Evaluating Fare Structure with Best–Worst Method for Improving Sustainable Transit Operations: Istanbul Metro Example
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Conceptual Review
2.1. Fares and Subsidies
2.2. Fare and Elasticity
2.3. Fare Structure
- Flat fare (FF) does not vary based on any factor. All passengers pay the same fare.
- Distance-based fare (DBF) determined by the distance or the number of stations crossed.
- Time-based fare (TBF) determined by when the trip is made.
- Zone-based fare (ZBF) determined by where the trip is made, and no zones crossed.
2.3.1. Flat Fare (FF)
2.3.2. Distance-Based Fare (DBF)
2.3.3. Time-Based Fare (TBF)
2.3.4. Zone-Based Fare (ZBF)
2.4. Fare Structure Assessing Criteria
2.4.1. Social Equity
2.4.2. Benefit Received
2.4.3. Operators’ Profit
2.4.4. Ticket Price
2.4.5. Number of Trips (Demand)
2.4.6. Decentralization
2.4.7. Urban Morphology
2.5. Fare Collection
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Transportation in Istanbul
- Average travel time per 10 km = 18 min 51 s;
- Time lost per year during rush hours (average time lost due to being stuck in traffic) = 80 h = 3.3 days [45].
3.1.1. Public Transport in Istanbul
3.1.2. Ticket Types in Istanbul
3.1.3. Istanbul Metro Data
- According to a recent urban mobility report, 48% of daily trips were made by PT;
- Rail systems account for 20.59% of all trips;
- Metro İstanbul accounts for 10% of all trips;
- The number of trips made by the Istanbul Metro (M lines) 7.4% of the total trips [48].
3.2. Best–Worst Method (BWM)
- Step 1
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 4
- Step 5
4. Results
- PT plays an essential role in shifting the demand from cars to sustainable modes and decreasing congestion in cities like Istanbul. But TBF may push users to use private cars due to high fares during peak hours. Considering Istanbul’s congestion problem mentioned in the previous sections, TBF may not be beneficial for passengers.
- FF is an easy-to-implement, cheap, and simple solution for the operator. It is also easy for passengers to understand and control. It is the optimal solution for cities with a single center that are not large enough. However, FF is an effortless way out. In cities where the number of trips increases and distances grow longer (especially in linear cities like Istanbul), it is essential to evaluate a more customized fare structure such as DBF.
- It was observed that Istanbul operators’ profits decreased due to increases in operating costs, due to the addition of new lines to the end of the metro lines operated with FF in the city in recent years. For example, the first stage of M4 (Kadıköy-Sabiha Gökçen Airport) was completed in 2012 and is in service, with 16 stations along a 21.7 km line between Kadıköy and Kartal. With the second stage, the line was extended from Kartal to Tavşantepe, and with the opening of the third stage in 2022, access from Tavşantepe to Sabiha Gökçen Airport was provided. With the third stage, the length of the line increased to 33.5 km and the no. of stations to 23. With the extensions made, the length of the line (and operating costs) increased, but the 1–2-station travel fare was still the same as the 22–23-station travel fare. As emphasized, this is unfair for both the operator and the passenger. When DBF is implemented, passengers will pay according to the number of stations, and injustice will be eliminated.
- In Istanbul, the operating income only covers 30–35% of the monthly fixed expenditure [53]. The situation is similar for the Istanbul Metro [54]. In this case, as in most major cities worldwide (except for good examples in East Asia), operations can continue thanks to subsidies. However, the difference between operating income and expenses widens every year, and the subsidies also increase. Li et al. show that DBF can increase operator revenue by 5.88% [55]. DBF, which is applied to convenient fare levels after a thorough analysis of journeys, will attract those who prefer different modes for short distances with its affordable fares. Also, it will charge much higher fares for long-distance travelers. As a result, operating income will increase, and the need for subsidies will decrease.
- In Istanbul and similar cities, urban renewal and rising land values in the city center are leading to new housing areas in the suburbs. This increase in land values in the center is driving up housing costs. Residents, especially low-income residents, are moving away from the center and settling in the less-accessible city periphery [56]. This leads to difficulties in accessing urban services for low-income individuals, increased transportation costs, longer travel times, etc.: in other words, transportation poverty. For this group, where private vehicle ownership rates are low, PT is the only option. In this respect, investments in PT are a useful tool for ensuring social equity.
- In this study, social equity criteria are used in the sense of vertical, and Benefit Received criteria are used in the sense of horizontal equity. It is dramatic that experts vastly outperform the other five criteria on these two equality criteria. With these assessments, they prioritize passenger interests over operator interests for PT. This can be interpreted as a reflection of the problem of social inequality in Istanbul.
