP) agreements are often used to implement these projects. However, PPP agreements in regeneration projects are complex and, in many cases, produce controversial results, either in relation to the partnership itself or to the project resulting from that partnership. In this sense, it is important to provide recommendations for the development of these processes and the resulting projects. Based on this, the present study conducts a comparative analysis between the Brazilian, Italian, and UK contexts regarding PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects and a comparative analysis between three specific case studies: Porto Maravilha in Rio de Janeiro, Porta a Mare in Livorno, and Harbourside in Bristol. Based on the analyses carried out, the study provides recommendations for improving these practices and the resulting projects. In this sense, it is expected that the study contributes to the state of the art on the subject.

1. Introduction

Urban regeneration practices are being implemented in different urban contexts in an attempt to recover degraded areas and avoid the consumption of new land. Among the areas of interest for urban regeneration, waterfronts stand out for their attractiveness. In different urban contexts, many waterfront areas are being returned to urban use with the relocation of port and industrial activities to new places. These areas are usually quite strategic and attractive, as they are located in the center of consolidated cities [1]. In addition to its economic importance and land reuse, the regeneration of waterfronts is also important from an environmental perspective, as waterfronts are strategic territories in the context of climate change, especially concerning rising water levels. In this sense, the regeneration of these territories gains relevance in view of the need to make them more resilient and sustainable.

In many urban regeneration processes, including urban regeneration of waterfronts, Public–Private Partnership (PPP) arrangements are observed with the aim of developing these areas. Although there is no single definition, a Public–Private Partnership can be understood as a public procurement model used in the provision of infrastructure and services, where the public and private sectors establish a long-term contractual or institutional relationship, with an explicit allocation of responsibilities and risk-sharing [2,3].

The use of PPPs may be motivated by several factors, including public sector budget constraints and the attempt to attract private capital; the incorporation of private sector capacity, knowledge, and innovation; the possibility of obtaining new infrastructure without transferring ownership to the private sector; and the changing role of the State in society and the economy, shifting from an operator State to a regulator State [4,5,6].

Despite this, in many cases, these PPP arrangements are controversial from a financial and social point of view, resulting in criticism about the real benefits of these practices. In addition, the urban and architectural results obtained are also often controversial [1].

In this context, this study aims to provide recommendations for PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects through a comparative analysis of countries (Brazil, Italy, and the UK) and case studies (Porto Maravilha in Rio de Janeiro, Porta a Mare in Livorno, and Harbourside in Bristol).

Meeting the proposed objective, the study aims to answer the following research questions:

• What positive factors are observed regarding PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects in the contexts of Brazil, Italy, and the UK? Which factors should be improved?
• What positive factors are observed regarding PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects in the Porto Maravilha, Livorno Porta a Mare, and Bristol Harbourside case studies? What factors should be improved?
• What recommendations can be extracted for improving PPP agreements in urban regeneration projects?
• What recommendations can be extracted for improving urban regeneration projects resulting from these PPP agreements?

To analyze the PPP arrangements in these contexts, the study focused on the enabling environment of these countries and the exogenous factors that impact these countries [7]. On the other hand, to analyze the case studies, the study focused on the PPP arrangement and its phases—the preparation phase, the procurement phase, and the contract management phase [7]. The preparation phase encompasses all necessary planning prior to the contract; the contracting phase refers to the bidding process and the contract itself; and finally, the contract management phase involves the development of the partnership, including the construction, operation, and maintenance of the project [8]. In addition, the context of the area before the project and the results obtained through the project were also discussed.

Concerning the methodology, the study uses cross-country analysis and cross-case analysis. Both analyses are used to make comparisons, finding similarities and differences, and drawing recommendations [9]. In this sense, it is hoped that the study will generate new knowledge about research into PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects, contributing to policies and practices on the topic.

The study is organized into five sections. After this brief introduction, Section 2 presents the methodology used. The third and fourth sections present, respectively, the results obtained and the discussion of the results. Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions drawn from the study.

2. Materials and Methods

The study analyzes the Brazilian, Italian, and UK contexts regarding PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects, as well as three specific case studies, Porto Maravilha, Livorno Porta a Mare, and Bristol Harbourside (Figure 1). The choice of contexts and case studies seeks to provide geographical and developmental diversity in terms of the use of PPP arrangements.

The analysis of the three contexts was carried out considering elements related to the enabling environment and exogenous factors. The enabling environment refers to a country’s environment, external to the PPP arrangement itself, but which can be controlled in order to facilitate the development of partnerships. These include the presence of a specific legal and regulatory framework, the standardization of processes, and the presence of specific agencies to support PPP projects. Exogenous factors include factors that cannot be controlled, but which also influence the development of PPP arrangements. The exogenous factors analyzed refer to the availability of financial markets and capital, community support, socioeconomic factors, macroeconomic and economic policy conditions [7].

The analysis of the three case studies was carried out considering the internal environment of the PPP arrangement in its different phases: preparation phase, procurement phase, and contract management phase [7]. In addition, the urban context before the project and the urban results after the project were also analyzed.

Both the analysis of the three contexts and the analysis of the three case studies attempted to identify positive aspects and aspects for improvement. Finally, a comparative analysis was carried out between the contexts and between the case studies.

