Boundedly Rational Behavior in Games
A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).
Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 September 2012) | Viewed by 5650
Special Issue Editor
Special Issue Information
Dear Colleagues,
Bounded rationality is a broadly and controversially discussed topic in behavioral economics and behavioral game theory. Agents with limited cognitive abilities who act in complex and uncertain environments will develop behavioral patterns and underlying cognitive models and belief structures which can hardly be reconciled with expected utility maximization. In strategic interactions, it is of special interest how coordination and cooperation problems are resolved by boundedly rational players. When modelling boundedly rational behavior, however, there is the danger of ad hoc explanations. Arbitrary assumptions about non-observable parts of the explanans drive the results. Therefore, this special issue puts the focus on economic explanations of specific patterns of boundedly rational behavior. We consider models of other-regarding behavior like fairness or reciprocity models which are based on preferences (and therefore axiomatic utility theory) not to represent boundedly rational behavior. Relevant topics for this special issue include
- decision principles like satisficing
- models of rule-governed behavior and heuristics
- adaptive behavior and simple learning rules
- role of emotions
- equilibrium concepts for boundedly rational players
PD Dr. Markus Pasche
Guest Editor