- Istanbul has the highest income inequality in Türkiye. Income inequality is calculated by comparing the income of the lowest 20% with that of the highest 20%. The wider the gap between the highest and lowest income groups, the greater the income inequality. While the richest 20% of Türkiye’s population accounts for 47.6% of the total income, the lowest 20% receives only 6.1%. According to this, in 2018, the income of the richest 20 percent in Türkiye was 7.8 times that of the poorest 20%. Based on TÜİK data, the highest income inequality by province was in Istanbul (8.6) [57]. This data strongly emphasizes the importance of social equality in Istanbul. Developing policies in this direction will reduce social and economic inequalities.
- The distribution of card types across income groups provides important insights into the socio-economic characteristics of Istanbul Metro users. Monthly Mavikart (student and full-fare) and teacher and social cards are predominantly used by higher-income households, suggesting that frequent PT usage and monthly fare products are more common among economically stable groups. In contrast, free cards, particularly the 65+ and disabled cards, exhibit relatively higher shares among lower- and middle-income groups, highlighting the redistributive role of socially targeted fare policies. These findings demonstrate that fare differentiation and card-type structures serve as key policy instruments to improve transport equity, enabling vulnerable or mobility-dependent groups to maintain access to urban transit services. Consequently, analyzing card-type usage patterns alongside household income levels provides a useful framework for evaluating the equity performance of fare systems.
- The spatial relationship between income distribution and the metro in Istanbul reveals an important dimension of transport equity. High-income districts are primarily concentrated along central and coastal areas such as Beşiktaş, Şişli, Sarıyer, Kadıköy, and Bakırköy, where metro accessibility is relatively strong due to the presence of major corridors including M1, M2, and M4. The M2 line, which serves as the main north–south urban corridor, has the highest passenger demand and accessibility, while M1 and M4 also serve dense urban areas with relatively high ridership. Middle-income districts, such as Ümraniye, Ataşehir, Maltepe, and Bahçelievler, are served by expanding metro corridors, including M5, M7, and M8, which improve accessibility between peripheral residential areas and the urban core. In contrast, lower-income districts located mainly on the western and northwestern periphery, such as Bağcılar, Esenler, and Gaziosmanpaşa, have historically experienced limited rail access, although recent infrastructure investments, such as M3, M7, and M9, have significantly improved connectivity. Overall, the analysis suggests that the expansion of the metro network from M1 to M9 plays a critical role in reducing spatial inequalities in PT accessibility and contributes to the broader objective of enhancing social equity in urban mobility.
- In modern cities, accessible and convenient travel should be considered a fundamental right for all citizens. Therefore, operators are required to ensure a minimum level of service to guarantee this right [58]. Those with incomes high enough to afford a private car can choose not to use PT. Those without a private car have only two options: PT and taxi. Istanbul has been plagued by a long-standing taxi shortage. In Istanbul, there is only one car for every three people; PT is the only option for millions. Experts recommend providing this service to low-income residents, who have no other option but PT, at a fare proportional to their budget. Higher-income residents, if charged according to their budgets, would pay more per trip than others. This, of course, carries the risk that high-income passengers using PT will opt for their private vehicles instead.
- The benefit received criterion implies that passengers pay in proportion to the benefits they receive from PT. It is no surprise that experts chose DBF as the superior fare structure when they chose the benefit received criterion as the superior decision criterion. Paying for the distance (or number of stations) traveled in DBF can be interpreted as an application of the benefit received criterion.
4.1. Statistical Analysis for Expert Surveys
4.1.1. Fare Structure Analysis
4.1.2. Assessing Criteria Analysis
4.1.3. Comparison Between Fare Structures and Assessing Criteria
4.2. Sensitivity Analysis for Expert Surveys
5. Discussion
- A positive and meaningful relationship was found between the ticket price criteria and TBF. In other words, experts favoring time-based fare differentiation regarded ticket prices as important, with higher fares during peak hours and lower fares during off-peak periods.
- Another positive and meaningful relationship emerged between the number of trips criterion and DBF. As stated in this and previous studies, DBF has a remarkable potential to increase the number of trips, especially short trips (due to its low fare).