For the comparative analysis, the study uses cross-country analysis and cross-case analysis. Cross-country analysis is used to compare data from different countries, while cross-case analysis is used to compare specific case studies. Both analyses aim to find similarities and differences, common points, and individual insights. The analysis can be carried out using qualitative data, identifying variables, and using summary tables. Finally, both analyses also allow the production of new knowledge and understanding for the field of research, for policies and practices related to the topic analyzed [9].

The material used to analyze the three contexts and their respective case studies was extracted from secondary data obtained through document analysis. The documents analyzed include national and local laws, decrees, and resolutions, as well as scientific literature. In the case of Livorno Porta a Mare, official documents were requested and received directly from the Municipality of Livorno. In the case of Bristol Harbourside, official documents were obtained through a visit to the Bristol Historical Archives.

Figure 2 illustrates the methodological approach.

3. Results

3.1. The Brazilian Context and the Case of “Porto Maravilha” in Rio de Janeiro

Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Brazil are governed primarily by Law No. 11,079/2004 [10], which establishes general rules for bidding and contracting. PPPs are defined as administrative concession contracts, either in the sponsored modality, combining user fees and government payments, or in the administrative modality, in which services are provided directly to the public administration. These arrangements also fall under Laws No. 8987/1995 [11] and No. 9074/1995 [12]. Contracts must specify scope, pricing, risk allocation, user rights, performance indicators, penalties, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Guarantees of public obligations may include earmarked revenues, funds, insurance, or guarantees from financial institutions. Bidding must follow the rules of Law No. 14,133/2021 [13] and may include arbitration as regulated by Law No. 9307/1996 [14]. Several states have created PPP Units to support design, contracting, and monitoring.

Urban regeneration initiatives in Brazil occur mainly in central areas of medium and large cities, with the Estatuto da Cidade (City Statute, Law No. 10.257/2001) [15] providing the main legal framework. Among its instruments, the Operação Urbana Consorciada–OUC (Urban Consortium Operation) stands out, allowing municipalities to coordinate interventions with property owners, residents, and private investors [16]. OUCs enable structural transformations, environmental improvements, changes in land use and construction regulations, and the legalization of irregular buildings. Each OUC must be established by specific municipal law, which defines boundaries, objectives, social measures, environmental assessments, and compensation mechanisms. Financing often relies on the sale of Certificados de Potencial Adicional de Construção-CEPACs (Certificates of Additional Construction Potential), which capture value generated by regulatory changes.

The effectiveness of PPPs and regeneration projects depends on exogenous factors such as capital market development, community support, socio-economic conditions, and macroeconomic stability. Since the 2000s, the Brazilian capital market has expanded through regulatory modernization, infrastructure improvements, and broader investor participation. Regulated by CVM, CMN, ANBIMA, and B3, it is now the largest in Latin America [17]. Community support, however, is divided, with some groups favoring strong state intervention and others privatization [18]. Brazil’s socio-economic context is marked by persistent inequalities, exacerbated by the 2014 recession and the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in less developed regions [19]. Macroeconomic indicators show volatility: GDP per capita contracted in 2009, 2015, 2016, and 2020, with a modest recovery thereafter. Inflation has also been high, peaking at 9.3% in 2022 and reaching 4.6% in 2023, signaling economic instability.

The Porto Maravilha project in Rio de Janeiro is the largest OUC in Brazil and a landmark PPP structured as an administrative concession [20]. It aimed to regenerate the city’s historic port area, once central to national development but in decline since the 1970s due to economic shifts and logistical challenges. Previous revitalization attempts had failed due to poor coordination between government and private stakeholders [21]. The Porto Maravilha initiative emerged in the context of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, with goals of transforming the port into a hub for culture, tourism, business, and housing. The project covers an area of approximately 500 ha and provides for the construction of around 4.5 million square meters over a period of 30 years (Figure 3). The delimited perimeter contains three integral neighborhoods, four partial neighborhoods, and the region’s historic slums, with strong links to Afro-Brazilian culture [22]. Before the project, the area had a population of 28,000 inhabitants, mainly located in precarious settlements in the hills. In addition, the area was crossed by a viaduct (Elevado da Perimetral-Perimetral Elevated), characterizing it as a transit zone, with abandoned and degraded buildings [23].

The OUC included a complex package of works and services. Among the works were the demolition of the viaduct, the construction of tunnels, the building of museums, a new waterfront, renovated roads and sidewalks, and rebuilt urban infrastructure networks [24]. Among the services were the conservation and maintenance of the road system, green spaces and squares; maintenance and repair of public lighting and sidewalks; execution of urban cleaning services; selective waste collection; maintenance of the drainage network and collective galleries; maintenance of traffic signs; installation and maintenance of bicycle racks; maintenance and conservation of tourist, historical and geographical points and monuments; and citizen services [24].

The OUC Porto Maravilha was created in 2009 by Complementary Law No. 101/2009 [25] (Figure 4). However, the procedures for implementing the OUC began in 2006, through Decree No. 26,852/2006 [26], which created and delimited the Área de Interesse Urbano Especial (AEIU) da Região Portuária do Rio de Janeiro–Area of Special Urban Interest of the Rio de Janeiro Port Region. Complementary Law No. 101/2009 amended the Master Plan and authorized the Executive Branch to create the OUC Porto Maravilha. Complementary Law No. 101/2009 was followed by Complementary Law No. 102/2009 [27], which created the Companhia de Desenvolvimento Urbano da Região do Porto do Rio de Janeiro–CDURP (Urban Development Company of the Port Region of Rio de Janeiro), responsible for developing the Area of Special Urban Interest. Decree No. 31,620 [28] created CDURP and approved its statutes.

