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Games, Volume 3, Issue 2 (June 2012) – 2 articles , Pages 78-118

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Article
Quantum Type Indeterminacy in Dynamic Decision-Making: Self-Control through Identity Management
by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky and Jerome Busemeyer
Games 2012, 3(2), 97-118; https://doi.org/10.3390/g3020097 - 15 May 2012
Cited by 19 | Viewed by 5593
Abstract
The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In a dynamic decision context, type indeterminacy induces a game with multiple selves associated with a state [...] Read more.
The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In a dynamic decision context, type indeterminacy induces a game with multiple selves associated with a state transition process. We define a Markov perfect equilibrium among the selves with individual identity (preferences) as the state variable. The approach allows to characterize generic personality types and derive some comparative static results. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Boundedly Rational Behavior in Games)
247 KiB  
Article
What Behaviors are Disapproved? Experimental Evidence from Five Dictator Games
by Raúl López-Pérez and Marc Vorsatz
Games 2012, 3(2), 78-96; https://doi.org/10.3390/g3020078 - 23 Apr 2012
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 5845
Abstract
The literature on social norms has often stressed that social disapproval is crucial to foster compliance with norms and promote fair and cooperative behavior. With this in mind, we explore the disapproval of allocation decisions using experimental data from five dictator games with [...] Read more.
The literature on social norms has often stressed that social disapproval is crucial to foster compliance with norms and promote fair and cooperative behavior. With this in mind, we explore the disapproval of allocation decisions using experimental data from five dictator games with a feedback stage. Our data suggests that subjects are heterogeneous in their disapproval patterns, distinguishing two main groups: (1) Subjects who only disapprove choices that harm them, and (2) subjects who disapprove socially inefficient choices. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)
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