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
| PT | Public transportation |
| BWM | Best–Worst Method |
| DBF | Distance-Based Fare |
| FF | Flat Fare |
| FRR | Farebox Recovery Ratio |
| AFC | Automatic Fare Collection |
| ZBF | Zone-Based Fare |
| TBF | Time-Based Fare |
| LOS | Level of service |
| NTU | Associação Nacional das Empresas de Transportes Urbanos |
| UTA | Utah Transit Authority |
| TOD | Transit-Oriented Development |
| TUİK | Turkish Statistical Institute |
| IBB | Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality |
| MCDM | Multiple-criteria decision making |
| AHP | Analytic Hierarchy Process |
| MABAC | Multi-Attributive Border Approximation Area Comparison |
| BELBİM | Electronic Money and Payment Services Inc. |
Appendix A
| Structure 1 | Structure 2 | Structure 3 | Structure 4 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Name of Structure | FF | DBF | ZBF | TBF |
| Best | DBF | |||
| Worst | FF | |||
| How many times better is “The Best” than The Others? | FF | DBF | ZBF | TBF |
| DBF | 5 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| How many times worse is “The Worst” than The Others? | FF | |||
| FF | 1 | |||
| DBF | 5 | |||
| ZBF | 2 | |||
| TBF | 2 | |||
| Weights | FF | DBF | ZBF | TBF |
| 0.10 | 0.46 | 0.22 | 0.22 | |
| Consistency Ratio (ζ) | 0.024 | |||

| Critera 1 | Critera 2 | Critera 3 | Critera 4 | Critera 5 | Critera 6 | Critera 7 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Name of Criteria | Social Equity | Benefit Received | Operator Profit | Ticket Price | Number of Trips (Demand) | Decentralization | Urban Morphology |
| Best | Social Equity | ||||||
| Worst | Decentralization | ||||||
| How many times better is “The Best” than The Others? | Social Equity | Benefit Received | Operator Profit | Ticket Price | Number of Trips (Demand) | Decentralization | Urban Morphology |
| Social Equity | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 2 |
| How many times worse is “The Worst” than The Others? | Decentralization | ||||||
| Social Equity | 6 | ||||||
| Benefit Received | 3 | ||||||
| Operator Profit | 2 | ||||||
| Ticket Price | 2 | ||||||
| Number of Trips (Demand) | 1 | ||||||
| Decentralization | 1 | ||||||
| Urban Morphology | 3 | ||||||
| Weights | Social Equity | Benefit Received | Operator Profit | Ticket Price | Number of Trips (Demand) | Decentralization | Urban Morphology |
| 0.32 | 0.18 | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.18 | |
| Consistency Ratio (ζ) | 0.03 | ||||||

References
- Buchanan, C. Traffic in Towns; Ministry of Transport: London, UK, 1963.
- Vivier, J.; Kenworthy, J.R.; Laube, F. Millennium Cities Database for Sustainable Mobility: Analyses and Recommendations; ISTP: Brussels, Belgium, 2001. [Google Scholar]
- Mohring, H. Optimization and scale economies in urban bus transportation. Am. Econ. Rev. 1972, 62, 591–604. [Google Scholar]
- De Borger, B.; Proost, S. The political economy of public transport pricing and supply decisions. Econ. Transp. 2015, 4, 95–109. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Metro Istanbul. Strategic Plan 2021–2025 (Revised Version). 2024. Available online: https://www.metro.istanbul/Content/assets/uploaded/stratejik%20plan2021-2025_guncel.pdf (accessed on 7 June 2025).
- Tsai, F.M.; Chien, S.I.J.; Spasovic, L.N. Optimizing distance-based fares and headway of an intercity transportation system with elastic demand. Transp. Res. Rec. 2008, 2089, 101–109. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Nuworsoo, C.; Golub, A.; Deakin, E. Analyzing equity impacts of transit fare changes. Eval. Program Plan. 2009, 32, 360–368. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Gokasar, I.; Karakurt, A.; Kuvvetli, Y.; Deveci, M.; Delen, D.; Pamucar, D. Correction: Sustainable regional rail system pricing using a machine learning-based optimization approach. Ann. Oper. Res. 2024, 332, 1315–1316. [Google Scholar]
- Kilani, M.; Proost, S.; Van der Loo, S. Road pricing and public transport pricing reform in Paris. Econ. Transp. 2014, 3, 175–187. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Bondemark, A.; Andersson, H.; Wretstrand, A.; Brundell-Freij, K. Is it expensive to be poor? Public transport in Sweden. Transportation 2021, 48, 2709–2734. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Deakin, E.; Harvey, G. Transportation Pricing Strategies for California; California Air Resources Board: Sacramento, CA, USA, 1996.