The Public Tender 001/2010 [29], opened in July, defined the bidding process for choosing the private partner. The following month, Decree No. 32,666/2010 [30], determined the issuance of CEPACs and the Municipality issued 6,436,722 CEPACs at a value of R$545.00 each, to be used as additional construction potential for the AEIU. In October 2010, the Qualification Trial, the Technical Proposal Trial, and the Final Score were carried out. The winner was the Porto Novo Consortium, made up of construction companies OAS Ltd.a, Norberto Odebrecht Brasil S/A, and Carioca Christiani-Nielsen Engenharia S/A (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). In November 2010, the public notice for the signing of the administrative concession contract was published [31].

In June 2011, the Porto Maravilha Real Estate Investment Fund, owned by Caixa Econômica Federal, bought a single lot of CEPACs for R$3.5 billion. The PPP contract was managed through service orders that marked the start of the project phases. In June 2018, it was reported that Caixa Econômica Federal had declared that the Porto Maravilha Real Estate Investment Fund, responsible for the OUC payments, had no liquidity. In January 2023, CDURP announced that it was paralyzing the project due to the lack of liquidity in the Real Estate Investment Fund [31]. To date, around 85% of the project has been completed.

Concerning the urban development project, major infrastructure improvements were made, such as the demolition of the Elevado da Perimetral, the construction of tunnels, new roads, public lighting, water treatment, and the extension of the light rail, which improved connectivity. Cultural projects such as the Museu de Arte do Rio–MAR (Rio Art Museum) and the Museu do Amanhã (Museum of Tomorrow) were highlighted, as well as new public spaces and the strengthening of Afro-Brazilian heritage with the discovery of Cais do Valongo, an old pier located in the port area related to the arrival of enslaved Africans in America, and the Circuito da Herança Africana e o Museu de História Cultural Afro-Brasileira–MUHCAB (African Heritage Circuit and the Museum of Afro-Brazilian Cultural History). However, there has been criticism of the high investment in these projects to the detriment of precarious settlements and the negative social impacts, such as gentrification, the displacement of vulnerable populations, and the lack of social housing proposed in the project [32].

Concerning the process, the use of a PPP arrangement as an integrated model for building infrastructure and providing services was a distinguishing feature of the project, allowing the municipality greater control by centralizing execution in a single company. However, criticism arose as to the real need for this partnership since public resources from various levels of government were mobilized. The rapid execution of the works also generated debate, as the project subsequently lost momentum, suggesting that a gradual implementation could have been more effective. There was also criticism of the imbalance in benefits between the entities involved, with allegations of insufficient compensation for the port authority. Another relevant criticism refers to the dependence on the sale of CEPACs, bought by a single agent, which weakened the process. Finally, excessive optimism in relation to the national economic scenario compromised the financial viability and progress of the project [32].

3.2. The Italian Context and the Case of “Porta a Mare” in Livorno

The Italian legal framework for Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) is aligned with European Union directives, which distinguish between contractual PPPs, based on agreements for the design, financing, construction, operation, or maintenance of infrastructure and services; and institutionalized PPPs, in which mixed public–private entities are created to manage projects [33]^. Italy also recognizes a third form, negotiable PPPs, which emerged in the 1990s in complex urban programs with a strong regional focus [34]. Contractual PPPs are governed by Legislative Decree No. 36/2023 [35] and defined as long-term economic operations involving risk-sharing and predominantly private investment. Institutional PPPs fall under Legislative Decree No. 175/2016 [36], which regulates companies with public participation, including the Società di Trasformazione Urbana–STU (Urban Transformation Societies), specialized entities for urban transformation projects.

Institutional support for PPPs in Italy has evolved since the creation in 1999 of the Unità Tecnica Finanza di Progetto–UTFP (Project Finance Technical Unit), later replaced in 2015 by the Dipartimento per la Programmazione e il Coordinamento della Politica Economica–DIPE (Department for Economic Policy Planning and Coordination), which today provides legal, financial, and technical guidance and promotes PPP models nationally and internationally [37]. Contractual PPPs benefit from a standardized contract template (Legislative Decree No. 50/2016) [38], while institutionalized PPPs rely on case-specific guidelines such as those for STUs.

Urban regeneration has become increasingly central in Italian planning, driven by the need to contain urban sprawl and revitalize existing urban areas. Although some national guidelines exist, such as Laws No. 10/2013 [39] and No. 133/2014 [40], regional legislation has proved more effective, with regions such as Veneto, Lazio, Lombardy, Tuscany, and Emilia-Romagna adopting their own frameworks. Municipalities have also promoted innovative practices, including co-management of public spaces and temporary reuse of abandoned areas [41,42].

Exogenous factors strongly shape the potential of PPPs in Italy. The national financial market remains underdeveloped, heavily dependent on bank credit, and lacking diversification in long-term instruments, limiting private investment capacity and risk distribution [43]. The relationship between public and private actors has historically been marked by mistrust and political interference, though in recent years partnerships have reopened as tools to tackle urban and economic challenges [44]. Socio-economically, Italy faces persistent territorial disparities: the northern regions enjoy higher productivity and income, while the south lags behind in development [45]. At the macroeconomic level, Italy has recorded low per capita GDP growth and periods of high inflation, creating a fragile economic environment that constrains the sustainable expansion of PPPs.