- Bandegani, M.; Akbarzadeh, M. Evaluation of horizontal equity under a distance-based transit fare structure. J. Public Transp. 2016, 19, 161–172. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Mayworm, P.D.; Laao, A.M.; McEnroe, J.M. Patronage Impacts of Changes in Transit Fares and Services; UMTA: Washington, DC, USA, 1980. [Google Scholar]
- Daskin, M.S.; Schofer, J.L.; Haghani, A.E. Designing and evaluating distance-based and zone fares. Transp. Res. Part B 1988, 22, 25–44. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Ling, J.H. Transit fare differentials: A theoretical analysis. J. Adv. Transp. 1998, 32, 297–314. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Cummings, C.P.; Fairhurst, M.; Labelle, S.; Stuart, D. Market segmentation of transit fare elasticities. Transp. Q. 1989, 43, 407–420. [Google Scholar]
- Voith, R. Fares, service levels, and demographics. J. Urban Econ. 1997, 41, 176–197. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Harris, A.E.; Thomas, R.; Boyle, D. Fare elasticity model. Transp. Res. Rec. 1999, 1669, 123–128. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Matas, A.; Raymond, J.-L.; Ruiz, A. Economic and distributional effects of different fare schemes. Transp. Res. Part A 2020, 138, 1–14. [Google Scholar]
- Wang, S.; Liu, Y.; Corcoran, J. Equity of public transport costs before and after a fare policy reform. Transp. Res. Part A 2021, 144, 104–118. [Google Scholar]
- NTU. Novas Tendências em Política Tarifária; NTU: Brasília, Brazil, 2005. [Google Scholar]
- Wang, Z.J.; Li, X.H.; Chen, F. Impact evaluation of a mass transit fare change. Transp. Res. Part A 2015, 77, 213–224. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Nassi, C.D.; Costa, F.C.D.C. Analytic hierarchy process for fare systems. Res. Transp. Econ. 2012, 36, 50–62. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Liu, Y.; Wang, S.; Xie, B. Effects of public transport fare policy change. Transp. Policy 2019, 76, 78–89. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Liu, Z.; Wang, S.; Zhou, B.; Cheng, Q. Robust optimization of distance-based tolls. Transp. Res. Part C 2017, 79, 58–72. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Cervero, R. Transit pricing research: A review and synthesis. Transportation 1990, 17, 117–139. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Farber, S.; Bartholomew, K.; Li, X.; Páez, A.; Habib, K.M.N. Assessing social equity in distance-based transit fares. Transp. Res. Part A 2014, 67, 291–303. [Google Scholar]
- Simic, V.; Gokasar, I.; Deveci, M.; Karakurt, A. Type-2 neutrosophic model for pricing system selection. Socio-Econ. Plan. Sci. 2022, 80, 101157. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Chung, Y.S.; Chiou, Y.C. Willingness-to-pay for a bus fare reform. Transp. Res. Part A 2017, 95, 289–304. [Google Scholar]
- Sharaby, N.; Shiftan, Y. Fare integration and transit ridership. Transp. Policy 2012, 21, 63–70. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Brown, A.E. Fair fares? Equity impacts in Los Angeles. Case Stud. Transp. Policy 2018, 6, 765–773. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Donnelly, R.M.; Ong, P.M.; Gelb, P.M. Evaluation of the Denver RTD off-peak free fare transit demonstration. Transp. Res. Part A 1980, 16A. [Google Scholar]
- Benk, S.; Akdemir, T. Pricing strategies in public transport services. Ekon. Bilim. Derg. 2010, 2, 131–138. [Google Scholar]
- Beyazit, E. Evaluating social justice in transport. Transp. Rev. 2011, 31, 117–134. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Guo, Y.; Chen, Z.; Stuart, A.; Li, X.; Zhang, Y. Systematic overview of transportation equity. Transp. Res. Interdiscip. Perspect. 2020, 4, 100091. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Picodi. Public Transport Fares in Big Cities. 2023. Available online: https://www.picodi.com/us/bargain-hunting/public-transport-2023 (accessed on 24 December 2025).