The Porta a Mare project in Livorno exemplifies an institutional PPP through an STU. Livorno, with about 160,000 inhabitants, is a Tuscan port city historically tied to its shipyard industry. The decline of the Fratelli Orlando shipyards due to international competition in the 1990s prompted the municipality to consider urban regeneration alternatives. The Structural Plan of 1997 formalized these proposals, and the search began for a private partner to revitalize the area, preserve jobs, and reintegrate the region into the city’s urban fabric [46]. The proposal for the area was divided into two different uses: one part remains for industrial use, and the other part for urban use (Figure 5). The regenerated area destined for urban use constitutes the Porta a Mare project and was the objective of the PPP agreement. The industrial area was bought by the company Azimut Benetti, which was also, finally, the private partner in the PPP agreement [47].

The project area covers over 10 hectares along the waterfront and was designed as a multifunctional district combining residential, commercial, tourist, and leisure spaces. It is structured into five zones: Piazza Mazzini, Officine Storiche, Molo Mediceo, Arsenale, and Lips, each with specific functions, balancing new development with restoration of historic buildings. Planned in two phases, the first focused on Piazza Mazzini and Officine Storiche, while the second includes the Molo Mediceo, the Arsenale, and the Lips area [48,49].

The project to regenerate the Porta a Mare area only began to effectively shape up in 2003, through Deliberation No. 127/2003 [50] (Figure 6). Despite this, some important steps had been taken beforehand. In 2002, Deliberation No. 82/2002 [51] was established, a document with general guidelines and the preliminary perimeter of the intervention, in which the municipality gave up its majority shareholding and required the private partner to own land within the area. With the bankruptcy of the shipyards in July 2002, the complex was put up for sale for 50 million euros, and after negotiations between September 2002 and June 2003, the company Azimut Benetti acquired the area in December for 50.6 million euros. With the purchase of the shipyards, Azimut Benetti became the largest local owner and was confirmed as a private partner and the STU was established with minority participation by the city council [52,53]. Other owners, such as SPIL and LIPS, opted to sell their land, and their purchase was financed by Azimut Benetti, as provided for in the original partnership model [47].

Initially, almost the entire Porta a Mare area was owned by Azimut Benetti, which sold a large part of these areas to STU between 2004 and 2006, keeping only the part destined for the new shipyard. In 2007, the municipality sold some additional areas to STU [54]. Also in 2007, the Accordo di Programma per lo svilupp e la trasformazione urbanistica dell’ex Cantiere Navale Orlando di Livorno e delle aree portuali limitrofe (Program Agreement for the development and urban transformation of the former Orlando Shipyard in Livorno and the surrounding port areas) [55] was signed between the various public and private entities involved in the urban transformation, defining functions, but with no concrete progress on the development of the Tourist Port, an important element in the context of the project. In 2008, the STU areas were transferred to Società Porta Medicea srl, the majority shareholder of which was IGD. Of the five phases of the project, only two have been completed (Piazza Mazzini in 2014 and Officine Storiche in 2023), while the other areas (Molo Mediceo, Arsenale and Lips) are still under review and development, impacted by the pandemic [56,57].

Although not yet fully completed, the urban regeneration carried out in the Porta a Mare area has been evaluated positively, especially due to the development of new activities and the rapprochement of the population with the waterfront. However, significant criticisms were pointed out, mainly in relation to urban integration and the architectural results. The connection of the regenerated area with the adjacent urban fabric was considered insufficient. The architectural style of the new buildings was also criticized for clashing with the surrounding historic buildings. Other criticisms include the high building and functional density concentrated in a single area, insufficient green spaces, and concerns about the sustainability of future use. The non-realization of the Tourist Port is seen as a significant flaw, as it compromises the full meaning of the proposed transformation of Livorno’s port area [58].

Regarding the process, the commitment of both the public and private sectors in developing the partnership and the project stands out as a positive aspect. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the process of choosing the private sector was highly conditional on the requirement that it owns land in the project area considerably limiting the competitiveness of the process and raising doubts about its transparency. Another critical element was the lack of public participation during the development of the partnership and the definition of the project. The participatory process related to the Porta a Mare area was only carried out in 2015. The participatory process, called “Il futuro è dietro la Porta! (a Mare)” (The Future is Behind the Door! at the Sea), activated Livorno’s citizens in the formulation of strategies and operational projects for the development of the Porta a Mare area and the surrounding neighborhoods. Although the initiative had a positive impact on activating the population, this was not taken into account from the start of the process [58].

3.3. The British Context and the Case of “Harbourside” in Bristol

The United Kingdom has been a pioneer in the adoption of PPP arrangements, consolidating itself as one of the largest global markets for this model. The main instrument was the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), launched in 1992 and replaced in 2012 by Private Finance 2 (PF2), alongside other mechanisms such as Joint Ventures (JVs) [59]. PFI consisted of long-term contracts, usually lasting 25 to 30 years, under which the private sector designed, financed, built, and operated public assets, assuming risks related to construction, maintenance, and management. Public sector payments were linked to performance and covered both investment and service costs [60,61]. Although PFI supported more than 700 infrastructure projects across sectors, it revealed weaknesses: lengthy and costly procurement processes, limited operational flexibility, insufficient financial transparency, inappropriate risk transfers, and excessive investor profits. These shortcomings led to its replacement by PF2 in 2012, which was itself discontinued in 2018 [62]. Meanwhile, JVs also played an important role by creating jointly owned entities between public and private actors, sharing risks and responsibilities while leveraging complementary financial, technical, and institutional resources [63]. The UK does not have a single piece of legislation governing PPPs; instead, HM Treasury and the Infrastructure and Projects Authority provide policy and oversight, supported by the PFI Centre of Excellence, which develops guidance and standardized documentation [60].

Urban regeneration in the UK developed through multi-level governance arrangements. At the national level, legislation, circulars, and guidance shaped urban policies; at the regional level, agencies such as the Regional Development Agencies (1999–2012) and later Local Enterprise Partnerships coordinated strategies; and at the local level, authorities implemented frameworks, supplementary guidance, and instruments such as Section 106 agreements or the Community Infrastructure Levy [64]. Policy has evolved through six main phases [65]: the post-war focus on physical regeneration (1945–1968), centered on housing and city center redevelopment; the social and community welfare approach (1968–1979), emphasizing services, welfare, and community development; entrepreneurial regeneration in the 1980s, marked by reduced state spending and market-led initiatives such as Enterprise Zones and Urban Development Corporations; the competitive phase (1991–1997), characterized by initiatives like City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget; the urban renaissance and neighborhood renewal (1997–2010) under New Labour, which balanced physical, economic, and community-focused renewal while strengthening local government; and the austerity era of the 2010s, defined by severe cuts in public funding, increased reliance on localism, private actors, and a stronger focus on economic growth and housing delivery than on welfare. Overall, the UK experience shows that regeneration policies have shifted with political and economic contexts, often lacking continuity or coordination and raising persistent concerns about inclusivity, long-term benefits, and the balance between economic priorities and community needs.

Exogenous factors further reveal opportunities and constraints for PPPs. The UK remains a leading global financial hub, supported by strong institutions, a skilled workforce, and a robust regulatory environment, maintaining its reputation as an attractive investment destination [66]. Yet its advantage over other major markets has narrowed in recent years [67]. While the UK is recognized as a leader in PPP innovation, arrangements such as PFI have been criticized for lack of transparency, undermining public trust [62]. The socio-economic context has been affected by austerity, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the cost-of-living crisis, with 22% of the population living in relative poverty, compounded by inequalities linked to disability, ethnicity, and gender [68]. From a macroeconomic perspective, GDP per capita growth has fluctuated significantly: sharp declines in 2009 (−5.3%) and 2020 (−10.4%), a strong recovery in 2021 (+8.2%), moderate growth in 2022 (3.9%), and contraction in 2023 (−0.9%), reflecting an overall slowdown. Inflation has also been problematic, reaching 7.9% in 2022 and remaining high in 2023. Uncertainty related to Brexit, global instability, geopolitical tensions, populism, protectionism, and climate change has all placed pressure on the macroeconomic environment [69].

Within this context, the regeneration of Bristol’s central port area through the Harbourside project is a significant case. With around 483,000 inhabitants, Bristol is one of the UK’s “Core Cities” and is considered the regional capital of the West of England [70]. Its maritime history, tied to trade, manufacturing, and slavery, shaped its development. However, the decline of its central docks following the creation of new facilities in Avonmouth left large, underused areas [71]. From the 1970s onward, regeneration projects focused on culture and leisure were introduced to revitalize the city center and Bristol’s central docks area underwent four major regeneration phases [72,73]. The first was the conversion of transit sheds into the Watershed media center in 1982, followed by the demolition of the Tobacco Bonds and relocation of Lloyds Bank headquarters in the late 1980s, then a Millennium-funded phase that created Millennium Square, @Bristol, and an IMAX cinema (now the Aquarium) in the late 1990s. The final phase focused on a 7-hectare site owned by British Gas, British Rail, and Bristol City Council, which, after several failed attempts, was successfully redeveloped through a PPP arrangement [72,74]. Harbourside’s area has been designed for mixed use, including housing, offices, and leisure areas (Figure 7) [73].

The PPP arrangement responsible for the Harborside project was established in 1997 (Figure 8), but its origins date back to 1993 with the creation of the Harbourside Sponsors Group (HSG), composed of British Gas, British Rail, and Bristol City Council. The HSG was initiated by the Bristol Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) as a non-binding agreement to collaborate on the area’s regeneration, to develop a vision, identify a developer, and secure financing [75]. The 1997 Bristol Local Plan and the 1998 Planning Brief Implementation Phase provided an overall vision and outlined ten objectives for transforming the area into a mixed-use site with offices, housing, and retail. In 1997, seven developers submitted proposals in a competition, and the consortium of Crest Nicholson and British Land was selected based on their master plan and land bid, although British Land later withdrew, leaving Crest Nicholson to proceed with the project [73].

In 1998, Crest Nicholson presented its first outline plan for the Harbourside project, which faced strong public opposition, as did its second plan in August 1999 [73,74]. The failure of the first two outline plans reflected deep conflicts among stakeholders, poor design, tensions between planning and development priorities, weak political and business leadership, strong opposition forces, and media influence [76]. Nevertheless, Crest Nicholson was given a third chance in 2000, when it adopted a new approach, setting up the Canon Marsh Consultative Group (CMCG), which brought together landowners, municipal officials, civil society, business representatives, and architects [73,74]. This inclusive strategy balanced stakeholder interests, significantly reduced opposition, and led to the acceptance of the third outline plan by Bristol City Council in 2001 [76].