- Litman, T.M. Evaluating transportation equity. ITE J. 2022, 92, 43–49. [Google Scholar]
- Camporeale, R.; Caggiani, L.; Ottomanelli, M. Horizontal and vertical equity modeling. Transp. Res. Part A 2019, 125, 184–206. [Google Scholar]
- Borndörfer, R.; Karbstein, M.; Pfetsch, M.E. Fare planning models. Discret. Appl. Math. 2012, 160, 2591–2605. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Tsai, F.M.; Chien, S.; Wei, C.H. Joint optimization of temporal headway and differential fare. J. Transp. Eng. 2013, 139, 30–39. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Ballou, D.P.; Mohan, L. Decision model for evaluating transit pricing policies. Transp. Res. Part A 1981, 15, 125–138. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Lee, E.H.; Kim, J.; Park, S. Passenger to Train Assignment Using Only Smart Card Data. Transp. Res. Rec. 2026, 2675. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Zhou, H.; Wang, Y.; Hancock, T.; Choudhury, C.; Palma Araneda, D.; Hou, M.; Wang, Y. Modelling the Heterogeneity in Preferences of Subway Passengers Utilizing Smart Card Data from Beijing. Transp. Res. Part A Policy Pract. 2026, 205, 104887. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- De Gruyter, C.; Currie, G.; Rose, G. Sustainability measures of urban public transport. Sustainability 2017, 9, 43. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- TomTom. TomTom Traffic Index Ranking 2024. 2025. Available online: https://www.tomtom.com/traffic-index/ranking/ (accessed on 8 June 2025).
- Kaya, A.; Koç, M. Over-agglomeration effects on sustainable development: Istanbul case. Sustainability 2018, 11, 135. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Batur, İ.; Koç, M. Travel demand management case study in Istanbul. Cities 2017, 69, 20–35. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Metro Istanbul. Metro Istanbul Lines. 2025. Available online: https://www.metro.istanbul/Hatlarimiz/TumHatlarimiz (accessed on 7 June 2025).
- BELBİM. TCDD–IETT–Metro Istanbul Travel Data Details (27 May–2 June 2024); BELBİM: Istanbul, Türkiye, 2025. [Google Scholar]
- Rezaei, J. Best-worst multi-criteria decision-making method. Omega 2015, 53, 49–57. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Rezaei, J. Best-worst multi-criteria decision-making method: Linear model. Omega 2016, 64, 126–130. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Saaty, T.L. How to make a decision: The analytic hierarchy process. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 1990, 48, 9–26. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- IETT. Activity Report 2024. 2025. Available online: https://iett.istanbul/BBImages/Slider/Image/i%CC%87ett-genel-mu%CC%88du%CC%88rlu%CC%88g%CC%86u%CC%88_2024-faaliyet-raporu-1.pdf (accessed on 7 June 2025).
- Metro Istanbul. Activity Report 2024. 2025. Available online: https://www.metro.istanbul/Content/assets/uploaded/2024_faaliyet_raporu.pdf (accessed on 7 June 2025).
- Li, N.; Mao, B.; Huang, J.; Wen, F.; Xu, G. Fare structure optimization of intercity railway. IET Intell. Transp. Syst. 2025, 19, e70041. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Istanbul Transport Poverty Workshop. From Transportation Poverty to Inclusive Transportation Systems; TÜBİTAK Project No. 120K152; Istanbul Transport Poverty Workshop: Istanbul, Türkiye, 2021. [Google Scholar]
- Euronews. Türkiye’nin Yoksulluk ve Gelir Dağılımı Eşitsizliği Haritası. 2019. Available online: https://tr.euronews.com/2019/09/23/a-dan-z-ye-turkiye-nin-yoksulluk-ve-gelir-dagilimi-esitsizligi-haritasi (accessed on 6 September 2025).