Once the outline plan was accepted, negotiations between Bristol City Council and Crest Nicholson took place in 2002. In 2003, a Development Agreement and a Section 106 Agreement were signed. In 2004, final planning permission was granted. During this period, Crest Nicholson acquired all the land from the Council and other landowners. Finally, the Harbourside project was divided into four phases of development. In 2013, the entire Harbourside project was completed [74].

Concerning the project, the possibility of returning the waterfront to urban and mixed uses is positive. Despite this, criticism regarding the limited variety of uses has been noted. The absence of street-level uses facing the waterfront is also negative, as it does not create a real connection between the buildings and the waterfront. The social housing previously planned but not fully delivered is also a negative point. Other negative aspects relate to the high density, architectural design, and quality of materials used in the buildings. The low connectivity of the Harbourside area with the rest of the city is also a negative point, as there is no possibility of crossing in the surrounding area. Finally, there is criticism regarding processes of exclusion and gentrification since the regeneration effect of the area has “spilled over” its boundaries and ended up interfering with the dynamics of surrounding areas.

Concerning the PPP process, the ability to bring together different landowners to work towards the urban regeneration of the area stands out. The ability to include different stakeholders during the consultation process is also noteworthy, as it was crucial in reducing conflicts and opposition. However, it is important to note that stakeholders were only involved in the third project proposal and that this involvement did not result in a completely innovative proposal. Finally, criticisms regarding the transparency of the process documentation were observed and identified, lending a sense of opacity.

4. Discussion

4.1. Cross-Country Analysis

The cross-country analysis makes it possible to identify the similarities and differences observed in the three contexts regarding the enabling environment and the exogenous factors (

Table 1. Cross-country analysis. Source: Prepared by the authors.

	Brazil	Italy	United Kingdom
Enabling Environment	Regulated by Law No. 11079/2004 (administrative and sponsored concessions) and other laws (8987/1995; 9074/1995; 14133/2021). PPP units exist in some states. City Statute (Law No. 10257/2001) provides instruments like OUC for urban regeneration, which is implemented at the municipal level.	Aligned with EU guidelines; distinguishes contractual (Legislative Decree 36/2023), institutionalized (Legislative Decree 175/2016), and negotiable PPPs. Institutional support via DIPE and ANAC, but there is limited use of standard models. Regional/municipal legislation is important for urban regeneration.	Pioneer in PPPs (PFI, PF2, JVs). There is no single piece of legislation governing PPPs in the UK; policy and oversight are provided by HM Treasury and the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, supported by the PFI Centre of Excellence. Governance across national, regional, and local levels. Complex institutional framework, with various types of initiatives related to urban regeneration in different time periods.
Exogenous Factors	Strengthened the capital market since the 2000s. Divided community support (state vs. privatization). Persistent regional inequalities. Unstable macroeconomic scenario with fluctuating GDP per capita and high inflation.	Fragile financial market. Lack of public support for PPPs. Major regional disparities (north vs. south). Unstable macroeconomic scenario with fluctuating GDP per capita and high inflation.	Strong global financial center, but the advantage is narrowing. Mixed public support. Socio-economic challenges (austerity, COVID-19, rising living costs, inequalities, 22% relative poverty). Macroeconomic volatility (GDP fluctuations, high inflation); uncertainty from Brexit, global crises, and climate change.

).

Regarding the legal and regulatory framework, it is observed that in Brazil and Italy, legal structures are established through specific national laws. On the other hand, in the United Kingdom, there is no single law, with PPP policy being implemented through HM Treasury, the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, and the PFI Centre of Excellence.

The PFI Centre of Excellence is a specialized agency that provides expert knowledge, consultancy, and tools to help public bodies manage PPP projects in the UK. In the Italian context, the DIPE also provides this type of support for PPPs. In Brazil, PPP support units operate at the state level and exist only in some states.

Regarding process standardization, in Brazil, laws related to PPP arrangements ensure a minimum level of standardization as they define the necessary elements. In the Italian context, standard models are available for contractual PPPs, but other modalities do not have models to follow. In the UK, models are provided by the PFI Centre of Excellence for the more conventional PPP arrangements.

Regarding urban regeneration, the Brazilian context has the City Statute, a national law that provides instruments through which urban regeneration projects can be promoted. These instruments, in turn, must be incorporated into Municipal Master Plans and implemented by the municipalities. In Italy, urban regeneration is closely linked to regional and municipal laws. Finally, in the UK, urban regeneration has a complex structure, with different initiatives over time and involving various levels of government. Nevertheless, it is observed that in all contexts, the local level is strongly related to urban regeneration initiatives.

Similarities and differences can also be observed regarding exogenous factors. Concerning the financial and country markets, Brazil and the UK have strong markets. However, in Brazil, the strengthening of the financial and capital market occurred mainly from the 2000s onward. In the UK, despite the robustness of its financial and capital markets, the gap between the UK and other global markets is decreasing. Italy does not stand out in terms of financial and capital markets, presenting a weak market.

Regarding community support, this factor can be considered a barrier in all three countries. In Brazil, community support is highly polarized. In Italy, there is also community resistance to supporting PPP practices. The same occurs in the UK, where there is criticism regarding the transparency and cost-effectiveness of these practices.

The socioeconomic context is also affected in all three countries. Despite being one of the largest economies in the world, Brazil is one of the most unequal countries globally. In Italy, disparities are most pronounced between the north and south. In the UK, some challenges have complicated the socioeconomic scenario.

Finally, the macroeconomic context, evaluated through GDP growth and inflation rates, is also not positive in any of the three contexts.

4.2. Cross-Case Analysis

The cross-case analysis makes it possible to identify the similarities and differences between the three cases analyzed in terms of the PPP arrangement and the urban regeneration project carried out through the partnership (

Table 2. Cross-case analysis. Source: Prepared by the authors.

	Brazil	Italy	United Kingdom
Context of the area	Rio de Janeiro port area, historically strategic but degraded since the 1970s, with abandoned buildings, obsolete infrastructure, and precarious occupations. Previous revitalization attempts failed.	Former Fratelli Orlando shipyard area, economically and urbanely declined. City studies since 1995 aimed to reactivate the economy, preserve jobs, and reintegrate the area.	Former central docks in Bristol, derelict since the mid-20th century; the city center has a long maritime history. Several cultural and leisure-based regeneration phases since the 1970s.
Proposed Project	Transform ~500 hectares into a hub for culture, tourism, housing, and services; construction of cultural facilities, upgraded infrastructure, and enhancement of historical heritage; linked to the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics.	Transform more than 10 hectares, divided into 5 zones (Piazza Mazzini, Officine Storiche, Molo Mediceo, Arsenale, LIps area); regeneration of historic buildings, creation of multifunctional spaces.	Transform 7-hectare waterfront into mixed-use area with housing, offices, leisure, cultural attractions.
PPP arrangement	PPP through Administrative concession; creation of OUC Porto Maravilha; CDURP and Porto Novo Consortium; financed mainly by sale of CEPACs (purchased by Caixa Econômica Federal, creating a real estate fund).	Institutionalized PPP (STU) between municipality and private sector; Azimut Benetti as leading private partner; strong public-private commitment, but limited competition and late public participation.	PPP was established in 1997; early collaboration between British Gas, British Rail, and Bristol City Council; Crest Nicholson selected via competition; phased development after inclusive consultations.
Analysis of the PPP arrangement	Enabled speed and centralized management; Criticisms: financially fragile due to dependence on a single CEPAC purchaser; project halted in 2023 due to liquidity crisis; benefits concentrated in certain actors; highlights need for gradual, inclusive planning.	Strong public-private commitment. Criticisms: limited competitiveness in private partner selection, delayed public participation.	Ability to align landowners and engage stakeholders; inclusive consultations improved outcomes. Criticisms: late involvement, and transparency concerns; perceived opacity in documentation and decision-making.
Analysis of the urban results	Improved infrastructure (demolition of Elevado da Perimetral, new tunnels/roads), cultural and tourist facilities (Museum of Tomorrow, Rio Art Museum), valorization of Afro-Brazilian heritage; Criticisms: gentrification, social exclusion, unbuilt social housing.	Return of population to the waterfront, economic activation, and valorization of urban space. Criticisms: poor integration with adjacent urban fabric, clashing architecture, high density, insufficient green space, unbuilt Tourist Port.	Waterfront returned to urban use, attracted investment. Criticisms: limited functional variety, lack of street-level activation, insufficient social housing, high density, design/connectivity issues, and gentrification of surrounding neighborhoods.

).

In all three case studies, the area context had a strong historical component. In Rio de Janeiro, the port area is closely linked to the African origins in Brazil, with the arrival of enslaved people. In Livorno, the area was occupied by the former Fratelli Orlanda shipyard, which holds historical importance for the city’s economy. Finally, Bristol has a strong maritime history.

All three projects aimed to reconvert the former port area into a post-industrial space, with uses for leisure, culture, tourism, commerce, and housing. However, the projects differ significantly in scale: while the projects in Livorno and Bristol cover 10 ha and 7 ha, respectively, the Porto Maravilha project covers more than 500 ha, making it considerably more complex, both in terms of the project and its development, and in terms of the PPP arrangement and the governance of the actors involved.

Regarding the PPP arrangements, the three cases exhibit very different levels of complexity. The Livorno case is probably the least complex: an institutionalized PPP was created between the Municipality of Livorno and the private company Azimut Benetti, which purchased the entire area to be regenerated. In Bristol, three different parties owned the land, so to work on the area as a whole, the three owners formed an initial group, which later allowed the establishment of a partnership with the private developer Crest Nicholson, who also purchased the land.

In the Porto Maravilha case, a public company was created to manage the partnership with the winning private consortium. Additionally, certificates of building potential were proposed for the area, with the sale of these certificates being used to pay the private partner. These certificates were purchased in a single auction by Caixa Econômica Federal.

It is interesting to note that regarding the completion of the PPP and the project, the three case studies are at different stages. The Bristol case has been fully completed, while the Livorno project is still in progress. The Porto Maravilha project stalled due to illiquidity in certificate payments. Despite being at different phases, interesting conclusions can be drawn from the three cases.

In the Porto Maravilha case, the PPP arrangement was notable in that it served as a centralized management structure for a series of works and services. However, as mentioned, the economic-financial fragility of the arrangement prevented the completion of both the partnership and the project. In the Livorno case, there is strong public and private commitment. However, it is also evident that the local population was not included in the initial phases of the process, with participatory processes taking place many years later. Furthermore, it was observed that the selection of the private partner was not fully transparent due to limitations set in the selection tender. In the Bristol case, although delayed, the participatory process became necessary due to strong opposition to the first two plans presented for the area.