- Yun, J. Strategies for improving sustainability of fare-free policy for the elderly. Sustainability 2023, 15, 14678. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Eriskin, E. Collaborative game-theoretic optimization of public transport fare policies. Sustainability 2024, 16, 11199. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
















| Fare Structure Type | Advantages | Disadvantages |
|---|---|---|
| Flat Fare (FF) | Easiest to understand. | It places an unfair burden on those making short trips. |
| Simplest and cheapest to | A fare increase will cause the greatest loss of riders. | |
| implement and administer. | It places an unfair burden on those making short trips. | |
| Distance-Based Fare (DBF) | It should make the biggest revenue. | Difficult to use. |
| Considered equitable; longer trip | Hard to implement and oversee. | |
| Time-Based Fare (TBF) | Should increase ridership. | Possibility of fraudulent behavior. |
| Allows management of fleet usage through shift to off-peak. | Could necessitate new equipment. | |
| Zone-Based Fare (ZBF) | On long PT lines, traveling to more zones allows higher fares to help cover operating costs. | When zone fares vary, it may encourage urban decentralization. Decentralization extends service distances, raising operator costs and fares. |
| Metro Line | Avg. Daily Ridership (2024 Data) | Estimated PPHPD | Reference Capacity (PPHPD) | Capacity Utilization (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | 357.116 | 20.058 | 60.000 | 33.4% |
| M2 | 445.763 | 25.037 | 60.000 | 41.7% |
| M3 | 138.821 | 7.797 | 60.000 | 13.0% |
| M4 | 299.659 | 16.831 | 60.000 | 28.1% |
| M5 | 292.945 | 16.454 | 60.000 | 27.4% |
| M6 | 16.469 | 925 | 60.000 | 1.5% |
| M7 | 218.545 | 12.275 | 60.000 | 20.5% |
| M8 | 62.925 | 3.534 | 60.000 | 5.9% |
| M9 | 49.873 | 2.801 | 60.000 | 4.7% |
| Fare Structure Weighting | Fare Structure Assessing Criteria Weighting | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Experts | FF | DBF | ZBF | TBF | Social Equity | Benefit Received | Operator Profit | Ticket Price | Number of Trips (Demand) | Decentralization | Urban Morphology |
| Expert 1 | 13.5% | 27.0% | 51.4% | 8.1% | 18.5% | 32.6% | 5.6% | 12.4% | 12.4% | 9.3% | 9.3% |
| Expert 2 | 11.8% | 25.7% | 7.4% | 55.1% | 20.9% | 34.9% | 5.6% | 20.9% | 7.0% | 6.0% | 4.7% |
| Expert 3 | 25.9% | 43.2% | 4.9% | 25.9% | 31.8% | 19.1% | 3.2% | 7.6% | 12.7% | 12.7% | 12.7% |
| Expert 4 | 10.8% | 40.5% | 24.3% | 24.3% | 33.8% | 22.3% | 14.9% | 11.2% | 8.9% | 3.3% | 5.6% |
| Expert 5 | 7.2% | 56.2% | 13.0% | 23.6% | 24.3% | 24.3% | 5.4% | 16.2% | 12.1% | 9.7% | 8.1% |
| Expert 6 | 14.0% | 45.3% | 16.3% | 24.4% | 6.4% | 8.0% | 27.5% | 16.0% | 27.5% | 10.7% | 3.8% |
| Expert 7 | 11.8% | 41.2% | 41.2% | 5.9% | 20.2% | 34.6% | 10.1% | 10.1% | 13.5% | 4.8% | 6.7% |
| Expert 8 | 6.7% | 26.2% | 49.7% | 17.4% | 33.7% | 19.4% | 9.7% | 7.8% | 12.9% | 12.9% | 3.6% |
| Expert 9 | 9.1% | 24.2% | 21.2% | 45.5% | 20.7% | 35.2% | 4.8% | 13.8% | 10.3% | 6.9% | 8.3% |
| Expert 10 | 6.8% | 63.2% | 12.0% | 18.0% | 23.1% | 11.0% | 2.2% | 5.5% | 27.5% | 16.5% | 14.3% |
| Expert 11 | 12.6% | 57.7% | 21.0% | 8.7% | 15.0% | 11.8% | 11.8% | 7.1% | 5.4% | 17.7% | 31.3% |
| Expert 12 | 22.6% | 41.9% | 12.9% | 22.6% | 24.5% | 24.5% | 5.5% | 9.1% | 13.6% | 9.1% | 13.6% |
| Expert 13 | 6.5% | 16.3% | 55.4% | 21.7% | 32.4% | 17.6% | 11.8% | 8.8% | 5.9% | 5.9% | 17.6% |