Regarding the projects themselves, many positive and negative common points can be observed. In all three projects, the waterfront was reopened to the city, which had previously been hindered by port and industrial activities. This return of the waterfront was achieved through a mixed-use approach.

On the other hand, among the negative aspects, there is generally insufficient integration between the regenerated areas and their surroundings, both from a physical and social point of view. In addition to this, there is a lack of social housing in the projects carried out. Finally, there are also processes of gentrification of the original residents, especially vulnerable and low-income populations. The low integration of the area, the lack of social housing, and the gentrification processes observed in the case studies demonstrate the exclusionary nature of these projects, which are part of the neoliberal logic of urban space production, especially when it comes to spaces of great interest such as urban waterfronts.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

The present study aimed to extract recommendations for PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects, based on the Brazilian, Italian, and UK contexts, and in three specific case studies: Porto Maravilha, Livorno Porta a Mare, and Bristol Harbourside.

To this purpose, the study used cross-country analysis and cross-case analysis. The analyses allowed us to find similarities and differences between the contexts and cases analyzed, as well as to extract new knowledge on the topic.

As seen, PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects can be controversial, presenting negative results from both financial and social perspectives. Beyond this, the projects resulting from such practices may also be controversial. In this context, some recommendations may assist policymakers in improving these practices.

Concerning PPP arrangements, some points should be prioritized:

• Strengthening public sector leadership: To ensure that practices serve the interests of the population, the public sector must lead the entire process. This can be reinforced through a clear legal and regulatory framework, the creation of specialized agencies equipped to support different levels of government, and the standardization of processes.
• Developing local institutional capacity: Since the local level is closest to this type of practice, it is important to enhance municipal expertise to ensure that governments can negotiate balanced agreements and effectively manage contracts over time.
• Increasing competitiveness in partner selection: It is crucial to design bidding processes that foster genuine competition and avoid conditions that limit participation. Clear and fair criteria should guide the selection of partners.
• Selecting a strong and committed private partner: While the public sector should lead the process, the private partner must be committed and robust enough to carry it forward.
• Strengthening transparency and accountability: Improving the clarity of contracts, decision-making, and monitoring processes is essential. Increased transparency builds public trust and reduces perceptions of opacity.
• Institutionalizing participatory processes from the outset: Public involvement should be embedded from the earliest stages of process design to prevent conflicts and distrust. Early engagement helps align outcomes with the real needs of the community.
• Diversifying financing mechanisms: Over-reliance on a single instrument or investor should be avoided. Encouraging multiple investors and funding sources ensures resilience and reduces financial vulnerability.
• Balancing risk allocation realistically: Risks should be shared proportionally between public and private actors. Excessively optimistic financial assumptions undermine sustainability and jeopardize implementation.
• Gradual and adaptive implementation: Adopting phased approaches allows for adjustments to changing economic or social conditions. Gradual implementation mitigates the risks of premature investments based on overly optimistic forecasts.

Concerning urban regeneration projects, some points should be prioritized:

• Safeguarding cultural and historical identity: Given the historical character of these areas, it is important to incorporate architectural and planning solutions that respect and enhance local heritage, avoiding clashes between new developments and existing urban contexts. To this end, in the regeneration of historic neighborhoods and heritage-rich waterfronts, PPP models should incorporate explicit and enforceable cultural heritage protection measures into their arrangements.
• Integration with the surrounding urban fabric: Projects should be physically and socially connected to adjacent neighborhoods through mobility networks, public spaces, and functional continuity. This integration should respect historical street patterns, scales, and spatial relationships, avoiding the creation of isolated enclaves disconnected from the existing city.
• Ensuring functional diversity and mixed-use vitality: Encourage a balanced mix of residential, commercial, cultural, and recreational functions, avoiding regeneration focused purely on tourism and single-use developments that can undermine everyday urban life and local identity.
• Expanding green and public spaces: Public and green spaces should be designed as inclusive and accessible environments that reinforce historical narratives and cultural meanings, rather than as purely aesthetic or market-oriented amenities. Providing sufficient open and accessible areas promotes sustainability, community well-being, and long-term urban resilience. Green spaces also help prevent a sense of excessive building density.
• Prioritizing social housing and inclusion: To prevent gentrification or the displacement of vulnerable groups, regeneration projects must integrate affordable housing. A clear approach is to include non-negotiable quotas for affordable and social housing, ensuring that vulnerable and long-term residents can remain in regenerated areas.
• Strengthening the monitoring of social outcomes: Considering the contradictory effects observed in different urban regeneration practices, it is essential to define and monitor indicators not only for physical and financial progress but also for social impacts, ensuring that projects achieve broader public goals. In this sense, in addition to physical and financial indicators, PPPs should define and monitor social and cultural performance indicators, including impacts on heritage preservation, social diversity, and community access to regenerated spaces.

Based on the suggested recommendations, the study aims to generate new knowledge for the field of PPP research in urban regeneration projects, while also providing comparative evidence relevant to public policy and enabling the assistance of public and private actors involved in urban regeneration practices and the PPP agreements that support them.

However, the study has limitations. Given the depth of the analysis, we chose to focus on three contexts and case studies. However, the analysis of only three contexts and three case studies does not represent a broad scope of these practices and, therefore, demonstrates the limited scope of the study. In this sense, future studies could include new contexts and case studies in an attempt to broaden the analysis and, consequently, extract more insights on the topic.