| Expert 14 | 5.3% | 54.3% | 20.2% | 20.2% | 13.8% | 34.4% | 8.3% | 13.8% | 20.7% | 3.1% | 5.9% |
| Expert 15 | 10.3% | 46.6% | 17.2% | 25.9% | 4.1% | 35.3% | 8.4% | 13.9% | 20.9% | 10.5% | 7.0% |
| Expert 16 | 7.4% | 48.5% | 17.6% | 26.5% | 29.0% | 16.1% | 10.8% | 10.8% | 16.1% | 10.8% | 6.5% |
| Expert 17 | 5.2% | 56.4% | 21.9% | 16.4% | 34.4% | 20.7% | 8.3% | 6.9% | 20.7% | 5.9% | 3.1% |
| Expert 18 | 11.4% | 55.4% | 26.9% | 6.3% | 24.6% | 25.3% | 2.8% | 5.1% | 25.3% | 11.9% | 5.1% |
| Expert 19 | 22.2% | 44.4% | 11.1% | 22.2% | 34.2% | 16.5% | 9.7% | 13.0% | 13.0% | 5.9% | 7.8% |
| Expert 20 | 27.0% | 51.4% | 13.5% | 8.1% | 16.8% | 32.1% | 6.1% | 11.2% | 16.8% | 5.6% | 11.2% |
| Expert 21 | 9.1% | 50.0% | 27.3% | 13.6% | 17.4% | 28.6% | 4.5% | 17.4% | 11.6% | 8.7% | 11.6% |
| Expert 22 | 10.3% | 46.6% | 25.9% | 17.2% | 19.3% | 32.4% | 7.7% | 12.9% | 12.9% | 5.3% | 9.6% |
| Average Weights | 12.20% | 43.70% | 23.30% | 20.80% | 22.70% | 24.40% | 8.40% | 11.40% | 14.90% | 8.80% | 9.40% |
| Kolmogorov–Smirnov a | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Statistic | N | Sig. | |
| FF. Flat Fare | 0.209 | 22 | 0.014 c |
| DBF. Distance-Based Fare | 0.188 | 22 | 0.041 c |
| ZBF. Zone-Based Fare | 0.212 | 22 | 0.011 c |
| TBF. Time-Based Fare | 0.236 | 22 | 0.003 c |
| SE. Social Equity | 0.130 | 22 | 0.200 c,d |
| BR. Benefit Received | 0.172 | 22 | 0.090 c |
| OP. Operator Profit | 0.167 | 22 | 0.114 c |
| TP. Ticket Price | 0.086 | 22 | 0.200 c,d |
| NT. Number of Trips (Demand) | 0.207 | 22 | 0.015 c |
| DEC. Decentralization | 0.169 | 22 | 0.100 c |
| UM. Urban Morphology | 0.187 | 22 | 0.043 c |
| Mean Rank | Chi-Square | Sig. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| FF | 1.52 | 33,056 | 0.000 |
| DBF | 3.70 | ||
| ZBF | 2.43 | ||
| TBF | 2.34 |
| Statistic | Se | Standardized Statistics | Sig. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DBF-FF | 253,000 | 30,796 | 4.108 | 0.000 |
| ZBF-FF | 205,500 | 30,794 | 2.565 | 0.010 |
| TBF-FF | 161,000 | 24,834 | 3.658 | 0.008 |
| ZBF–DBF | 32,000 | 28,762 | 2.903 | 0.004 |
| TBF-DBF | 21,000 | 30,788 | 3.427 | 0.001 |
| TFB-ZBF | 93,000 | 26,765 | 0.448 | 0.654 |
| Mean Rank | Chi-Square | Sig. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| SE. Social Equity | 5.77 | 63,570 | 0.000 |
| BR. Benefit Received | 6.00 | ||
| OP. Operator Profit | 2.52 | ||
| TP. Ticket Price | 3.73 | ||
| NT. Number of Trips (Demand) | 4.57 | ||
| DEC. Decentralization | 2.68 | ||
| UM. Urban Morphology | 2.73 |
| Statistic | Se | Standardized Statistics | Sig. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SE-BR | 114,000 | 24,779 | 0.767 | 0.443 |
| SE-OP | 19,500 | 30,790 | 3.475 | 0.001 |
| SE-TP | 16,000 | 24,827 | 3.182 | 0.001 |
| SE-NT | 38,000 | 26,770 | 2.503 | 0.012 |
| SE-DEC | 6000 | 30,788 | 3.914 | 0.000 |
| SE-UM | 16,000 | 30,790 | 3.589 | 0.000 |
| BR-OP | 10,500 | 28,758 | 3.651 | 0.000 |
| BR-TP | 5500 | 30,765 | 3.933 | 0.000 |
| BR-NT | 27,000 | 24,842 | 2.737 | 0.006 |
| BR-DEC | 8500 | 30,792 | 3.832 | 0.000 |
| BR-UM | 13,000 | 28,760 | 3.564 | 0.000 |
| OP-TP | 165,500 | 26,739 | 2.263 | 0.024 |
| OP-NT | 201,500 | 28,734 | 2.933 | 0.003 |
| OP-DEC | 105,000 | 24,799 | 0.403 | 0.687 |
| OP-UM | 154,500 | 30,747 | 0.911 | 0.362 |
| TP-NT | 147,000 | 24,787 | 2.098 | 0.036 |
| TP-DEC | 62,000 | 26,709 | 1.610 | 0.107 |
| TP-UM | 70,000 | 26,688 | 1.311 | 0.190 |
| NT-DEC | 15,500 | 24,822 | 3.203 | 0.001 |
| NT-UM | 31,000 | 24,834 | 2.577 | 0.010 |
| DEC-UM | 117,000 | 26,688 | 0.450 | 0.653 |
| Mean | N | Std. Deviation | Std. Error Mean | Correlation | Sig. | t | Sig. (2-Tailed) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FS | 0.1834 | 22 | 0.03631 | 0.00774 | 0.026 | 0.908 | 10,931 | 0.000 |
| AC | 0.0951 | 22 | 0.01194 | 0.00255 |
| DBF | ZBF | TBF | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FF | Spearman’s rho | −0.216 | −0.327 | −0.068 |
| Sig | 0.335 | 0.138 | 0.762 | |
| DBF | Spearman’s rho | −0.259 | −0.329 | |
| Sig | 0.245 | 0.135 | ||
| ZBF | Spearman’s rho | −0.558 | ||
| Sig | 0.007 |
| Benefit Received | Operator Profit | Ticket Price | Number of Trips | Decentralization | Urban Morphology | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Social Equity | Spearman’s rho | −0.372 | 0.029 | −0.459 | −0.159 | −0.021 | −0.153 |
| Sig | 0.088 | 0.897 | 0.032 | 0.478 | 0.928 | 0.496 | |
| Benefit Received | Spearman’s rho | −0.302 | 0.436 | −0.145 | −0.518 | −0.131 | |
| Sig | 0.172 | 0.043 | 0.521 | 0.014 | 0.560 | ||
| Operator Profit | Spearman’s rho | 0.066 | −0.179 | −0.259 | −0.271 | ||
| Sig | 0.770 | 0.426 | 0.245 | 0.223 | |||
| Ticket Price | Spearman’s rho | −0.195 | −0.372 | −0.187 | |||
| Sig | 0.383 | 0.088 | 0.405 | ||||
| Number of Trips | Spearman’s rho | 0.185 | −0.357 | ||||
| Sig | 0.409 | 0.103 | |||||
| Decentralization | Spearman’s rho | 0.169 | |||||
| Sig | 0.453 |
| FF | DBF | ZBF | TBF | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Social Equity | rho | −0.155 | −0.248 | 0.018 | 0.127 |
| Sig | 0.492 | 0.265 | 0.938 | 0.573 | |
| Benefit Received | rho | 0.034 | −0.294 | 0.163 | −0.015 |
| Sig | 0.880 | 0.185 | 0.468 | 0.946 | |
| Operator Profit | rho | −0.042 | −0.244 | 0.299 | 0.049 |
| Sig | 0.852 | 0.274 | 0.177 | 0.829 | |
| Ticket Price | rho | 0.015 | −0.225 | −0.186 | 0.441 |
| Sig | 0.946 | 0.315 | 0.407 | 0.040 | |
| Number of Trips | rho | −0.081 | 0.475 | −0.235 | −0.138 |
| Sig | 0.721 | 0.025 | 0.292 | 0.540 | |
| Decentralization | rho | 0.063 | 0.304 | −0.192 | 0.033 |
| Sig | 0.780 | 0.169 | 0.393 | 0.885 | |
| Urban Morphology | rho | 0.287 | 0.071 | −0.095 | −0.123 |
| Sig | 0.195 | 0.754 | 0.673 | 0.587 |
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content. |
© 2026 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.
Share and Cite
Urhan, Ö.M.; Gürsoy, M. Evaluating Fare Structure with Best–Worst Method for Improving Sustainable Transit Operations: Istanbul Metro Example. Sustainability 2026, 18, 3715. https://doi.org/10.3390/su18083715
Urhan ÖM, Gürsoy M. Evaluating Fare Structure with Best–Worst Method for Improving Sustainable Transit Operations: Istanbul Metro Example. Sustainability. 2026; 18(8):3715. https://doi.org/10.3390/su18083715
Chicago/Turabian StyleUrhan, Ömer Murat, and Mustafa Gürsoy. 2026. "Evaluating Fare Structure with Best–Worst Method for Improving Sustainable Transit Operations: Istanbul Metro Example" Sustainability 18, no. 8: 3715. https://doi.org/10.3390/su18083715
APA StyleUrhan, Ö. M., & Gürsoy, M. (2026). Evaluating Fare Structure with Best–Worst Method for Improving Sustainable Transit Operations: Istanbul Metro Example. Sustainability, 18(8), 3715. https://doi.org/10.3390/su18083715

